













The EU, France, and Spain
Bettina Steible
Pursuant to Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the State parties 
have the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). In this context, the objective of this thesis is to analyze whether the European Union 
(EU) and two of its Member States – France and Spain – have enforced their obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL. It seeks to scrutinize how two juris corpuses, namely IHL and EU law, 
which used to follow separate paths, appeared to converge and be interlinked. This thesis takes 
the view that the enforcement of IHL must be analyzed from a multilevel perspective. While 
IHL rely on national law to be truly effective, the process of European integration makes it 
imperative to add the supranational level: the EU. This configuration generates a virtuous circle 
of compliance whereby the legal authority of Common Article 1 is reinforced, thus leading 
to the improved enforcement of IHL. In turn, the EU projects its values on the international 
scene and is strengthened as a leader in human rights. Likewise, the EU constitutes an additional 
level of guarantee and action for its Member States in the enforcement of their obligation 
arising under IHL. It is argued that the EU has established itself as an essential actor of IHL on 
the international scene. The EU – a self-proclaimed leader in human rights matters – and its 
Member States are not only bound by Common Article 1, but they also have accepted their 
mandate to effectively enforce it on the international scene
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Que la fascination intellectuelle
suscitée par le droit humanitaire
ne nous fasse jamais oublier
ce qu’il est censé protéger :
une humanité compromise par la guerre.
Jean d’Aspremont & Jérôme de Hemptinne 
(Droit international humanitaire, Paris, Pedone, 2012)
Jaime Brunet Romero was born in Bayonne (France) on 20 July 1926 and died 
on 4 January 1992 in San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa). Born into a family of Catalan 
businesspeople who had moved to Gipuzkoa in the 18th century (where they 
performed significant industrial work), he was educated in a liberal environ-
ment, critical of the times in which he lived.  He was encouraged to study 
law by his father, Jaime Brunet Goitia, the local head of the Republican Party 
and former deputy mayor of San Sebastián, where both his grandfather and 
great-grandfather had previously held the post of mayor. He studied at the 
University of Valladolid, where he worked for a time as assistant professor.
His love of reading was only matched by that of learning languages, 
which allowed him to get by with ease on his many travels, which took 
him, despite the difficulties of the day, to more than thirty countries. It was 
during his travels, he recounted, that he realised the degree of abuse of and 
discrimination and violence against the weak by the powerful still present in 
the 20th century and the ease with which the most elementary of human rights 
were infringed on a daily basis. During the later years of his life, his sensitivity 
towards human rights and the defence of civil freedom, often in the face of 
governmental abuse, became a constant concern for him.
In the absence of heirs, and stirred by a disgust for injustice, he decided 
to leave his fortune in order that a foundation bearing his name be created on 
his death devoted to disseminating human rights and rewarding those whose 
work in their defence should merit such recognition. This led to the creation 
of the Jaime Brunet Romero Foundation, based at the Public University of 
Navarre, in accordance with his last will and testament.
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The Jaime Brunet Foundation, based at the Public University of Navarre, 
was created at the express wish of Jaime Brunet Romero to encourage respect 
for human dignity, basic freedoms and human rights, and to contribute to the 
eradication of inhumane and degrading situations and treatment. Since 1998, 
the principal activity of the foundation has been to hold the Prize bearing 
Brunet’s name to distinguish the track records or work of people or institu-
tions that have excelled in the defence of human rights. Coming with a signif-
icant monetary prize, it has, to date, been awarded on 19 occasions to people 
and institutions of international renown, which in turn has consolidated the 
prestige of the prize.
Given the important relationship between the Foundation and the Public 
University of Navarre, it seemed appropriate to strengthen the ties between 
the objectives of the foundation and the academic activity conducted at the 
university, chiefly research, and within that field that of young researchers in 
training. In this regard, the Board of Trustees of the Foundation decided to 
establish a new award to recognise doctoral thesis work whose content was 
directly related to human rights, their defence and advocacy. 
In addition to the recognition itself and the prize money, the award also 
entails the publication of the doctoral thesis in question. The copy you are 
holding is the winning entry from the 2018 edition, the third in a collection 
which will, logically, focus on the subject of human rights.
At the Brunet Foundation, we are convinced that this initiative will contrib-
ute very positively to the ends of the foundation and incentivise the careers of 
many young researchers.
Ramón Gonzalo García 
Chair of the Jaime Brunet Foundation 
Rector of the Public University of Navarre
Jaime Brunet Romero nació en Bayona (Francia) el 20 de julio de 1926 y fa-
lleció el 4 de enero de 1992 en San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa). Nacido en el seno de 
una familia de emprendedores catalanes que se había asentado en el siglo xviii 
en Gipuzkoa (donde desarrollaron una importante actividad industrial), fue 
educado con un talante liberal y crítico con la época que le tocó vivir. Fue en-
caminado a la carrera de Derecho por su padre, Jaime Brunet Goitia, jefe local 
del partido republicano que llegó a ser teniente de alcalde del ayuntamiento 
de San Sebastián, donde ya habían ocupado la alcaldía su abuelo y bisabuelo. 
Cursó sus estudios en la Universidad de Valladolid, en la que ejerció por un 
tiempo como profesor ayudante.
Su afición destacada por la lectura se acompañó por el interés de apren-
der idiomas, con los que pudo desenvolverse con facilidad en sus numerosos 
viajes, que le llevaron, a pesar de las dificultades de su tiempo, a recorrer más 
de treinta países. En estos viajes, según confesaba, captó y comprendió cuánta 
discriminación y violencia, cuánto abuso de los poderosos sobre los débiles 
existen aún en nuestro siglo, y con qué facilidad se conculcan diariamente los 
derechos más elementales de la persona humana. En los últimos años de su 
vida su sensibilidad por la situación de los derechos humanos y la defensa de la 
libertad del ciudadano, también ante los abusos de la Administración pública, 
se convirtieron en su constante preocupación.
Al no tener descendencia directa, y movido por sus sentimientos que le 
rebelaban contra las actuaciones injustas, decide legar su fortuna para crear a 
su fallecimiento la fundación que con su nombre se dedique a divulgar los 
derechos humanos y a premiar a quienes por su trabajo en defensa de los mis-
mos se hicieran merecedores de este reconocimiento. De este modo, se crea la 
Fundación Jaime Brunet Romero, con residencia en la Universidad Pública de 
Navarra, según su voluntad testamentaria.
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La Fundación Jaime Brunet, residente en la Universidad Pública de Na-
varra, fue creada por expreso deseo de Jaime Brunet Romero con el objetivo 
de fomentar el respeto a la dignidad humana, las libertades fundamentales y los 
derechos humanos, así como la erradicación de situaciones y tratos inhumanos 
y degradantes. La actividad fundamental de la fundación, desde 1998, ha sido 
la convocatoria del Premio homónimo para distinguir la trayectoria u obra de 
personas o instituciones que se hayan destacado por la defensa de los derechos 
humanos. El premio, con una importante dotación económica, ha sido con-
cedido hasta el momento en 19 ocasiones a personas e instituciones de gran 
prestigio internacional, lo que a su vez ha consolidado el renombre del premio.
Dada la importante relación entre la Fundación y la Universidad Pública 
de Navarra, parecía oportuno ligar mejor la conexión entre los objetivos fun-
dacionales y la propia actividad académica universitaria, fundamentalmente la 
investigadora, y dentro de esta la de jóvenes investigadores en formación. En 
ese sentido, el Patronato de la Fundación tomó la decisión de instaurar un nue-
vo premio que reconociera trabajos de tesis doctoral cuyo contenido tenga una 
relación directa con los derechos humanos y su defensa y promoción. 
Aparte del reconocimiento y de la dotación económica, el premio con-
lleva la publicación de la tesis doctoral. El ejemplar que tiene en sus manos 
corresponde al trabajo premiado en la convocatoria de 2018, es el tercero de 
una colección que lógicamente se construirá en torno al tema de los derechos 
humanos.
Desde la Fundación Brunet estamos convencidos de que esta iniciativa 
contribuirá muy positivamente a los fines fundacionales, a la par que permitirá 
incentivar la carrera de muchos jóvenes investigadores.
Ramón Gonzalo García 
Presidente de la Fundación Jaime Brunet 
Rector de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary armed conflicts in different parts of the world, most notably in 
Syria, have shown that one of the greatest challenges of International Huma-
nitarian Law (hereafter, ‘IHL’) is the lack of a centralized monitoring mecha-
nism in charge of ensuring that it is correctly applied and enforced. While it is 
difficult to have access to reliable figures on the number of civilian casualties in 
armed conflicts, there is no doubt that too many men, women, and children are 
killed unlawfully every day in blatant violation of IHL. Against this background, 
the involvement of the European Union (hereafter, ‘EU’) in this field, formali-
zed with the adoption of the Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with IHL 
in 2005 1, constitutes a promising development for the respect and promotion 
of IHL. The objective of this thesis is therefore to analyze to what extent the 
EU and two of its Member States – France and Spain – ensure respect for IHL 
pursuant to Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF RESEARCH
IHL, also called the law of armed conflicts or jus in bello, is a branch of public 
international law. It reaffirms and develops the traditional international laws 
of war and covers «all those rules of international law which are designed to 
regulate the treatment of the individual – civilian or military, wounded or 
active – in international armed conflicts» 2. A pragmatic set of norms, it came 
into existence, not to outlaw the state of war, but rather to regulate it and to 
1 Council of the European Union, Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting compli-
ance with international humanitarian law (IHL) (2009/C 303/06) (hereafter, ‘IHL Guidelines’). 
2 Mary Ellen O’ Connell, «I. Historical development and legal basis», in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 11.
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reduce as much as possible the loss of lives. As the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (hereafter, ‘ICRC’) puts it, IHL «seeks, for humanitarian 
reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflicts» 3. «As a set of norms, IHL is the 
expression of an international consensus. It could be seen as a “social contract” 
between States to protect human life and dignity even in times when mortal 
peril could seem to justify all acts of violence» 4.
IHL is subtended by the principle of ‘Human Law’, a principle formu-
lated by Jean Pictet in the following terms: «[m]ilitary necessity and the main-
tenance of public order must always be compatible with respect for the human 
person» 5. Three other principles spring from this principle, all of them being 
foundational to IHL treaties and conventions. First, there is the principle of 
‘Humanitarian Law’ according to which «[b]elligerents shall not inflict harm 
on their adversaries out of proportion with the object of warfare, which is to 
destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy» 6. Second, the principle 
of the ‘Law of Geneva’ is defined as follows: «[p]ersons placed hors de combat 
and those not directly participating in hostilities shall be respected, protected 
and treated humanely» 7. Finally, the principle of the ‘Law of War’ provides that 
«the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare 
is not unlimited» and is the cornerstone of The Hague Law 8.
In the words of Jean Pictet, these principles «inspire the entire substance 
of the documents» and serve «as the bone structure» of IHL, insofar as they 
provide «guidelines in unforeseen cases» 9. As an expression of the usage of 
peoples, they are «valid at all times, in all places and under all circumstances» 10. 
They therefore constitute non-derogable rights, at the heart of the interna-
tional legal order, that have inspired IHL.
3 Swiss/ICRC Initiative on Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 
January 2015. 
4 Vincent Bernard, «Editorial. Time to take prevention seriously», International Review of the Red 
Cross, vol. 96 (895/896), 2014, p. 689. 
5 Jean Pictet, Development and principles of International Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht/Geneva, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers/Institut Henry Dunant, 1985, p. 61.
6 Ibid., p. 62.
7 Ibid., p. 63.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 57.
10 Ibid.
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Since the adoption of the first Geneva Conventions, about 150 years ago, 
IHL has become one of the pillars of public international law. It finds its ori-
gins both in treaty and customary international law. The former traditionally 
comprises two streams, already identified by Jean Pictet: the so-called ‘Hague 
Law’ and ‘Geneva Law’. In addition to these bodies of law, several specialized 
treaties and conventions have been adopted, especially on the regulation of 
weapons and arms 11.
The Hague Law is the most ancient juris corpus of IHL and mainly 
regulates the conduct of hostilities. Based on the observation that war cannot 
be eradicated, The Hague Conventions, adopted in 1899 12 and 1907 13, aim at 
organizing warfare in accordance with some established principles and rules. 
These principles do not seek the eradication of violence but intend to limit 
abuses by establishing thresholds of tolerance, determining what is necessary 
to conduct hostilities, and providing for the limits of the use of lethal force 14.
As for Geneva Law, it emerged in response to various convergent factors. 
Its origins date back to the nineteenth century, when Henri Dunant witnessed 
the atrocities committed during the Battle of Solferino 15. After that terrible 
event, he wrote ‘Un souvenir de Solférino’ where he exposed the ideas that would 
lead to the creation of the ICRC and the adoption of the first Geneva Con-
vention, in 1864 16. Nonetheless, this instrument and the following ones – such 
as The Hague Conventions – proved to be unsuccessful in impeding the com-
mission of other mass exactions.
World War II highlighted the limits of these instruments, especially with 
regard to non-combatants and civilians. Indeed, at the time, the protection of 
non-combatants came down to the Convention for the Amelioration of the 
11 See, e.g.: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Geneva, 10 October 1980. 
12 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regu-
lations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899. 
13 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
14 Mario Bettati, Droit humanitaire, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2000. 
15 Official website of the ICRC, Solferino and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
01-06-2010. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2010/solfe-
rino-feature-240609.htm (Accessed: 01.04.2017).
16 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Geneva, 22 August 1864. 
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Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 17, Convention 
(X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 
Convention 18 and the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War 19. Japan and the USSR had not ratified the latter and no convention 
encompassed the protection of civilians as such. The atrocities committed dur-
ing World War II therefore underlined the important gaps of the existing legal 
framework, hence the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (hereafter, ‘GC I’), the Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter, ‘GC II’), the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter, ‘GC III’), 
and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (hereafter, ‘GC IV’) 20. The Geneva Conventions have reached 
universal ratification. They mainly intend to protect and safeguard the persons 
that do not take part in hostilities, those who are hors de combat. In 1949, the 
objective was to instill humanity in international law as a whole and in IHL 
specifically, in order to prevent barbarities from occurring again.
The role of the ICRC in the development, application, and enforcement 
of IHL should be highlighted. Established in 1863, it is an «independent, neu-
tral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims 
of armed conflict and other situations of violence» 21. The work of the ICRC is 
based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, its Statutes, 
and the resolutions of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
17 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 
Field, Geneva, 27 July 1929. 
18 Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Con-
vention, The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
19 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929. 
20 Although three of them were already under discussion before World War II.
 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.




Its action is twofold as it responds to emergencies but also promotes respect for 
IHL and its implementation in national law. It is therefore possible to consider 
that there are operational and legal aspects in the work conducted by the ICRC.
At operational level, the ICRC is entrusted with many tasks; one of them 
is to serve as an intermediary between the parties to the conflict and to assist 
war victims, in particular, to visit and conduct individual interviews with pris-
oners of wars and interned civilians 22. At the beginning of an armed conflict, 
the ICRC sends a note to the belligerent parties to remind them of their duties 
stemming from IHL. Then, during the armed conflict, the ICRC intends to 
enhance respect of IHL through procedures that often are confidential. It for-
mulates constructive propositions while pressuring the parties to respect IHL. 
Finally, it proposes countless spontaneous humanitarian initiatives that go far 
beyond its specific rights conferred upon by the Geneva Conventions 23. It dis-
creetly performs considerable work and is the actor par excellence of IHL.
At legal level, the original Geneva Convention of 1864 was adopted on 
the ICRC’s initiative and the ICRC has developed IHL ever since, adapting 
the legal framework to modern developments. Furthermore, the universal 
ratification of the Geneva Conventions may be credited to this organization 
and the ICRC continues to advocate for the ratification of other IHL trea-
ties. In this context, one of the ICRC’s principal missions is to ensure respect 
for the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols in international 
and non-international armed conflicts, as stated in article 4 of its statute 24. 
22 Robert Kolb, Jus in bello, le droit international des conflits armés, 2nd ed., Brussels, Bruylant, 2009, p. 491.
23 Ibid.
24 Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross adopted on 19 November 2015 and 
came into force on 1 January 2016, article 4:
 «1. The role of the ICRC shall be in particular:
 (a)  to maintain and disseminate the Fundamental Principles of the Movement, namely hu-
manity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality;
 (b)  to recognize any newly established or reconstituted National Society which fulfils the 
conditions for recognition set out in the Statutes of the Movement, and to notify other 
National Societies of such recognition;
 (c)  to undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, to work for the 
faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to 
take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law;
 (d)  to endeavour at all times – as a neutral institution whose humanitarian work is carried out 
particularly in time of international and other armed conflicts or internal strife – to ensure 
the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims of such events and of their 
direct results;
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As a result, IHL would not be as important as it is today without the ICRC’s 
work 25.
It should be noted that the Geneva Conventions are, predominantly, 
State-centered. They regulate extensively international armed conflicts (here-
after, ‘IAC’), thus opposing two or more States. Conversely, the regulation of 
non-international armed conflicts (hereafter, ‘NIAC’) is scarce as a result of 
a strict interpretation of the principles of non-intervention and State sover-
eignty. Hence, article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (hereafter, 
‘Common Article 3’) enshrines a set of rules applicable to NIACs, often called 
a ‘mini-convention’ itself.
As international relations and forms of armed conflicts evolved, new trea-
ties were adopted. In this context, the High Contracting Parties adopted in 
1977 Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(hereafter, ‘Additional Protocol I’) as well as Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, ‘Additional Protocol II’) 26. 
These protocols enshrine the convergence of The Hague and Geneva Law, 
as they establish rules regarding the conduct of hostilities and the protection 
awarded to persons hors de combat. IHL is therefore a well-established branch of 
international law, developed by an important number of treaties and conven-
tions, and benefits from general acceptance.
Nonetheless, armed conflicts have importantly changed since the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions. Nowadays, most armed conflicts are 
 (e)  to ensure the operation of the Central Tracing Agency as provided in the Geneva Conventions;
 (f)  to contribute, in anticipation of armed conflicts, to the training of medical personnel and 
the preparation of medical equipment, in cooperation with the National Societies, the 
military and civilian medical services and other competent authorities;
 (g)  to work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humani-
tarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof;
 (h) to carry out mandates entrusted to it by the International Conference.
 2. The ICRC may take any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically 
neutral and independent institution and intermediary, and may consider any question requiring 
examination by such an institution».
25 Kolb, Jus in bello, le droit international des conflits armés, op. cit., 2009, p. 491.
26 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-In-
ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
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internal 27, and therefore involve non-State armed groups, which do not nec-
essarily have access to IHL knowledge. In addition, while the principle of 
distinction between combatants and civilians is the cornerstone of IHL, civil-
ians have become the main target in numerous conflicts 28. These elements, 
together with other factors, lead to widespread violations of IHL. It is com-
monly accepted that IHL itself remains fit for purpose and still represents the 
appropriate framework to regulate armed conflicts. Consequently, finding ways 
to ensure greater compliance with IHL represents one of IHL’s greatest impor-
tant challenges. In this respect, an important weakness of such a well-estab-
lished corpus of law is – paradoxically – that IHL treaties and conventions do 
not establish a centralized oversight mechanism 29. As observed by the ICRC:
[T]he Geneva Conventions of 1949 are an exception among multilateral 
treaties in that they do not establish a Conference of State Parties or another 
similar type of institutional forum, in which States can discuss the application 
of IHL or current and emerging challenges to compliance with it 30.
This question is of utmost importance and high on the agenda. Indeed, 
the ICRC and Switzerland jointly consulted States and other stakeholders in 
order to «enhance and ensure the effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance 
with international humanitarian law» 31. This process culminated with the 32nd 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which took place 
in Geneva in December 2015. In accordance with the proposal put forward by 
the ICRC and the Swiss Government, an annual meeting of the State parties to 
the Geneva Conventions would have been established, «a non-politicized forum 
for them to share best practices and technical expertise» 32. However, the results 
of the Conference did not match the expectations, as no agreement was reached 
27 Annyssa Bellal, The War Report. Armed conflicts in 2016, The Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2017, pp. 27-30. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sharon Weill, The role of national courts in applying International Humanitarian Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 6. 
30 Swiss/ICRC Initiative on Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 
January 2015.
31 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 1. Strengthening 
legal protection for victims of armed conflicts, 01.12.2011. 
32 News release: «No agreement by states on mechanism to strengthen compliance with rules of 
war», ICRC, Geneva, 10.07.2015. 
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on the creation or development of an efficient compliance mechanism. Instead, 
it was agreed to pursue the «inclusive, State-driven intergovernmental process» 
and to submit its outcome to the 33rd International Conference 33.
Thus, in the absence of centralized system, the responsibility to ensure 
the proper enforcement of IHL falls on States. Pursuant to Common Article 
1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the State parties have the obliga-
tion, not only to respect, but also to ensure respect for IHL. Nowadays, this 
obligation is considered as comprising a positive obligation: that to use all 
the legal means available to induce the other members of the international 
community to comply with IHL. On this basis, State parties have a duty to 
take all the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent violations of IHL 
from occurring, to put an end to them when they indeed occur, and to pun-
ish their perpetrators when such violations amount to war crimes. Thus, this 
obligation is understood as providing «the nucleus for a system of collective 
responsibility» 34.
One of the risks of international treaties and conventions is that they can 
end up being deprived of practical effect in the absence of norms of trans-
position or implementation at national level. In the case of IHL, this risk is 
particularly high in the absence of any specific mechanism of enforcement of 
IHL at international level. Consequently, it is necessary to effectively enforce 
Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which 
establishes an obligation to ‘ensure respect’ IHL.
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM
In this context, one may wonder whether there is any part to play for the EU 
in ensuring respect for IHL. Indeed, the EU has progressively entered into 
the field of IHL through practice. The cornerstone of the EU’s practice can 
be found in the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
33 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 32IC/15/R2 
on Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Switzerland, 8-10 
December 2015.
34 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, «Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests», International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 
82(837), 2000, pp. 67-87. 
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adoption of the Geneva Conventions 35, as it marks the first time the EU refers 
exclusively to IHL 36. After this fundamental declaration, references to IHL in 
EU acts have become more frequent and explicit and have been included in 
legally binding acts 37. This interest in IHL gained momentum with the adop-
tion of the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL (hereafter, 
‘IHL Guidelines’) in 2005, revised in 2009 38.
Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, establish-
ing and maintaining the rule of law has become an essential aspect of the EU’s 
policies; in the EU’s view, IHL is seen as part of the rule of law and the respect 
for human rights. The Treaty of Lisbon therefore extends the possibilities of 
interaction between IHL and the EU, so that these interactions constitute an 
interesting field of research to be explored. Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that IHL falls under the remit of the Member States and does not 
constitute an integrated competence of the EU. Consequently, an analysis of 
the relationship between the EU and IHL fields would be more accurate if it 
were accompanied with an analysis of the legal framework of – at least – some 
Member States.
In this context, the concept of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ 39 is a useful 
instrument to analyze the interactions between the international, European, 
and domestic levels on this issue. This concept was introduced by Ingolf Per-
nice, who argued that the European Union did not need a formal constitution, 
35 Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, BUE 7/8-1999, 12.08.1999. 
36 Tristan Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère et de sécurité 
commune de l’Union européenne», Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, vol. 84(846), 2002, 
p. 436.
37 Josiane Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», in Anne-Sophie 
Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, Colloque Nice 18-19 juin 2009, Paris, Pe-
done, 2010, pp. 45-74.
38 IHL Guidelines.
39 See, e.g.: Joakim Nergelius, Pasquale Policastro and Kenji Urata (eds.), Challenges of Multi-Level 
Constitutionalism, Kraków, Polpress, 2004; Teresa Freixes, Yolanda Gómez Sánchez and Antonio 
Viñas (dir.), «Constitucionalismo multinivel e integración europea», in Constitucionalismo multi-
nivel y relaciones entre Parlamentos: Parlamento Europeo, Parlamentos nacionales, Parlamentos regionales 
con competencias legislativas, Madrid, CEPC, 2011; Yolanda Gómez Sánchez, Constitucionalismo mul-
tinivel. Derechos fundamentales, 3rd ed., Madrid, Editorial Sanz y Torres, 2011; Alessandra Silveira, 
«Interconstitucionalidade: normas constitucionais em rede e integraçáo europeia na sociedade 
mundial», in Alexandre Walmott Borges and Saulo Pinto Coelho (coord.), Interconstitucionalida-
de E Interdisciplinaridade. Desafios, âmbitos e níveis de integraçáo no mundo global, Uberlândia/MG, 
Ediçáo Laboratório Americano de Estudos Constitucionais Comparado/LAECC, 2015. 
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insofar as it already possessed a ‘multilevel constitution’, entailing the EU 
founding treaties together with the EU Member States’ constitutions 40. As 
noted by Francisco Balaguer Callejón, the process of European integration 
has created new constitutional spaces and a constitutional dialogue among 
the different agents at stake, which inevitably have an impact both at EU and 
domestic levels 41. In this context, the underpinning of multilevel is that powers 
and competences are distributed among various levels of governance – inter-
national, regional, national, and local – «in a flexible manner, depending on 
considerations of effectiveness, subsidiarity, culture and so on» 42.
Paraphrasing Teresa Freixes, the multilevel approach constitutes an auton-
omous paradigm in the process of European integration, as it allows explaining 
the legal complexities applicable to the systems integrated into sub-systems 43. 
As observed by Yolanda Gómez 44, the multilevel interpretation of the legal 
order is not centered exclusively on the European and national levels of legal 
production. Conversely, it also integrates the other levels found internally 
(such as the legislation produced by sub-national entities 45) and, for present 
purposes, externally. As Teresa Freixes has shown, «multilevel is all-pervasive, as 
it is present in both vertical (hierarchy), horizontal (competences) and network 
relations (cooperation and subsidiarity)» 46.
Multilevel constitutionalism is therefore especially relevant for present pur-
poses, as it offers a flexible legal framework of interactions between the interna-
tional, European, and domestic levels on the issue of ensuring respect for IHL.
Against this background, the general objective of this thesis is to analyze 
whether the EU and two Member States – France and Spain – enforce their 
40 Teresa Freixes, «Multilevel constitutionalism as general framework for the ascertainment of the 
legal regulations in the European Union», in Joan Lluís Pérez Francesch (coord.), Libertad, Seguridad 
y Transformaciones del Estado, Barcelona, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2010, p. 71.
41 Francisco Balaguer Callejón, Manual de Derecho Constitucional, vol. 1, 7th ed., Madrid, Tecnos, 
2012, p. 246.
42 Anne Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 2(3), 2009, p. 535. 
43 Freixes, Gómez Sánchez and Viñas (dir.), «Constitucionalismo multinivel e integración europea», 
in Constitucionalismo multinivel y relaciones entre Parlamentos, op. cit., 2011, p. 26. 
44 Gómez Sánchez, Constitucionalismo multinivel, op. cit., p. 46. 
45 See, e.g.: Josep María Castellá Andreu, «Hacia una protección «multinivel» de los derechos en 
España. El reconocimiento de derechos en los estatutos de autonomía de las comunidades autó-
nomas», Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, vol. XL(120), 2007, pp. 723-741.
46 Freixes, «Multilevel constitutionalism as general framework for the ascertainment of the legal 
regulations in the European Union», p. 71.
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obligation to ensure respect for IHL. It seeks to scrutinize how two juris cor-
puses, namely IHL and EU law, which used to follow separate paths, appeared 
to converge and be interlinked.
More specifically, the question is whether the emergence of a new IHL 
actor on the international scene will lead to IHL becoming better respected 
as well as lending to its further development and its ability to adapt to current 
issues. Consequently, this thesis will aim to study the current legal framework 
of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, its authority, significance, and con-
tent and assess if and to what extent the EU, France, and Spain are bound by 
Common Article 1. Furthermore, it will seek to analyze the practice of the 
EU, France, and Spain on this matter and assess whether it is consistent with 
the principles proclaimed. Lastly, it will scrutinize whether France and Spain 
align with the EU policy on IHL. In particular, it will intend to examine when 
their positions converge and when they diverge, in order to see the impact – if 
any – of EU policy on IHL at national level.
3. INNOVATIVE ASPECTS
This research is innovative in different aspects. Given the fact that the EU’s 
concerns in the field of IHL are relatively recent, the academic and institu-
tional literature on the relationship between Common Article 1 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the EU is scarce.
Some authors have touched upon questions regarding the EU and IHL. In 
this respect, the interest on this matter probably dates back to 2001, as Tristan 
Ferraro submitted a PhD thesis on IHL and the EU («Droit international human-
itaire et l’Union européenne» 47). A year after, he published a groundbreaking 
article on IHL in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 48. As the EU’s 
practice on the matter and involvement in security questions have developed, so 
has the interest in the scholarship.
47 Tristan Ferraro, «Droit international humanitaire et l’Union européenne», PhD thesis, Université 
de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, December 2001. Available at: http://revel.unice.fr/pie/?id=68 (Ac-
cessed: 01.04.2017). 
48 Tristan Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère et de sécurité 
commune de l’Union européenne», Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, vol. 84(846), 2002, 
pp. 435-461. 
36 │ ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
In particular, the applicability of IHL to the EU, with a special focus on 
CSDP operations 49, is a growing concern among scholars. In the same way, some 
book chapters 50, one book 51, and at least one research project 52 have focused on 
the relationship between the EU and IHL 53. Nonetheless, such literature fails to 
directly address the question of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL at EU 
level. It should likewise be noted that while some articles and book chapters have 
been published on the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL 54, 
they are either outdated or incomplete. In particular, they fail to situate the issue 
in a broader context and to articulate it with EU legal issues.
Finally, a PhD thesis on ‘The role of the European Union in ensur-
ing respect for International Humanitarian Law’ 55 was submitted by Andrea 
Breslin in 2011; however, it fails to directly address the multilevel dimension 
49 See, e.g.: Tristan Ferraro, «The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law 
to Multinational Forces», International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 95(891/892), 2013, pp. 561-
612; Frederik Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a particular 
focus on the law of armed conflicts and human rights, Intersentia, 2010; Valentina Falco, «Symposium 
on complementing international humanitarian law: exploring the need for additional norms 
to govern contemporary conflict situation: the internal legal order of the European Union as 
a complementary framework for its obligations under IHL», Israel Law Review, vol. 42, 2009, 
pp. 168-205; Gian-Luca Beruto, International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Opera-
tions, 31rst Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Interna-
tional Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2008. 
50 Marco Sassòli and Djemila Carron,«EU Law and International Humanitarian Law», in Dennis 
Patterson and AnnaSödersten, A companion to European Union Law and International Law, John 
Wiley and Sons, 2016, pp. 413-426; Faria Medjouba and Justine Stefanelli, «La prise en con-
sidération du Droit international humanitaire par l’Union européenne – Une introduction», in 
Jean-Marc Sorel and Corneliu-Liviu Pepescu, La protection des personnes vulnérables en temps de 
conflit armé, Brussels, Bruylant, 2010, pp. 87-130. 
51 Anne-Sophie Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, Colloque Nice 18-19 juin 
2009, Paris, Pedone, 2010. 
52 ATLAS project. See: http://www.philodroit.be/-FP7-ATLAS-?lang=fr (Accessed: 01.04.2017). 
53 At the time of writing.
54 Pål Wrange, «The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law», Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 78(4), 2009, pp. 543-544; Andrea Breslin, «Ensuring 
respect: the European Union’s Guidelines on promoting compliance with International Human-
itarian Law», Israel Law Review, vol. 43(2), 2010, pp. 381-413; Éric David, «Rapport introductif», 
in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, pp. 7-16; Morten Knudsen, 
«Les lignes directrices de l‘UE concernant la promotion du respect du DIH et leur mise en œuvre», 
in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, pp. 175-182. 
55 Andrea Breslin, «The role of the European Union in ensuring respect for International Hu-
manitarian Law», PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Galway, 2011. Available at: https://
aran.library.nuigalway.ie/bitstream/handle/10379/2727/PhD%20Thesis%20-%20Andrea%20
Breslin.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed: 01.04.2017). 
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of the obligation to ensure respect in the European context. Furthermore, 
it does not systematically address the implementation of the obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL in the EU, French and Spanish legal systems. In addi-
tion, the present thesis, presented six years later, brings updated data on the 
matter.
‘It should nonetheless be noted that this thesis is the result of a research 
process that finalized in May 2017.
4. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
In this thesis, it is sustained that the EU has established itself as an important 
actor of IHL on the international scene. The EU – a self-proclaimed leader in 
human rights matters – and its Member States are not only bound by Com-
mon Article 1 but have also accepted their mandate to effectively enforce it 
on the international scene. This thesis takes the view that the enforcement of 
IHL must rely not only on national law, its transposition, and enforcement at 
national level to be truly effective 56, but that it must further be analyzed from 
a multilevel perspective. In accordance with this view, Member States remain 
primary enforcers of Common Article 1, but the EU is considered an additio-
nal level, both of guarantee and action.
Indeed, with the recognition of Common Article 1 in EU law, a three-
fold movement is pursued. First, it reinforces the legal authority of Common 
Article 1 on the international scene and participates in the creation of opinio 
juris in this sense. As such, it recognizes IHL’s special position in public interna-
tional law and contributes to the process of strengthening IHL at international 
level. Second, it strengthens the self-assigned assumption that the EU is a leader 
in human rights matters, in accordance with articles 2, 3, and 21 of the Treaty 
on the European Union (hereafter, ‘TEU’). Third, it establishes an additional 
duty for EU Member States, who are bound by Common Article 1 by virtue 
of international law, but also by EU law. As a result, it participates in the process 
of generating respect for IHL at domestic level. In turn, the EU serves as an 
additional level of action for EU Member States where they can coordinate a 
common response to violations of IHL. Consequently, enshrining Common 
56 Weill, The role of national courts in applying International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2014, p. 6. 
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Article 1 in EU law develops a virtuous circle with legal consequences at 
international, European, and domestic levels.
This thesis is divided into two parts, which are further divided into two 
chapters. As explained below, Common Article 1 is an obligation with three 
dimensions: preventing violations of IHL from occurring, adopting measures 
to end them when they effectively occur, and punishing the violations of IHL 
that are tantamount to war crimes. The first two dimensions are contained in 
Common Article 1, while the third one is a necessary corollary thereof, whose 
original regulation is found in other provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
As a consequence, the first two dimensions – preventing and ending violations 
of IHL – are analyzed together, whereas the punitive dimension is examined 
separately.
On the one hand, the objective of Part I is to analyze the meaning of the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL and how it has been implemented at EU, 
French, and Spanish levels with regard to its first two dimensions: preventing 
violations of IHL from occurring and adopting measures to put an end to 
them if they actually occur.
On the other hand, the third dimension of Common Article 1 is analyzed 
in the second part of this thesis, since it is arguably the one that has activated 
most legal developments in recent decades. Therefore, Part II deals with the 
corresponding mechanisms of international responsibility and criminalization 
that may be triggered in the event of violations of IHL. It should be noted in 
this regard that while most of such developments deal with individual criminal 
responsibility, both at national and international levels, the mechanisms of State 
responsibility are also touched upon, even though they are not punitive in a 
strict sense.
Part 1 
ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING 
AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL

INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, public international law has evolved around the Westphalian sys-
tem of international relations, which protects State sovereignty and the prin-
ciple of non-interference. The law governing armed conflicts traditionally res-
pects this conception of international relations. Indeed, the ‘Law of War’ origi-
nally regulated IACs only, and was more inspired by the conduct of hostilities 
than by the necessity to alleviate suffering.
Nonetheless, World War II entailed dramatic changes in this regard, as 
international human rights and the necessity to protect human beings started 
to erode the traditional system of international relations. In particular, the 
principle of humanity has fueled in international law following World War II 
with the adoption of several human rights treaties and conventions, such as the 
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 1 or the ‘Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ 2. In line with this concern, 
the update of the four ‘Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’ (hereafter, 
‘Geneva Conventions’) has humanized the law of war; human rights have 
entered into its sphere and now constitute an axis determining the conduct 
of hostilities. One manifestation of this process is the fact that the principle 
of military necessity must always be balanced with the principle of humanity.
This concern for human beings at international level has therefore devi-
ated the ‘raison d’État’, insofar as geopolitical interests shall no longer have an 
exclusive role in international affairs. Conversely, States must also respect and 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 
78 U.N.T.S., 277.
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call for the respect of international legal instruments protecting human beings. 
This idea was already highlighted by Christian Tomuschat (1999) on the occa-
sion of the ‘General Course on Public International Law’ at The Hague Acad-
emy of International Law in the following terms:
The international legal order cannot be understood anymore as being 
based exclusively on State sovereignty [...]. States are no more than instru-
ments whose inherent function is to serve the interests of their citizens as 
legally expressed in human rights 3.
This shift is reflected in the Geneva Conventions, which enshrine the 
obligation ‘to respect and ensure respect’ into Common Article 1 to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (hereafter, ‘Common Article 1’).
The objective of this first part is to analyze the meaning of the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL, and how it has been implemented at EU, French, 
and Spanish levels with regard to its first two dimensions: preventing violations 
of IHL from occurring and adopting measures to put an end to them if they 
actually occur.
Firstly, the content and meaning of the obligation to ensure respect for 
IHL is provided. Common Article 1 is at the heart of public international law 
and stipulates an erga omnes obligation, according to which the international 
community has the duty to act in case of serious or repeated violations of IHL. 
This system of collective responsibility is further reinforced by the crystalliza-
tion of the concept of Responsibility to Protect as a norm of international law, 
as well as with the development and consolidation of International Human 
Rights Law.
Secondly, the implementation at EU, French, and Spanish levels is 
addressed. In this context, the implementation at EU level is inevitably differ-
ent from the one at domestic level, as the EU cannot be a party to the Geneva 
Conventions. Bearing this element in mind, the integration of Common Arti-
cle into the EU, French, and Spanish legal orders is analyzed and followed by 
the practice of the three actors.
3 Christian Tomuschat, «International Law: Ensuring the survival of mankind in the eve of a new 
century: General course on Public International Law», in Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the 




In this first chapter, the international legal framework regulating the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL is analyzed, with a special focus on its preventive and 
reactive dimensions. It is sustained that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL 
has gained prominence in the general architecture of public international law 
and has become one of its essential components. While Common Article 1 
establishes a perfectible system of collective responsibility, it entails an external 
legal obligation falling upon the international community to ensure respect for 
IHL by other States.
In the first section of this chapter, a definition of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL is provided. This obligation was first considered a «tiny seed» 4, 
but it has considerably evolved to the point that it is now commonly accepted 
that it enshrines a system of «collective responsibility» 5, which binds the inter-
national community as a whole in case of violations of IHL by one of the 
warring parties. Far from being a stylistic clause, Common Article 1 imposes 
an obligation on the State parties to the Geneva Conventions to ensure respect 
for IHL by other States.
Traditionally, this obligation entails two dimensions 6: to prevent violations 
of IHL from occurring and to react to violations of IHL when they indeed 
occur in order to put an end to them. To do so, State parties have an extensive 
arsenal of tools at their disposal, which have been created in the Geneva Con-
ventions themselves, but also in other branches of international law.
4 Frits Kalshoven, «The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstance: From 
Tiny seed to Ripening Fruit», Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 2, 1999, pp. 3-61. 
5 Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, «Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 
revisited», op. cit., 2000, pp. 67-87.
6 There is a third dimension, that to punish the violations of IHL which amount to war crimes. 
However, it has been importantly developed within the frame of international criminal law and 
is therefore addressed in the second part of this study.
44 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
In the second section of this chapter, it is argued that the authority of the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL has been reinforced with the creation of 
sophisticated international legal tools that complement it. In particular, the tre-
mendous development of International Human Rights Law and the appear-
ance of the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ contribute to the devel-
opment of a system of collective responsibility whose objective is to ensure 
respect for IHL.
Section 1 
COMMON ARTICLE 1 TO THE FOUR GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS
[I]t is evident that Article 1 [common to the four Geneva Con-
ventions] is no mere stylistic clause, but is deliberately invested 
with imperative force, and must be obeyed to the letter 7.
Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions reads as follows: «The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances» 8. This obligation, placed at the forefront of 
the Conventions, emphasizes the importance that the High Contracting Par-
ties wanted to confer upon it. It stipulates a two-fold responsibility: «to res-
pect» and «to ensure respect» for the Conventions. One may therefore wonder 
whether the second aspect of the obligation, to «ensure respect», should be 
understood as a mere repetition, an obligation binding upon State parties to 
ensure that their armed forces comply with IHL, or as an obligation entailing 
a broader meaning.
Establishing an «obligation to respect» may seem superfluous insofar as 
States are supposedly willing to respect the treaties that they ratify. This idea 
refers to the fundamental principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda, 
pursuant to which agreements must be kept. In accordance with the 1969 
‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (hereafter, ‘VCLT’), international 
treaty law is «binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith» 9. This basic principle of international law means that the parties 
to a treaty must comply with it and respect the obligations contained therein.
However, this principle is broader, since the parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions must also «ensure respect» for IHL. The meaning of this provision 
is far from being clear, as the Geneva Conventions themselves do not offer 
additional details. Following the evolution of the international case-law and 
7 Jean Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume IV: Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Geneva, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 17.
8 Article 1 Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (hereafter, ‘VCLT’), 
article 26.
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dominant scholarship, it is argued that the obligation to ensure respect for 
IHL has acquired a larger scope, to the point that it now places a duty on the 
international community as a whole to take all the necessary steps to ensure 
that the warring parties comply with IHL.
Indeed, while the obligation to ensure respect for IHL is an innovation of 
the Geneva Conventions, originally conceived as an obligation with internal 
effects, it also entails an external dimension. Moreover, Common Article 1 has 
acquired the status of customary obligation and constitutes an obligation of 
quasi-constitutional character in the international legal order. Lastly, its scope 
has considerably enlarged, in terms of applicability, content, and implementing 
measures.
1. AN OBLIGATION WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EFFECTS
When it was formulated, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL was probably 
understood as an obligation with an internal dimension only. According to this 
interpretation, State parties to the Geneva Conventions are placed under the 
obligation to ensure that their armed forces indeed respect IHL. However, an 
external dimension to that obligation has emerged, most likely because of the 
absence of any centralized monitoring system contemplated in IHL. Pursuant 
to this external dimension, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL likewise 
applies to third States to armed conflicts, which must take all the necessary and 
reasonable measures to ensure that the warring parties comply with IHL.
The origins of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL date back to the 
1929 Geneva Conventions, as article 87 already provided for the obligation to 
«respect» the Convention «in all circumstances» 10. The wording of the article 
highlights the willingness to create a permanent, non-derogable obligation. No 
condition may be interposed in order to justify any infringement upon the 
1929 Geneva Conventions, not even the traditional principle of reciprocity. 
Already at that moment, abandoning reciprocity was a clear manifestation of 
the substitution of the bilateral logic, typical of the traditional law of war, with 
10 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929: «The provisions 
of the present Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstanc-
es. In time of war if one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall, 
nevertheless, remain binding as between the belligerents who are parties thereto».
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the more imperative necessity to protect human beings 11. As the ICRC official 
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1952 (hereafter, ‘1952 official 
Commentary’) put it:
It is not an engagement concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each 
party to the contract only in so far as the other party observes its obliga-
tions. It is rather a series of unilateral engagements solemnly contracted 
before the world as represented by the other Contracting Parties. Each 
State contracts obligations ‘vis-à-vis’ itself and at the same time ‘vis-à-vis’ 
the others. The motive of the Convention is such a lofty one, so universally 
recognized as an imperative call of civilization, that one feels the need for 
its assertion, as much because of the respect one has for it oneself as because 
of the respect for it which one expects from one’s opponent, and perhaps 
even more for the former reason than for the latter 12.
In 1949, the obligation takes a new turn with the adoption of the four 
Geneva Conventions, as State parties also have the duty to «ensure respect» for 
IHL.With the enshrinement of Common Article 1 in the Geneva Conven-
tions, it is the first time that the obligation to ensure that third parties comply 
with IHL is stipulated. This principle was later reaffirmed in Additional Proto-
col I 13, thus reinforcing its authority.
Nevertheless, the scope of the obligation used to be more restricted than 
it is today. It is reasonable to believe that, when it was drafted, the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL was not understood as an instrument binding upon 
third States to an armed conflict. It rather referred to the obligation to ensure 
11 Alexandre Devillard, «L’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire: l’article 1 
commun aux Conventions de Genève et à leur premier Protocole Additionnel, fondement d’un 
droit international humanitaire de coopération?», Revue québécoise de droit international, vol. 20(2), 
2007, p. 78. 
12 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952b, pp. 27-29. 
13 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, ‘Additional Protocol I’), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, article 1(4).
 This general obligation was reproduced in Additional Protocol I but not in Additional Protocol 
II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. However, it is 
clear that this obligation is valid for non-international armed conflicts as well since it explicitly 
covers the conflicts defined by Common Article 3 (see infra).
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that the nationals of the warring parties respect IHL. The records of the travaux 
préparatoires demonstrate that the adoption of this provision did not lead to 
much discussion:
M. MARESCA [Italie] pense qu’il conviendrait de préciser les termes 
«s’engagent à faire respecter», qui selon l’interprétation qu’on leur donne, 
sont un pléonasme ou introduisent une idée nouvelle en droit internatio-
nal.
M. CASTBERG [Norvège] estime qu’il s’agit de faire respecter les 
Conventions par l’ensemble de la population.
M. YINGLING [États-Unis d’Amérique] partage la manière de voir du 
délégué de la Norvège. Il estime que l’article I n’implique pas l’obligation 
d’édicter des sanctions pénales.
[...]
M. LAMARLE [France] estime que les termes «faire respecter» tendent 
au même but que l’expression «au nom de leurs peuples», qui a été suppri-
mée à Stockholm.
L’article I est ainsi adopté sans changements 14.
On the basis of these comments, it has been argued that Common Arti-
cle 1 should be restricted to its internal dimension, so that the State parties 
should not solely comply with IHL in times of war, but also take all the nec-
essary measures in times of peace in order to ensure that the relevant rules can 
effectively be enforced in case of armed conflict 15. It should be noted in this 
regard that, as the French delegate observed, the wording of Common Article 
1 proposed at the 17th International Conference of the Red Cross was slightly 
different from the final version of the Geneva Conventions as it included the 
expression «au nom de leurs peuples» (on behalf of their peoples). The ICRC 
considered at the time that the latter expression should be understood as asso-
ciating the peoples themselves in the respect of the fundamental principles 
14 Conférence diplomatique de Genève 1949. Acte final de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève 
1949, annexe 2, section B de la Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de 
guerre, p. 51.
15 See: Isabelle Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», in 
Michael J. Matheson and Djamchid Momtaz (eds.), Les règles et institutions du droit international 
humanitaire à l’épreuve des conflits armés récents/Rules and institutions of International Humanitarian 
Law put to the test of recent armed conflicts, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010b, 
pp. 701-704. 
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contained in the Geneva Conventions in order to facilitate its application at all 
times, including in case of civil war:
En invitant les Hautes Parties Contractantes à déclarer solennellement 
qu’elles s’engagent au nom de leur peuple, le Comité International de la 
Croix Rouge a eu l’intention d’associer les peuples eux-mêmes au respect 
des principes qui sont à la base de la présente Convention et à l’exécution 
des obligations qui en découlent. Le texte aura, en outre, l’avantage de fa-
ciliter l’application de la Convention, notamment en cas de guerre civile 16.
It could therefore be understood that the intent of the parties when the 
Geneva Conventions were drafted was to stipulate an obligation with internal 
effects only 17.
Nevertheless, international law is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
current state of the international community. In particular, the travaux prépara-
toires can be seen as no more than supplementary means of interpretation, so 
that the intent of the parties expressed at the moment of the 17th International 
Conference of the Red Cross is not decisive. It is indeed necessary to refer to 
subsequent State practice 18 on this matter to comprehend the whole meaning 
and implications of Common Article 1. In the words of Frits Kalshoven, the 
international community planted a «tiny seed», but it has considerably evolved 
afterward. Indeed, different elements suggest that the valid interpretation of 
Common Article 1 is an extensive one, as Common Article 1 actually estab-
lishes a two-fold duty, with both internal and external effects.
First, it could be objected that the intent of the parties was not to stipu-
late an obligation with internal effects only. As Isabelle Moulier demonstrates, 
a restrictive interpretation would mean that the expression «to ensure respect» 
16 CICR, Projets de Conventions révisées ou nouvelles protégeant les victimes de la guerre établis 
par le Comité international de la Croix Rouge avec le concours d’experts des gouvernements, 
des sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge et d’autres associations humanitaires, XVIIe Confé-
rence internationale de la Croix-Rouge (Stockholm, août 1948), nº 4, 2è ed., Genève, mai 1948, 
p. 4. Quoted in Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. 
cit., 2010b, pp. 703-704. 
17 Kalshoven, «The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstance: From Tiny 
seed to Ripening Fruit», op. cit., 1999, pp. 3-61.
18 In accordance with article 31(3)(b) VCLT: «Any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation» shall be taken 
into account, together with the context when interpreting treaties». 
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is a repetition of the duty «to respect»; it would therefore be unnecessary, as 
this duty already exists as a consequence of the ratification of the Geneva 
Conventions:
Si l’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire ne 
s’étend pas à l’ordre international, elle ne constitue alors qu’un ‘doublet’ 
de l’obligation de respecter les Conventions qu’il était finalement inutile 
d’exprimer puisqu’elle découle ipso jure de la ratification des Conven-
tions 19.
Consequently, if the State parties decided to add this clause to the four 
Geneva Conventions, it is more logical to look for a different meaning. In this 
line of reasoning, the ICRC delegate’s comment during the debate on Com-
mon Article 1 should not be forgotten:
M. PILLOUD [Comité international de la Croix-Rouge] rappelle 
qu’en présentant ses propositions à la Conférence de Stockholm le Comité 
international de la Croix-Rouge releva que les Parties contractantes doi-
vent non seulement appliquer elles-mêmes les Conventions, mais encore 
faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour que les principes humanitaires 
qui sont à leur base soient universellement appliqués 20.
It thus seems that the extensive interpretation of Common Article 1 could 
be inferred at the time when the Geneva Conventions were adopted. As Éric 
David observes, since the ICRC delegate’s declaration was not contradicted, 
it was understood that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL should go 
beyond the scope of State parties’ populations; otherwise, it would not make 
sense to refer to a universal application of IHL 21. As a consequence, it seems 
19 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
p. 705. 
20 Acte final de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève 1949, annexe 2, section B de la Convention 
de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, p. 51.
21 Éric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 3rd ed., Brussels, Bruylant, 2002, pp. 562-563: 
«Cette déclaration, qui n’a pas été contredite à l’époque, montre que, dans l’esprit de ses auteurs, 
l’obligation mise à la charge de l’Etat partie avait une portée qui dépassait largement le cadre 
de sa seule population puisqu’il s’agissait de veiller à ce que les Conventions de Genève fussent 
«universellement appliquée»; une application universelle ne se limite évidemment pas à une 
application nationale». Quoted in Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international 
humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, p. 706. 
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plausible to consider that the delegates chose a wording that could accommo-
date a broad understanding of Common Article 1 «be it in terms of an entitle-
ment or a duty» 22. The 1952 official Commentary, published only three years 
after the adoption of the Conventions, endorsed such interpretation:
The Contracting Parties do not undertake merely to respect the Con-
vention, but also to ensure respect for it [...] It follows therefore that in 
the event of a Power failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting 
Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it 
back to an attitude of respect for the Convention 23.
As Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo note 24, the original version in French 
of the 1952 official Commentary clearly distinguishes between the entitlement 
to act (pouvoir) and the obligation to do so (devoir):
Ainsi encore, si une Puissance manque à ses obligations, les autres Parties 
contractantes [...] peuvent-elles – et doivent-elles – chercher à la ramener au 
respect de la Convention 25 [emphasis added].
Volume II of the Commentaries ratified this interpretation and provided 
the following details:
The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Con-
vention demands in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be 
content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything 
in their power to ensure that it is respected universally 26.
The 1952 official Commentary thus signed the «birth certificate» of 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, as it is commonly interpreted today. 
22 Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the 
obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations», International Review of the Red 
Cross, vol. 96(895-896), 2015, p. 715. 
23 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, 
pp. 25-26. 
24 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 715. 
25 Pictet (dir.), Commentaires des Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949. Volume I, op. cit, 1952a, p. 25.
26 Jean Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume II: Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960, pp. 25-26.
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Moreover, subsequent practice, coupled with international case-law and schol-
arship, has endorsed to some extent the ‘broad’ interpretation of the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL. It cannot be solely understood as ensuring that the 
nationals of a State party to an armed conflict respect IHL, but rather as an 
external obligation falling upon third States to ensure that the warring par-
ties comply with IHL norms, i.e. an obligation to ensure respect for IHL by 
others 27.
In this sense, the Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of 
the Additional Protocols in 1977 used the exact same wording as that of the 
Geneva Conventions, without further debate, thus seemingly acknowledging 
the interpretation proposed by the ICRC 28. Actually, the extensive interpre-
tation of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL was referred to and taken 
for granted by national delegates, as evidenced in the official records of the 
Diplomatic Conference:
[l]ors de la première session, plusieurs experts ont souligné le caractère 
impératif du droit humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés. On s’est 
notamment référé à l’article premier, commun aux Conventions qui four-
nit une base juridique aux actions collectives de la communauté interna-
tionale. On peut considérer que l’ensemble des Hautes Parties Contrac-
tantes ont reçu un mandat supérieur, celui de concourir à l’application des 
Conventions – et certains ont parlé à ce sujet de responsabilité collective. 
Dans une proposition, des experts ont prié le CICR d’étudier le rôle que 
doivent jouer les Parties aux Conventions pour donner effet à l’intérêt qu’a 
la communauté des Etats à voir ces Conventions dûment respectées 29.
In the same way, the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols was the 
occasion to complement Common Article 1. Indeed, article 7 of Additional 
Protocol I provides the possibility for Switzerland – the depositary of the 
27 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, pp. 707-
736.
28 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, 1987, p. 36. 
29 CICR, Conférence d’experts gouvernementaux sur la réaffirmation et le développement du 
droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés (Genève, 3 mai-3 juin 1972), 
Commentaire, vol. II, première partie, Genève, janvier 1972, p. 7. Quoted in Moulier, «L’obliga-
tion de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, p. 708. 
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Protocol – to convene meetings of the State parties to discuss general prob-
lems concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol I 30. An expert to the second session of the 1972 ‘Experts Conference 
on the reaffirmation and development of IHL applicable in armed conflicts’ 
indeed underlined that this article elaborates in detail the collective commit-
ment undertaken by the State parties pursuant to Common Article 1 31. In the 
same way, article 89 of Additional Protocol I completes Common Article 1 and 
enshrines the State parties’ consensus on its broad interpretation:
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, 
the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in 
co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United 
Nations Charter.
Here, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others is explicitly rec-
ognized and the connection between third States and the wrongful behavior 
of the belligerent parties is clearly established.
Another important aspect of this article is the reference to the United 
Nations (hereafter, ‘UN’), as it entails the mutual recognition of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello in an international treaty. In the same line, the International 
Court of Justice (hereafter, ‘ICJ’) confirmed the existence of a link between 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL and the UN in the ‘Advisory Opinion 
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory’ (hereafter, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Wall’). It expressly 
referred to the responsibility of the UNSC and the General Assembly in this 
regard:
The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Se-
curity Council, should consider what further action is required to bring 
to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall 
and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory 
Opinion 32.
30 Additional Protocol I, article 7. 
31 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
p. 710. 
32 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion (hereafter, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Wall’), ICJ Reports 2004, para. 163. 
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Different UN bodies have embraced this new concern. By way of exam-
ple, the UNSC has scrutinized IHL violations on different occasions, includ-
ing in Kuwait, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo, 
and Sudan 33. This also holds true regarding the Secretary-General, the General 
Assembly and even the Human Rights Council 34.
The idea that the international community as a whole is involved in a 
universal mechanism of responsibility to ensure respect for IHL is therefore 
clear. States may act individually, but also in cooperation with the UN, pro-
vided that their action complies with the UN Charter. Actually, article 89 of 
Additional Protocol I has gained increasing relevance as most of the measures 
adopted by the State parties to ensure respect for IHL are now conducted 
under the UN umbrella.
This broad interpretation of Common Article 1 is further confirmed by 
practice. By way of example, the ICRC has based its action on this interpre-
tation of Common Article 1 in order to encourage the respect for IHL of the 
parties to an armed conflict:
[i]t is on this interpretation that the ICRC has taken a number of steps, 
confidentially or publicly, individually or generally, to encourage States, 
even those not Party to a conflict, to use their influence or offer their coo-
peration to ensure respect for humanitarian law. (9) Leaving aside any bila-
teral or multilateral measures taken by States, which rarely become known, 
it should be pointed out that the organized international community has 
frequently and emphatically manifested its concern that humanitarian law 
should be respected 35.
In this regard, the fact that the European Union, an international organ-
ization representing 28 Member States, decided to adopt ‘Guidelines on pro-
moting compliance with IHL’ 36 is revealing. Indeed, these Guidelines, which 
33 Michael J. Matheson, «The New International Humanitarian Law and its Enforcement», in 
Michae J. Matheson and Djamchid Momtaz (eds.), Les règles et institutions du droit international 
humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, p. 153.
34 Robin Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», in An-
drew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli, The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 121.
35 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, op. 
cit., 1987, p. 36. 
36 IHL Guidelines.
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express the consensus of the EU Member States on this matter, specifically 
focus on the EU action «to address compliance with IHL by third States, 
and as appropriate, non-State actors operating in third States». This way, they 
endorse the broad interpretation of Common Article 1 according to which 
State parties – EU Member States – are under a duty to ensure respect for IHL 
by other States.
Nowadays, the dominant view among scholars 37 is that Common Article 
1 entails an obligation, «both on State parties to an armed conflict and on third 
States not involved» 38. The obligation to ensure respect for IHL entails conse-
quences not only regarding the active subjects of the violation, i.e. the States 
that infringe upon IHL or suffer from the violation, but also of third States to 
the armed conflict 39. The State parties to the Geneva Conventions therefore 
commit themselves to negative obligations, not to infringe upon them, but also 
to positive obligations, to ensure that third States respect them. In the event 
that a State fails to fulfill its obligations, the other States must act to bring it 
back to an attitude of respect for the Conventions.
This interpretation is also consistent with the current international case-
law. In particular, the ICJ applied Common Article 1 in the Advisory Opinion 
on the Wall in the following terms:
The Court would also emphasize that Article 1 of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention, a provision common to the four Geneva Conventions, 
provides that «The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and 
to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstance». It 
follows from that provision that every State party to that Convention, 
whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation 
to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are com-
plied with 40.
37 See contra: Tomasz Zych, «The scope of the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for In-
ternational Humanitarian Law», Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice, vol. 27, 2009, pp. 251-270. 
38 ICRC, Improving compliance with IHL – ICRC Experts seminar, Geneva, ICRC, October 
2003.
39 Nicolas Levrat, «Les conséquences de l’engagement pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes 
de ‘faire respecter’ les Conventions humanitaires», in Frits Kalshoven and Yves Sandoz (eds.), 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law/Mise en oeuvre du droit international humanitaire, 
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 269.
40 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Wall, op. cit., para. 15.
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The wording used by the ICJ leaves no doubt and the duty to ensure 
respect for IHL by others is clearly established. State parties are placed under 
a duty not only to respect IHL but also to ensure that third States engaged in 
an armed conflict comply with IHL. This duty has become universalized and 
is the responsibility of all. As evidenced in the ICRC Study on ‘Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL 
by other States has become a norm of customary law, sustained by extensive 
practice in this sense. It is on this basis that the authors of the Study stipulate 
Rule 144, according to which States must «exert their influence, to the degree 
possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law» 41. It is interesting 
to note in this regard that despite a certain number of objections to the ICRC 
Study, no State has ever objected to Rule 144 42, thus seemingly confirming the 
consensus existing on the external aspect of the obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL. As such, this obligation constitutes «the nucleus for a system of collec-
tive responsibility» in the words of Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi 
Condorelli 43. The «tiny seed» has indeed evolved, and the scope of Common 
Article 1 has been extended over the years.
However, it should be made clear that the obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL is a ‘best effort obligation’, or ‘obligation of due diligence’. Pursuant 
to the system established by Common Article 1, States are placed under an 
obligation with external effects, that is, to ensure that the parties to an armed 
conflict respect IHL. By its very nature, this obligation cannot be an absolute 
obligation, i.e. an obligation to achieve a specific result as it would be idealistic 
and impossible to enforce. If that were the case, third States to armed conflicts 
could incur responsibility in case of failure to take action or if they have been 
unable to succeed in bringing back to an attitude of compliance the warring 
parties at stake. On the contrary, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL is 
conceived as a best effort obligation. States must take all the necessary measures 
to prevent and stop IHL violations, but realistically, it is impossible to require 
this result in order to conclude to the fulfillment of this obligation.
41 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
vol. 1, Brussels, Bruylant, 2005, rule 144.
42 Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, 
p. 122. 
43 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revis-
ited», op. cit., 2000, p. 68.
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This interpretation is in line with the standard applied to the obligation 
to prevent genocide by the ICJ in the case on the ‘Application of the Conven-
tion on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide’ (hereafter, 
‘Bosnian Genocide Case’):
Secondly, it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct 
and not of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation 
to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of 
genocide: the obligation of State parties is rather to employ all means reasona-
bly available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible 44 [emphasis 
added].
As Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo observe, «[t]his does not turn the 
duty to ensure respect into a vacuous norm» 45. States are still bound by the 
obligation but only to the extent that they are able to take action, and this 
action has some potential to influence either warring party. In this respect, the 
ICJ goes on to consider the following:
A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is 
not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly fai-
led to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, 
and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide 46.
Therefore, the fact that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL by oth-
ers is an obligation of due diligence does not mean that States are completely 
exempt from acting or that they are solely authorized to take action. Con-
versely, it is possible to apply the reasoning of the ICJ to Common Article 1 
and consider that their responsibility will depend on their capacity to influ-
ence the infringing party to the armed conflict. In this regard, Knut Dörmann 
and José Serralvo even argue that if a State has clos ties to one of the warring 
44 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Re-
ports 2007, p. 43, para. 430. 
45 Dörmann, and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 724.
46 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Re-
ports 2007, p. 43, para. 430. 
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parties, its duty to ensure respect is reinforced 47. It is indeed interesting to note 
that the ICJ calls for an assessment in concreto in order to determine whether a 
State has duly discharged the obligation at stake 48.
Thus, the obligation to respect and to ensure respect was initially formu-
lated as a simple yet important reaffirmation of the pacta sunt servanda principle. 
Nevertheless, it has substantially evolved, notably thanks to the ICRC’s intense 
work in this sense. The external dimension of the obligation to ensure respect 
has been recognized by the ICJ and the scholarship. Common Article 1 there-
fore establishes a decentralized monitoring system whereby all State parties 
are guardians of the Geneva Conventions and are bound by it at all times, 
even when they do not participate in hostilities themselves. Besides, the legal 
authority of Common Article 1 has been strengthened thanks to State practice 
and further jurisprudential developments. The Geneva Conventions, including 
Common Article 1, have acquired customary status upon their universal rat-
ification. Common Article 1 is also considered an erga omnes obligation, and 
some IHL norms are even recognized jus cogens status, thus bestowing upon 
Common Article 1 a special role in the preservation of the international legal 
order. The underpinning is that a violation of IHL entails consequences for the 
international community as a whole. This idea has been stated and confirmed 
by various international and regional tribunals on several occasions, thus high-
47 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 724.
48 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Re-
ports 2007, p. 43, para. 430: «Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly 
discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, 
is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the actions of persons likely to commit, or already 
committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical 
distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the polit-
ical links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main 
actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since 
it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen 
thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis 
the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the other hand, it 
is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even 
if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent 
the commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the 
breach of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains that 
the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have 
achieved the result – averting the commission of genocide – which the efforts of only one State 
were insufficient to produce».
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lighting the general consensus on the special role of IHL in the international 
legal order. The special nature of IHL therefore reinforces the authority of 
Common Article 1 and actually constitutes the legal grounds that entitle third 
States to act in case of violation of IHL by others.
2. AN OBLIGATION OF «QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL» 49 CHARACTER
Some scholars have argued that Common Article 1 is a stylistic clause devoid 
of legal authority, which merely serves as an introduction to the Geneva Con-
ventions 50. However, this assertion does not stand up to analysis. Conversely, it 
is argued that Common Article 1 stipulates an obligation of quasi-constitutio-
nal character in international law.
2.1. Common Article 1 is a legal obligation
Firstly, it clearly appears that Common Article 1 cannot be a moral duty 
instead of a legal obligation, as it is enshrined within the body of the Geneva 
Conventions. State parties always have the possibility to include the general 
principles that sustain the content of the treaties and conventions they ratify 
into a preamble, but in the case of the Geneva Conventions, it was decided 
not to include a preamble. If one looks at the records of the 17th Interna-
tional Conference of the Red Cross, a preamble that included the content 
of Common Article 1 was proposed. However, as Nicolas Levrat observes, 
national delegates rejected this proposal and decided to enshrine the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL within the body of the Conventions 51. The inclusion 
of this obligation in the legally binding clauses of the Geneva Conventions 
49 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revis-
ited», op. cit., 2000, p. 68.
50 See, e.g.: Paul de la Pradelle,«Jus Cogens et Conventions humanitaires», Annales de droit interna-
tional médical, nº 18, 1968, p. 24. Quoted in Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit 
international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, p. 703. 
51 Levrat, «Les conséquences de l’engagement pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes», op. cit., 
1989, p. 268.
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thus appears to be a deliberate choice; it is indeed an obligation that all State 
parties must comply with.
Furthermore, the wording of Common Article 1 is imperative. As Robin 
Geiβ notes, the ICJ held that the expression «to undertake» means «to accept 
an obligation [...] it is not merely hortatory or purposive» 52. Therefore, the 
content of Common Article 1 cannot be interpreted as a moral duty; con-
versely, it stipulates a legally binding obligation that the State parties must ful-
fill. In this sense, Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo highlight that a change was 
made between the 1929 and the 1949 formulas, as Common Article 1 is writ-
ten in the active voice in contrast with the 1929’s wording («shall be respected 
by the High Contracting Parties») 53. In linguistic terms, this change denotes 
a stronger authority and seems to endorse the idea that Common Article 1 is 
an obligation that States must actively comply with. It can even be argued that 
the fact that Common Article 1 opens the four Geneva Conventions actually 
underlines its importance 54.
2.2. Common Article 1 is a customary obligation
Secondly, the Geneva Conventions have achieved universal ratification 
and have become customary law, thus binding upon the international com-
munity as a whole. In this regard, the ICJ acknowledged that some IHL norms 
enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties are not ordinary 
treaty law to the extent that these conventions and treaties have merely given 
specific expression to the general principles of IHL, the latter being autono-
mous obligations in the international legal order.
The customary nature of IHL has been affirmed on different occasions 
and by different international tribunals, thus demonstrating the consensus in 
this regard. The ICJ started such process in the Corfu Channel Case where it 
referred indirectly to the customary nature of humanitarian law treaties. The 
52 Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, 
p. 112. 
53 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 711. 
54 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
p. 714. 
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ICJ relied on the customary nature of The Hague Convention of 1907 to 
apply it to Albania, a State that had not ratified the Convention. In particular, it 
held that some norms of The Hague Convention VII of 1907 express «elemen-
tary considerations of humanity» 55 and are therefore declaratory of a general 
principle of international law. The ICJ reiterated such reasoning in the Nica-
ragua v. United States of America Case of 27 June 1986 (hereafter, ‘Nicaragua 
Case’) 56 as well as in its ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons’ of 8 July 1996 (hereafter, ‘Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons’) 57. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ held that the Geneva Conventions 
«are in some respects a development, and in other respects no more than the 
expression of such principles» 58. In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weap-
ons, the Court was even more explicit:
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law appli-
cable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human 
person and «elementary considerations of humanity» as the Court put it 
in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (1. C. J. Re-
ports 1949, p. 22), that The Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed 
a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by 
all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain 
them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law 59.
The interpretation of the ICJ leaves little room for doubt as the cus-
tomary character is unequivocally affirmed, as a result of the international 
consensus on these norms and of their fundamental nature in the international 
legal order. As Vincent Chetail notes, «the generality of the formula seems to 
postulate the customary nature of the Geneva Conventions as such, or at least 
55 ICJ, Corfu channel case, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22. 
56 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States), (hereafter. ‘Nicaragua Case’) Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 
p. 114.
57 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1, ICJ Reports 1996, 
p. 226.
58 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., para. 218.
59 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1, ICJ Reports 1996, 
p. 226, para. 79. 
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of the great majority of their provisions» 60. Consequently, stating that States 
are under a duty to ensure respect for norms of customary character provides 
more authority to that duty. Moreover, Common Article 1 itself is customary, 
as recognized by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case:
The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United States 
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 
«respect» the Conventions and even «to ensure respect» for them «in all 
circumstances», since such obligation does not derive only from the Con-
ventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law 
to which the Conventions merely give specific expression 61.
Common Article 1 is only the conventional expression of the more gen-
eral principles of IHL. It thus binds upon all States, regardless of the status of 
ratification of the Geneva Conventions in their domestic legal orders. This 
approach is further confirmed by the ICRC Study on ‘Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’ where it is stated that State practice establishes 
Common Article 1 as a norm of customary international law 62.
This interpretation was taken up by the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter, ‘ECtHR’) in the Kononov v. Latvia case of 17 May 2010 
where the Grand Chamber resorted to IHL as a source of interpretation 
to solve the case and confirmed the customary nature of the Geneva Con-
ventions 63. In this case, the appellant considered that his conviction of war 
crimes in 2004 for his behavior during World War II infringed upon article 7 
of the ECHR (no punishment without law). In particular, he alleged that the 
crimes he was charged with did not constitute an offense at the time of their 
commission and that he could not have foreseen his prosecution for war 
crimes as a result. Therefore, the ECtHR had to decide whether there was 
a sufficiently clear legal basis in 1944 for the crimes of which Mr. Kononov 
60 Vincent Chetail, «The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international hu-
manitarian law», International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 85(850), 2003, p. 244. 
61 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., para. 220. 
62 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2005, rules 
139-144.
63 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Kononov v. Latvia (application nº 36376/04), Judgment of 15 May 
2010. 
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had been convicted. The Court upheld the approach of domestic courts in 
considering the following:
there was a plausible legal basis for convicting the applicant of a separate 
war crime as regards the burning to death of Mrs. Krupniks [an expectant 
mother]. The Court finds this view confirmed by the numerous specific 
and special protections for women included immediately after the Second 
World War in the Geneva Conventions (I), (II) and (IV) of 1949, notably in 
Article 16 of the last-mentioned Convention 64.
To reach this conclusion, the ECtHR referred to the case-law of the ICJ 
on the customary nature of IHL. It thus acknowledged that women already 
benefitted from a special protection derived from the laws and customs of 
war before 1944 – a protection confirmed by the Geneva Conventions in the 
aftermath of the war. Therefore, customary law already protected women at 
the time when Mr. Kononov perpetrated those acts, and a clear legal basis to 
convict him existed.
2.3. Common Article 1 is an «erga omnes» obligation
Thirdly, Common Article 1 is not an ordinary legal obligation, insofar as 
it has acquired the status of erga omnes obligation. The concept of erga omnes 
obligation was introduced in international law in the 1970 Barcelona Traction 
case, in the following famous obiter dictum:
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign 
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them 
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment 
to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor 
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between 
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, 
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protec-
64 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Kononov v. Latvia (application nº 36376/04), Judgment of 15 May 
2010, para. 218. 
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tion. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view 
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a 
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes 65.
This means that there are inter partes obligations, which induce traditional 
bilateral relationships, and erga omnes obligations, which bind States towards the 
international community as a whole. As the International Law Commission 
(hereafter, ‘ILC’) puts it, «some obligations enjoy a special status owing to the 
universal scope of their applicability» 66. This entails two consequences: «[t]hese 
rules concern all States and all States can be held to have a legal interest in the 
protection of the rights involved» 67. Therefore, as Isabelle Moulier explains, the 
violation of an erga omnes obligation entails effects not only with regard to the 
States affected by the violation but also with regard to all States. Consequently, 
any State is allowed to seek the respect for this norm, even in the relationship 
between other States. Accordingly, the breach of an erga omnes obligation allows 
an extension of the right to take legal action not only to the State whose sub-
jective interests have been prejudiced but also to all States, without requiring 
a personal prejudice. The legal interest to ensure respect for an erga omnes obli-
gation is therefore universal and objective 68.
While the erga omnes nature of IHL rules in general has been recognized 
in different cases 69, Common Article 1 has been explicitly recognized as such 
by the ILC. Indeed, it is provided as the only example of an erga omnes obliga-
tion, for which «every State may invoke the responsibility of the State violating 
65 ICJ, Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. 
Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, para. 33. 
66 International Law Commission (hereafter, ‘ILC’), Report of the Study Group of the Interna-
tional Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the di-
versification and expansion of international law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://
legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
67 ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law, 
A/CN.4/L.682, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682 
(Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
68 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
pp. 720-721. 
69 See, e.g.: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1-T10, judgment, 10 December 
1998, para. 151-152; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskić et al., Case IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 
14 January 2000, para. 23; ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1. ICJ Reports 1996, para. 157. 
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such obligation[s]» 70 in the ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on 
the Fragmentation of International Law’. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ‘ICTY’) ratified this interpretation in the 
Kupreskić Judgment of 14 January 2000 by considering e followingth:
[...] the bulk of this body of law lays down absolute obligations, namely 
obligations that are unconditional or in other words not based on recipro-
city. This concept is already encapsulated in Common Article 1 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions [...].
As a consequence of their absolute character, these norms of internatio-
nal humanitarian law do not pose synallagmatic obligations, i.e. obligations 
of a State vis-à-vis another State. Rather [...] they law down obligations 
towards the international community as a whole, with the consequence 
that each and every member of the international community has a ‘legal 
interest’ in their observance and consequently a legal entitlement to de-
mand respect for such obligations 71.
In this judgment, the ICTY underlines the consequences of the erga omnes 
character of the Geneva Conventions, i.e. they do not only bind all interna-
tional actors at all times, but all States have an interest in ensuring their respect. 
The ICTY recalls that the Geneva Conventions are absolute and hold a special 
position in international law; hence the principle of reciprocity does not apply. 
These provisions aim to protect common interests so that each State has a ‘legal 
interest’ in ensuring their respect and to put an end to their violation.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that public international law already 
recognizes the particular status of the Geneva Conventions. Article 60 VCLT, 
which deals with the principle of reciprocity, States that in the case of breach 
by one of the State parties, the termination or suspension of the operation of 
the treaty normally accepted in international law:
do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human person 
contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions 
prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties 72.
70 ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of internation-
al law, A/CN.4/L.682, p. 182, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/
CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017), 
71 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskić et al., Case IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000, pa-
ras. 517 and 519. 
72 VCLT, article 60.
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Thus, the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 1, stipulate 
rules so fundamental that they do not obey to the same regime are general treaty 
norms. The exception stated by article 60 VCLT is a manifestation of the special 
value granted to the legal interest protected by the Geneva Conventions. The 
latter regulates armed conflicts and aims to instill some humanity in the conduct 
of hostilities; the protection of humanity is deemed so important that IHL does 
not enunciate relative rules that may or may not be complied with depending on 
the conduct of the remaining parties to the conflict. Conversely, IHL establishes 
a body of rules that shall be unconditionally observed by the warring parties.
Another element that underlines the legal force of Common Article 1 
vis-à-vis the international community as a whole is the already mentioned 
involvement of and corresponding action undertaken by the United Nations 
in the IHL field. In addition to the duty of cooperation with the United 
Nations in addressing the serious violations of the Geneva Conventions fore-
seen in article 89 of Additional Protocol I, serious and repeated violations of 
IHL may be interpreted as «threats» to the international peace as provided 
by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If that were the case, the UNSC may, in 
turn, adopt resolutions binding upon the international community aiming at 
stopping them, pursuant to Article 39 73 of the UN Charter, even in the case 
of non-international armed conflict. The ICRC had already highlighted the 
connection between IHL violations and international peace and security in 
its 1993 ‘Report on the Protection of War Victims’:
There are lastly situations in which total or partial failure must be admit-
ted, despite all efforts to ensure application of international humanitarian 
law. While these must certainly be maintained, violations are of such mag-
nitude that their very continuation would represent an additional threat 
to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter.
It is then the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council to 
make such an assessment and recommend or decide on what measures are to 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter 74.
73 «The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity». 
74 Report on the Protection of War Victims, Prepared by the ICRC, Geneva, June 1993, para. 3.1.2. 
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Against this background, the UNSC has adopted such resolutions on 
different occasions whereby IHL violations have been treated as «threats» to 
the international peace. In this regard, as Michael J. Matheson explains, the 
UNSC has analyzed serious IHL violations occurring in Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan as threats to the peace, thus triggering 
Chapter VII and its corresponding wide-ranging powers to deal with such 
violations 75.
It has also authorized the resort to force in order to stop violations of 
IHL on this basis, most notably to protect civilians. By way of example, in 
reaction to the violations of IHL perpetrated by the Libyan authorities in 
2011, the UNSC decided to act under Chapter VII authorizing Member 
States «to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians under threat 
of attack in the country» while demanding that «the Libyan authorities 
comply with their obligations under international law, including inter-
national humanitarian law» 76. The same holds true regarding the conflict 
in the Central African Republic in 2013 where the UNSC, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the deployment of the Afri-
can-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MISCA) and of French troops in order «to help protect civilians, stabilize 
the country and restore State authority over the territory, as well as create 
conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance» 77. The 
UNSC largely refers to IHL in this resolution, by, inter alia, condemning 
its infringement and calling upon the parties to comply with specific IHL 
obligations.
The UNSC has also resorted to other aspects of Chapter VII to enforce 
Common Article 1. In this regard, as Michael J. Matheson notes, the UNSC 
has imposed arms embargos and other trade and financial sanctions on offend-
ing States or armed groups 78. In the same way, it created ad hoc international 
75 See: UNSC S/RES/771 (1992), UNSC S/RES/1199 (1998), UNSC S/RES/1315 (2000), 
UNSC S/RES/1593 (2005). Quoted in Matheson, «The New International Humanitarian Law 
and its Enforcement», op. cit., 2010, pp. 153-154.
76 UNSC S/RES/1973 (2011), ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’, 
17 March 2011, para. 3. 
77 UNSC, S/RES/2121 (2013), Situation in Central African Republic, 10 October 2013. 
78 Matheson, «The New International Humanitarian Law and its Enforcement», op. cit., 2010, 
p. 155.
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criminal tribunals in ex-Yugoslavia 79 and in Rwanda 80 in order to punish some 
serious violations of IHL and prosecute the high-level individuals responsible 
for the atrocities committed during these armed conflicts 81.
The obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL is therefore a gen-
eral and unconditional obligation. The 1952 official Commentary empha-
sizes that the Geneva Conventions constitute «a series of unilateral engage-
ments solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the other 
Contracting Parties» 82; they are not ordinary instruments of international 
law but constitute special ones. This means that the obligation applies not 
only in times of armed conflict, but also before and after. Actually, States 
must «prepare in advance, that is to say in peacetime, the legal, material or 
other means of loyal enforcement of the Convention» 83. The expression «in 
all circumstances» further means that, as soon as one of the conditions of 
application of Article 2 is fulfilled, no Power bound by the Convention can 
offer any valid pretext, legal or other, for not respecting the Convention in all 
its parts. It also means that the application of the Geneva Conventions does 
not depend on the nature of the conflict, which is therefore applicable both 
to IACs and NIACs 84.
2.4. Common Article 1 protects «jus cogens» norms
Fourthly, some of the Geneva Conventions rules have been recognized 
the status of jus cogens in some instances, thus bestowing upon Common Arti-
cle 1 a particular role in international law.
Jus cogens rules, or peremptory norms, are enshrined as ‘constitutional’ 
norms of the international legal order and are non-derogable. While the main 
sources of international law are normally not organized hierarchically, some 
79 UNSC S/RES/827 (1993), Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993. 
80 UNSC S/RES/955 (1994), Establishment of an International Tribunal and adoption of the 
Statute of the Tribunal, 8 November 1994. 
81 The penal repression of IHL violations is extensively addressed in Part II of this thesis. 
82 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 25. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b.
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limited rules of international law are deemed more important than others; 
consequently, they enjoy a «superior position» in the international legal system 
because of the importance of their content and the universal acceptance of 
their superiority 85. The VCLT defines peremptory norms at article 53 in the 
following terms:
[a] norm accepted and recognized by the international community of Sta-
tes as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character 86.
While the definition of jus cogens norms is settled by the VCLT, its content 
is subject to debate. However, there are several signs to be found in the interna-
tional case-law and in the ILC’s work on the codification of international law 
that make think that some IHL norms belong to jus cogens.
In particular, the ICJ recognized on different occasions the jus cogens 
character of some IHL norms. Drawing upon the reasoning of the Corfu 
Channel Case, it held in the Nicaragua Case that Common Articles 1 and 3 
reflect «elementary considerations of humanity» 87. Then, the idea that some 
IHL rules are peremptory norms became more explicit in the Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, where the ICJ stated that The Hague and 
Geneva Conventions constitute «intransgressible principles of international 
customary law» 88. While the expression ‘jus cogens’ is not used in either case, 
the choice of the wording is noteworthy insofar as the ICJ acknowledges the 
fundamental importance of the Geneva Conventions in the international 
legal system. This interpretation is confirmed by the ILC, which considers 
that jus cogens «is sometimes expressed by the designation of some norms as 
‘fundamental’ or as expressive of ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ or 
85 ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of internation-
al law, A/CN.4/L.682, p. 182, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/
CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
86 VCLT, article 53. 
87 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., p. 114.
88 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 
p. 226, para. 79. 
70 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
‘intransgressible principles of international law’» 89, thus referring explicitly 
to the cases involving IHL. The ICTY endorsed this interpretation in the 
above-mentioned Kupreskić case of 14 January 2000, where it did not hesi-
tate to use the expression ‘jus cogens’ itself:
[m]ost norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those prohi-
biting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremp-
tory norms of international law of jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and 
overriding character 90.
Lastly, the ILC refers to «basic rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict» as one the most frequently cited examples of jus 
cogens norms 91.
Consequently, the Geneva Conventions undoubtedly have a special status 
in the international legal order and constitute some of the fundamental norms 
thereof. They have not only reached customary status, but they also contain 
peremptory norms of international law in accordance with the case-law of 
the ICJ, later confirmed by the ICTY. This demonstrates the special nature of 
some of the provisions contained in the Geneva Conventions, which hold a 
special position in the hierarchy of the international legal system. In line with 
this reasoning, infringing upon IHL norms does not constitute an ordinary 
violation of international law; instead, these are violations of customary norms 
of international law, or even in some cases, violations of jus cogens norms and 
therefore of the very essence of the international legal order. This means, as far 
as Common Article 1 is concerned, that the obligation falling upon the inter-
national community to «ensure respect for IHL» is even more authoritative as 
its purpose is to protect these fundamental norms. Ensuring respect for IHL 
is thus of utmost importance insofar as it constitutes one of the safeguards of 
89 ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of internation-
al law, A/CN.4/L.682, p. 182, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/
CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
90 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskić et al., Case IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000, 
para. 520. 
91 ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of internation-
al law, A/CN.4/L.682, p. 128, 13.04.2006. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/
CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
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some of the most elementary norms of international law. Nonetheless, if the 
legal authority of Common Article 1 is ascertained, its content and conse-
quences are more difficult to grasp.
3. AN OBLIGATION WITH AN EXTENDED SCOPE
While Common Article 1 establishes a fundamental obligation in the interna-
tional legal order, it does not provide indications on how to implement it. As 
a result, any attempt to gather the different types of measures at the disposal 
of the State parties is faced with difficulties, especially when considering the 
secrecy in which States often need to operate in case of violation of IHL. Des-
pite this difficulty, it is possible to identify the different measures available to 
State parties thanks to an analysis of State practice, international case-law and 
scholarship 92. Concretely, States benefit from a wide set of measures, ranging 
from diplomacy to military action.
The scope of Common Article 1 is extensive. Firstly, its scope of appli-
cability has broadened, as it is now acknowledged that Common Article 1 is 
applicable both in times of international and non-international armed con-
flicts and that its recipients are not States only. Secondly, it entails the necessity 
to end but also to prevent IHL violations, with prevention increasingly being 
recognized a key issue in the enforcement of Common Article 1. Finally, inter-
national actors benefit from a wide range of tools, more or less effective, to 
implement this obligation.
3.1. Applicability
As a preliminary comment, the question as to whether any violation of 
the Geneva Conventions may trigger Common Article 1 arises. Given the fact 
that Common Article 1 applies in all circumstances, it could be inferred that 
92 See, e.g.: Umesh Palwankar, «Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL», International Review of the Red Cross, nº 298, 1994; Djamchid Momtaz, «Les défis 
des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international humanitaire», in Michael 
J. Matheson and Djamchid Momtaz, Les règles et institutions du droit international, op. cit., 2010, 
pp. 85-101; Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 
2010b, pp. 732-782. 
72 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
each violation to the Geneva Conventions could indeed activate Common 
Article 1. However, it seems more plausible to apply this reasoning to the 
sole internal dimension of Common Article 1, as applying it to the exter-
nal dimension would entail unrealistic results and deprive the provision of 
any practical relevance 93. Otherwise, it could be argued that the duty of third 
countries is triggered by the commission of serious violations of IHL. This line 
of reasoning is arguably coherent, insofar as infringing upon such provisions 
would undermine the international public order and may entail the criminal 
responsibility of their perpetrators 94. Nonetheless, as Robin Geiβ observes, two 
elements nuance this assertion: the fact that Common Article 1 is an obliga-
tion of due diligence and the uncertainty regarding the threshold of gravity or 
seriousness of the violations.
Since State parties are subject to an obligation of due diligence, they are 
not required to take measures as soon as any violation of the Geneva Conven-
tions occurs; conversely, «States are in any case obliged to do only what can 
reasonably be expected in the circumstances of each particular instance, e.g. 
to exert their influence». And in this respect, the level of seriousness of the 
offence modulates the level of intervention expected from third States, instead 
of conditioning it. That is, «the more serious and imminent a breach, the more 
will be required of States», a graduation which is actually allowed by the due 
diligence nature of Common Article 1. Consequently, if minor violations of 
IHL are repeatedly taking place, they could trigger Common Article 1 even 
though they do not constitute serious violations strictly speaking. In the words 
of Robin Geiβ «[i]t follows that any breach of the Geneva Conventions by 
another State, irrespective of where and when it occurs, activates the obligation 
to ensure respect» 95.
Against this background, the scope ratione temporis of Common Article 1 
has been extended. Even though IHL applies to situations of armed conflicts 
only, the same does not hold true regarding Common Article 1, as a result of 
93 Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, 
p. 124.
94 These serious violations of IHL now also include war crimes as specified under Article 8 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the other war crimes existing under cus-
tomary international humanitarian law. See: ICRC, What are «serious violations of international 
humanitarian law»? Explanatory note, Geneva, ICRC, 2014.
95 Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, 
pp. 124-126.
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its permanent nature. In this regard, it appears clearly from the wording of 
Common Article 1 that the State parties must ensure respect for the Geneva 
Conventions «in all circumstances». Therefore, Common Article 1 equally 
applies in peacetime and must be read in conjunction with the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions that expressly apply during peacetime. As the 2016 
ICRC ‘Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention’ (hereafter, 
‘2016 official Commentary’) notes, «[o]therwise, the obligation could have 
been addressed to the ‘Parties to the conflict’ rather than to the ‘High Con-
tracting Parties’ more generally» 96.
Secondly, the scope ratione materiae of Common Article 1 has also been 
enlarged. The obligation to ensure respect is not limited to the Geneva Con-
ventions and Additional Protocol 1, but rather extends to IHL in general. This 
assertion is confirmed by State practice, as evidenced in the ICRC Study on 
‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’:
For example, the ICRC’s appeals in relation to the conflict in Rho-
desia/Zimbabwe in 1979 and to the Iran–Iraq War in 1983 and 1984 
involved calls to ensure respect for rules not found in the Geneva Con-
ventions but in the Additional Protocols (bombardment of civilian zones 
and indiscriminate attacks) and the countries alleged to be committing 
these violations were not party to the Protocols. It is significant that these 
appeals were addressed to the international community, that no State ob-
jected to them and that several States not party to the Additional Protocols 
supported them 97.
In the same line of reasoning, Common Article 1 applies to both IACs 
and NIACs. Indeed, even though Common Article 1 was not reproduced in 
Additional Protocol II, Common Article 3, which governs NIACs, certainly 
applies to them. The ICJ endorsed this interpretation in the Nicaragua Case in 
the following terms:
The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United States 
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 
«respect» the Conventions and even «to ensure respect» for them «in al1 
96 See: Marie Henckaerts (dir.), Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, Geneva, Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, 2016, «Article 1: Respect and Ensure Respect».
97 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2005, rule 144. 
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circumstances» [...]. The United States is thus under an obligation not to 
encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in 
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 98.
As Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli observe, it 
can be argued that NIACs, as defined by Additional Protocol II, fall indi-
rectly within the scope of Common Article 1, to the extent that article 1(1) 
provides that the Protocol «develops and supplements Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949» 99. Therefore, the obligation to 
ensure respect could apply to Additional Protocol II by means of this indirect 
reference to Common Article 3, which is undeniably subject to Common 
Article 1.
Thirdly, the scope ratione personae has also importantly been extended, so 
as to include the State parties when they participate in multinational opera-
tions and international organizations, besides State parties themselves 100. In this 
respect, the 2016 official Commentary emphasizes the idea that State parties 
cannot hide behind the shield of multinational operations in order to evade 
their obligations stemming from IHL. This entails two consequences. On the 
one hand, State parties are compelled to ensure respect for the Geneva Con-
ventions by their contingents, as they still retain some authority over them. 
According to the 2016 official Commentary, this means that they are able to 
do so:
by ensuring that their troops are adequately trained, equipped and ins-
tructed; by exercising the disciplinary and criminal powers remaining to 
them; by attempting to ensure their coalition partners desist in potentia-
lly unlawful conduct; and, ultimately, by opting out of specific operations 
if there is an expectation that these operations may violate the Conven-
tions 101.
98 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., para. 220. 
99 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «Common Article 1 revisited: Protecting collective 
interest», op. cit., 2000, p. 69.
100 See Henckaerts (dir.), Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, op. cit., 2016, «Article 
1: Respect and Ensure Respect».
101 Ibid.
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On the other hand, it means that State parties should ensure that the 
State or international organization leading the operation at stake complies 
with IHL, thus making guarantees of compliance a condition for the transfer 
of command 102. As for international organizations, while they cannot be bound 
formally by the Geneva Conventions, they remain bound by customary inter-
national law, and therefore by Common Article 1.
Finally, one aspect of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL that should 
not be overlooked is the necessity to reach out to non-State armed groups. 
If one reads Common Article 1 literally, it appears that it is addressed to the 
«High Contracting Parties», instead of the «parties to the conflict». As a result, 
non-State armed groups participating in NIACs are excluded from its scope 
of application. However, an important number of IHL violations are commit-
ted by non-State armed groups, which have never received any IHL training 
in many cases. Furthermore, as the 2016 official Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions underlines, all parties to a NIAC, including non-State armed 
groups, must respect the guarantees contained in Common Article 3 and 
ensure respect for it internally 103. Consequently, non-State armed groups are 
not completely exempted from compliance with IHL and efforts must be 
conducted in this sense.
Djamchid Momtaz, who considers that incentives to respect IHL are 
lacking for armed groups, underlines this idea. He notes that many States are 
quite reluctant to actually fill in this gap to the extent that they consider these 
groups as terrorists and are reticent to take measures that would allow them to 
be properly trained in IHL. In addition, the behavior of these groups during 
warfare does not constitute a ground for liability at international level, except 
if they manage to overthrow the government and replace it or create a new 
State structure within the territory of the State at stake. This concern thus 
becomes more worrying when the intent of these armed groups is not to take 
over the power, but rather to control natural resources, hence the necessity to 
overcome obstacles such as the terrorist label and to find original solutions to 
reach out to them 104.
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, p. 93. 
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3.2. Content
As regards the content of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, the ICJ 
brought some elements of clarification on two occasions and enounced prin-
cipally negative obligations. However, Common Article 1 also entails positive 
obligations, i.e. ending and preventing IHL violations. In addition, it includes 
the obligation to punish perpetrators and refers to the existing mechanisms of 
international responsibility, but those aspects are extensively addressed in the 
second part of this study.
Firstly, in the above-mentioned Nicaragua Case of 1986, the ICJ held 
that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL entails the duty not to encourage 
disrespect for IHL:
The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United States 
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 
«respect» the Conventions and even «to ensure respect» for them «in al1 
circumstances» [...] The United States is thus under an obligation not to 
encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in 
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 105.
This judgment highlights a negative obligation stemming from Common 
Article 1, the obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the 
conflict to infringe upon IHL. In this case, the Court considered that the US 
government’s support for the ‘contras’ forces against the Nicaraguan govern-
ment constituted a violation of the Conventions. Inter alia, the publication by 
the CIA of a military textbook entitled ‘Psychological operations in guerrilla 
war’ (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas), which encouraged to neutral-
ize specific targets such as judges or security officers after gathering the local 
population for them to participate in the event and present their accusations, 
constituted an illegal encouragement in violation of Common Article 3 to the 
four Geneva Conventions.
Secondly, Common Article 1 prohibits recognizing an illicit situation 
deriving from a violation of IHL. In this regard, the ICJ ruled in the Advisory 
105 ICJ, Nicaragua Case, op. cit., para. 220. 
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Opinion on the Wall of 9 July 2004 that third States cannot recognize the ille-
gal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and cannot render aid 
or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such edification 106. It also 
recalled the general duty of all the State parties to the Geneva Conventions to 
ensure compliance with IHL by Israel, while respecting the UN Charter and 
international law:
[A]ll the State parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an 
obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international 
law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as 
embodied in that Convention 107.
Besides recalling the necessity to ensure respect for IHL, the ICJ identi-
fies negative obligations deriving from it. Nonetheless, if Common Article 1 
did not exist, these negative obligations could be inferred from other norms 
of public international law 108. They may be considered an extension of the 
application of the pacta sunt servanda principle, to the extent that State parties 
have the obligation to execute in good faith the treaties that they ratify and 
cannot undermine the objectives thereof 109. In the same way, third States are 
also subject to a duty not to knowingly aid or assist in the commission of IHL 
violations pursuant to the general regime of State responsibility 110.
As observed by Alexandre Devillard, these negative obligations cannot by 
themselves constitute the basis of a true obligation to ensure respect for IHL; 
however, the existence of this obligation necessarily entails such obligations, as 
they constitute its minimum threshold 111. It is therefore necessary to identify 
the positive obligations that derive from the obligation to ensure respect for 
IHL, as they probably constitute the most interesting aspect of the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL.
106 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Wall, op. cit., para. 136. 
107 Ibid., para. 159. 
108 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 727.
109 VCLT, article 26.
110 ILC, «Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commen-
taries», Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, article 16. 
111 Devillard, «L’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2007, p. 92. 
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The first aspect of these positive obligations is that State parties are subject 
to a duty to end IHL violation. In this respect, the ICJ held in the Advisory 
opinion on the Wall the following:
Al1 States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation 
resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assis-
tance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all State 
parties [...] have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United 
Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance with inter-
national humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention 112 [emphasis 
added].
It appears clearly from this ruling that States are subject to a positive duty 
to stop IHL violations, besides the negative obligations stemming from Com-
mon Article 1. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli already 
highlighted this aspect in the following terms:
[i]l ne s’agit pas seulement de ne pas reconnaître les situations illégales, mais 
il faut aussi que chacun agisse positivement pour les faire cesser, en utilisant 
dans ce but tous les moyens disponibles et juridiquement admissibles 113.
It is also the approach adopted by the ICRC Study on ‘Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’ in Rule 144, which provides that States «must 
exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international 
humanitarian law» 114. As Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo note, this aspect of 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL implies that a violation of IHL has 
already been committed 115. There is extensive State practice that sustains the 
legally binding nature of this obligation.
The second aspect of these positive obligations is the duty to prevent IHL 
violations. In this respect, the issue surrounding whether Common Article 
1 entails an obligation to prevent is difficult to answer, insofar as Common 
Article 1 is supposed to bind third States in the case of serious or repeated 
112 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Wall, op. cit., para. 163. 
113 Laurence Boisson de Chazournesand and Luigi Condorelli, «De la responsibilité de protéger 
ou d’une nouvelle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie», Revue générale de droit international 
public, vol. 1, 2006, p. 15.
114 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2005, rule 144.
115 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 728. 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK │ 79
violations of the Geneva Conventions. However, several elements support the 
existence of a duty to prevent IHL violations.
It could be argued that the obligation to prevent derives from the erga 
omnes nature of Common Article 1. In this regard, it seems logical to tie pre-
ventive measures to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, insofar as the 
consequences of violating IHL are too serious to merely intervene a posteri-
ori 116. Furthermore, as the official Commentary to the Geneva Conventions so 
underline, Common Article 1 stipulates a permanent obligation. It therefore 
applies at all times, including before the commission of IHL vio lations:
If it is to fulfill the solemn undertaking it has given, the Government 
must of necessity prepare in advance, that is to say in peace-time, the legal, 
material or other means of ensuring the faithful enforcement of the Con-
vention when the occasion arises 117.
The idea according to which Common Article 1 entails a duty of preven-
tion is supported by subsequent practice. By way of example, the State parties 
endorsed this interpretation of Common Article 1 on the occasion of the 30th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in 2007 in 
the following terms:
The obligation of all States to refrain from encouraging violations of 
international humanitarian law by any party to an armed conflict and to 
exert their influence, to the degree possible, to prevent and end violations, 
either individually or through multilateral mechanisms, in accordance with 
international law 118 [emphasis added].
Several scholars likewise share this approach 119. In this regard, Marco 
Sassòli even considers that the prevention of IHL violations should actually be 
the main focus of IHL implementing measures:
116 Devillard, «L’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2007, p. 96. 
117 Pictet (dir.), Commentaire aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949. Volume I, op. cit., 1952a.
118 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Resolution 3, 2007, para. 
2. Quoted in Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 
2015. p. 730. 
119 See, e.g., Devillard, «L’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 
2007, pp. 75-131; Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. 
cit., 2015, pp. 707-736; Levrat, «Les conséquences de l’engagement pris par les Hautes Parties 
Contractantes», op. cit., 1989, pp. 31-32.
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For a branch of law that applies in a fundamentally anarchic, illegal and 
often lawless situation such as armed conflicts, the focus of implementing 
mechanisms is and must always be on prevention 120.
In any event, the obligation to prevent IHL violations can only be tied 
to some degree of predictability. As highlighted by Dörmann and Serralvo, 
«under international law, due diligence obligations involving the need to pre-
vent a particular event can only be triggered if the event in question is actually 
foreseeable» 121.
3.3. A variety of implementing measures
Even though the ICJ has not provided further details concerning the 
content of the positive obligations falling upon the State parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, different types of reactive measures can be identified in response 
to serious violations of IHL. Some of them are explicitly provided by IHL, 
while others can be deduced from State practice. Against this background, 
different scholars have intended to detail the different measures available for 
the States parties to fulfill their obligation to ensure respect for IHL 122, which 
are presented below.
Firstly, State parties may adopt measures of prevention. In order to prevent 
IHL violations from occurring, States may resort to both soft and hard law. Soft 
law measures include training, promoting and disseminating IHL in general 
both among armed forces and the civilian population 123, as well as cooperation 
in the field of IHL with other States and international organizations. Even 
though most of these measures could seem trivial, they actually play a role of 
120 Marco Sassòli, «State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law», Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross, vol. 84(846), 2002, p. 401. 
121 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, p. 730. 
122 See e.g.: Palwankar, «Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL», op. cit., 1994; Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit 
international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010, pp. 85-101; Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le 
droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, pp. 732-782. 
123 Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions’ content is actually referred to by articles 
47/48/127/144 of the four Geneva Conventions. The wording expressly refers to an obligation 
valid «in time of peace as in time of war». 
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utmost importance with regard to Common Article 1 as they establish the 
structures which allow for the effective application of IHL in times of war. 
Hard law measures refer to the relationship between IHL and the fight against 
impunity, such as the criminalization of the violation of IHL norms, notably to 
create a deterrent effect 124. They may also refer to an interesting aspect of pre-
vention, which is the use of conditionality clauses in bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. By way of example, Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo emphasize 
the role played by the Arms Trade Treaty in preventing IHL violations 125.
Secondly, State parties may also resort to measures in reaction to IHL 
violations, in order to stop them. They include diplomatic action aiming at 
putting an end to these violations, including the expulsion of diplomats or 
the severance of diplomatic relations, the non-renewal of trade agreements, 
etc. State parties and international organizations can also publicly condemn 
the violations of IHL in order to bring opprobrium on the belligerent parties 
at stake, with a view to exerting pressure on them. In this respect, diplomatic 
measures constitute arguably one of the softest means to end violations of IHL. 
Consequently, their impact is limited, and their efficiency will depend on a 
variety of factors, including the cultural and political affinities of the States at 
stake.
In this context, the legality of unilateral countermeasures 126 arises 127. 
Indeed, it is not self-evident that third States to armed conflicts are allowed 
to adopt such countermeasures unilaterally on the basis of Common Article 
1. On the one hand, it could be argued that third States to armed conflicts 
are indeed allowed to resort to such measures, insofar as erga omnes or even jus 
cogens obligations have been breached. This reasoning is logical to the extent 
that it is acknowledged that all States have a legal interest in ensuring their 
respect. Following this line of argument, no difference would be established 
between the States affected by the violations of IHL and third States. This is, 
for example, the approach followed by the Institute of International Law (Insti-
124 This type of action is extensively addressed in Part II of this thesis. 
125 Dörmann and Serralvo, «Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions», op. cit., 2015, pp. 732-
735. 
126 Measures adopted by a State (A) in response to a wrongful act committed by another State (B) 
towards the former (A), and which would be considered illegal in other situations. 
127 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, pp. 92-93; Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international 
humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, pp. 746-749. 
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tut de Droit International) 128. In particular, article 5 of the 2005 Resolution on 
‘Obligations erga omnes in international law’ States the following:
Should a widely acknowledged grave breach of an erga omnes obliga-
tion occur, all the States to which the obligation is owed: (a) shall endeavour 
to bring the breach to an end through lawful means in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations; (b) shall not recognize as lawful a situation 
created by the breach; (c) are entitled to take non-forcible counter-measures under 
conditions analogous to those applying to a State specially affected by the breach 129 
[emphasis added].
The Institute of International Law therefore pushes the argument to its 
conclusion and makes no distinction between States specially affected by the 
breach and third States acting in the collective interest.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the third States not spe-
cially affected by the breach cannot adopt countermeasures individually and 
are allowed to adopt them collectively only, that is, under the UN auspices. 
Although this approach contradicts some of the logical consequences of grant-
ing some IHL rules erga omnes status, it is probably the most reasonable conclu-
sion given the current state of international law and practice. As some scholars 
note 130, the ILC explicitly distinguishes between injured States and third States 
in the ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 
(hereafter, ‘ARSIWA’) 131. Therefore, while third States are required to react, 
128 Institut de Droit International, «The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Fun-
damental Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties», 14th 
Commission, Rapporteur Mr. Milan Šahoviæ, Berlin Session, 1999; Institut de Droit Interna-
tional, «Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law», 5th Commission, Rapporteur 
Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Krakow Session, 2005. 
129 Institut de Droit International, «Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law», Fifth 
Commission, Rapporteur Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Krakow Session, 2005.
130 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, pp. 92-93; Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international 
humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, pp. 746-749; Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Res-
pect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, pp. 128-129.
131 ILC, «Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with com-
mentaries», Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, article 48: «Any 
State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in 
accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States in-
cluding that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or 
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 2. Any State 
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they must do so within the UN framework if they want to adopt counter-
measures.
The case of the resort to force is particularly clear, as States are not 
allowed to resort unilaterally to the use of lethal force in order to ensure 
respect for IHL 132. Common Article 1 does not constitute a legal basis for 
military action, and it appears clearly from international law and practice 
that Common Article 1 must be read in conjunction with international law 
and the UN Charter. In addition, according to ARSIWA, countermeasures 
cannot affect:
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights;
(c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals;
(d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international 
law 133.
entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State: (a) 
cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition 
in accordance with article 30; and (b) performance of the obligation of reparation in accor-
dance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of 
the obligation breached».
132 This question has gained renewed interest in light of the 2017 US missile attack on Syria. 
See inter alia: Marko Milanovic, «The clearly ilegal US missile strike in Syria», EJIL: Talk!, 
07.04.2017, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-clearly-illegal-us-missile-strike-in-syria/ 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Harold Koh Koh, «Not illegal: But now the hard part begins», Just 
Security, 07.04.2017, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/ 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Emmanuel Goffi, «Analyse: Syrie: Peut-on violer le droit international 
pour sanctionner une violation du droit international?», MULTIPOL, 11.04.2017, available at: 
http://reseau-multipol.blogspot.com.es/2017/04/analyse-syrie-peut-on-violer-le-droit.html 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Jure Vidmar, «Excusing Illegal Use of Force: From Illegal but Legit-
imate to Legal Because it is Legitimate?», EJIL: Talk!, 14.04.2017, available at: https://www.
ejiltalk.org/excusing-illegal-use-of-force-from-illegal-but-legitimate-to-legal-because-it-is-le-
gitimate/ (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Kevin Jon Heller, «Why Unilateral Humanitarian Interven-
tion Is Illegal and Potentially Criminal», Opinio Juris, 20.04.2017, available at: http://opiniojuris.
org/2017/04/20/against-unilateral-humanitarian-intervention-and-why-it-can-be-criminal/ 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Nancy Simons, «The legality surroundings the US strikes in Syria», 
Opinio Juris, 25.04.2017, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/25/the-legality-surround-
ing-the-us-strikes-in-syria/ (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Jennifer Trahan, «In defense of humanitarian 
intervention», Opinio juris, 19.04.2017, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/19/in-de-
fense-of-humanitarian-intervention/ (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
133 ILC, «Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commen-
taries», op. cit., article 50. 
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It is therefore unambiguous that the resort to force is not an option for 
States acting individually. Nonetheless, States can turn to the UNSC and 
adopt implementing measures collectively, which may include the resort to 
force.
Lastly, the international mechanisms of compliance with IHL must be 
mentioned, despite their doubtful success. IHL specifically refers to a mech-
anism of prevention of IHL violations: the system of Protecting Powers and 
of their substitute. In particular, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols refer to the Protecting Powers 134, i.e., neutral States that must be 
designated by either belligerent party and accepted by the adverse party to the 
armed conflict. The underlying idea of such mechanism is that the Protecting 
Power must safeguard the interests of the belligerent party that designated 
it. Consequently, a support is provided to the parties to the armed conflict, 
with a view to preventing violations of IHL from occurring 135. However, as 
Isabelle Moulier notes, the system established by the Geneva Conventions is 
not mandatory, and the parties to the armed conflict actually have the choice 
to designate or not a Protecting Power 136. It is only with the adoption of the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 that the mandatory character of the designa-
tion was formalized. The system nonetheless relies on an agreement between 
the Protecting Powers, and the parties to the armed conflict at stake. In case 
of failure, it is foreseen that the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian 
organization shall fulfill this role.
This mechanism creates the possibility to continuously monitor the par-
ties to the armed conflict as the Protecting Powers or their substitute are in 
charge of a wide range of activities aiming at ensuring respect for IHL taking 
place throughout the armed conflict. Indeed, the Protecting Powers or their 
substitute are responsible for, inter alia, the communication between the parties 
to the armed conflict in relation to the application of the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols; support and protection activities; as well as the 
monitoring of the enforcement of the parties’ obligations under IHL. The 
Protecting Powers therefore fulfill a preventive role, but they may also play a 
reactive role if they see that one of the warring parties is not complying with 
134 Articles 8/8/8/9 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
135 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
p. 737. 
136 Ibid., p. 738. 
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IHL. Nonetheless, this system has not been used recently and, in practice, the 
ICRC has been recognized as a substitute.
Besides, IHL itself foresees the possibility to submit the case to the Inter-
national Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (hereafter, ‘IHFFC’) in 
accordance with article 90 of Additional Protocol I 137. The IHFFC was estab-
lished in 1991 and is competent to «enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave 
breach or other serious violation of the Geneva Conventions or Additional 
Protocol I» and to «facilitate the restoration of an attitude of respect for these 
instruments through its good offices» 138. Upon an investigation, the IHFFC 
must present its conclusions and its recommendations on the situation at stake. 
The IHFFC’s report is made public only if all the belligerent parties agree to 
do so 139.
It thus appears that this mechanism was established in order to enforce 
Common Article 1 and for the international community to benefit from some 
sort of monitoring mechanism. Furthermore, as Djamchid Momtaz observes, 
there is no obligation to be affected by the violation of IHL for a State to refer 
the situation to the IHFFC. The system established by article 90 of Additional 
Protocol I therefore reinforces the idea that some IHL norms are erga omnes, 
and that any State has a legal interest in ensuring their respect.
Although this mechanism is promising regarding the enforcement of 
Common Article 1, it is subject to important limitations and has never been 
activated. One first obstacle to the use of the IHFFC is the fact that its com-
petence is mandatory only if the relevant States have ratified the Protocol and 
made a formal declaration in this sense, and one of the State parties to the IAC 
requests its services 140. Thus, the competence of the IHFFC is importantly 
limited and leaves aside armed conflicts not of an international character. Even 
though the IHFFC’s services may be requested on an ad hoc basis too, then 
all the warring parties must give their consent. Another important obstacle 
is the fact that the State parties seem not to be very keen on resorting to it, 
137 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
article 90. 
138 Marcel Stutz, Leonard Blazeby and Netta Goussac, «Strengthening compliance with Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: The work of the ICRC and the Swiss Government», The University of 
Western Australia Law Review, vol. 39, Issue 1, 2015, p. 56. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
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even when they have had the opportunity to do so. By way of example, the 
UNSC preferred to request an ad hoc fact-finding commission to the Secretary 
General in reaction to the widespread violations of IHL in Darfur, albeit it had 
previously considered that it could refer cases to the IHFFC 141.
Another means to enforce Common Article 1 foreseen by IHL is the 
mechanism provided by article 7 of Additional Protocol I:
The depositary of this Protocol shall convene a meeting of the High Con-
tracting Parties, at the request of one or more of the said Parties and upon 
the approval of the majority of the said Parties, to consider general problems 
concerning the Application of the Conventions and of the Protocol.
This mechanism has already been implemented on different occasions, 
but not on the basis of this provision. So far, the State parties have met on three 
occasions: in 1999, 2001, and 2014 in order to scrutinize some questions sur-
rounding the respect by Israel of its obligations under IHL. The UN General 
Assembly triggered this mechanism in two resolutions whereby it called on 
Switzerland to organize those meetings with regard to GC IV’ 142, even though 
the Geneva Conventions themselves do not establish a similar system to the 
one provided by Additional Protocol I. The objective of such meetings was 
to reaffirm the illegality of colonization in the occupied territories in order 
to stop it. While the results of the 1999 Conference were mitigated, the 2001 
Conference led to the adoption of a declaration whereby the 115 participating 
States not only affirmed the de jure applicability of GC IV but also:
the obligations of all States based on common Article 1, the obligations of 
the parties to the conflict reflected in the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
the specific obligations of Israel as the Occupying Power 143.
It is worth noting that the ICJ used these declarations when it recognized 
the illegality of the construction of the wall by Israel in the Advisory Opinion 
141 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, pp. 89-90. 
142 Ibid., p. 88. 
143 Matthias Lanz, Emilie Max and Oliver Hoehne, «The Conference of High Contracting Parties 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17 December 2014 and the duty to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law», International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 96(895/896), p. 1120. 
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on the Wall of 9 July 2004 144. What is more, these conferences have had an 
impact on the Israeli case-law. Indeed, the Supreme Court considered that the 
destructions derived from the construction of the wall were disproportionate 
in comparison with the military advantages so that it had to be redesigned 
in order to cause the least possible damages to civilians 145. It is therefore an 
example of the indirect effect on the ground as a domestic court used these 
conferences as sources of interpretation of the law.
Another conference was convened by the Swiss Government on the 
basis of further General Assembly resolutions adopted between 2009 and 2011 
in order to identify «the measures to enforce the Convention in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to ensure its respect 
in accordance with article 1» 146. While consultations seemed not to provide 
successful results, 2014 marked a turning point as tensions were increasing and 
Palestine requested the Swiss Government to intensify their efforts to convene 
such a conference. Eventually, 128 States participated in the Conference of 
High Contracting Parties held on 17 December 2014. It is interesting to note 
that while the outcome of the former conferences was used by the ICJ in the 
Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the 2014 final declaration in turn referred to 
the Advisory Opinion to recall the illegality of the construction of the wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its associated regime. As emphasized by 
Matthias Lanz, Emilie Max, and Oliver Hoehne, the outcome of this Confer-
ence is particularly important with respect to Common Article 1 for a number 
of reasons, including the high number of participating countries, or its level of 
details regarding the specific alleged violations and duties falling upon both the 
Occupying Power and Palestinian actors 147.
Common Article 1 thus establishes an erga omnes obligation, binding upon 
the international community as a whole. It is an unconditional and general 
144 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, p. 89. 
145 Menaske Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ, 7957/04, Supreme Court of Israel Judgment 
of 15 September 2005, Tadkin-Supreme, 2005, vol. 3, p. 3333. Quoted in Momtaz, «Les défis des 
conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010, p. 89. 
146 UNGA, Res. 64/10, 5 November 2009, op. cit., para. 5. Quoted in Lanz, Max and Hoehne, «The 
Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17», op. cit., p. 
1120. 
147 Lanz, Max and Hoehne, «The Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 17», op. cit, pp. 1121-1127.
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obligation that may be implemented thanks to a variety of tools at States’ dis-
posal, and it may even be sanctioned by an intervention of the Security Coun-
cil, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Vincent Chetail is therefore 
correct when he affirms that:
Common Article 1 is not a stylistic clause devoid of any real legal weight, 
but a norm firmly anchored in customary law and entailing obligations for 
every State, whether or not they have ratified the treaties in question 148.
While Common Article 1 may be implemented by resorting to vari-
ous types of measures aimed at preventing or stopping IHL violations, it also 
highlights one of the main issues regarding IHL: «the need to enhance the 
effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance» 149. Indeed, the Protecting Pow-
ers mechanism has been underused; the IHFFC has never been triggered, so 
that, in practice, the institution in charge of monitoring compliance with IHL 
during warfare has become the ICRC. However, some of these activities, such 
as public denunciations, cannot be undertaken by the ICRC because of the 
principles that underpin its action 150. Consequently, there clearly is a gap that 
needs to be addressed.
Against this background, the ICRC and the Swiss Government under-
took a consultation process between 2012 and 2015 in order to improve com-
pliance with IHL precisely in order to develop more effective international 
mechanisms. This process culminated with the 32nd International Conference 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which took place in Geneva in Decem-
ber 2015. In accordance with the proposal put forward by the ICRC and 
the Swiss Government, an annual meeting of the State parties to the Geneva 
Conventions would have been established, «a non-politicized forum for them 
to share best practices and technical expertise» 151. Unfortunately, the results of 
the Conference did not match the expectations, as no agreement was reached 
on the creation or development of an efficient compliance mechanism. State 
148 Chetail, «The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international humanitarian 
law», op. cit., 2003, p. 263. 
149 Stutz, Blazeby and Goussac, «Strengthening compliance with International Humanitarian Law», 
op. cit., 2015, p. 51. 
150 Ibid., p. 57.
151 News release, «No agreement by states on mechanism to strengthen compliance with rules of 
war», ICRC, Geneva, 10/07/2015. 
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parties thus agreed to continue the «inclusive, State-driven intergovernmental 
process» and to submit its outcome to the 33rd International Conference 152.
Despite those limitations, further international developments have rein-
forced the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. In this regard, it is difficult to 
talk about Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions without referring 
to the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ too, formalized in 2005 on the 
occasion of the World Summit. This concept echoes the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL, as it foresees that in the case of default from the relevant State, 
the international community has the duty to use all the diplomatic, humani-
tarian and other appropriate means to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition, the emer-
gence and consolidation of International Human Rights Law in the aftermath 
of World War II is promising also with regard to IHL, insofar as it offers juris-
dictional forawhere IHL may be used as a norm of reference.
152 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 32IC/15/R2 
on Strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law, Geneva, Switzerland, 8-10 
December 2015. 
Section 2 
AN OBLIGATION REINFORCED BY FURTHER 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
As explained in the first section of this chapter, Common Article 1 has com-
pensated to some extent the lack of centralized monitoring system of IHL. 
Nonetheless, it arguably constitutes a perfectible mechanism of compliance. 
In this regard, other means to ensure respect for IHL have developed in the 
international arena, outside of IHL, which may be used to reinforce Common 
Article 1. Hereafter, particular attention is paid to International Human Rights 
Law (hereafter, ‘IHRL’) and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (hereafter, ‘R2P’).
1. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Even though traditionally, IHL and IHRL have been two distinct bodies of 
law, with divergent origins, field, extent of application, they are getting closer 
insofar as they pursue a common objective: the protection and safeguard of the 
human being. In this respect, IHRL have proved to be an interesting instru-
ment to ensure respect for IHL.
1.1. An increasing convergence of IHL and IHRL
Originally, IHL and IHRL were meant to apply to different situations. 
Traditional public international law used to distinguish between peace law and 
war law so that the applicable legal framework depended on the belligerent 
situation in a determined place: IHL would apply to war times while IHRL 
would apply to peace times. This difference in the scope of application ratione 
temporis was grounded on several differences.
The essence of IHRL is to prevent the State from infringing individuals’ 
freedoms and promote the well-being of its people during peacetime, whereas 
the objective of IHL goal is to regulate the conduct of hostilities and to pro-
tect human beings in times of armed conflict. In the latter case, the individual 
is an object of the rule, in contrast with IHRL, whose subject is the individ-
ual. Hence, IHL does not have the specificities of IHRL, i.e. objectivity and 
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non-reciprocity 153. In the same line, the addressees are different. The Law of 
War traditionally ties a specific branch of the State, the military one, whereas 
IHRL apply to all State authorities.
These differences result from the fundamental difference of nature of 
both corpuses. Indeed, IHL has always pretended to be universal. It is one of 
the oldest branches of international law and has been importantly codified 
through international treaties and conventions since the nineteenth century. 
On the contrary, human rights were first developed within the national arena: 
the British Bill of Rights, the American Constitution, or the French Declara-
tion of human rights, all these legal frameworks were created in order to grant 
rights to their citizens. It is only during the twentieth century that they got 
internationalized, and even universalized, most notably with the adoption of 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 154 and other treaties 
thereafter.
Furthermore, these corpuses’ philosophical sources are divergent. The 
IHL’s philosophical sources go back to chivalry times when honor, loyalty 
and the protection of the weak prevailed. It also draws its ideas from religious 
principles. It often refers to the notion of ‘Civilization’ as opposed to ‘Barba-
ry’ 155. The Law of War used to be seen as military rather than humanitarian 
law 156. Conversely, IHRL is the product of the Enlightenment movement of 
the eighteenth century and has been linked to Western liberal revolutions 157. It 
used to refer to the political and social organization of the State 158. Therefore, 
the Law of War comprised technical rules regulating belligerent relationship 
with foreigners while human rights used to be led by associative movements 
invoking liberal or socialist ideals (although it changed after World War II) 159.
153 Frédéric Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, 9th ed., Paris, Presses Universi-
taires de France, 2008, p. 32.
 However, this statement should be nuanced with regard to the principle of non-reciprocity, 
which also applies to IHL. In contrast, reprisals are authorized.
154 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71, 10 Decem-
ber 1948.
155 For an insight into the diverse religious, philosophical and cultural origins of IHL, see Chris-
tophe Greenwood, «Historical development and legal basis», in Dieter Fleck, The handbook of 
international humanitarian law, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 15-27.
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Another important difference between IHL and IHRL is that they are 
regulated at international level in very different ways. The latter is regulated 
by numerous universal and regional declarations and conventions as well as all 
specific ones, such as the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. A con-
sequence is that most of them are short and simple texts. On the contrary, IHL 
is described in a limited number of treaties and conventions that are extremely 
detailed. In the same line, their control is different as most of the human rights 
conventions refer to their own monitoring systems, which may be universal or 
regional. This is in contrast with IHL, which establishes a decentralized mon-
itoring system 160.
Lastly, the ICRC and the UN used to consider each other with mistrust, 
as the former feared that the instillation of human rights in IHL would lead 
to its politicization and therefore undermine it. As for the UN, it was estab-
lished in order to maintain global peace and security. As a consequence, it 
was rather hostile to develop IHL, a law necessary in times of war, as it would 
entail acknowledging that it had failed in maintaining international peace and 
security 161. Nonetheless, the position of the UN has evolved. In 1967, the 
United Nations Security Council (hereafter, ‘UNSC’) referred expressly to the 
‘Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ for the first 
time and established a connection between IHL and human rights 162. This new 
involvement of the UN was further confirmed on the occasion of the Tehran 
International Conference on Human Rights in 1968 163.
Indeed, despite these differences, IHL and IHRL share a common prin-
ciple: they both aim to protect and safeguard human beings. World War II 
represents an important change in this respect. After horrendous atrocities 
were committed, the international community established international legal 
instruments so as to prevent such dramatic exactions from occurring again. 
As mentioned above, human rights were internationalized, notably with the 
adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, or the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide in that same year. As some kind of mirroring effect, 
160 Mario Bettati, Droit humanitaire, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2000, p. 21. 
161 Ibid. 
162 UNSC S/RES/237 (1967). 
163 UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41, Final act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 
22 April to 13 May 1968.
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IHL got humanized. The adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, 
particularly GC IV, marks this philosophy as it introduced the «humanitarian» 
notion in the Law of Armed Conflicts and contributed to building bridges 
between both corpuses. The result today is that both bodies of law are applica-
ble to armed conflicts. One manifestation of such process is that the statuses of 
civilians in IHL and of human beings in IHRL are converging 164.
Various possibilities exist in order to conciliate the application of IHL and 
IHRL. According to the first interpretation – the most cautious one – IHL and 
IHRL are complementary. Indeed, IHRL ensures the protection of human 
beings in ordinary times while IHL does so in very exceptional times, i.e. in 
times of armed conflict. However, according to this theory, IHL and IHRL are 
bodies of law that maintain their specificities and differences.
Another theory conciliating IHL and IHRL is the so-called ‘conver-
gence’ theory. This is notably the subject-matter of the ICRC’s work, which 
focuses on the convergence of some core rights of both corpuses. And indeed, 
although they have different material scopes of application, they converge on 
some points: the obligation to protect the individual regardless of nationality, 
the impossibility to invoke the non-performance defence, as well as the obliga-
tion to respect some substantial rights in all circumstances 165. The ICJ seemed 
to endorse this movement of convergence between IHL and IHRL, insofar as 
it considered in its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that human rights 
are applicable at all times, including in war time:
The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war. [...] In principle, the right 
not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities 166.
It further confirmed this position on 9 July 2004 in the Advisory Opin-
ion on the Palestinian Wall 167. This approach goes further than the «comple-
164 Kolb, Jus in bello, le droit international des conflits armés, op. cit., 2009, p. 22.
165 Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, op. cit., 2008, p. 33.
166 ICJ, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Re-
ports 1996, para 24.
167 ICJ, 9 July 2004, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestin-
ian territory, Advisory opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136. Confirmed in subsequent cases: ICJ, 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Ugan-
da), 19 Dec. 2005, para. 216; ICJ, Application of the International Convention on the Elimina-
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mentary theory» as it seeks to grant human beings the best protection through 
the cumulative application of both juris corpuses 168.
As Heintze underlines it, this case-law is in line with current international 
human rights treaties, which contain provisions applicable to war times 169. An 
example at the European level is article 15 ECHR, as it refers to the applica-
tion of human rights norms «in time of war or other public emergency threat-
ening the life of the nation» 170. In this case, the State party at stake is allowed to 
derogate from the obligations included in the Convention. Nevertheless, some 
rights of this Convention cannot be suspended and are intransgressible rights. 
This inviolability illustrates the convergence between IHL and IHRL as they 
both define some essential rights, which cannot be derogated from in any cir-
cumstances. Therefore, the convergence theory participates in the creation of a 
set of rights and principles that transcend all legal branches, a perspective con-
firmed by the ICTY, which held in the Delalic case of 20 February 2001 that:
the two legal regimes share a common ‘core’ of fundamental standards 
which are applicable at all times, in all circumstances and to all parties, and 
from which no derogation is permitted 171.
This convergence is particularly noticeable regarding Common Article 3 
insofar as it details a list of rights that must be safeguarded in any circumstances. 
In this respect, the rights contained in Common Article 3 are to be interpreted 
in relation with human rights. For instance, the «judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples» are to be understood in light 
of human rights instrument, e.g. Article 6 ECHR, for which the ECtHR has 
developed an important case-law 172. In the same line, it is difficult to under-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Order, 15 Oct. 2008, para. 112. Quoted in Christian 
Tomuschat, «Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law», European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, vol. 21(1), 2010, p. 18.
168 Hans-Joachim Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and 
International Humanitarian Law», International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 86(856), 2004, p. 793. 
169 William Abresch, «The human rights law of internal armed conflicts: the ECHR in Chechnya», 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 16(4), 2005, pp. 741-767.
170 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 15.
171 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka «Pavo»), Hazim Delic and Esad LandŽo 
(aka «Zenga») (hereafter, ‘Celebici Case’), Case IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, 20 February 
2001, para. 149.
172 See Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, op. cit., 2008, p. 33. 
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stand the human right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment – found in 
IHRL – without taking account of its interpretation in the context of IHL, 
especially in the context of GC III 173.
Moreover, IHL and IHRL mutually enrich themselves. IHRL reinforces 
IHL norms to the extent that it formulates with further details the States’ obli-
gations 174. In the same way, IHL updates IHRL, as the problem of disappear-
ances underlines it. Although they constitute a serious human rights violation, 
in times of war, Geneva Conventions III and IV impose on the Occupying 
Party some detailed obligations concerning their prisoners so as to avoid the 
problem of disappearances 175.
In order to solve the problems of applicability between IHL and HRL, it 
has been sustained that IHL may be considered the lex specialis toward IHRL. 
The philosophy at the origin of the lex specialis theory is that a «special rule 
is more to the point (“approaches more nearly the subject in hand”) than a 
general one and it regulates the matter more effectively (“are ordinarily more 
effective”) than general rules do» 176. Thus, a State that is party to both IHRL 
and IHL treaties must interpret their provisions in a consistent way 177. This 
approach was exposed in the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use 
or Threat of Nuclear Weapons where, after having said that IHRL applies in 
times of war as well, the Court held the following:
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable 
in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus, whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon 
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to 
173 Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Hu-
manitarian Law», op. cit., 2004, p. 795.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The function and scope 
of the lex specialis rule and the question of «self-contained regimes»: an outline, prepared for 
the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law of the International Law Commis-
sion. Available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/ 55/fragmentation_outline.pdf, para. 2.2. 
Quoted in Abresch, «The human rights law of internal armed conflicts: the ECHR in Chechn-
ya», op. cit., 2005, p. 5.
177 Abresch, «The human rights law of internal armed conflicts: the ECHR in Chechnya», op. cit., 
2005, p. 746.
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Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law appli-
cable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself  178 
[emphasis added].
In this case, the Court considered that the right to life is non-derogable, so 
that no one can be arbitrarily deprived of their life even in times of war. It also 
recognized the primacy of IHL over IHRL in situations of armed conflicts, as 
it constitutes lex specialis, so that the word ‘arbitrarily’ shall be read in light of 
IHL. Moreover, in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the Court demonstrated 
even more clearly that the right to life in situations of armed conflicts is to be 
interpreted in accordance with IHL 179. Indeed, it held the following:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may 
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both 
these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to 
it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law 180.
Thus, IHL and IHRL, originally two distinct corpuses have converged to 
the point that some authors talk about the «human rights law of internal armed 
conflicts» 181. The application of human rights to non-international conflicts is 
undeniably important, especially when the State refuses to recognize that an 
armed conflict is taking place, or to fill in the gaps of IHL. In this regard, the 
lex specialis approach might prove to be an effective instrument of delimitation 
of applicability of both bodies of legal norms, although its practical application 
is difficult 182.
178 ICJ, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Re-
ports 1996, p. 226, para 25.
179 Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Hu-
manitarian Law», op. cit., 2004, p. 796.
180 ICJ, 9 July 2004, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory, Advisory opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 106.
181 Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Hu-
manitarian Law», op. cit., 2004, p. 796.
182 Breslin, «The Role of the European Union in Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian 
Law», op. cit., 2011, p. 121.
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1.2. Resorting to IHRL to ensure respect for IHL
Against this background, IHRL can prove to be useful in relation with 
accountability mechanisms «to compensate for the deficits of» IHL 183. As 
observed by Hans-Joachim Heintze:
[I]t comes as no surprise that both the ICRC and academics have on 
numerous occasions attempted to use the implementation mechanisms of 
the UN human rights treaties, disarmament treaties and environmental 
treaties as examples of possible systems to ensure compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law and to make them appealing to States 184.
In this context, the reporting mechanisms existing under the UN may 
be used to promote ratifications and monitor them. By way of example, the 
UNGA has established a system of biennial resolutions on the status of the 
Additional Protocols. It is worth referring to the last resolution adopted within 
this framework:
[Resolution A/RES/71/144 of 13 December 2016 w]elcomes the uni-
versal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and notes the trend 
towards a similarly wide acceptance of the two Additional Protocols of 
1977 in the context of their upcoming fortieth anniversary 185.
In this resolution, the General Assembly foreseeably calls upon the States 
that have not yet ratified the protocols to do so. It likewise addresses recom-
mendations to the States that are parties to Protocol I to recognize the IHFFC 
and to consider making use of its services. The resolution goes beyond the 
scope of the additional protocols strictly speaking, insofar as it also encourages 
the ratification of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, its two protocols, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
183 Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Hu-
manitarian Law», op. cit., 2004, p. 798.
184 Ibid.
185 UNGA, Resolution A/RES/71/144 of 13 December 2016, Status of the Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed con-
flicts.
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armed conflict, as well as «other relevant treaties on international humanitarian 
law relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict».
For present purposes, Resolution A/RES/71/144 dedicates a few para-
graphs to the improvement of the implementation of IHL. In particular, it
notes with appreciation the 10 resolutions adopted at the Thirty-second 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, held in 
Geneva from 8 to 10 December 2015, in particular resolutions 1 to 4, re-
calls their importance, as well as the recommendations for further actions 
therein, in strengthening international humanitarian law, and notes with 
appreciation in this regard resolution 2, entitled «Strengthening complian-
ce with international humanitarian law», in which the Conference, inter 
alia, recommended the continuation of an inclusive, State-driven intergo-
vernmental process based on the principle of consensus and in line with 
the guiding principles of the consultation process to find agreement on 
features and functions of a potential forum of States and to find ways to 
enhance the implementation of international humanitarian law 186.
It likewise welcomes the activities of the ICRC Advisory Service on 
IHL, the increasing number of national commissions for the implementation 
of IHL and their work. Interestingly, it requests the Secretary General to sub-
mit a «comprehensive report on the status of the Additional Protocols [...] as 
well as on measures taken to strengthen the existing body» of IHL. There is 
therefore a willingness to associate the UN, the ICRC, and the State parties, in 
order to create synergies contributing to the effective implementation of IHL.
Furthermore, individuals may decide to bring legal action before courts 
dedicated to human rights, since they may be deprived from legal standing in 
the IHL field. In this context, it is worth mentioning the case of the European 
Court of Human Rights, to the extent that it has increasingly referred to 
IHL in its case-law and has recognized the «cumulative and direct application 
of IHL» 187. Indeed, it has issued judgments on numerous situations relating 
to armed conflicts such as the conflict in Chechnya 188, the conflict oppos-
186 Ibid., para. 8. 
187 Heintze, «On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Hu-
manitarian Law», op. cit., 2004, p. 801.
188 As of February 2017, the ECtHR had issued more than 250 judgments finding violations of 
the ECHR in connection with the armed conflict in Chechnya. See ECtHR, Factsheet ‘Armed 
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ing Cyprus to Turkey 189, the conflict between the Turkish security forces and 
the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) 190, the Balkan wars 191, NATO oper-
ations in the former Yugoslavia 192, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh 193, international military operations in Iraq 194, the conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia 195, as well as some sporadic cases relating to acts 
conflicts’, February 2017. Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Armed_con-
flicts_ENG.pdf (Accessed: 15.05.2017).
 See also Abresch, «The human rights law of internal armed conflicts: the ECHR in Chechnya», 
op. cit., 2005, pp. 741-767.
189 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2011; ECtHR, Grand Cham-
ber, Varnava and other v. Turkey, Judgment of 18 September 2009; ECtHR, Andreou v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 27 October 2009; ECtHR, Charalambous and Others v. Turkey and Emin and 
Others v. Cyprus, Decision on the admissibility of 3 April 2012. Quoted in ECtHR, Factsheet 
‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
190 See e.g.: ECtHR, Mentes and others v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 November 1997; ECtHR, Orhan 
v. Turkey, Judgment of 18 June 2002; ECtHR, Er and others v. Turkey, Judgment of 31 July 2012; 
ECtHR, Meryem Çelik and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 April 2013; ECtHR, Benzer and 
Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 November 2013. Quoted in ECtHR, Factsheet ‘Armed con-
flicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
191 Concerning the war in Croatia: ECtHR, Grand Chamber: Marguš v. Croatia, Judgment of 27 
May 2014; Concerning the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ECtHR, Palić v. Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Judgment of 15 February 2011; ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others 
v. the Netherlands, Decision on the admissibility of 11 June 2013; ECtHR, Grand Chamber: 
Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment of 18 July 2013; ECtHR, Mus-
tafić-Mujić and Others v. the Netherlands, Decision on the admissibility of 30 August 2016. 
Quoted in ECtHR, Factsheet ‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
192 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 
Decision on the admissibility of 19 December 2001; ECtHR, Grand Chamber: Markovic and 
others v. Italy, Judgment of 14 December 2006; ECtHR, Grand Chamber,
 Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Decision on the 
admissibility of 31 May 2007. Quoted in ECtHR, Factsheet ‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 
2017.
193 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, Judgment of 16 June 2015; ECtHR, 
Grand Chamber, Sargsyan v. Azerbaidjan, Judgment of 16 June 2015. Quoted in ECtHR, Fact-
sheet ‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
194 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 March 2010; ECtHR, 
Grand Chamber, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 2011; 
ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 2011; ECtHR, 
Pritchard v. the United Kingdom, Strike-out decision of 18 March 2014; ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber,Hassan v. the United Kingdom (Application nº 29750/09), Judgment of 16 September 
2014; ECtHR, Jaloud v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 20 November 2014. Quoted in ECtHR, 
Factsheet ‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
195 ECtHR, Ukraine v. Russia (III), Strike-out decision of 1 September 2015; ECtHR, Lisnyy and 
Others v. Ukraine and Russia, Decision on the admissibility of 5 July 2016. Furthermore, five 
inter-State applications lodged by Ukraine against Russia (Ukraine v. Russia (nº 20958/14); 
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that occurred during World War II 196. In those cases, the interplay between 
IHL and IHRL is evident, as the Court applies the rights contained in the 
ECHR, especially the right to life (article 2) or the right to liberty and security 
(article 5), in light of IHL.
A clear example can be observed in the Hassan v. The United King-
dom case of 2014 197. It concerned the acts of British armed forces in Iraq, in 
the context of an international armed conflict, against the applicant’s brother. 
The latter alleged that his brother had been arbitrarily deprived of liberty and 
found dead, bearing marks of torture and execution. For present purposes, the 
case raised issues regarding the right to liberty and security in times of armed 
conflicts (article 5 ECHR) and the interplay between IHL and IHRL. In par-
ticular,
this is the first case in which a respondent State has requested the Court to 
disapply its obligations under Article 5 or in some other way to interpret 
them in the light of powers of detention available to it under international 
humanitarian law 198.
Consequently, the Court had to clarify the rules of applicability between 
IHL and IHRL in order to determine whether the existence of an interna-
tional armed conflict entailed the disapplication of article 5 ECHR. On this 
basis, the Court based its reasoning on article 31(3) VCLT, which required 
that the interpretation of treaty norms should take into account subsequent 
State practice as well as other relevant rules of international law applicable to 
the case. In this instance, the interpretation of article 5 ECHR shall therefore 
take into account subsequent State practice and IHL. Accordingly, the Court 
refused to rely on the lex specialis rule. It added that it should interpret and 
apply the provisions contained in the ECHR in a manner which is «consistent 
Ukraine v. Russia (II) (nº 43800/14); Ukraine v. Russia (IV) (nº 42410/15); Ukraine v. Russia 
(V) (nº 8019/16) and about 4000 individual applications relating to the events in Crimea or the 
hostilities in Eastern Ukraine are pending before the ECtHR. Quoted in ECtHR, Factsheet 
‘Armed conflicts’, op. cit., February 2017.
196 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 21 October 2013; 
ECtHR, Kononov v. Latvia (Application nº 36376/04), Judgment of 17 May 2010. 
197 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Hassan v. the United Kingdom (Application nº 29750/09), Judgment 
of 16 September 2014.
198 Ibid., para. 99. 
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with the framework under international law delineated by the [ICJ]» regard-
ing the interplay between IHL and IHRL 199. It further considered both IHL 
and the ECHR provide safeguards from arbitrary detention in time of armed 
conflicts, so that article 5 ECHR should be interpreted in light of the Geneva 
Conventions:
even in situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under the 
Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the background 
of the provisions of international humanitarian law. By reason of the co-
existence of the safeguards provided by international humanitarian law and 
by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted 
deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) of that provision 
should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war and 
the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions 200 [emphasis added].
On this basis, the Court concluded that since the internment of the appli-
cant’s brother complied with IHL, it shall not be considered non-arbitrary and 
article 5 ECHR had not been violated.
In addition to IHRL, the emergence of the notion of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ echoes the system established by Common Article 1, thereby provid-
ing it with greater authority.
2. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
A corollary of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL as provided by Com-
mon Article 1 is the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, a concept deve-
loped under the auspices of the UN in 2005 201. While these are not equivalent 
concepts, they are deeply linked and it is difficult to talk about Common 
Article 1 without referring to the R2P, a broader and recent concept that has 
gained much importance in the recent years.
199 Ibid., para. 102. 
200 Ibid., para. 104.
201 UN 2005 World Summit of the UN concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (paras. 138-139 of A/
RES/60/1 – 2005 World Summit Outcome Document).
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The R2P was a Canadian idea, which was eventually endorsed by UN 
Member States on the occasion of the 2005 World Summit. It is defined in the 
Final Document of the 2005 International Summit as a responsibility falling 
upon States to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, eth-
nic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It foresees that in the case of default 
from the relevant State, the international community has the duty to use all the 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other appropriate means to protect populations. 
This may entail the resort to force.
In this regard, one may wonder whether this ‘new’ concept reinforces 
the legal authority of Common Article 1 or if it is a demonstration of the 
impotence of the international community to prevent these crimes, especially 
considering its uncertain legal value.
It is argued that in a strictly legal sense, the creation of the concept of R2P 
reinforces the obligation to ensure respect for IHL and actually develops upon it, 
by adding other international crimes. Indeed, even though the R2P has an uncer-
tain legal value, it is a recent concept that develops upon Common Article 1.
2.1. A recent concept that develops upon Common Article 1
The absence of reaction from the international community when exac-
tions were committed in Rwanda or in ex-Yugoslavia led the Canadian gov-
ernment to form the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (hereafter, ‘ICISS’), an ad hoc commission founded by Gareth 
Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun and composed of members of the UN General 
Assembly. The purpose of such commission was to provide tools to the inter-
national community in case of crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. The outcome of this process was the publi-
cation of the report on the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in December 
2001 202. This report also intended to provide a new framework that could 
combine antagonist views on what should be the international community’s 
response in case of international crimes. In this context, some advocated for 
the concept of ‘right to intervene’ or ‘droit d’ingérence’ in the words of Ber-
202 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereafter, ‘ICISS’), The Re-
sponsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
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nard Kouchner, while others feared that the implementation of such principle 
could lead to abuse and neocolonial interventions.
The concept of Responsibility to Protect was later enshrined in the final 
Document of the 2005 World Summit. The Heads of State and Government 
therefore committed themselves to protect their own population, but also to pre-
vent the most horrendous crimes – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity – by helping other States to comply with this responsi-
bility. The R2P is defined in the 2005 World Summit Final Document as follows:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including 
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international com-
munity should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early war-
ning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case ba-
sis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and internatio-
nal law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, 
to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out 203.
203 UN 2005 World Summit of the UN concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (paras. 138-139 of A/
RES/60/1 – 2005 World Summit Outcome Document). 
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Thus, in accordance with the 2005 UN World Summit, States have the 
R2P their populations from genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. The R2P is based on three pillars: 1) the State’s responsibility 
to protect its own population; 2) the international assistance and reinforcement 
of capacities; and 3) the action of the international community in the event 
that a State fails to protect its own population. The issue of reaction is therefore 
a consequence only if prevention has failed 204, and it also includes the respon-
sibility to rebuild, besides the responsibility to act when crimes are commit-
ted. The international community has the duty to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from these 
crimes; this may imply in last resort the use of coercive force.
While the first two pillars have been approved without much discussion, 
the third one is more controversial, as some countries have expressed fears of 
another formulation of the so-called droit d’ingérence. This is not surprising as it 
constitutes the most extreme form of intervention and may entail irreparable 
damages. Moreover, the experience in Libya demonstrates that it is difficult 
to fulfill the objectives assigned – protecting civilian populations and ensure 
respect for the law, or to strictly stick to the mandate. Nevertheless, all three 
pillars are equally important, so that the third one shall be activated solely in 
last resort. It should therefore be recalled that the prior objective of the R2P 
is to provide a peaceful solution and focuses on prevention. Further, the ICISS 
Report enumerates several conditions that must be fulfilled for a military 
intervention to fall under the R2P: right intention, last resort, proportional 
means, and reasonable prospects. Finally, the third pillar remains subject to the 
respect of international law. In particular, any military action undertaken in this 
respect shall be taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by 
referral to the Security Council.
One may wonder whether the implementation of the R2P as described 
above might not entail an infringement upon the fundamental principle of 
State sovereignty. Yet, as emphasized in the report of the ICISS, one of the aims 
of the R2P is to make the concept of sovereignty enter into a new paradigm, 
that of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 205. Traditionally, sovereignty is defined as 
204 Gareth Evans, «The Responsibility to Protect: consolidating the norm», Da favorite papers, vol. 1, 
2010, p. 73. 
205 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, op. cit., 2001. 
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the absolute and unconditional authority of the State to govern itself. This 
concept has consequences both internally and externally. Internally, this means 
that the State has the power to do everything it deems necessary to govern itself, 
although internal sovereignty has also evolved as a result of democratization, 
thus finding its legitimacy in the people. Externally, the concept of sovereignty 
provides rights and obligations to the State. In particular, sovereignty underlies 
the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, namely the 
sovereign equality of all States, and the principle of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other States 206, with all the consequences that they entail.
However, the R2P intends to change this paradigm, by associating the 
concept of external sovereignty with that of responsibility: «Sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citi-
zenship» 207, so that internal sovereignty implies the obligation to protect one’s 
inhabitants’ dignity and basic rights. As Anne Peters puts it 208:
As internal sovereignty has evolved from a primarily power-based to a 
legitimacy-impregnated concept and from the idea of uniformity to the 
division of powers, so is external sovereignty now evolving. Notably, the 
new concept of sovereignty as responsibility to protect infuses external 
sovereignty with elements of internal sovereignty, because it conditions 
non-intervention (a consequence or corollary of external sovereignty) on 
the capability properly to discharge the internal functions of a sovereign, 
and postulates the sovereign’s accountability vis-à-vis the population 209.
Pursuant to this approach, sovereignty cannot be understood as an absolute 
and unconditional power anymore, insofar as humanity becomes the element 
that legitimizes it. Humanity has become the «normative source and end of 
sovereignty» 210. The word ‘responsibility’ is not an empty concept but entails a 
responsibility to protect basic human rights. If the State fulfills correctly that 
responsibility, then it acquires legitimacy. However, if a State is unable to prevent 
the commission of the most horrendous crimes, namely the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing, it does not properly 
206 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, U.N.T.S. nº 993, article 2. 
207 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, op. cit., 2001, para. 135. 
208 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, pp. 513-544.
209 Ibid., p. 517. 
210 Ibid., p. 518.
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assume its responsibility as sovereign, thus allowing third States to take over that 
responsibility. Anne Orford summarized well this idea in the following terms:
[i]f a government could no longer guarantee the security and welfare of 
the population, it might no longer be recognizable as the lawful authority 
over a territory. Sovereignty, understood in that sense of an obligation to 
preserve life, had become a pooled function. If local claimants to authority 
in Africa – whether they be governments, rebel leaders, militia leaders, civil 
society, or the general population – fail to exercise the responsibility to 
protect citizens, «they cannot legitimately complain against international 
humanitarian intervention». A government that cannot protect its citizens 
may no longer even be recognizable as the lawful authority in a territory 211.
The infringement upon the internal sovereignty thus activates a reaction 
at international level, to the extent that the «obligation to protect basic rights 
of all persons within the State is owed not only to them but also to the inter-
national community» 212. Hence, if the international community decides to take 
action on the basis of the R2P, it would not amount to an infringement of the 
principle of State sovereignty, but rather as a consequence of the incorrect ful-
fillment of sovereignty by the State at stake. In Gareth Evans’ words, «the core 
theme is not intervention but protection» 213.
Thus, in the same way as Common Article 1, the R2P foresees a sys-
tem of collective responsibility in case of international crimes. In this respect, 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli already observed in 
2006 214 that the R2P, far from being a new concept, actually covers the same 
content as already existing concepts such as the late ‘droit d’ingérence’ or more 
importantly, the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Semantics 
change, but the content does not, as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ merely 
assembles several legal concepts into a single framework 215.
In particular, both concepts follow the same logic. Both establish a sys-
tem of collective responsibility at international level pursuant to which third 
211 Anne Orford, «Moral responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect», European Journal of Inter-
national Law, vol. 24(1), 2013, p. 101.
212 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, p. 526.
213 Evans, «The Responsibility to Protect: consolidating the norm», op. cit., 2010, p. 73. 
214 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «De la Responsabilité de Protéger ou d’une nouvelle 
parure», op. cit., 2006, pp. 11-18.
215 Ibid.
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States may intervene in the event of a failure from another State. In the case of 
Common Article 1, third States must take all the possible measures necessary 
to put an end to repeated or serious violations of IHL, while the R2P requires 
third States to protect the basic rights of the inhabitants of a State if the latter 
fails to do so.
While the logic is the same, there are some differences. The R2P is indeed 
a broader concept ratione materiae. It may be activated in the event of violations 
of both IHL and IHRL, as it intends to protect populations from war crimes, 
but also genocides, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing without 
requiring the nexus of an armed conflict. It is also a broader concept ratione 
temporis insofar as it explicitly includes prevention and the responsibility to 
rebuild. As shown by Anne Peters, the «emphasis on protection corresponds to 
the evolution of the contemporary human rights discourse, in which protec-
tion has become the overarching doctrinal paradigm» 216.
Furthermore, the wording of the R2P is more precise than that of Com-
mon Article 1, as the latter is written in broad terms, without even specifying 
the means to achieve the purpose of ensuring respect for IHL. Specifically, the 
R2P explicitly envisages measures, from prevention to military intervention. 
That being said, the measures available for States to ensure respect for IHL and 
to implement the R2P are de facto similar and shall always be undertaken in 
accordance with international law.
Consequently, the R2P is a recent concept which is structurally similar 
to Common Article 1. It goes further than the latter by protecting pop-
ulations from the most serious violations of IHL and IHRL, thanks to a 
progressive interpretation of the principle of sovereignty. The content of 
sovereignty shifts from the notion of power to that of responsibility for the 
protection of peoples’ basic rights. In the same way as Common Article 1, 
it is intended to be at the basis of the international legal order, as it aims to 
preserve the international public order through the establishment of a system 
of collective responsibility binding upon the international community. This 
principle has become popular in the last years and has been implemented on 
several occasions by the UNSC to justify the use of force. Nevertheless, the 
implications of such concept are far from being clear to the extent that its 
legal status is subject to debate.
216 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, p. 525. 
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2.2. An uncertain legal status
The R2P’s legal status is far from being crystal clear as evidenced by the 
number of scholarly publications on this matter. In this respect, calling it a 
‘concept’, a ‘principle’, or a ‘norm’ entails different consequences 217.
It could be argued that it is an instrument of soft law and that it cannot 
be considered in any way as legally binding. In this sense, the inclusion of the 
R2P principle in a General Assembly’s resolution does not necessarily confer 
a compulsory legal effect to it so that it should normally be considered as 
non-binding. However, this approach might be too radical.
A more nuanced approach to the issue considers that not all the elements 
of the R2P benefit from the same legal status. In this respect, Anne-Laure 
Chaumette notes that even if we considered the R2P as a legal norm, it could 
not be interpreted as a duty falling upon third States, but rather as a possibility, 
the responsibility to protect being a secondary obligation. Indeed, she demon-
strates that the R2P is twofold. First, the State in question must protect its own 
population, and there is here a classical obligation, a duty. Second, third States 
are authorized to take action, so that the R2P does not actually enunciate a 
positive obligation, but a legal authorization. The R2P authorizes a particular 
behavior but does not punish the absence thereof. The objective of the R2P, 
in Anne-Laure Chaumette’s view, is not to punish the defaulting State, but 
rather to find a mechanism to restore the legality and effectively protect civil-
ians 218. This approach is shared by Alain Pellet, who considers that the State in 
question indeed has a duty to protect, this duty being a customary obligation; 
however, he also considers that the duty falling upon the international com-
munity is soft 219.
In this line of argument, it could also be argued that the different pillars 
of the R2P benefit from differing legal effects. A representative from Pakistan 
expressed this idea on the occasion of the 2009 UN General Assembly debate 
217 Anne-Laure Chaumette, «La responsabilité de protéger, interrogations sémantique», in An-
ne-Laure Chaumette and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (dir.), La responsabilité de protéger, dix ans après, 
Actes du colloque du 14 novembre 2011, CEDIN, Pedone, 2013, p. 17.
218 Chaumette, «La responsabilité de protéger, interrogations sémantique», op. cit., 2013, pp. 17-18. 
219 Alain Pellet, «What normativity for the Responsibility to Protect?», in Chaumette and Thouve-
nin (dir.), La responsabilité de protéger, dix ans après, op. cit., 2013, pp. 185-191.
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on the R2P in the following terms: «If members have not noticed, let me point 
out that everyone agrees to pillars one and two» 220.
Nevertheless, others purport that the R2P as a whole has effectively 
become a legal norm:
the reiteration of the principle of sovereignty as implying responsibility 
to protect, and its limited, but partly inconsistent application in practice, 
has promoted its ongoing process of crystallization into hard international 
law 221.
As observed by Jean-Marc Thouvenin, the case-law of the ICJ also stresses 
that «[it] is well recognized that declarations [...] may have the effect of creat-
ing legal obligations», and «the sole relevant question is whether the language 
employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear intention [...]» 222. In this 
context, the Resolution was approved unanimously, thus reaching universal 
endorsement. In the view of Alex J. Bellamy, the inclusion of the R2P concept 
in the World Summit Outcome:
transformed the principle, from a commission proposal actively supported 
by a relatively small number of like-minded States’ to a concept ‘endorsed 
by the entire UN membership 223.
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, the R2P has two recipients, not 
only the population but also the international community. It consequently 
aims to become an erga omnes norm 224, whose violation is in the interest of the 
international community as a whole. Be that as it may, endorsing the R2P as 
an erga omnes obligation cannot give rise to an entitlement to the use of lethal 
force, as the R2P always remain subject to international law, including the UN 
Charter.
220 UN GAOR, 63rd Session, 98th plen. mtg, p. 4, UN Doc. A/63/PV.98, 24/07/2009. Quoted in 
Jonah Eaton, «An emerging Norm – Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the Respon-
sibility to Protect», University of Michigan Law School, vol. 32(4), 2011, p. 790. 
221 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, p. 524. 
222 Jean-Marc Thouvenin, «The legal effects of the Responsibility to Protect commitments», in 
Chaumette and Thouvenin (dir.), La responsabilité de protéger, dix ans après, op. cit., 2013, pp. 10-12. 
223 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: the Global Effect to End Mass Atrocities, 2009, p. 95. Quoted 
in Anne Orford, «Moral responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect», op. cit., 2013, p. 102. 
224 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, p. 526. 
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According to the UN Secretary General, the legal nature of the R2P 
originates not only from the concept of sovereignty understood as responsi-
bility but also from pre-existing fundamental principles of international law 225. 
In this regard, while the responsibility to protect from war crimes is already 
established by IHL through Common Article 1, other instruments of IHRL 
also stipulate erga omnes obligations. In the above-mentioned Barcelona Trac-
tion Case, the ICJ held the following:
[a]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising 
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very 
nature, the former are the concern of all States. In the view of the impor-
tance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in 
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, 
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from 
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the 
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general 
international law... others are conferred by international instruments of a 
universal or quasi-universal character 226.
In the same line, the ILC gave as examples of jus cogens norms the prohi-
bition of, inter alia, genocide and racial discrimination in its Commentary to 
the ‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ in 2001 227. Likewise, it referred to 
crimes against humanity as one of the «most frequently cited candidates for 
the status of jus cogens» in its Report on ‘Fragmentation of international law’ 228. 
As a result, it seems reasonable to agree with Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 
and Luigi Condorelli when they talk about a new ornament for a well-estab-
225 Report of the Secretary General on Responsibility to Protect: timely and decisive response, 
A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25.07.2012, p. 3. 
226 ICJ, Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. 
Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32. 
227 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on article 4, paras. 4-6 in Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Fifth-sixth Session (A/56/10), pp. 283-284.
228 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of In-
ternational Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international 
law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13.04.2006, p. 189. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/
CN.4/L.682 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
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lished concept («une nouvelle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie») 229. 
The R2P actually brings different existing elements of international law into 
a single unified framework.
Conclusions 
Chapter 1
Common Article 1 and the R2P establish a system of collective responsibility 
in case of violations of IHL and mass atrocities respectively. While the former 
focuses on the violations of IHL, the latter aims to tackle violations of both IHL 
and IHRL. Both systems participate in the creation of a multilevel governance 
system, whereby the international community takes action in case of failure at 
State level. As a result, they constitute one aspect of the implementation of IHL.
While Common Article 1 benefits from an undisputable legal authority 
and is considered an obligation of quasi-constitutional 230 nature in the inter-
national legal order, the same cannot be said about the R2P, whose legal status 
has not been unanimously decided yet. In any case, the emergence of the R2P 
as a norm of international law reinforces the authority of Common Article 1, 
as it is a structurally similar concept. It contributes to the development of an 
international legal framework that establishes a system of collective respon-
sibility whenever international crimes were to be committed. What happens 
within the borders of a State has become a matter of international concern 
whenever serious or repeated violations of IHL and human rights occur, and 
States can no longer protect themselves behind the principle of sovereignty. In 
this respect, while the normativity of pillar three of the R2P is not definite, 
there seems to be an international consensus concerning pillar one as a legal 
norm, that is, on sovereignty as responsibility.
Pursuant to the system established by Common Article 1, States are 
placed under a duty to ensure respect for IHL internally and externally. Com-
229 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «De la Responsabilité de Protéger ou d’une nouvelle», 
op. cit., 2006, pp. 11-18.
230 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, «Common Article 1 revisited: Protecting collective 
interest», op. cit., 2000, pp. 68, 85-86. 
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mon Article 1 sets up a decentralized system of compliance whereby States are 
made guardians of the respect for IHL. Common Article 1 indeed stipulates an 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL by other States, a «multi-faceted responsi-
bility» 231 falling upon all States, which requires them to act before, during and 
after warfare.
It first entails measures in time of peace, to prevent IHL violations from 
occurring, such as the adoption of domestic legislation transposing IHL or 
the dissemination of IHL among the civilian population. The underpinning is 
the following: if States take all the necessary measures in times of peace, then 
they will be ready to conduct hostilities in accordance with IHL. In prag-
matic terms, it would indeed appear more difficult for the armed forces, just 
to name those, to learn how to conduct hostilities lawfully during warfare. As 
a result, one important challenge is to reach the future members of non-State 
armed groups, as they are responsible for a significant number of IHL viola-
tions. Disseminating and promoting IHL not only within the armed forces but 
also among civilians is indeed essential. Furthermore, the use of conditionality 
clauses, especially in arms trade, is an effective means to implement the preven-
tive aspect of Common Article 1. The objective at the stage of prevention is 
arguably to avoid that the irreparable is committed, and in practical terms, this 
is probably an essential aspect of Common Article 1.
The obligation to ensure respect for IHL also requires States to react 
during an armed conflict, in order to end IHL violations. In this respect, third 
States may conduct different individual actions, from political dialogue to eco-
nomic action, to exert pressure on the belligerent party infringing upon IHL. 
Nonetheless, countermeasures and military intervention can only be agreed 
upon within the framework of the UN and remain subject to international 
law, in particular to the prohibition of the use of force.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, this obligation is conceived as a best 
effort obligation, or a due diligence obligation. It would indeed be unrealistic to 
obtain the effective cessation of any IHL violation from third States. A concomi-
tant issue therefore arises: even though third States cannot be required to success-
fully stop IHL violations, one could wonder what would be the consequences in 
the absence of reaction from third States in the case of serious or repeated vio-
231 Stutz, Blazeby and Goussac, «Strengthening compliance with International Humanitarian Law», 
op. cit., 2015, p. 54.
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lations of IHL. In accordance with the fundamental principles of international 
law, if a State breaches upon its international obligations, it entails its interna-
tional responsibility 232. As a result, it is possible to wonder whether an omission 
can entail the international responsibility of third States to the armed conflict. 
While this line of reasoning might seem appealing in order to ensure that third 
States effectively take all the possible measures to implement Common Article 1, 
it seems unrealistic and extremely difficult to enforce as it would be practically 
unfeasible to entail the responsibility of all the States that have not taken action 
in response to an armed conflict taking place in a third country. Furthermore, 
it shifts the focus from the most pressing issue: that the State actually infringing 
upon IHL is brought back to an attitude of compliance.
That being said, all States arguably do not have the same capacities and 
political bonds with one another, so that differing responsibilities should prob-
ably be established. In this regard, one could claim that the States’ actual capac-
ity to influence the infringing State is the determining element. As mentioned 
above, Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo argue that if a State is closely tied to 
one of the warring parties, its duty to ensure respect for IHL is stronger 233. This 
position is in line with the case-law of the ICJ on the obligation to prevent 
genocide 234.
It could also be argued that the permanent members of the UNSC have 
a more important role to play, an approach already proposed by the ICISS 
Report with regard to the R2P. Being the institution in charge of establishing 
and maintaining international peace and security pursuant to the UN Charter, 
it arguably holds an important role in this regard and the same reasoning could 
be made with regard to Common Article 1. This perspective is actually sus-
tained by practice, as the UNSC has already described IHL violations as threats 
to international peace and security.
In this regard, the UN Secretary General proposed to require the five 
permanent members to abstain and not veto resolutions authorizing interna-
232 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 
2001, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement nº 10 (A/56/10), 
chp.IV.E.1) (hereafter, ‘ARSIWA’), articles 1-2. Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../
ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf&lang=EF (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
233 ARSIWA.
234 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Re-
ports 2007, p. 43, para. 430. 
114 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
tional reaction in situations where people are at risk of mass atrocities, but the 
UN General Assembly did not endorse this proposal in 2009 235. Nonetheless, 
there have been some changes since 2009. In this sense, Jonah Eaton actually 
considers that there are legal expectations towards the UNSC from the inter-
national community to take action in situations of international crimes:
There is now a heavy accumulated weight of opinio juris, both from op-
ponents and advocates of responsibility to protect, that the Security Cou-
ncil should act in cases of mass atrocity crimes, despite the considerable 
degree of mistrust revealed 236.
It is important noticing that one of the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council, France, has undertaken a campaign in this sense. In response to 
Russia’s constant use of its right to veto in relation with the Syrian conflict, a 
French-Mexican initiative was proposed before the General Assembly inviting 
the permanent members of the UNSC to refrain from using their right to veto 
in the event of mass atrocities 237. In particular, the political statement describes 
«crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale» as 
threats to international peace and security requiring action by the international 
community. It also calls for international action and specifically refers to the R2P 
principle. The political statement refers to the right to veto as a ‘responsibility’ 
rather than a privilege. In parallel to this, the Accountability, Coherence and 
Transparency Group 238 drafted a ‘Code of conduct regarding Security Council 
action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ 239. At the time 
235 According to Jonah Eaton, only over thirty-five states echoed the Secretary-General’s Report’s 
call that Security Council members refrain from using the veto in situations where people are at 
risk of mass atrocities. See Eaton, «An emerging Norm – Determining the Meaning and Legal 
Status of the Responsibility to Protect», op. cit., 2011, p. 797.
236 Ibid., p. 801.
237 70th General Assembly of the United Nations, Political statement on the suspension of the veto 
in case of mass atrocities presented by France and Mexico, Open to signature to the members of 
the United Nations. Available at: http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/French%20
Mexican%20Proposal%20English.pdf (Accessed: 06.10.2015). 
238 The Accountability, Coherence, Transparency Group was created in 2013 under the auspices of 
the Swiss government. It is a regional group uniting 27 small and medium States whose objec-
tive is to improve the coherence and transparency of the Security Council.
239 Explanatory Note on a Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against geno-
cide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Available at: http://www.unelections.org/files/
Code%20of%20Conduct_EN.pdf (Accessed: 06.10.2015).
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of writing, the French-Mexican initiative has gathered the support of more than 
75 States, while the Code of conduct has been supported by 53 States 240. The 
initiative is gaining visibility. On the occasion of the 70th session of the General 
Assembly in 2015, the then French President of the Republic publicly renounced 
to using its right of veto in case of mass atrocities, thus adding pressure:
La France veut que les membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité ne 
puissent plus recourir au droit de veto en cas d’atrocités de masse. Com-
ment admettre que l’ONU, encore aujourd’hui, puisse rester paralysée, 
lorsque le pire se produit ? Là aussi, montrons l’exemple. Je m’engage ici à 
ce que la France n’utilise jamais son droit de veto lorsqu’il y a des atrocités 
de masse.
Le droit de veto, tel qu’il avait été introduit lors de la fondation des 
Nations unies n’était pas le droit de bloquer. C’était le devoir d’agir. Nous 
devons agir. Nous pouvons agir. Nous l’avons montré depuis 70 ans. Là, 
aujourd’hui, nous pouvons agir pour régler les drames d’aujourd’hui et 
sauver la planète demain. Agissons 241.
While the effects of such initiative remain to be seen, they arguably high-
light a certain change regarding the prerogatives of the UNSC and certainly 
tilt the balance in favor of a duty for the UNSC to act. Without going that far, 
some have argued that Common Article 1 entails «an obligation to explain and 
justify inactivity, or even potentially obstructing voting behavior in a multilat-
eral forum» 242.
These developments are interesting insofar as they aim to provide the 
UNSC’s permanent Member States with a higher duty, which stems from its 
particular role in maintaining international peace and security. Since this insti-
tution has already taken action to ensure respect for IHL, it might be argued 
that its permanent Member States are more responsible for ensuring respect 




241 Débat général de la 70ème Assemblée générale des Nations unies – Discours de M. François 
Hollande, président de la République française – Assemblée générale – 28.09.2015. Available 
at: http://www.franceonu.org/70eme-Assemblee-generale-des-Nations-unies-le-discours-de-
Francois-Hollande (Accessed: 06.10.2015). 
242 Geiβ, «The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions», op. cit., 2015, 
pp. 129-130.
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for IHL than the other States. Nonetheless, given the current state of interna-
tional law, it probably is possible to talk about a soft duty only and assigning 
responsibility in the technical legal sense to the UNSC permanent members 
in case of omission has not yet occurred.
This discussion also highlights one of the main issues regarding IHL: «the 
need to enhance the effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance». Indeed, the 
Protecting Powers mechanism has been underused; the IHFFC has never been 
activated, so that, in fine, the institution in charge of monitoring compliance 
with IHL during armed conflicts is the ICRC. However, some of these activi-
ties, such as public denunciations, cannot be undertaken by the ICRC.
The system established by Common Article 1, completed by the R2P and 
IHRL, is therefore undeniably perfectible, insofar as the action of the inter-
national community to ensure respect for IHL, especially regarding interven-
tion, can remain conditioned by political interests. This consideration also adds 
weight to the necessity of prevention, to take all the possible measures in peace-
time to prevent that war crimes and other mass atrocities occur, so as not to be 
in an irreparable situation and need to resort to international criminal law.
Chapter 2 
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC 
LEVELS
The previous chapter is dedicated to the meaning, content, and scope of the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL. It is acknowledged that Common Arti-
cle 1 has become an essential element of IHL and is at the heart of the inter-
national legal order itself. In this regard, while the legal authority of Common 
Article 1 as a system of collective responsibility has been progressively accepted 
in the international legal system, it is equally important to ensure that State 
parties effectively endorse this acceptation of Common Article 1 as they are its 
primary enforcers.
Therefore, the objective pursued in this chapter is to assess whether and 
to what extent the EU 1, France, and Spain are bound by Common Article 1. 
In particular, it seeks to analyze if and how the three actors have transposed 
Common Article 1 into their respective legal orders, and if they have effec-
tively implemented it.
In the first section, the issue of transposition is analyzed. The question of 
the integration of Common Article 1 does not raise much doubt with regard 
to France and Spain, as both are State parties to the Geneva Conventions and 
have enacted legislation to integrate them in their respective legal orders. Con-
versely, this question is especially relevant with respect to the EU, since it can-
not be a party to the Geneva Conventions but has nonetheless adopted a doc-
ument, the Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL 2, which appears to 
‘transpose’ the content of Common Article 1 at EU level.
1 Some paragraphs in this chapter were published in: Bettina Steible, «Externalizing EU values: 
the case of International Humanitarian Law», in Baigorri and Elvert (eds.), Paz y valores europeos 
como possible modelo de integración y progreso en un mundo global = Peace and and European values as a 
potential model for integration and progress in a global words, Cuadernos de Yuste, 11, Brussels, P.I.E. 
Peter Lang, 2019, pp. 77-97.
2 IHL Guidelines.
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In the second section, the practice of the EU, France, and Spain on this 
issue is analyzed. Common Article 1 establishes an obligation mostly towards 
States, so that State practice is a key element of the effective implementation 
of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Analyzing practice serves different 
purposes in this regard. From a strictly legal perspective, it assists in interpret-
ing the norms themselves, in accordance with article 31(1)(b) VCLT 3, and may 
contribute to the crystallization of customary norms, as it is one of the two 
constitutive elements. Lastly, it allows assessing to what extent the principles 
are translated into action, thus raising questions about the norms’ effectiveness.
3 VCLT, article 31.3.b): «Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation» shall be taken into account, together 
with the context when interpreting treaties.
Section 1 
TRANSPOSITION OF THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE 
RESPECT
Pour remplir sa tâche, le droit international est continue-
llement obligé de recourir au droit interne. Sans lui, il 
est, sous de nombreux rapports, tout à fait impuissant 4.
The purpose of IHL is to guarantee the protection of people hors de combat, 
who do not participate or do not participate anymore in the conduct of hos-
tilities. This entails an obligation on the part of State parties to integrate the 
norms contained in IHL treaties into their own legal orders.
This obligation of transposition is based on international law, as it is 
reflected in the principle pacta sunt servanda: «Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith» 5. In this 
sense, article 27 VCLT adds that «[a] party may not invoke the provisions of 
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty» 6. As Claudia 
Sciotti-Lam has shown, treaty-based obligations reflect even more clearly the 
voluntarist nature than customary international law. When it ratifies a treaty, a 
State first consents to it and cannot find justifications to refuse the enforcement 
of such treaty. Otherwise, it would act in bad faith, and therefore, in violation 
of the most elementary principles of general international law. Consequently, 
the binding nature of a treaty for its State parties is based on the expression of 
consent made at the time of ratification. In this context, performance in good 
faith of treaty-based obligations imposes their integration in the legal orders 
of their State parties 7.
In the case of IHL, many of the norms contained in the Geneva Con-
ventions are very detailed. On this basis, it has been sustained that regarding 
the «internal operation of treaties» in IHL, «there is no doubt that most of 
4 Heinrich Triepel, «Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international», RCADI, 1923, 
p. 106. Quoted in Claudia Sciotti-Lam, L’applicabilité des traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de 
l’homme en droit interne, Brussels, Bruylant, 2004, p. 47. 
5 VCLT, article 26. 
6 VCLT, article 27. 
7 Sciotti-Lam, L’applicabilité des traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme en droit interne, 
op. cit., 2004, pp. 36-46. 
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their provisions are of a self-executing character» 8 as they do not require spe-
cial implementing measures for their direct application. Conversely, a limited 
number of provisions are not self-executing, those «specifying, explicitly or 
implicitly, that States must provide for special means for implementation» 9.
In this context, the objective of this section is to analyze how the EU, 
France, and Spain have integrated Common Article 1 into their respective 
legal orders. It is argued in that regard that national legislation plays an impor-
tant role in ensuring respect for IHL. Quite intuitively, it constitutes a reaffir-
mation of State parties’ commitment, already expressed at the moment of rati-
fication, and therefore contributes to the formation of opinio juris in that sense. 
This obligation of transposition is even more relevant in the case of Common 
Article 1, as there is no universal or regional mechanism of enforcement of 
the law and the correct implementation and application of IHL remains in the 
hands of the State parties. Finally, it constitutes a measure for implementation 
of IHL 10 and thus contributes to the enforcement of Common Article 1.
Despite a limited legal framework and a lack of attributed competence, the 
EU has ambitiously ‘transposed’ Common Article 1 by means of its Guidelines 
on ensuring compliance with IHL, thus reflecting its founding values. As for 
France and Spain, the issue of transposition is not very problematic, as both have 
adopted a monist approach to international law. In this respect, they have ratified 
the Geneva Conventions and adopted the measures necessary for their integra-
tion in their respective legal orders. Therefore, attention has been paid to policy 
documents with a view to analyze their approach to Common Article 1.
1. THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN OBLIGATION TO «PROMOTE 
COMPLIANCE WITH IHL»
In a ground-breaking article published in 2002 in the International Review 
of the Red Cross, Tristan Ferraro explained how International Humanitarian 
8 Krzysztof Drewicki, «National legislation as a measure for implementation of international hu-
manitarian law», in Frits Kalshovenand and Yves Sandoz, Implementation of International Humani-
tarian Law/Mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1989, p. 111.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., pp. 109-131.
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Law had entered into the EU’s sphere 11 by way of its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (hereafter, ‘CFSP’) to the point that the EU can be consi-
dered a ‘driving force’ of the implementation and creation of IHL («moteur 
de la mise en oeuvre et de la création du droit international humanitaire») 12. 
Nonetheless, a few decades before, this question was not even imaginable as 
the European Community, and later the EU, did not have a claim to be an 
IHL actor. The prior objective of the European Communities was econo-
mical 13. In that respect, they used to be considered the «economic Europe» 
as opposed to the «Europe of human rights», embodied by the Council of 
Europe. Furthermore, as the project of European Defense was rejected in 
1952 14, there was no reason for the European Community to interfere in the 
area of IHL.
However, as the European economic integration had advanced, European 
leaders felt the need to democratize and politicize the European Community, 
and later on, the European Union. The idea of a political union has made its 
way so that a CFSP has been envisaged as well and created eventually in 1992. 
Today, despite the fact that the EU is one of the first economic powers in the 
world, it is still seeking its political power, especially at the international level. 
In this regard, the EU is often regarded as an economic giant, but a political 
dwarf. It is clear that the EU has not achieved such a political integration that 
it is able to speak with one voice at the international level.
Nevertheless, the EU has brought IHL into its area of concern. It should 
be noted that this appropriation of IHL by the EU is not without problems 
insofar it increases the complexity of the relationship between International, 
European and domestic law. The EU’s intervention in the IHL sphere is thus 
at the crossroads of various contemporary mutations: the transformation of the 
EU from an economic to a political entity, as well as the slowing down of the 
image of the State on the international scene. It likewise highlights the com-
plexity of the relationship between the different corpuses of law, which are not 
subject to a clear-cut division but actually evolve with regard to each other. 
11 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, pp. 435-
461. 
12 Ibid., pp. 444-450. 
13 José Carlos Remotti Carbonell, «La estrategia común europea contra el terrorismo», in Teresa 
Freixes et. al., La gouvernance multi-level. Penser l’enchevêtrement, Brussels, E. M. E, 2012, p. 153.
14 Treaty of Paris, 1952.
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This is particularly relevant for the EU, some sort of unidentified legal object 
torn between international law and domestic law.
The obligation to ensure respect for IHL is enshrined in Common Arti-
cle 1, a provision contained in a multilateral treaty. However, it is possible to 
wonder whether the EU is bound by such obligation. While it is commonly 
accepted among scholars and international practitioners that Common Article 
1 applies not only to the parties of an armed conflict, but also to third States to 
the armed conflict at stake, the legal nexus with the EU is not self-explaining 
insofar as the EU is not a State. Indeed, EU practice in the field of IHL, and 
in particular in its promotion, is possible to identify 15; however, it remains 
uncertain whether this practice is due to an opinio juris or to a choice of public 
policy.
It is argued that the EU is indeed placed under a duty to ensure respect 
for IHL. Actually, the EU already started to act as if it were bound by Com-
mon Article 1 within the frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
even before adopting its Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL in 
2005.
It should be noted that there are external and internal legal factors that 
compel the EU to enforce Common Article 1. The EU is indeed subject to 
a legal duty to ensure respect for IHL, albeit it has interpreted this duty on 
a softer tone and have referred to ‘promoting compliance’ with IHL. In this 
regard, the European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with IHL 
are especially important, as they represent to some extent the EU ‘transposi-
tion’ of Common Article 1 into the EU legal order, even though they consti-
tute an instrument of soft law.
It is argued that Common Article 1 establishes a legal duty upon the EU. 
There are indeed different elements that tilt the balance in favor of some link 
with IHL. Firstly, despite the willingness of the EU to build an autonomous 
legal order 16 distinct from international law, the EU is an international actor, 
dotted with legal personality. As a consequence, it must comply with interna-
tional law, and a fortiori with customary international law, as is the case with 
15 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002; Josiane 
Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», in Millet-Devalle, L’UE 
et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010.
16 ECJ, Case C-6/64, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] 
ECR 585.
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 123
Common Article 1. Secondly, the EU legal order itself compels the EU to 
comply with Common Article 1, as a result of its ‘transposition’ through the 
adoption of the ‘Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL’ in 2005 17 and 
more importantly of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
1.1. An obligation derived from customary international law
If one were to follow the traditional course of international law, the Euro-
pean Union could not be a party to the Geneva Conventions, and conse-
quently, would not be bound by Common Article 1. Nonetheless, the special 
nature of Common Article 1 in the international legal order establishes a legal 
obligation for the EU. Indeed, its customary nature as well as the fact that it is 
an erga omnes obligation turns it into a compulsory duty for the EU.
1.1.1. The absence of obligation derived from Treaty Law
The EU is an international organization dotted with international legal 
personality and as such, it is an international actor that must act pursuant to 
international law, a situation confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon 18.
The EU did not have international legal personality and was unable to 
conclude international treaties until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lis-
bon 19. It is clear that the EU as such did not wait until the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon to be an active international player, but it helped clarify 
the status of the EU and put an end to the academic debate on this aspect.
Consequently, the question regarding the integration of international law 
into the EU legal order arises. In this respect, scholars used to agree on the 
idea that the EU legal order was monist in its relations with international law. 
However, the 2008 Kadi judgment 20 seems to have changed this view, as the 
17 IHL Guidelines.
18 TEU, articles 3 and 21. 
19 TEU, article 47: «The Union shall have legal personality». 
20 Joines Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 Sep-
tember 2008, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351. 
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Court of Justice adopted the «Solange» 21 reasoning and appeared to follow a 
dualist approach. An individual challenged the implementation at EU level of 
a United Nations Security Council resolution which mandated that his assets 
be frozen as a result of its involvement with terrorism. Therefore, as evidenced 
by Gráinne de Búrca, the case was particularly sensitive:
The case presented a direct confrontation between the U.N. system 
of international security and peace, with its aspirations to general appli-
cability and universal normative force, and the EU system, situated so-
mewhere between an international organization and a constitutional 
polity 22.
Actually, the ECJ revolutionized the relationship between international 
law and the European legal order. Acting as a constitutional court, it refused 
to recognize the primacy of the UNSC resolution over EU law, and annulled 
Council Regulation 881/2002 by arguing that it was not compatible with 
fundamental rights, one of the very foundations of the EU legal order:
Those provisions cannot, however, be understood to authorize any de-
rogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foun-
dation of the Union 23.
21 In reference to the famous judgments of the German Constitutional Court on the relationship 
between EU law and German constitutional law, in particular with regard to fundamental rights: 
«As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community law receives a 
catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament and of settled validity, which is 
adequate in comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law, a 
reference by a court of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Federal Constitutional Court 
in judicial review proceedings, following the obtaining of a ruling of the European Court under 
Article 177 of the Treaty, is admissible and necessary if the German court regards the rule of 
Community law which is relevant to its decision as inapplicable in the interpretation given by 
the European Court, because and in so far as it conflicts with one of the fundamental rights of 
the Basic Law».
 See BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I-Beschluß, 19/05/1974; BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 
197/83 Solange II-decision, 22 October 1986. 
22 Gráinne De Búrca, «The International Legal Order after Kadi», Harvard International Law Journal, 
vol. 51(1), 2010, p. 5. 
23 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 Sep-
tember 2008, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351, para. 303. 
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In spite of this judgment, the EU legal order is actually more open to the 
influence of international law than some other systems 24. In this regard, Article 
216(2) of the TFEU recalls that the international agreements concluded by the 
EU are binding upon its institutions and Member States. As observed by Chris-
tina Eckes, the Court has consistently held that «the primacy of international 
agreements concluded by the Community [Union] over secondary [...] legisla-
tion requires that the latter be interpreted, in so far as is possible, in conformity 
with those agreements» 25. She also demonstrates that despite the fact that the 
EU has adopted a dualist approach in recent times, «this should not lead to the 
immediate conclusion that the Court has become less international law friend-
ly» 26 as its case-law also includes judgments very open to international law and 
usually attempts to interpret EU law in light of international law.
Regarding IHL specifically, it should be noted first that there are no direct 
references to it in the founding treaties of the EU. As Valentina Falco high-
lights 27, the attempt of the ICRC to persuade EU Member States to include 
IHL in the section dealing with foreign and security policy during the nego-
tiations of the Amsterdam Treaty proved to be unsuccessful. This gap has not 
been filled in the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, even though the EU has inter-
national legal personality, IHL treaties can be ratified by States only, not by 
international organizations. This situation might change in the future insofar 
as international relations are evolving and do not rely on the sole State actor 
anymore. A symptomatic example of this change is the foreseen accession of 
the EU to the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of human 
24 Enzo Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R. A. Wessel, «Introduction: International Law as Law of the 
European Union», in Enzo Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R. A. Wessel, International Law as Law of 
the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 2. 
25 Case C-335/05, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 June 2007, Řízení Letového Pro-
vozu ČR, s.p. v. Bundesamt für Finanzen, [2007] ECR I-4307, para. 16 with reference to Case 
C-61/94, Judgment of the Court of 10 September 1996, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR 
I-3989, para. 52; Case C-286/02, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 April 2004, Bel-
lio F.lli [2004] ECR I-3465, para. 33; Case C-311/04, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) 
of 12 January 2006, Algemenes Scheeps Agentuur Dordrecht [2006] ECR I-609, para. 25; Joined 
Cases C-447/05 and C-448/05, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 8 March 2007, 
Thomson and Vestel France [2007] ECR I-2049, para. 30. Quoted in Christina Eckes, «Interna-
tional Law as Law of the EU: The role of the Court of Justice», CLEER Working Papers 6, 2010, 
p. 11. 
26 Eckes, «International Law as Law of the EU: The role of the Court of Justice», op. cit., 2010, p. 16. 
27 Falco, «Symposium on complementing international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2009, p. 188.
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter, the ‘ECHR’) as provided by 
article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union. In the same way, the Council of 
Europe modified the Statute of the aforementioned Convention so as to allow 
the EU to adhere to it 28. While the EU cannot become a party to IHL treaties 
for the time being, one may wonder whether there are other means to connect 
the EU with IHL, especially as a passive actor of IHL.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that all the EU Member States are 
parties to the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, their actions are subject to the 
respect for IHL, which also includes their actions within the frame of the EU. 
It would be quite contradictory – or convenient – for EU Member States not 
to comply with IHL by protecting themselves behind some sort of EU ‘shield’. 
In this line of argument, the applicability of IHL to international organiza-
tions – including the EU – ever-increasingly involved in peace operations has 
been debated in the international scholarship 29. Recent advances in the field 
of common defense and security augur further developments in this sense 30.
In this context, one may wonder whether the doctrine of functional suc-
cession is applicable. Article 351 TFEU holds that the international agreements 
binding upon the Member States that were concluded before 1958 enjoy a 
special status and shall not be derogated by EU Law 31. However, this is not 
satisfactory insofar as for the doctrine of functional succession to be applicable, 
the EU must explicitly hold competence in this matter. Nonetheless, this is not 
the case in IHL matters and EU competences do not cover all the areas gov-
erned by the Geneva Conventions. Consequently, a «full transfer of powers» 
from the Member States to the EU cannot take place 32.
28 Protocol nº 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, amending the control system of the Convention, article 17. 
29 See, for instance, Ferraro, «The applicability and application of international humanitarian law 
to multinational forces», op. cit., 2013, pp. 561-612; Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s 
Security and Defence Policy, op. cit., 2010; Beruto, International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and 
Peace Operations, op. cit., 2008. 
30 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/14820/mogherini-%20pres-
entsimplementation-plan-on-security-and-defence-to-eu-ministers_en (Accessed: 16.11.2016).
31 TFEU, article 351: «The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more 
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be 
affected by the provisions of the Treaties». 
32 ECJ, Case C-301/08, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 22 October 2009, Irène 
Bogiatzi v. Deutscher Luftpool, Société Luxair, European Communities, Luxembourg, Foyer 
Assurances Sam [2009] ECR I-10185.
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Thus, it appears that the EU cannot be bound by Common Article 1 by 
means of a treaty obligation, as it cannot become a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions and does not hold competence in this regard. However, an obligation 
can be established on the basis of the customary nature of Common Article 1.
1.1.2. An obligation derived from the customary nature of Common 
Article 1
It is argued that the EU is bound by the obligation to ensure respect for 
IHL because of the special position of the Geneva Conventions in general, 
and of Common Article 1 in particular, in the international legal order. In the 
words of Tristan Ferraro, the EU is at least a «passive subject» 33 of Common 
article 1.
As explained in Chapter 1, the Geneva Conventions reached universal 
ratification and have customary status. In particular, Common Article 1 is 
an erga omnes obligation which ensures the respect for, inter alia, peremptory 
norms. Against this background, it is commonly accepted that international 
organizations are bound by customary international law in their external 
relations. As observed by Frederik Naert, this link is subject to the principle 
of specialty. It exists if the norms at stake are relevant for the activities of 
the international organization in question, and the latter has the capacity 
to apply such norms 34. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by article 
38 of the ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations’ (not yet 
into force):
Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from 
becoming binding upon a third State or a third organization as a customary 
rule of international law, recognized as such 35.
33 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 459.
34 Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, op. cit., 2010, p. 391. See, in 
particular, footnote 1740. 
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations (adopted 20 March 1986, not yet entered into force) 
(1986), 25 ILM 543. 
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Nonetheless, as Frederik Naert emphasizes, the objective of this provision 
is not to confirm the subjection of international organizations to customary 
international law, but rather to refute their systematic exclusion 36.
In this context, the EU case-law has considered on several occasions that 
the EU must comply with customary law. In the A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt Mainz, the Court of Justice recognized customary international 
law as a source of EU law in the context of the law of treaties:
The rules of customary international law concerning the termination 
and suspension of treaty relations by reason of a fundamental change in 
circumstances are binding on the European Community institutions and 
form part of the Community legal order 37.
As Valentina Falco has shown, the Intertanko case of 2008 further con-
firmed such approach by considering that treaty law applies to the EU to the 
extent that it expresses customary international law:
The powers of the Community must be exercised in observance of in-
ternational law, including provisions of international agreements in so far as 
they codify customary rules of general international law 38.
In the same way, as observed by Christina Eckes, the ECJ held that even 
though the Vienna Convention regulates international agreements concluded 
between States only, it also applies to an agreement concluded by the EU and 
therefore binds upon the EU, insofar as it expresses general customary inter-
national law 39.
36 Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, op. cit., 2010, p. 391. See, in 
particular, footnote 1740. 
37 ECJ, Judgment of the Court of 25 January 1979, Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt Mainz, [1998], ECR I-3655, para. 46. Quoted in De Búrca, «The International 
Legal Order after Kadi», op. cit., 2010, p. 6. 
38 ECJ, Case C-308/06, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 June 2008, The Queen, 
on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) 
and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR I-04057, para. 51. Quoted in Falco, 
«Symposium on complementing international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2009, p. 184.
39 ECJ, Case C-386/08, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 25 February 2010, Brita 
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafenm [2010], paras. 40-42. Quoted in Eckes «International 
Law as Law of the EU: The role of the Court of Justice», op. cit., 2010, p. 16. 
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Thus, if one applies this case-law to IHL, one may infer that the EU is 
indeed bound by Common Article 1. This interpretation is actually ratified 
by the 2016 Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, which states that 
international organizations are bound by customary IHL, especially Commo 
Article 1:
International organizations are – in the current state of international 
law – not directly or formally bound by the Conventions because only 
States may become ‘High Contracting Parties’. However, it is now widely 
agreed that, as subjects of international law, they are bound by customary 
international humanitarian law, and thus also by the obligations to respect 
and to ensure respect for that body of law 40.
The conclusions of Rapporteur Paolo Mengozzi in relation with the 
2015 Diakité Case are worth mentioning in this regard. In this case, the Court 
of Justice of the EU had to pronounce itself on the meaning of the concept 
of ‘internal armed conflict’ as provided by article 15(c) of Council Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004_ in order to decide whether Mr. Diakité could 
be eligible to subsidiary protection. Rapporteur Paolo Mengozzi confirmed 
that the EU is bound by IHL even though it is not a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions and used the case-law of the ICJ to do so:
D’une part, l’obligation d’interprétation conforme n’a été posée, 
en principe, que par rapport aux engagements internationaux qui lient 
l’Union. En l’espèce, s’il est constant que l’Union n’est pas partie aux con-
ventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 et à leurs protocoles additionnels, la 
Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) a affirmé que ces actes expriment des 
«principes intransgressibles du droit international coutumier». En tant que 
tels, ils lient les institutions, y compris la Cour qui doit assurer une lecture 
du droit de l’Union conforme à ces principes 41.
Even though this paragraph was not reproduced in the Court’s judg-
ment, it is an indicator that demonstrates that not only the EU must act in 
40 See «Article 1: Respect and Ensure Respect», in Henckaerts (dir.), Updated Commentary on the 
First Geneva Convention, op. cit., 2016, para. 139.
41 Case C-285/12, of 18 July 2013, Aboubacar Diakité v. Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux 
apatrides (18 July 2013), Conclusions of Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi, para. 26.
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accordance with established principles of customary international law, but that 
its legal order must comply with the customary principles expressed in the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. In this sense, EU offi-
cials have made several statements reaffirming the customary character of the 
Geneva Conventions. By way of example, Anna Sotaniemi, in her quality of 
legal adviser before the Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN affirmed that 
«most of the provisions of the [Geneva] Conventions and their 1977 additional 
protocols are generally recognized as customary law» 42.
It therefore appears that the EU is bound by Common Article 1 at least 
in its internal dimension, i.e. the EU must take all the appropriate measures 
to ensure that IHL is respected internally. However, it is possible to wonder 
whether the same reasoning applies to the external dimension of Common 
Article 1. The 2016 Commentary to the first Geneva Convention provides 
some elements of clarification in the following terms:
At the same time, and even absent any such exercise of command and 
control, international organizations, whether or not they are themselves 
party to the conflict, are also obliged under customary international law to 
ensure respect by others. This is particularly the case where the organiza-
tion has mandated the use of armed force in the first place, or engages in 
operations in support of other Parties to the conflict 43.
The obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others is therefore clearly 
established for international organizations, including the EU. In this regard, the 
EU has increasingly deployed military operations and civilian missions all over 
the globe within the frame of its Common Security and Defence Policy 44, so 
that it may fulfill command and control tasks or support other parties to an 
armed conflict. It should be noted nonetheless that the wording to the official 
Commentary does not require the use of armed force or support for other 
parties to the armed conflict for an international organization to be expected 
42 Statement by Ms. Anna Sotaniemi, Legal adviser, Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN on 
behalf of the EU, UNGA, 61st session, 6th committee, Agenda Item 75: Status of the Protocols 
Additionals to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims in 
armed conflicts, New York. Quoted in Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and 
Defence Policy, op. cit., 2010, p. 533. 
43 Ibid., para. 25.
44 It has 17 operations and missions deployed all over the world at the time of writing. 
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to comply with Common Article 1 and take action to ensure respect for IHL. 
This is consistent with the fact that Common Article 1 establishes an obliga-
tion of due diligence, which binds third actors to the armed conflict gradually, 
depending on their capacity to influence the behavior of the warring parties. 
As a matter of fact, the 2016 Commentary clarifies that international organ-
izations remain subject to the obligation to ensure respect due to – first and 
foremost – the customary nature of this obligation. As a result, the EU cannot 
elude its responsibility and has the obligation to take all the necessary and 
reasonable measures to ensure respect for IHL in all situations, including those 
where it has not sent a military operation or a civilian mission.
Thus, even without being a formal party to the Geneva Conventions, the 
EU is subject to a customary obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others, i.e. 
in its external dimension. Furthermore, this obligation has been received in the 
EU legal order by way of the adoption of the Guidelines on promoting com-
pliance with IHL. There are also internal factors that make the EU a potential 
subject of Common Article 1.
1.2. An obligation derived from the EU legal order
The EU’s duty to ensure respect for IHL does not only stem from its cus-
tomary obligations, but also from the EU legal order. As a matter of fact, even 
before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU already acted as if it 
were bound by Common Article 1. It was notably one of the priorities of the 
EU for the 63rd General Assembly of the UN:
The EU will continue to promote and improve compliance with 
international humanitarian law in a visible and consistent manner. In 
addition the EU attaches great importance to the implementation of 
the Responsibility to protect, a concept that was endorsed at the 2005 
World Summit, and emphasizes the need for further consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity in the General Assembly and the 
Security Council 45.
45 European Union Priorities for the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations, 16 June 2008, 
Brussels.
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Indeed, the EU intends as much as possible to fulfill the obligation «to 
ensure respect» for IHL by others. It means that the EU takes «all possible 
steps to ensure that the rules are respected by all, and in particular by parties 
to conflict» 46. Here, the choice of the vocabulary is significant, as the wording 
of Common Article 1 is used. It demonstrates that the EU recognizes that the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL establishes an obligation of due diligence 
for third parties to an armed conflict, in concordance with the current domi-
nant approach in this sense.
In this respect, even though the EU is not formally bound by IHL treaties, 
it can adopt a declaration whereby it commits to act in accordance with such 
treaties, and for the purposes of this thesis, with the obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL. This is precisely what the EU did when it adopted the Guidelines on 
promoting compliance with IHL in 2005 which were further updated in 2009 
during the Swedish Presidency 47. In this regard, one could say that the EU has 
integrated Common Article 1 into the EU legal order through the adoption of 
these Guidelines, a fundamental piece whose language ‘transposes’ the content 
of Common Article 1 and adapts it to the EU. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty 
now offers sizeable opportunities for the EU to develop this area further as it 
implicitly refers to IHL. Indeed, a Peace Nobel Prize winner, it is not surpris-
ing that the EU has interest in complying with Common Article 1 and in pro-
moting compliance with IHL. Abiding by IHL and ensuring respect for IHL is 
actually in the interest of the EU, an international organization willing to assert 
its normative power and to promote multilateralism on the international scene.
1.2.1. An explicit but soft ‘transposition’: The Guidelines on promoting 
compliance with IHL
In December 2005, the Council adopted the Guidelines on Promoting 
Compliance with IHL, a text initiated by Sweden and adopted during the Brit-
ish Presidency of the EU. The Guidelines were further updated in 2009 during 




IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 133
Conventions. These Guidelines represent to some extent the ‘transposition’ of 
Common Article 1 into the EU legal order and reflect the EU commitment 
regarding the importance of IHL, even though they are not legally binding.
As Pål Wrange explains, a report including various proposals relating to 
the procedures under the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, 
the Conventional Weapons Convention, and the UN Commission for Human 
Rights and fundamental standards of humanity was drafted by a committee under 
the auspices of the Swedish Delegation on Public International Law in 2003; 
however, the «EU track» was preferred. A set of proposals was therefore submit-
ted to COJUR, the Council Working Group on Public International Law, with-
out much success. The following year, the Swedish Delegation submitted a new 
proposal that triggered the process of elaboration and adoption of the current 
Guidelines. The process benefited from the insight of different actors, ranging 
from ICRC representatives to EU institutions officials and COJUR experts. It is 
worth noticing that although the Swedish Delegation expected the proposals to 
be adopted progressively, the idea of adopting comprehensive guidelines on the 
model of the existing human rights guidelines was endorsed. The Swedish Del-
egation then wrote a first draft, which was taken over by the UK, as it was about 
to ensure the rotating presidency. COJUR finalized the Guidelines, which were 
endorsed by the Political and Security Committee, the Coreper and eventually 
the Council. 49 According to Javier Solana, former High Representative for the 
CFSP, the IHL Guidelines were created:
Because of the explosive growth of operations and missions conducted 
under the European Security and Defence Policy and as a result of our 
conviction that counterterrorism be conducted within the framework of 
international law, the Guideline on IHL is growing in importance 50.
Therefore, these Guidelines intervened, on the one hand, to adapt the 
institutional means to the already existing operational means in the field of 
IHL. On the other hand, it also seems that they were adopted in order to foster 
the EU’s dialogue with the United States on counterterrorism and the need 
49 Wrange, «The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law», op. cit., 2009, pp. 543-544.
50 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines Human rights and International Humanitarian 
law, March 2009, QC-83-08-123-EN-C.
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to respect international law. Despite this context, they apply to all situations 
where IHL is at stake.
Thus, the Guidelines give the EU some sort of ‘legal basis’ to act in this 
field and detail the actions that may be undertaken to fulfill this purpose. The 
updated Guidelines in 2009 reflected the need for better integration of IHL 
in every external aspect of the EU’s action and better implementation of it 51. 
They are also explicitly complementary to other Guidelines and Common 
Positions already adopted within the EU in relation to matters such as human 
rights, torture and the protection of civilians.
Despite their non-legally binding character, these Guidelines represent 
an important step forward concerning the recognition of Common Article 1 
in EU law, especially within a framework where unanimity has to be reached. 
Their legal significance is not defined either in the former treaties or in the 
Lisbon Treaty, but they acquire a solo consensu character since they represent the 
will of the Member States in the Council 52 and represent a «strong political 
signal that they are priorities for the Union» 53. They indeed reflect the exist-
ence of a consensus within the EU on how CFSP’s instruments can be used 
in the field of IHL 54. Besides, they are indicative of their authors as the Court 
of Justice held it in the Dansk Rørindustri and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities case of 28 June 2005:
Although those measures may not be regarded as rules of law which the 
administration is always bound to observe, they nevertheless form rules of 
practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual 
case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment. Such measures therefore constitute a general act and the offi-
cials and other staff concerned may invoke their illegality in support of an 
action against the individual measures taken on the basis of the measures 55.
51 EEAS, «Human Rights and Democracy in the world», Report on EU action July 2008 to De-
cember 2009, European Commission, 2010. Available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/_human_rights/
docs/2010_hr_report_fr.pdf (Accessed: 31.10.2014).
52 David, «Rapport introductif», op. cit., 2010, p. 7.
53 Official Website of the EEAS, Human Rights Guidelines, Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/council_europe/more_info/eu_human_rights_guidelines/index_en.htm (Accessed 
13.04.2011). 
54 David, «Rapport introductif», op. cit., 2010, p. 7.
55 ECJ, Case C-189/02, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørin-
dustri and Others v. Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR I-05425. 
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The Guidelines thus reflect the EU’s commitment with Common Article 
1 and define the contours of its action in this field.
These Guidelines are of utmost importance with regard to the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL, as they constitute Common Article 1’s de facto trans-
position into the EU legal order. This idea is confirmed by the fact that even 
though a reference is made to the obligation to respect 56, the latter is expressly 
excluded from the scope of the Guidelines, which focus solely on the EU 
action «to address compliance with IHL by third States, and, as appropriate, 
non-State actors operating in third States». It is therefore a clear adhesion to 
the extensive interpretation of Common Article 1, according to which the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL entails an external dimension. It should 
nonetheless be noted that given the importance of Common Article 1 in the 
international legal framework, it would be desirable to see the commitment of 
the EU enshrined in a legally binding document, such as a Council Decision 57.
It is worth noticing that the wording slightly differs from that of the 
Geneva Conventions as the Guidelines refer to «promoting compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law» instead of ‘ensuring respect’. This change in 
the wording is most likely a choice. They convey the idea of a less constraining 
duty falling upon the EU than the one established by Common Article 1. This 
idea is further reinforced by the acknowledgment that the EU and its Member 
States are under duty «to ensure compliance with IHL in their own conduct, 
including by their own forces» (para. 2). There is therefore a clear willingness 
to diminish the scope of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, ‘promoting’ 
being less constraining than ‘ensuring’. The French version of the Guidelines 
goes even further, as it refers to the «promotion du droit international human-
itaire» in the title 58, thus removing the concept of compliance from the title.
This choice might be explained by the limitations of the EU: as explained 
infra, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is the privileged frame-
work of the EU action in promoting compliance with IHL, is a sensitive pol-
icy and remains quite limited. EU Member States have diverging interests 
56 IHL Guidelines, para. 2: «the same commitment extends to measures taken by the EU and its 
Member States to ensure compliance with IHL in their conduct, including their own forces». 
57 Such formalization of the EU’s commitment exists with regard to the International Criminal 
Court and constitutes a good practice.
58 Conseil de l’Union européenne, Lignes Directrices de l’UE concernant la promotion du droit 
international humanitaire (DIH) (2009/C 303/06). 
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in foreign matters, and most notably in the field of IHL, so that the CFSP is 
characterized by a derogatory regime. As a consequence, the wording of the 
Guidelines conveys the idea that States remain the prior actors in charge of 
enforcing Common Article 1 on the international scene. Nevertheless, it could 
be argued that this choice of vocabulary contradicts international law for two 
reasons. First, Common Article 1 establishes a customary obligation that is 
directly applicable to the EU, in its quality of international subject. Second, 
since Common Article 1 expresses an obligation of due diligence, it is not 
necessary to refer to a different formulation from the one contained in the 
Geneva Conventions, insofar as the flexibility deriving from EU’s capacities is 
already reflected in the notion of obligation of due diligence itself. The EU has 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, but always insofar as it has the means 
to do so. Nothing more but also nothing less is expected.
On the one hand, these Guidelines are indicative of the EU approach 
on IHL as they define it, its sources, scope of application and consequences in 
terms of individual responsibility. Firstly, it is explicitly stated that the princi-
ples of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law include promoting compliance with IHL. Common Arti-
cle 1 in particular and IHL in general are therefore included within the values 
of the EU, thus providing legitimacy for the EU to act on this matter. The 
Guidelines define IHL in the following terms:
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – also known as the Law of 
Armed Conflict or the Law of War – is intended to alleviate the effects of 
armed conflict by protecting those not, or no longer taking part in conflict 
and by regulating the means and methods of warfare 59.
As observed by Pål Wrange, the Guidelines remain silent as to whether 
Common Article 1 establishes a system of collective responsibility binding 
upon all states for any conflict 60. However, it could be argued that they indi-
rectly mention the erga omnes character of Common Article 1 when they stip-
ulate that compliance with IHL «is a matter of international concern» (para. 5), 
thus reflecting the wording used by the ICJ and the ILC.
59 IHL Guidelines, para. 4.
60 Wrange, «The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law», op. cit., 2009, p. 546. 
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Secondly, the Guidelines generally recall the scope of application of IHL 
and its sources. In this regard, the annex to the Guidelines includes the «prin-
cipal legal instruments on international humanitarian law and other relevant 
legal instruments», which refer to treaties and conventions resorting to The 
Hague Law, the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, 
International Criminal Law (most notably the statutes of the different inter-
national criminal tribunals), and treaties and conventions on the regulation 
of arms. Furthermore, the Guidelines integrate some aspects of the inter-
national case-law on IHL and Common Article 1. Indeed, they specifically 
assert that States must conform to customary obligations stemming from 
IHL, thus referring indirectly to the Corfu Channel and Nicaragua cases of 
the ICJ. However, all these references are quite vague and elude controversial 
questions such as the use of the ICRC Study on ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’.
Thirdly, the Guidelines refer to the fundamental principles of military 
necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality (para. 6). They likewise 
envisage the distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflicts (paras. 9, 10, and 11) as well as the relationship of IHL with Human 
Rights Law (para. 12), which is interpreted in line with the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on the Wall 61.
Fourthly, the IHL Guidelines reinstate some consequences resulting from 
the violation of IHL, notably concerning individual responsibility within the 
framework of International Criminal Law (paragraphs 13 and 14). Although 
these are elementary principles, they clearly emphasize the EU’s adhesion to 
this corpus, and its participation in terms of its codification.
On the other hand, these Guidelines establish the operational tools to 
be used by the EU, its institutions and bodies in order to promote compli-
ance with IHL, firstly between the EU itself and its Member States, but they 
also tie the EU together with its relationships with third states. These include 
the following: political dialogue, general public statements, demarches and/or 
public statements about specific conflicts, restrictive measures and sanctions, 
cooperation with other international bodies, crisis-management operations, 
fight against impunity for war crimes, training, and adopting rules ensuring 
61 ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, op. cit. 
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that arms trade is subjected to compliance with IHL. Again, the choice of the 
different means reflects to a great extent the measures available to States for 
fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for IHL 62.
Thus, the adoption of the IHL Guidelines is a positive step regarding 
the correct enforcement and application of IHL. Indeed, as observed by Pål 
Wrange, this is particularly relevant for IHL, a field where oversight mecha-
nisms are lacking in contrast with human rights law 63. Furthermore, the IHL 
Guidelines somehow give a ‘legal basis’ for the EU’s action in this matter, 
«even in cases where the public pressure or geopolitical exigencies are absent, 
or when the IHL aspect is not obvious» 64. The idea is therefore to provide the 
EU with a foundational text with a great potential for systematic and coherent 
action on this matter. Indeed, action on this matter can be traced back to the 
1990’s 65, but it had been quite chaotic. In this respect, it should be noted that 
since 2005, the EU has indeed implemented the Guidelines in its CFSP and 
has mainstreamed IHL as a result. By way of example, the ICRC conducted 
a mapping study of the references to IHL in EU public documents adopted 
between 2005 and 2009, according to which at least 300 EU public docu-
ments made reference to IHL 66. Therefore, the Guidelines have not become a 
dead letter and constitute, de facto, the ‘transposition’ of Common Article 1 into 
the EU legal order. The EU consciously adheres to Common Article 1 and 
reflects it in its own legal order thanks to these Guidelines. The reception of 
Common Article 1 into the EU legal order is therefore explicit, although the 
instrument to do so belongs to soft law. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the acts further adopted in order to implement this instrument of soft law can 
belong to hard law. Consequently, the potential of the Guidelines should not 
be under-estimated. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty augurs interesting devel-
opments in that regard, in particular with the ‘constitutionalization’ of EU’s 
objectives and values in EU primary law.
62 Palwankar, «Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for IHL», 
op. cit., 1994. See, supra, Chapter 1. 
63 Wrange, «The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law», op. cit., 2009, p. 542.
64 Ibid., p. 552. 
65 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 439.
66 Document available upon request.
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1.2.2. An implicit ‘constitutionalization’: The Treaty of Lisbon and the 
values of the EU
As mentioned above, the founding treaties do not refer explicitly to IHL. 
However, it is reasonable to consider that the Treaty of Lisbon contains indi-
rect references to IHL, in particular in light of the meaning provided to the 
concepts of ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’ and the ‘rule of law’ in the founding 
values and objectives enshrined in EU primary law.
First, it could be argued that the references to the more encompassing 
concepts of «peace», «security», and «international law» actually include IHL. 
Indeed, the objectives of «peace» and «security» codified in article 3 implicitly 
refer to the need to respect IHL, insofar as the latter contributes to the former. 
In addition, «the strict observance and the development of International Law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter» 67 is strictly 
related to IHL. In this respect, the EU assigns itself the mission of respecting 
and developing IHL and considers itself both as a passive and an active subject 
of international law. If all these elements are read together, an indirect reference 
to IHL may be found, especially in light of the movement of convergence of 
the Law of international peace and security with IHL, as explained in Chapter 
1. Thus, these references to the Law of international peace and security make 
it possible to establish a connection between the EU and Common Article 1.
Second, and more importantly, the integration of IHL into EU Law 
emphasizes the symmetry between the EU’s internal and external values. In 
this respect, the codification of EU’s values within the body of the Treaty of 
Lisbon turns them into legal requirements, not mere moral and political aspi-
rations. In this context, the EU’s approach to the concepts of democracy, rule 
of law, and respect for human rights is particularly important regarding IHL. 
Indeed, pursuant to their European acceptation, the concepts of democracy, 
rule of law, and overall, respect for human rights include the respect for and 
promotion of IHL at international level.
Well before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been 
considered a «community based on the rule of law» («communauté de droit») 68 
67 TEU article 3.5. 
68 ECJ, Case C-294/83, Judgment of the Court of 23 April 1986, Parti écologiste «Les Verts» 
v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23.
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in the words of the European Court of Justice, in which fundamental rights 
ought to be respected and protected 69. The European identity has been pro-
gressively shaped so that the Union is nowadays founded on «the values 
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities» 70 which have become «axiological» 71 to the EU with the adop-
tion of the Treaty of Lisbon. They now are the raison d’être of the EU 72, they 
legitimize it, and command its action since EU policies rely upon it. In this 
sense, the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
confirms the EU’s aspiration to be a leader in human rights matters on the 
international stage 73. Furthermore, several operational advances have been 
made in this sense since 2009. In particular, the EU adopted the Strategic 
Framework for Human Rights and Democracy in 2012 74, which constitutes 
the cornerstone of the EU’s action on human rights matters and includes 
aspects relating to IHL. Furthermore, it appointed its first EU Special Rep-
resentative for Human Rights 75, thus enhancing the EU’s visibility on this 
matter.
The EU has become a multilevel democracy which has encouraged 
Member States to respect these values, to the point that article 7 TEU fore-
sees a mechanism of sanction in the event of «a serious and persistent breach 
69 ECJ, Case C-29/69, Judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; 
C-11/70, Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfhr- 
und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, para. 4; C-44/79, J. Nold, 
Kohlen-und BaustoffgroBhandlung v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, para. 31; C-6/64, Flaminio 
Costa v. Enel [1964] ECR 585.
70 TEU, article 2.
71 Denys Simon, «Les fondations: L’Europe modeste?, Le traité de Lisbonne: oui, non, mais à quoi?», 
Europe, n° 7, July 2008, pp. 24-138.
72 Teresa Freixes, «Quelles valeurs à protéger dans le dialogue interculturel euro méditerrannéen?», 
in Teresa Freixes et al., La gouvernance multi-level. Penser l’enchevêtrement, Brussels, E.M.E, 2012, 
pp. 110-112.
73 While the EU self-assigns an extremely ambitious mission, its practice on this matter compels to 
relativize this statement, to the extent that the EU’s – controversial – action in response to the 
massive arrival of refugees on European soil has importantly damaged its aspiration to be a leader 
in human rights in the public’s eye just to mention one example. 
74 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, 25 June 2012, Luxembourg, 11855/12.
75 Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP of 25 July 2012 appointing the European Union Special 
Representative for Human Rights. 
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by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2» 76. A precedent may 
be found on the occasion of the Austrian crisis in 2000, when Jorg Haïder, 
an extremist leader acceded the Austrian government. Sanctions were taken 
against Austria which was unable to vote in the Council. Thus, proclaiming 
the respect for human rights was not merely formal but had concrete implica-
tions too. Said sanctions were eventually lifted as it was held that the policies 
conducted by the Austrian government would not pose a threat to the EU’s 
founding values. A more recent example can be found with the launching of 
a structured dialogue between Poland and the European Commission under 
the Rule of Law Framework 77, albeit it is too early to assess the results of this 
dialogue at the time of writing.
The result of this process is that the EU’s action must be consistent with 
this commitment to its values, both internally and externally. It should be 
76 TEU, article 7: «1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European 
Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of 
its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there 
is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before 
making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may 
address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.
 The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made 
continue to apply.
 2. The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States 
or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may deter-
mine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred 
to in Article 2, after inviting the Member State in question to submit its observations.
 3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties 
to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the gov-
ernment of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account 
the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal 
persons.
 The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to 
be binding on that State.
 4. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke mea-
sures taken under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being 
imposed.
 5. The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council for the purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union».
77 See European Commission, Fact Sheet: College Orientation Debate on recent developments in 
Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers, Brussels, 13 January 2016. Avail-
able at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm (Accessed: 28.01.2016). 
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noted in this regard that this commitment is not a mere political mandate, but 
a legal obligation enshrined in EU primary law. The self-proclamation in the 
‘constitutional’ text of a space where human rights are respected generates 
international expectations on this matter. The EU cannot pretend to incarnate 
a democratic space internally without promoting its values on the interna-
tional scene too without running the risk of establishing double standards, and 
vice versa. As a matter of fact, the externalization of the EU’s values is con-
firmed by the Lisbon Treaty provisions governing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the following terms:
Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by [...] demo-
cracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law 78.
In the same way, the Union’s foreign policy shall pursue the objectives 
of safeguarding «its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity» and of consolidating and supporting «democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the principles of international law» 79.
Thus, the EU self-assigns an extremely ambitious mission, a quasi-evan-
gelical mission, of projection and promotion of its values on the international 
stage, which includes the promotion of IHL. The inscription of this aspiration 
in the EU constitutional marble – the founding treaties – entails legal conse-
quences, not moral ones, and the EU must therefore subject its action to the 
respect of these values. It must live up to the expectations that it sets itself and 
that stem from its own primary law, in order to avoid accusations of double 
standards. In this respect, it seems that the EU is currently challenged by a set 
of crises: the economic crisis, Brexit and the surge of euro-skepticism in gen-
eral, as well as the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. While there are no easy responses 
to all these crises, the ‘constitutionalization’ of the EU’s values mean that the 
EU must always bear them in mind while it confronts such crises. In this line 
of argument, the importance of such crises should not overshadow its com-
mitment in IHL matters.
78 TEU, article 21.
79 Ibid.
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As Katharina Häusler and Alexandra Timmer have shown 80, the EU 
external activism on human rights matters is justified notably because of their 
universality. The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy are particularly significant in this regard, as it under-
lines that «[h]uman rights are universally applicable legal norms» 81. Therefore, 
the EU is not only compelled to promote human rights on the international 
scene because of internal constraints – its founding values – but also because 
of external constraints: human rights are enshrined in international treaties and 
conventions and are universally applicable. The EU adopts an approach based 
on, inter alia, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
is therefore in a position to refute Eurocentrism-based critics. The promotion 
of human rights is not only a reflection of European values, but also a legal 
duty, which is the result of an international consensus on the universal nature 
of human rights. The same holds true regarding IHL.
This is particularly relevant when talking about Common Article 1, as 
the EU has integrated IHL as one of the constituting elements of its values, in 
particular of the rule of law and human rights. This is clearly expressed in the 
introduction to the IHL Guidelines:
The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 
This includes the goal of promoting compliance with IHL 82.
This approach was further confirmed in the Declaration by the Presi-
dency on behalf of the Union on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions:
International law, including international humanitarian law, is one of the 
strongest tools the international community has to maintain international 
order and to ensure the protection and dignity of all persons. The European 
80 Katarina Häuslerand and Alexandra Timmer, «Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law in 
EU External Action: Conceptualization and Practice», in Wolfgang Benedek et al. (eds.), Europe-
an Yearbook on Human Rights 2015, Intersentia, p. 234. 
81 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, 25 June 2012, Luxembourg, 11855/12, p. 1.
82 IHL Guidelines, para. 3.
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Union will continue to do its utmost to promote an international order 
where no state or individual is above the law and no one is outside the 
protection of the law 83.
It appears from these declarations that ensuring respect for IHL is a com-
ponent of the rule of law as it contributes to subjecting all individuals and 
States to the law, while ensuring legal protection for all.
Furthermore, IHL is integrated into EU law through the vector of human 
rights, which in turns reflects the movement of convergence of IHL and Inter-
national Human Rights Law. As noted above, human rights are closely tied to 
the human principle, which also applies in times of armed conflict. The inte-
gration of human rights in IHL is blatant in the case-law of several regional tri-
bunals, such as the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
as well as in the development of international criminal law. Besides human-
izing IHL, this movement of convergence also allows to ensure the efficiency 
of IHL in response to its difficult litigation. In turn, the EU contributes to 
this movement of convergence as it has included the promotion of IHL as a 
sub-category – although autonomous – of its policy of promotion of human 
rights. The participation of the EU in the development and enforcement of 
IHL through its external action indeed reinforces its credibility as a human 
rights promoter and leader.
In fact, only three years after the creation of the CFSP, some acts already 
referred to IHL mainly thanks to declaratory acts 84 through the vector of the 
promotion of human rights. It indeed would be surprising to differentiate 
between IHL and human rights exactions when the EU deals with a particular 
situation. As Tristan Ferraro highlights, these references used to be scattered 
and reflected the lack of a consistent strategy regarding this matter 85. Never-
theless, those references to IHL became more frequent and explicit, includ-
ing in legally binding acts 86, to the point that the Geneva Conventions and 
their additional protocols can now be considered recurrent instruments of the 
83 Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 
adoption of the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949, 12535/1/09 REV 1 (Press 241), Brussels, 12 
August 2009.
84 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 437.
85 Ibid., p. 435.
86 Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», op. cit., 2010.
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CSFP 87. The EU has therefore used its policy of promotion of human rights 
at international level to enter into the IHL field, and in particular to promote 
compliance with IHL. While it could have been understood that the EU was 
associating both corpuses of law through their systematic combination, the 
EU’s approach is clearer on that aspect now. The promotion of IHL in the EU 
external action has become autonomous and is reported as a policy by itself. 
By way of example, Point 21 of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy included in the 2012 Strategic Framework for Human Rights and 
Democracy is specifically dedicated to IHL 88. The latter is integrated within 
the policy on human rights but appears in a specific section. The same holds 
true regarding the EU annual reports on human rights. It therefore clearly 
appears that, in the EU’s view, promoting compliance with IHL is seen as an 
extension of the necessity to guarantee its values.
As a subsidiary comment, the integration of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL in EU Law is consistent with the EU’s claim to be a super soft 
power. Besides the legal duty, there are other reasons why the EU should enter 
into IHL concerns which evolve around the ideas of legitimacy and democ-
ratization from a constitutional perspective. In particular, the EU’s ambition to 
establish a European constitutional legal order based on values – democracy, 
the rule of law, and the respect for human rights – calls for the externalization 
of these values in the EU action on the international scene.
In this regard, the meaning the EU wishes to place on its international 
action defines its own identity. The EU is sometimes termed a soft 89, civil, 
normative or even a calm power. According to Joseph Nye, a soft power is 
characterized by its capacity to influence, the promotion of its values, and an 
attractive power not exclusively based on military means 90. Although the EU 
is a sui generis entity, it is a union composed of free states, who decided to tie 
their relationships in such a way that they make war very unlikely to happen 
among them. The very purpose of the creation of the EU was to establish a 
permanent peace throughout Europe by creating interdependency among its 
87 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 436.
88 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, 25 June 2012, Luxembourg, 11855/12.
89 Joseph Nye, Soft power: The means to success in politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004. Quoted in 
Jérôme Koechlin, La politique étrangère de l’Europe, entre puissance et conscience, Paris, Infolio Ed., 2009.
90 Ibid. 
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members that would not allow for war to be waged among them. European 
integration has allowed for the union of historic enemies such as Germany 
and France, but it has also permitted the reunification of Western and Eastern 
Europe. The EU’s role as a pacific force in international relations is therefore 
legitimatized by and founded on this primary mission.
Consequently, the EU prefers to communicate and use diplomacy rather 
than be guided by military power. The EU projects itself in a post-modern 
world grounded by its rejection of the use of force and is refusal of any impe-
rial temptation 91. In this respect, the integration of IHL as one of the sources of 
EU Law is not surprising as the promotion of International Law has become a 
‘leitmotiv’ 92 in the CFSP, to the point that some authors talk about the «Euro-
peanisation of International Law» 93. For example, the 2003 European Security 
Strategy 94, the 2015 Security Agenda, the European Commission Commu-
nication on multilateralism 95, as well as the 2012 EU Strategic Framework 
and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 96 reassert these concerns: 
fostering multilateralism as well as the EU’s dialogue with third parties, setting 
respect for International Law as a priority. This approach was clearly expressed 
by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, in a 2015 speech at the UN Security Council:
Europe’s commitment to multilateralism – with the UN at its core – 
stems from our values and beliefs. But it is also an act of realism. The threats 
we face have never been so complex. They require complex, articulated 
91 Koechlin, La politique étrangère de l’Europe, entre puissance et conscience, op. cit., 2009. 
92 Knudsen, «Les lignes directrices de l‘UE concernant la promotion du respect du DIH et leur 
mise en œuvre», in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, p. 176.
93 See Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper and Erika De Wet, The Europeanisation of International Law: 
The Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States, TMC Asser Press, 2008.
94 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003. (The objective of the EU is «the development of a stronger interna-
tional society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order»).
95 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 10 Sep-
tember 2003, European Union and United Nations: the choice of multilateralism (COM[2003] 
526 final).
96 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012 11855/12, p. 1: «The European Union is founded 
on a shared determination to promote peace and stability and to build a world founded on re-
spect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These principles underpin all aspects of 
the internal and external policies of the European Union». 
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responses. The time when super-powers thought they could split the world 
into spheres of influence is long gone – we should all realise that. The num-
ber of regional and global actors has multiplied. And none of them can re-
alistically aspire at facing challenges, or truly benefiting from opportunities, 
alone. We need cooperation, more than ever. The new global order will be 
multilateral, or it will not be 97.
On the other hand, some may argue that the EU does not have the 
choice of being a soft power since it still does not benefit from an actual mil-
itary power 98, although the increasing involvement of the EU in defense mat-
ters 99 should nuance this multilateralist aspiration. However, it is still possible to 
assert that it is in the EU’s interest that multilateralism works. It would confirm 
its role as an international actor and increase the legitimacy of its foreign policy 
since it would be considered the first soft superpower in history 100. Whatever 
the EU’s motivation is, the EU’s image as a soft power conditions its interest in 
humanitarian matters and in IHL. The CFSP constitutes an important element 
in the definition of the EU’s identity and the integration of IHL into EU law 
shapes it. Humanitarian norms allow the EU to define its identity towards the 
other IHL actors, notably national, which are more likely to act according to 
their sole interests. It is pursuant to these norms that the EU defines its behav-
ior, perceives others’ behaviors, asserts its identity and determines its interests. 
In Delphine Loupsans’ opinion, it denies realistic determinism and seeks to 
promote governance based on norms of centrality 101.
The EU is actually an organization full of potential in relation with IHL. 
Despite the limitative framework of the CFSP 102, it has assets that differentiate 
it from other IHL actors and give it an added value. The EU model is often 
taken into account and can be inspirational for other regions such as South 
97 Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the UN Security Coun-
cil: Cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, New York, 
09.03.2015 (150309_01_en). 




100 IRRI-KIIB, Un concept de sécurité pour le 21ème siècle, Brussels, 2003. 
101 Delphine Loupsans, «La place des intérêts et des normes dans l’action humanitaire de l’Union 
européenne», PhD thesis, SPIRIT, Bordeaux, 2009. 
102 See infra.
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America, or Africa. They both started as economic actors on the international 
scene but are evolving towards human rights spaces as the establishment of 
regional courts of protection of human rights like the African Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have shown. In this 
line of argument, the future of international relations could potentially evolve 
towards multilateralism based on the interaction between continental unions 
acting in a complementary manner to States, and always under the auspices of 
the principles developed at UN level. In this framework, the EU could be in 
a good position to become a dynamic regional entity able to exercise leader-
ship 103 in IHL matters. This ambition was clearly expressed in 2008 by Louis 
Michel, former commissioner in charge of the Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Office (hereafter, ‘ECHO’):
Il est clair que l’Union européenne peut et doit exercer un rôle de 
premier plan pour mieux respecter le droit humanitaire à la mesure de son 
autorité politique et morale reconnue. Il en va du respect par l’Union eu-
ropéenne de ses propres valeurs éthiques fondamentales. La communauté 
internationale a un nom, c’est l’humanité. Forger pour cette humanité des 
valeurs communes fortes et justes, partagées par tous, en faire les repères 
intangibles d’une éthique universelle, c’est mon ambition, c’est l’ambition 
européenne, cela doit être notre engagement 104.
Thus, this implicit codification of IHL in primary law is significant as it 
guides the EU’s action both internally and externally. The Lisbon Treaty recog-
nizes implicitly the humanitarian policy as a key-policy and the EU as a global 
humanitarian actor for the first time.
To conclude, the European Union has become a global actor, active in 
many fields at international level. While its economic weight is undisputable, 
the same does not hold true regarding its political power on the international 
scene. In spite of that, the EU has integrated IHL in to its CFSP and has 
progressively allowed it to enter its sphere of competency even before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. As Tristan Ferraro demonstrates, the EU 
has been an active – and chaotic – promoter of IHL through its CFSP since 
the 1990’s, thus acting as if it were bound by Common Article 1. It has used 
103 Koechlin, La politique étrangère de l’Europe, entre puissance et conscience, op. cit., 2009. 
104 Respect du Droit International Humanitaire: un défi majeur, une responsabilité globale, Brussels, 
16.08.2009 (SPEECH/08/434). 
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its status and resources to reinforce the implementation and respect for IHL 
through the use of the Geneva Conventions as a recurrent element of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 105. In this regard, it is worth mention-
ing that the international community has acknowledged the EU’s action in 
the maintenance of international peace and security through the Statement 
by the President of the Security Council of 14 February 2014 106. In this state-
ment, the partnership of the EU with the UN in resolving global challenges 
is applauded, notably with regard to the promotion of human rights and the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts. It therefore constitutes a powerful 
signal regarding the perception and credibility of the EU on the international 
scene as well as the expectations that arise with respect to Common Article 1.
What is more, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has opened up 
new possibilities in this regard. In this respect, there are external and internal 
factors that compel the EU to comply with Common Article 1. The EU is a 
fully-fledged international actor which must act in accordance with interna-
tional law, and, a fortiori, with IHL, a legal corpus with customary character 
at the very heart of the international legal order. At internal level, the EU 
is a union of values – the rule of law, democracy and the respect for human 
rights – which include IHL in the Union’s perspective. Therefore, these values 
are not only axiological to the EU, but they must also be externalized in order 
to foster the EU’s external identity in symmetry with its internal identity. In 
this respect, promoting compliance with IHL is arguably in the interest of the 
EU, an international actor willing to assert its credibility and power through 
multilateralism. The process of recognizing IHL as an EU concern thus con-
tributes to the process of politicization of the EU. As a result of this integration 
of IHL into European law, the EU defines its identity but also contributes to 
the development of this area of international law.
Nonetheless, despite the unequivocal legal authority of Common Article 
1 in the international legal order and the fact that the EU did not wait until 
the Lisbon Treaty to act as if it were bound by Common Article 1, its action in 
the IHL field is limited. The CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy, where 
EU Member States wish to retain their sovereignty, a fortiori in the field of IHL, 
as it may entail the use of lethal force. Furthermore, there are no express refer-
105 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 443.
106 S/PRST/2014/4. 
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ences to IHL in the EU treaties. Hence, EU Member States preferred to refer 
to an obligation to ‘promote compliance with IHL’ in the IHL Guidelines, 
instead of an obligation to ‘ensure respect for IHL by others’. Nonetheless, this 
approach contradicts the current state of international law, as Common Article 
1 establishes an obligation of due diligence.
This duty to ensure respect for IHL therefore implies that implementing 
Common Article 1 remains primarily in the hands of EU Member States. It 
also implies that much effort is put during at preventive levels, rather than 
reactive levels although the IHL Guidelines also detail reactive measures that 
the EU may undertake in case of IHL violations. This aspect is particularly 
interesting as there is an increasing concern on prevention of IHL violations, as 
manifested with the publication of the ICRC in 2015 on ‘Generating respect 
for the law’ 107. In this regard, the intervention of the EU in the IHL field, and 
in particular in the promotion of its compliance is of utmost relevance with 
regard to the contemporary challenges of IHL. It is likely and desirable that the 
EU is to become a more important and credible player on this matter.
2. FRANCE AND COMMON ARTICLE 1
La défense des droits de l’Homme fait partie de l’identité de notre pays, la France, 
et elle est un principe d’action de la diplomatie française. C’est pour moi, aussi, un 
engagement ancien et personnel. La France ne se mettra pas du côté de ceux qui 
voudraient mettre les violations des droits de l’Homme et le droit humanitaire entre 
parenthèses, sous le tapis. Le choix n’est pas entre incantation et silence complice: 
entre les deux, il y a un espace pour l’action, et ce que je souhaite, c’est que la France 
l’occupe pleinement 108.
It clearly appears from this statement made by the former French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs that France must be active in order to ensure respect for IHL, 
and that no violations thereof can be met with silence. Nonetheless, beyond 
political declarations, it is important to scrutinize the relationship between the 
French legal order and Common Article 1. This is the objective pursued in this 
107 International Review of the Red Cross (2014), 96 (895/896), pp. 689-696. Generating respect for the 
law. 
108 Jean-Marc Ayrault, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development.
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fragment of the thesis, where the relationship between the French legal order 
and the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, and the extent to which Com-
mon Article 1 has been integrated in the French legal order are analyzed. This 
question is not subject to much debate, insofar as France is a State party to the 
four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, so that it is formally 
bound by Common Article 1.
Firstly, the relationship between International Law and domestic law must 
be analyzed. On this basis, France has ratified not only the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols, but also most of the IHL 
treaties and conventions, thus establishing a strong nexus between France and the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Secondly, the role of the National Consul-
tative Commission for Human Rights in ensuring respect for IHL is analyzed.
2.1. The articulation of international and domestic law
Cependant, comme nul n’a souhaité interrompre le cours des planètes, les confronta-
tions sont restées toutes théoriques et, à travers un dialogue nourri de concepts prétoriens 
apparemment contradictoires, des solutions concrètes ont pu être dégagées 109.
The French approach on the relationship between international and 
national law is equivocal and complex, torn between the willingness to assert 
the Constitution’s supremacy and the realities of a legal order intertwined 
between international law, European law and national law. For the sake of clar-
ity, it is therefore important to distinguish between the systems of integration 
of public international law and EU law into the French legal order, as they 
reflect the specific character of EU law in domestic law.
2.1.1. Public International Law
The relationship between French law and international law is defined 
in the French Constitution. The latter was adopted on 4 October 1958 and 
109 Jean-Paul Jacqué, «Droit constitutionnel, Droit communautaire, CEDH, Charte des Nations 
Unies. L’instabilité des rapports de système entre ordres juridiques», Revue française de droit consti-
tutionnel, vol. 1(69), 2007, pp. 3-37. 
152 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
constitutes the founding text of the Fifth Republic. It is the supreme norm of 
the French legal order and must be understood as including the so-called ‘con-
stitutionality bloc’ 110, i.e. its preamble, the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, 
the 2004 ‘Charter for the Environment’, and the 1789 ‘Declaration of Human 
Rights and Citizenship’ (Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen). The 
Constitution regulates to some extent the relationship between International 
and national law, and establishes distinctions depending on whether legislative 
or constitutional norms are at stake.
At first sight, it seems that the Constitution recognizes the primacy of 
international law over national law. According to the 1946 Constitution’s 
preamble, the French Republic shall comply with public international law 
rules (paragraph 14). As evidenced by Alain Pellet, the traditional French legal 
principle according to which international law is part of the law of the land 
is recognized as a constitutional principle, thus enshrining the subjection of 
the State to the international legal order into the Constitution 111. Moreover, 
according to Article 55, once a treaty or agreement is ratified or approved and 
published, it shall prevail over the acts of Parliament, provided that the princi-
ple of reciprocity is respected.
It should be noted in this regard that the principle of reciprocity is not 
absolute in international law, a fact that is recognized in the French legal order. 
As regards humanitarian treaties, the French Constitutional Court (Conseil 
constitutionnel) considered that it does not apply, in line with the current 
state of international law 112. The ECHR and corresponding case-law are thus 
exempt from the application of reciprocity. More importantly for present pur-
poses, the principle of reciprocity does not apply to IHL 113, as the ICRC has 
confirmed with regard to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 114. The legal grounds 
110 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 71-44 DC, 16 July 1971, Loi complétant les dispositions des 
articles 5 et 7 de la loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association. 
111 Alain Pellet, «Question nº 11: Le droit international et la constitution de 1958», La constitution en 
20 questions, Conseil constitutionnel, 2008, pp. 1-28. 
112 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 98-408 DC, 22 January 1999, Traité portant statut de la 
Cour pénale internationale. 
113 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 60-5: «Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to pro-
visions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian 
character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected 
by such treaties».
114 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b. 
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for such distinction between humanitarian treaties and ordinary treaties is, 
according to Claudia Sciotti-Lam, that the former does not establish mech-
anisms allowing the balance between States’ interests; rather, it aims at creat-
ing an international public order whose subjects are not only States, but also 
human beings 115. On this basis, the absence of reciprocity is not a condition 
for the compliance of French national law with international law, so that the 
legislator may not invoke this argument to justify incompliance with some 
treaty provisions 116.
Article 55 is generally understood as recognizing the monist character 
of the French Constitution; this approach is reinforced by the 1946 preamble. 
Nevertheless, the legal practice is not completely clear in that regard as the 
case-law is tinged with dualist overtones.
On the one hand, it appears from the case-law that the legislation must 
comply with international law. However, the Conseil constitutionnel refuses 
to scrutinize the compliance of national laws with international law 117. Indeed, 
according to the Constitutional Court, international rules do not belong to 
the constitutionality block. Therefore, a piece of legislation that violates a treaty 
does not necessarily violate the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court is 
not competent to scrutinize the conformity of national laws to the provisions 
of international treaties and conventions.
This situation led the judicial (Cour de cassation) and administrative 
(Conseil d’État) highest courts to take over this role 118. As a result, if the Con-
seil constitutionnel is in charge of monitoring the compliance of French 
laws with the Constitution, the Cour de cassation and Conseil d’État are in 
charge of monitoring the compliance of French laws with International law, 
the so-called ‘contrôle de conventionnalité’. This situation potentially leads to 
conflictive decisions as constitutional standards are not always equivalent to 
international standards, in particular in the field of fundamental rights, as they 
are formulated in very similar terms at international, European and national 
115 Sciotti-Lam, L’applicabilité des traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme en droit interne, 
op. cit., 2004, p. 303.
116 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 80-126 DC, 30 December 1980, Loi de finances pour 1981. 
117 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 74-54 DC, 15 January 1975, Loi relative á l’interruption 
volontaire de grossesse. 
118 Cour de cassation, chambre mixte, Judgment nº 73-13556, 24 May 1975, Société Jacques Vabre; 
Conseil d’État, Judgment nº 108243, 20 October 1989, Nicolo. 
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levels 119. The Constitution as the supreme norm of the French legal system 
thus appears to be a legal fiction difficult to maintain with the development of 
International Law.
This situation is particularly problematic in relation to ECHR law. In this 
regard, should a legal norm comply with the Constitution but not with the 
ECHR, the Cour de cassation and Conseil d’État must set aside the former, 
otherwise France would run the risk of being condemned by the European 
Court. Actually, this situation occurred in 1999, when the ECHR condemned 
France because the Cour de cassation applied a piece of legislation that was 
declared constitutional by the Constitutional Court 120.
On the other hand, the relationship between International Law and con-
stitutional norms is even more sensitive. Even though the principle of primacy 
of international law is enshrined in the Constitution, all the French high-
est courts – Conseil constitutionnel, Cour de cassation, and Conseil d’État – 
have refused to apply it to the Constitution 121, invoking that the Constitution 
remains the supreme norm of the French legal order. This position is the result 
of a settled case-law. In this regard, the Conseil d’État already considered in 
1996 that a bilateral treaty of extradition remains subject to constitutional 
principles in the Koné judgment 122. In this particular case, the supreme admin-
istrative court had to adjudicate on the validity of a decree of extradition. First, 
it recognized that there is a principle of constitutional nature in the French 
legal order according to which an extradition may be refused if it is requested 
119 See, inter alia: Christine Maugüe, «Le conseil constitutionnel et le droit supranational», Pouvoir, 
nº 105, 2003, pp. 67-68.
120 ECtHR, Zielinski et Pradal et al. vs France, Judgment of 28.10.1999.
121 Conseil constitutionnel, 19.11.2004, Decision Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe; 
Conseil d’État, Judgment nº 200286-200287, 30 October 1998, Sarran; Cour de Cassation, As-
semblée plénière, Judgment nº 99-60274, 02 June 2000, Pauline Fraisse. 
122 Conseil d’État, Judgment nº 169219, 03 July 1996, Koné: «Considérant qu’aux termes de l’article 
44 de l’accord de coopération franco-malien susvisé: “L’extradition ne sera pas exécutée si l’in-
fraction pour laquelle elle est demandée est considérée par la partie requise comme une infraction politique 
ou comme une infraction connexe à une telle infraction”; que ces stipulations doivent être interprétées 
conformément au principe fondamental reconnu par les lois de la République, selon lequel 
l’État doit refuser l’extradition d’un étranger lorsqu’elle est demandée dans un but politique; 
qu’elles ne sauraient dès lors limiter le pouvoir de l’État français de refuser l’extradition au seul 
cas des infractions de nature politique et des infractions qui leur sont connexes; que par suite, 
M. KONE est, contrairement à ce que soutient le garde des sceaux, fondé à se prévaloir de ce principe; qu’il 
ne ressort toutefois pas des pièces du dossier que l’extradition du requérant ait été demandée dans un but 
politique [emphasis added]».
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on political grounds instead of criminal grounds. Second, it considered that the 
provisions of the bilateral treaty between France and Mali had to comply with 
this constitutional principle, thus recognizing the primacy of constitutional 
norms over treaty norms. Then, the Conseil d’État confirmed such position in 
the Sarran case of 1998 in the following terms:
Considérant que l’article 55 de la Constitution dispose que «les traités 
ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, 
une autorité supérieure à celle des lois sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou 
traité, de son application par l’autre partie», la suprématie ainsi conférée aux 
engagements internationaux ne s’applique pas, dans l’ordre interne, aux 
dispositions de nature constitutionnelle; qu’ainsi, le moyen tiré de ce que 
le décret attaqué, en ce qu’il méconnaîtrait les stipulations d’engagements 
internationaux régulièrement introduits dans l’ordre interne, serait par là 
même contraire à l’article 55 de la Constitution, ne peut lui aussi qu’être 
écarté 123.
In this case, the highest administrative court scrutinized the validity of a 
decree and was asked to annul it because it did not comply with several norms 
of international law, including the ECHR and the UN Covenant on Politi-
cal and Civil Rights. Nonetheless, the Conseil d’État explicitly enshrined the 
primacy of constitutional norms over international norms. The position of the 
highest administrative court was later ratified by the Cour de cassation in the 
Fraisse case of 2000 in the exact same terms as those chosen by the Conseil 
d’État 124.
This interpretation of international law may be explained by different 
elements. As Christine Maugüé has observed 125, article 55 of the Constitution 
refers to the primacy of international law but with regard to legislative acts only. 
No mention is made to the superiority of international norms over constitu-
tional norms. Furthermore, the ratification procedure reinforces this argumen-
tation. Indeed, article 54 of the Constitution reads as follows:
123 Conseil d’État, Case nº 200286 200287, 30 October 1998, Sarran.
124 Cour de Cassation, Assemblée plénière, Judgment nº 99-60274, 02 June 2000, Pauline Fraisse: 
«que la suprématie conférée aux engagements internationaux ne s’appliquant pas dans l’ordre 
interne aux dispositions de valeur constitutitionnelle».
125 Christine Maugüe, «L’arrêt Sarran, entre apparence et réalité», Cahiers du conseil constitutionnel, 
nº 7, 1999. 
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if the Constitutional Council [...] has held that an international underta-
king contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, authorization to ratify 
or approve the international undertaking involved may be given only after 
amending the Constitution 126.
As a consequence, a treaty that would not comply with the Constitution 
cannot be ratified by the French authorities, except if they amend the Con-
stitution first. This provision therefore leaves the final word to the constituent 
power. If the latter refuses to modify the Constitution, then the international 
treaty will remain a dead letter regarding the French legal order 127. The Con-
stitutional Court eventually confirmed the position of the Cour de cassation 
and Conseil d’État  128.
While the situation of international norms in the French hierarchy of 
norms is clarified, some issues remain. In particular, the question surrounding 
their effective integration into the domestic legal order needs to be addressed. 
As evidenced by the monist understanding of article 55 of the Constitution, 
the international treaties and conventions that are ratified or approved are 
applicable into the national legal order once they enter into force. Nonethe-
less, their enforceability regarding individuals is subject to their publication in 
the Official Journal. Furthermore, if the international treaties and conventions 
do not entail legislative modifications, then their clauses must be self-executing 
for them to be directly applicable. The role played by the national jurisdictions 
in defining whether international norms are self-executing or not is therefore 
essential.
On another note, it should be highlighted that the Constitution does not 
refer to the acts adopted by the international organizations to which France is 
a Member State. However, as evidenced by Alain Pellet 129, they follow the same 
rules as those of treaties. International organizations’ decisions are obligatory 
and directly applicable as long as they are self-executing.
In addition, the Constitution does not refer to customary international 
law. In this respect, if the Conseil constitutionnel refuses to monitor the com-
pliance of national norms with treaty law, it accepts to do so in relation with 
126 French Constitution of 1958, article 54. 
127 Maugüe, «L’arrêt Sarran, entre apparence et réalité», op. cit., 1999.
128 Conseil constitutionnel, 19.11.2004, Decision Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe.
129 Pellet, «Question nº 11: Le droit international et la constitution de 1958», op. cit., 2008.
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unwritten principles of international law 130. The Conseil d’État, on the other 
hand, makes national law prevail in case of conflict with customary interna-
tional law 131.
Thus, domestic courts have established a sophisticated system of hier-
archy according to which international law prevails over legislative acts but 
remains subject to constitutional norms in the French hierarchy of norms. In 
this respect, reflecting only in terms of division between monism and dualism 
has proven to be quite superficial, as national courts have had to adapt the 
hierarchy of norms to the phenomenon of globalization.
2.1.2. The special case of EU law
Special mention needs to be made to EU law, as it does not exactly obey 
to the same rules as those that govern public international law. In particular, 
one of the main issues surrounding the relationship between EU and national 
law deals with the principle of primacy of EU law.
Indeed, the Court of Justice has consistently affirmed the primacy of EU 
law over national law 132, a principle which cannot be limited either by consti-
tutional norms 133 or fundamental rights 134. It is therefore an absolute principle, 
which accepts no limitations. While the principle of primacy is not alien to 
international law, the manner in which it is actually implemented in the EU 
framework is more sophisticated and efficient. In this regard, the European 
Court of Justice has developed several principles which are corollaries to the 
principle of primacy. First, the Court considered that the EU legal order can-
130 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 75-59 DC, 30 December 1975, Loi relative aux consé-
quences de l’autodétermination des îles des Comores; Decision nº 81-132 DC, 16 January 1982, 
Loi de nationalisation; Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nº 85-197 DC, 23 August 1985, Loi 
sur l’évolution de la Nouvelle Calédonie; Decision nº 92-308 DC, 09 April 1992, Traité sur 
l’Union européenne. Quoted in Pellet, «Question nº 11: Le droit international et la constitution 
de 1958», op. cit., 2008.
131 Conseil d’État, Judgment nº 148683, 06 June 1977, Aquarone. Quoted in Pellet, «Question 
nº 11: Le droit international et la constitution de 1958», op. cit., 2008.
132 ECJ, Case C-6/64, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] 
ECR 585.
133 ECJ, Cases C-29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 
134 ECJ, C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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not be assimilated to traditional international rules. In the case Costa vs. Enel 
of 1964, it held the following:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC treaty has crea-
ted its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, beca-
me an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which 
their courts are bound to apply 135.
It then went further in the case Les Verts of 1986:
It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic 
Community is a community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither 
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question 
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the treaty 136.
Consequently, the EU legal order is held to be different from the interna-
tional legal order; it becomes an integral part of domestic law and cannot obey 
to the same rules of integration at national level. What is more, the founding 
treaties constitute the «basic constitutional charter» of that order.
The appearance of the constitutional terminology and mechanisms at EU 
level is particularly significant. It demonstrates the willingness to establish a 
legal order similar to that of a State. This is further strengthened by other prin-
ciples of interpretation of EU law, most notably the principle of direct effect, 
recognized in the Van Gend en Loos case 137. The EU legal order does not only 
establish obligations between States, but it also creates individual rights, so 
that individuals are allowed to invoke EU law before their national courts. As 
a result, the traditional mechanisms stemming from international law cannot 
apply to EU law, as the principle of reciprocity would infringe upon the rights 
of individuals and the single market 138. This principle was indeed rejected by 
135 ECJ, Case C-6/64, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] 
ECR 585. 
136 ECJ, Case C-294/83, Parti écologiste «Les Verts» v. European Parliament. Judgment of the Court 
of 23 April 1986. European Court Reports 1986-01339. 
137 ECJ, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos. 
138 Jacqué, «Droit constitutionnel, Droit communautaire, CEDH, Charte des Nations Unies», op. cit., 
2007, pp. 3-37. 
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the Court of Justice as it considered it to be incompatible with the structure of 
the EU 139. The idea of legal order integrated into national law is made possible 
by the fact that national judges are the ordinary courts in charge of applying 
EU law 140. All these principles set out by the Court of Justice not only rein-
force the hierarchy of norms between EU and national law, but they also entail 
consequences regarding the mechanism of reception of EU law in national law 
and the manner in which the principle of primacy is actually implemented 141. 
Most notably, they allow an effective application of EU law on a daily basis by 
national judges.
Consequently, the affirmation of the primacy of EU law is not without 
problems in the French legal order, as constitutional norms are normally con-
sidered to be at the summit of the hierarchy of norms. Indeed, the relationship 
between EU law and national legislative acts was fairly rapidly resolved as the 
Cour de cassation recognized the primacy of EU law over national legislative 
acts, including subsequent acts 142. Even though the recognition arrived later, 
the Conseil d’État eventually followed the Cour de cassation’s approach in 
1989 143.
However, the relationship between constitutional and EU norms has 
been more conflictive or at least, more complex. In this regard, on the occasion 
of the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, the constituent power decided to 
enshrine the participation of France in the EU into Title XV of the Consti-
tution 144 in order to solve this conflict. Yet, it was not until the Constitutional 
Court scrutinized the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that it 
adopted a clear approach on this matter.
In this regard, the Constitutional Court now considers that it is incompe-
tent to scrutinize the constitutionality of the legislative acts that exactly trans-
139 ECJ, Case C-106/77, Judgment of the Court of 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Jacqué «Droit constitutionnel, Droit communautaire, CEDH, Charte des Nations Unies», op. cit., 
2007, p. 9. 
142 Cour de Cassation, chambre mixte, Judgment nº 73-13556, 24 May 1975, Société Jacques Vabre. 
143 Conseil d’État, Judgment nº 108243, 20 October 1989, Nicolo. 
144 Constitution of 1958, article 88-1: «The Republic shall participate in the European Union 
constituted by States which have freely chosen to exercise some of their powers in common by 
virtue of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, as they result from the treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December, 2007». 
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pose EU directives (decision 2004-496 DC). As article 88-1 of the Constitu-
tion explicitly refers to the participation of France in the EU, it appears that 
when the legislature transposes EU directives, it responds to an EU obligation 
that actually derives from a constitutional norm. Therefore, the Constitution 
obliges the French legislature to comply with its EU commitments. One con-
sequence is that if the Constitutional Court scrutinizes a legislative act which 
is the exact transposition of a Directive, it indirectly analyses the validity of the 
directive, a competence that belongs to the sole Court of Justice. Consequently, 
the Constitutional Court has declared itself incompetent to scrutinize the con-
stitutionality of transposing acts of EU directives.
In this context, the constitutional judge recognizes to some extent the 
primacy of EU norms and the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU. 
This approach constitutes a recognition of the trust towards the Court of Jus-
tice to ensure, together with the ordinary courts, the respect for the principles 
that are common to the Constitution and the EU legal order 145, especially 
fundamental rights. If an act of transposition challenges one of these common 
principles, the Court of Justice is entrusted to ensure its respect and the Con-
stitutional Court is not competent 146.
However, the constitutional judge does foresee an exception to the pri-
macy of EU norms: that they respect the rules and principles inherent in 
the French constitutional identity («règle ou principe inhérents à l’identité 
constitutionnelle de la France») 147. In this respect, if the constitutionality of a 
145 Bertrand Mathieu, «Les rapports normatifs entre le droit communautaire et le droit national. 
Bilan et incertitudes relatifs aux évolutions récentes de la jurisprudence des juges constitutionnel 
et administratif français», Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 4(72), 2007, pp. 675-693.
146 See, e.g.: Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 2004-498 DC, 29 July 2004, Loi relative à la bioé-
thique.
147 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 2006-540 DC, 27 July 2006 Loi relative au droit d’auteur et 
aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information («Considérant qu’aux termes du premier alinéa 
de l’article 88-1 de la Constitution: “La République participe aux Communautés européennes 
et à l’Union européenne, constituées d’États qui ont choisi librement, en vertu des traités qui les 
ont instituées, d’exercer en commun certaines de leurs compétences”; qu’ainsi, la transposition 
en droit interne d’une directive communautaire résulte d’une exigence constitutionnelle; Consi-
dérant qu’il appartient par suite au Conseil constitutionnel, saisi dans les conditions prévues par 
l’article 61 de la Constitution d’une loi ayant pour objet de transposer en droit interne une 
directive communautaire, de veiller au respect de cette exigence; que, toutefois, le contrôle qu’il 
exerce à cet effet est soumis à une double limite; Considérant, en premier lieu, que la transposi-
tion d’une directive ne saurait aller à l’encontre d’une règle ou d’un principe inhérent à l’identité 
constitutionnelle de la France, sauf à ce que le constituant y ait consenti; Considérant, en second 
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transposing act contradicts a principle specific to the domestic legal order, then 
the Court of Justice cannot ensure its respect, so that the Constitutional Court 
recovers its competence to scrutinize its validity with regard to that principle.
The primacy of the Constitution is therefore reaffirmed. As Bertrand 
Mathieu observes, on the one hand, the prevalence of EU law is actually based 
on the primacy of the Constitution (article 88-1); on the other hand, the 
existence of rules and principles inherent in the French constitutional identity 
poses a limit to such prevalence 148. Scholars have described this case-law as the 
‘French Solange’ 149, even though the limitation does not depend on the level 
of protection of fundamental rights at EU level, but rather on the nature of the 
norm at stake 150.
To sum up, it appears from an analysis of French case-law that inter-
national treaties are not superior to the Constitution but shall prevail over 
national legislative acts, with the exception of some EU law provisions, which 
are supreme provided that they respect the French constitutional identity.
2.2. Common Article 1 in national law
France has ratified most IHL treaties and conventions, albeit some issues 
remain in particular with regard to the IHFFC and the reservations made to 
Additional Protocol I. It seems that these elements are linked to the specifici-
ties of France, notably with regard to nuclear weapons, but also its history in 
Algeria. Despite these issues, France is an active actor of IHL on the overall. In 
lieu, que, devant statuer avant la promulgation de la loi dans le délai prévu par l’article 61 de 
la Constitution, le Conseil constitutionnel ne peut saisir la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes de la question préjudicielle prévue par l’article 234 du traité instituant la Commu-
nauté européenne; qu’il ne saurait en conséquence déclarer non conforme à l’article 88-1 de la 
Constitution qu’une disposition législative manifestement incompatible avec la directive qu’elle 
a pour objet de transposer; qu’en tout état de cause, il revient aux autorités juridictionnelles 
nationales, le cas échéant, de saisir la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes à titre 
préjudiciel»). 
148 Mathieu, «Les rapports normatifs entre le droit communautaire et le droit national», op. cit., 2007, 
pp. 675-693. 
149 Anne Levade, «Constitution et Europe ou le juge constitutionnel au coeur des rapports de sys-
tème», Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, nº 18, July 2005.
150 Mathieu, «Les rapports normatifs entre le droit communautaire et le droit national», op. cit., 2007, 
pp. 675-693.
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this respect, the analysis of its policy documents demonstrates that the respect 
for IHL is one of its priorities and Common Article 1 is explicitly recognized 
as an institutional mechanism of compliance.
2.2.1. An overall satisfactory ratification of IHL treaties
As Isabelle Fouchard observes in her report on the ‘Application et pro-
motion du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits 
de l’homme en temps de conflit armé’ 151, France is a party to the vast major-
ity of existing IHL treaties. As she highlights, it is therefore more accurate to 
examine which treaties have not been ratified by France in order to have an 
idea of France’s participation in IHL treaties 152.
In matter of protection of victims of armed conflicts, France is not a party 
to the Declaration provided for under article 90 of Additional Protocol I on the 
acceptance of the competence of the IHFFC 153. The French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs used to argue that France would change its position towards the IHFFC 
once the International Criminal Court would be competent to prosecute the 
war crimes committed by French nationals 154. Indeed, upon the ratification of 
the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, France opposed a dec-
laration on the basis of article 124 in order to exclude the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the war crimes committed by French nationals for a period of seven years 
upon the entry into force of the Statute 155. Even though this declaration was 
withdrawn on 13 August 2008 156, the position on the IHFFC has not changed.
This omission can be problematic. Even though the State parties have not 
resorted to the IHFFC, it constitutes a promising tool to ensure respect for IHL 
151 Isabelle Fouchard, Application et promotion du droit international humanitaire et du droit international 
des droits de l’homme en temps de conflit armé, ATLAS, 2009.
152 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
153 States accepting the competence of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commis-
sion based on Article 90 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 
1977. Available at: http://www.ihffc.org/Files/en/pdf/country_list_05.05.2014.pdf (Accessed: 
14.03.2016).
154 Notification dépositaire C.N.404.2000.TREATIES-12 (France: Ratification), 21 June 2000.
155 See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 2. 
156 Notification dépositaire C.N.592.2008.TREATIES-5 (France: Retrait de déclaration), 20 Au-
gust 2008. 
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whose potential should be exploited, as mentioned above 157. As the IHFFC’s 
website notes, the IHFFC benefits from an important role at international 
level as it is supported by the UN, the ICRC, and other intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations 158. In this, regard, the IHFFC is explicitly 
referred to in the EU ‘Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL’. There 
is therefore a discrepancy between what France agreed to commit to at EU 
level and what it commits to in its own capacity. It also questions whether any 
EU action in this sense would be supported by French authorities.
In relation with the protection of cultural property, France is not a party 
to the 1999 Hague Protocol 159. It is not a party either to the Convention on 
the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques of 10 December 1976 160. Apart from these exceptions, this 
overwhelming ratification demonstrates an overall engagement of France in 
favor of IHL.
As far as customary IHL is concerned, France considers that the most 
universally recognized humanitarian principles which are often formalized in 
treaty law are indeed of customary nature and shall therefore bind all States. 
However, the official position of the State is that the precise content and scope 
of customary principles remains subject to debate. In particular, it values the 
‘doctrinal value’ of the ICRC Study on ‘Customary International Humani-
tarian Law’, but it refuses to consider it as proper law, which may be invoked 
against States 161.
Turning now to the relationship between the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and their Additional Protocols – in particular Common Article 1 – and 
French law specifically, France signed the four Geneva Conventions on the 
date of their adoption and ratified them two years later, on 28 June 1951. It 
157 See, supra, Chapter 1.
158 Website of the IHFFC, «Welcome to the Website of the IHFFC». Available at: www.ihffc.org/
index.asp?page=home (Accessed: 22.04.2016). 
159 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl 
(Accessed: 14.03.2016).
160 Convention on the prohibition of military or any hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques, 10 December 1976. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl (Accessed: 14.03.2016).
161 Mission permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies, Rapport de la France sur l’«Etat des 
protocoles additionnels aux conventions de Genève de 1949 relatifs à la protection des victimes 
des conflits armés», New York, 2012, p. 2.
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also signed Additional Protocol II on the protection of victims of non-interna-
tional armed conflicts on 12 December 1977 and ratified it on 7 August 1980.
As for Additional Protocol I on the protection of victims of international 
armed conflicts, it took longer to get it ratified. Despite an active participation 
in the elaboration of the Protocol, France signed it and indicated that it was 
not bound by the instrument 162. As Marie-Hélène Aubert has shown, France’s 
reluctance to ratify the Protocol was based on the refusal to merge the law 
on the conduct of hostilities with humanitarian law on the one hand, and on 
the compatibility of Additional Protocol I with its doctrine of nuclear deter-
rence 163. Nonetheless, this position had become untenable, especially with 
regard to France’s willingness to present itself a leader in human rights issues on 
the international stage 164. Therefore, the then Prime Minister announced that 
France was willing to ratify the Protocol on the occasion of the 50th anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in March 1998 165. Against 
this background, France eventually ratified Additional Protocol I in April 2001, 
but it also made 18 reservations and declarations to it 166. Concretely, they deal 
with the right to self-defense, nuclear weapons, the definition of an armed 
conflict, or the notions of military advantage and military objective.
Finally, regarding Additional Protocol III, France signed it on 8 Decem-
ber 2005 and ratified it four years later, on 17 July 2009. Nonetheless, rat-
ification is not sufficient, insofar as the enforceability of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols depends on their publication in 
the French official journal. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the 1949 
Geneva Conventions were ratified by the President of the Republic on June 
1951 following an act of Parliament 167 and were published in French by decree 
162 Marie-Hélène Aubert, Rapport nº 2833 fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires étrangères sur le 
projet de loi adopté par le Sénat, autorisant l’adhésion au protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève 
du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (protocole I) (ensemble 
deux annexes), Paris, Assemblée Nationale, 20 December 2000, p. 15. 
163 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
164 Aubert, Rapport nº 2833 fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi adopté 
par le Sénat, op. cit., 2000, p. 17. 
165 Ibid.
166 Available at: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&doc-
umentId=D8041036B40EBC44C1256A34004897B2 (Accessed: 14.03.2016).
167 Act nº 51-161 of 16 February 1951 (Loi nº 51-161 du 16 février 1951 autorisant le Président 
de la République à ratifier les quatre conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 pour la protection 
des victimes de la guerre), JORF 17 February 1951, p. 1644. 
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nº 52-253 of 28 February 1952 168, thus enshrining the four Geneva Conven-
tions in domestic law. In the same way, an act of Parliament of 23 December 
1983 authorized the ratification of Additional Protocol II 169, which was pub-
lished in the Official Journal through the adoption of decree no. 84-727 of 17 
July 1984 170. Lastly, France formalized the ratification of Additional Protocol I 
through the adoption of an act of Parliament on 30 January 2001 171. Therefore, 
the criteria necessary for the correct ratification of the Geneva Conventions 
are fulfilled in the French legal order.
Generally speaking, as Isabelle Fouchard underlines, these ratifications 
highlight an active engagement in the promotion and respect for IHL, as only 
the reservations made to Additional Protocol I are likely to give rise to prob-
lems of application by the Government 172. With regard to Common Article 
1, this means that France is unequivocally bound by the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL, both in its internal and external dimensions.
Nevertheless, for the Geneva Conventions to be directly applicable, 
national jurisdictions must assess whether their clauses are self-executing or 
not. To do so, they follow a set of criteria well established in the case-law. The 
provisions contained in the international treaties and conventions must be 
clear and unconditional; in particular, they must be sufficiently precise to cre-
ate rights for individuals. The Conseil d’État conducts an assessment following 
168 Decree n° 52-253 of 28 February 1952 (Décret n° 52-253 du 28 février 1952 portant publica-
tion de la Convention relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, de la Convention relative 
à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre, de la Convention pour l’amélioration 
du sort des blessés, des malades et des naufragés des forces armées sur mer, de la Convention pour 
l’amélioration du sort des blessés et des malades dans les forces armées en campagne, signées à 
Genève le 12 août 1949), JORF 6 March 1952, p. 2617.
169 Act nº 83-1130 of 23 december 1983 (Loi nº 83-1130 du 23 décembre 1983 autorisant l’ad-
hésion de la République française au protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève du 12 
août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux [protocole 
II] adopté à Genève le 8 juin 1977, Journal Officiel de la République française), JORF 27 De-
cember 1983, p. 3731. 
170 Decree n° 84-727 of 17 July 1984 (Décret n° 84-727 du 17 juillet 1984 portant publication de 
ce protocole). 
171 Act nº 2001-79 of 30 January 2001 (Loi nº 2001-79 du 30 janvier 2001 autorisant l’adhésion 
au protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des 
victimes des conflits armés internationaux [protocole I]), JORF, 31 January 2001, p. 1650. Publi-
shed in the official journal through Decree nº 2001-565 of 25 June 2001 (Décret nº 2001-565 
du 25 juin 2001 portant publication de ce protocole), JORF, 30 June 2001, p. 10409. 
172 Fouchard, Application et promotion du droit international humanitaire et du droit international, op. cit., 
2009. 
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two cumulative criteria: first, the provision at stake is not exclusively intended 
to govern inter-State relations, and second, it does not require a transposing act 
to create effects towards individuals:
Une stipulation doit être reconnue d’effet direct par le juge administratif 
lorsque, eu égard à l’intention exprimée des parties et à l’économie généra-
le du traité invoqué, ainsi qu’à son contenu et à ses termes, elle n’a pas pour 
objet exclusif de régir les relations entre Etats et ne requiert l’intervention 
d’aucun acte complémentaire pour produire des effets à l’égard des parti-
culiers; l’absence de tels effets ne saurait être déduite de la seule circonstan-
ce que la stipulation désigne les Etats parties comme sujets de l’obligation 
qu’elle définit 173.
However, the perspective adopted by the French jurisdictions has been 
quite conservative concerning the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, they have con-
sidered that their provisions are too general, and cannot be directly applicable in 
the French legal order 174. National jurisdictions have not interpreted Common 
Article 1 specifically, but it is most likely that they would adopt the same line of 
reasoning. In particular, it is very plausible to consider that this provision aims 
to govern inter-States relations only and cannot create rights for individuals as 
a result. While this interpretation is logical, it might prove to be problematic 
regarding the criminalization of violations of IHL at domestic level 175.
2.2.2. An express recognition of Common Article 1 in policy documents
In any case, the particular status of the Geneva Conventions in IHL and 
the international legal order in general seems to be recognized. By way of 
example, the Textbook on the Law of Armed Conflicts (Manuel de droit des 
conflits armés) considers that the Geneva Conventions constitute, even today, the 
basis of IHL. This Textbook was written as a working tool aimed at supporting 
the military in the legal aspects of their conduct. It is not legally binding, but 
it offers a useful tool to approach the interpretation of French authorities with 
173 Conseil d’État, Ass., GISTI et FAPIL, nº 322326, 11 April 2012, conclusions of G. Dumortier. 
174 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 95-81527, 26 March 1996, E. Javor and al. vs. X. 
175 This aspect is extensively addressed in Chapter 4. 
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respect to IHL. In this Textbook, the obligation to ensure respect is referred to, 
as it is the condition of IHL’s efficiency:
Pour être efficace, le droit des conflits armés doit être respecté par le plus 
grand nombre d’États. Il doit tendre vers l’universalité, afin d’être accepté 
par tous. Il doit aussi être encadré par des mesures de confiance, de survei-
llance, de contrôle et de sanction 176.
The Textbook likewise recognizes that the exemplary behavior of the 
French military is an element that contributes to ensuring respect for IHL:
L’exemplarité du comportement de nos forces armées en la matière per-
met aussi que ces règles, parfois ignorées ou transgressées, soient mieux 
appliquées partout dans le monde 177.
It thus appears that the French authorities are well aware that they must 
ensure respect for IHL internally in order to be credible when conducting 
action to ensure respect for IHL externally.
In the same line, France’s Humanitarian Strategy for the period 2012-
2017 (Stratégie Humanitaire de la République Française, hereafter, ‘Strategy’) 
explicitly refers to Common Article 1 as one of the guiding principles of its 
humanitarian action in the following terms:
La France respecte et s’efforce de faire respecter le droit international 
humanitaire lors de tous les conflits armés, internationaux ou non-inter-
nationaux, conformément à l’article 1 commun aux quatre conventions de 
Genève du 12 août 1949 178.
In this respect, it is worth noticing that France recognizes the applica-
tion of Common Article 1 both in international and non-international armed 
conflicts. There also seems to be a sense of permanence in the wording chosen 
(«tous les conflits armés»). Furthermore, the Strategy refers to the necessity to 
176 Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Paris, Ministère de la Dé-
fense, 2012, p. 11. 
177 Ibid., p. 11. 
178 Ministère des affaires étrangères, Stratégie humanitaire de la République française, Paris, 
06.07.2012, p. 12. 
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reach both State and non-State actors in order to effectively ensure respect for 
IHL. The Strategy further confirms the relevance of IHL and the idea that it 
cannot be called in question, either directly or indirectly. It therefore acknowl-
edges the need to reach a uniform and ambitious interpretation, and to foster 
its application in good faith by all actors involved. It is also worth mentioning 
that the Strategy refers to the Responsibility to Protect as another guiding 
principle of France’s humanitarian action on the international stage. 179
In addition, it is important to note that France frames its action also 
within the EU context. In this respect, it refers to different provisions of EU 
law relating to humanitarian action and aid. The fact that the Strategy expressly 
refers to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL and states 
that France’s action ensures that they are implemented is of particular interest 
for present purposes 180.
The importance given to Common Article 1 is likewise expressed in the par-
agraph on strengthening national and international partnerships. Indeed, France 
commits to develop initiatives aiming at ensuring respect for IHL together with 
the Red Cross Movement, by intervening both in multilateral and bilateral fora, 
so as to support all the actors involved in armed conflicts in respecting IHL 181.
Furthermore, the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law provides examples of statements made by the highest French public 
authorities whereby they declare their commitment to Common Article 1 182. 
One of these speeches is particularly eloquent in this regard, as the Minister of 
Foreign and European Affairs stated the following:
[A]ll State parties to the conventions [1949 Geneva Conventions and 
their protocols] must not only obey them but also ensure that they are 
obeyed by the parties in an armed conflict.
What that means is that the international community has a special res-
ponsibility in ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law 183.
179 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
180 Ministère des affaires étrangères, Stratégie humanitaire de la République française, op. cit., 2012, 
p. 13: «Elle veille attentivement à la mise en œuvre des ‘Lignes directrices concernant la promo-
tion du droit international humanitaire’, dont l’Union européenne s’est dotée en 2005».
181 Ibid., p. 25.
182 Practice Relating to Rule 144. Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga 
Omnes. 
183 Ibid. 
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These declarations leave no doubt. Common Article 1 is understood as 
a legal obligation as the wording indicates, and the external dimension of the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL is explicitly stated. It also clearly endorses 
the idea that Common Article 1 establishes a system of collective responsibility 
binding upon the international community.
It can therefore be concluded that France is not only bound by the obli-
gation to ensure respect for IHL as any other State party to the Geneva Con-
ventions, but that it also is well aware of that and expressly recognizes so. 
Even though there is no doubt from an international perspective that France 
is bound by the Geneva Conventions, the domestic case-law on the Geneva 
Conventions is not conclusive regarding Common Article 1 specifically. None-
theless, some elements of soft law clearly indicate that France recognizes that 
it has a duty to ensure respect for IHL not only internally but also externally. 
In this respect, while the Strategy is not legally binding, it offers an interest-
ing insight about the French perspective on the obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL. The importance and relevance of the latter are emphasized, and the 
tone of the Strategy highlights the necessity and urgency to effectively ensure 
respect for IHL. Likewise, the Strategy endorses the broad interpretation of 
Common Article 1, understood as an obligation to ensure respect for IHL not 
only internally, but also by others.
2.3. The National Consultative Commission for Human Rights
State parties to the Geneva Conventions are expected to establish national 
committees in charge of advising and assisting governments in implementing 
and disseminating IHL. They therefore constitute a non-negligible aspect of 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Against this background, France cre-
ated the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (Commission 
Nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, hereafter, ‘CNCDH’) in 1947 
and granted it IHL competences in 1996. This was later confirmed in 2007 184. 
As its name suggests, the CNCHD’s mandate is much broader and includes 
human rights matters in general. Nevertheless, its mandate also explicitly refers 
184 Act nº 2007-292 relating to the French National Consultative Commission for Human Rights 
(Loi relative à la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme).
170 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
to IHL and it is recognized as the official national committee for the imple-
mentation of IHL, as provided by the ICRC.
In particular, pursuant to the Statutes of the CNCDH, the latter is respon-
sible for advising and proposing recommendations to the Government on IHL 
and humanitarian action matters. Furthermore, Decree nº 2007-1137 on the 
composition and functioning of the CNCDH stipulates that the CNCDH 
shall cooperate with the international organizations in charge of IHL and may 
call the attention of public authorities regarding the ratification of IHL treaties 
and conventions or the compliance of domestic law therewith. In addition, the 
CNCDH may assess which are the measures necessary to ensure the applica-
tion of IHL 185.
In this respect, the CNCDH’s activities include, inter alia, the implemen-
tation of France’s international obligations on this matter, the development of 
IHL, as well as the creation and implementation of international treaties and 
conventions relating to weapons. Within this frame, it has adopted a series of 
advisory opinions on IHL. The first advisory opinion on IHL dates back to 
1990 186. Afterwards, it has adopted advisory opinions on, inter alia, the ratifica-
tion of IHL instruments 187, the need to respect the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention on prisoners of war 188, the compliance of the French legal order 
with the Statute of Rome 189 and other IHL instruments 190, the respect for 
185 Decree nº 2007-1137 on the composition and functioning of the French National Consultative 
Commission for Human Rights (Décret nº 2007-1137 relatif à la composition et au fonction-
nement de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme), article 2.
186 CNCDH, Avis Mise en œuvre et développement progressif du droit international humanitaire, 
06 April 1990. 
187 CNCDH, Avis sur l’adhésion française au protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève du 
12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I), 
6 July 2001.
188 CNCDH, Avis concernant la situation des personnes détenues après avoir été arrêtées dans le 
cadre du conflit armé international en Afghanistan, 7 March 2002.
189 CNCDH, Avis sur la Cour pénale internationale, 23 October 2012; CNCDH, Avis sur la 
loi portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour Pénale Internationale, 6 No-
vember 2008; CNCDH, Avis sur le projet de loi adaptant la législation française au statut de 
la Cour Pénale Internationale, 29 June 2006; CNCDH, Avis sur l’avant-projet de loi portant 
adaptation de la législation française au Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 15 May 2003; 
CNCDH, Avis sur la mise en oeuvre du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 19 December 
2002. 
190 CNDCH, Avis sur la protection et l’utilisation des emblèmes de la croix rouge, du croissant 
rouge et du cristal rouge, 15 April 2010. 
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 171
humanitarian principles, the need to protect humanitarian workers 191 and 
medical staff operating in armed conflicts, or on arms trade 192. In few cases, 
the CNCDH has called the attention of the French government on violations 
occurring in armed conflicts, such as in Chechnya 193.
While these opinions are not legally binding, they are helpful in order to 
assess where France stands on these issues and the efforts that still need to be 
undertaken. Furthermore, even though this does not hold true for all advisory 
opinions, some of them have been followed to some extent by the French 
authorities. By way of example, the CNCDH recommended the adoption of 
a pluri-annual framework law that would establish the principles of France’s 
humanitarian action on the international scene in 2011 194. On the following 
year, the French government adopted the above-mentioned Humanitarian 
Strategy for the period 2012-2017. Even though this is a non-legally bind-
ing instrument, it is reasonable to assume that the recommendation of the 
CNCDH had something to do with its adoption.
Thus, as any other State party to the Geneva Conventions, France is sub-
ject to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, both internally and externally. 
In this regard, the overwhelming ratification of IHL treaties denotes an over-
all commitment of France with respect to IHL in general, and the Geneva 
Conventions in particular. France has ratified the four Geneva Conventions 
and their three additional protocols, and it has complied with its internal obli-
gations in order to give full effect to these ratifications. It is therefore une-
quivocally bound by Common Article 1, a situation not explicit in domestic 
law but acknowledged by the authorities in different policy documents and 
public statements. Furthermore, France has long framed itself as the ‘country of 
human rights’. Mirroring the EU, France bases the functioning of democracy 
and its involvement in international organizations on the respect for human 
rights, which are considered its founding values 195. Pursuant to this mandate, 
France must take all measures to ensure respect for IHL on the international 
191 CNDCH, Avis sur le respect et la protection des travailleurs humanitaires, 22 May 2014; CNC-
DH, Avis sur le respect et la protection du personnel humanitaire, 17 January 2008.
192 CNCDH, Avis sur le projet de Traité sur le commerce des armes, 23 June 2011; CNCDH, Avis 
portant sur les systèmes d’armes à sous-munitions, 21 September 2006; CNCDH, Avis sur le 
projet de convention cadre sur les transferts internationaux d’armes, 23 June 2005. 
193 CNCDH, Avis sur la situation en Tchétchénie et en Ingouchie, 19 December 2002.
194 CNCDH, Avis sur l’action humanitaire de la France, 31 March 2011.
195 See: http://www.franceonu.org/Protection-of-Human-Rights (Accessed: 08.06.2016).
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scene. In addition, it clearly appears that France’s action on the matter is multi-
lateral. In this regard, France places its action to ensure respect for IHL within 
the framework of the EU’s action as well as within the UN.
What is more, in terms of capacities, France is an important actor on the 
international scene and must act accordingly. In particular, it probably has a 
higher duty to ensure respect for IHL in its quality of permanent member of 
the UNSC. It is therefore important to scrutinize France’s action within the 
UNSC in order to assess whether it complies with the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL. It is worth noting that the protection of civilians was one 
of the main priorities of the French presidency of the UNSC during June 
2016 196. Furthermore, the above-mentioned French-Mexican initiative on 
UNSC permanent members refraining from using their right to veto in case 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing is 
encouraging insofar as it highlights the shift from a State-centered approach 
to a human-centered approach of international relations. When the most 
serious international crimes are committed, the French government is ready 
to give up on one of its most important privileges. France’s commitment to 
the R2P is clear, which in turn has an impact on the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL.
Yet, two issues remain regarding the integration of Common Article 1 in 
the French legal order: the refusal to recognize the competence of the IHFFC 
and the lack of direct effect of the Geneva Conventions’ provisions in the 
French legal order. As mentioned above, the IHFFC is a promising tool that 
should be used by the State parties to implement their obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL, and it is regrettable that France does not follow this path. As 
for the lack of direct effect, while it is understandable regarding Common 
Article 1, it nonetheless entails problems regarding the criminalization of IHL 
violations. As evidenced in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the actual criminalization 
of IHL violations was made possible in France only with the establishment of 
international criminal jurisdictions despite a clear mandate already established 
in the Geneva Conventions.
196 See: Conférence de presse de présentation du programme de travail de la présidence française du 
Conseil de sécurité, Intervention de M. François Delattre, représentant permanent de la France 
auprès des Nations unies, 01.06.2016. Available at: http://www.franceonu.org/Le-maintien-de-
la-paix-colonne-vertebrale-de-la-Presidence-francaise-du-Conseil (Accessed: 08.06.2016). 
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3. SPAIN AND COMMON ARTICLE 1
A State party to the Geneva Conventions, there is no doubt that Spain is 
bound by the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, as provided by Common 
Article 1. Therefore, in this section, the transposition of Common Article 1 
into the Spanish legal order is analyzed. In particular, the articulation of inter-
national, EU, and domestic law is examined and applied to Common Article 1. 
It should also be noted that due to the internal structure of Spain, the regional 
authorities (Comunidades Autónomas) may also conduct their own external 
action 197. However, this aspect is excluded from the present analysis, as it would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the same way as France, Spain has ratified not only the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols, but also most of the 
IHL treaties and conventions, thus establishing a strong nexus with the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL. Furthermore, Spain has established a national Commis-
sion on International Humanitarian Law. All in all, it seems that the obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL is well integrated into the Spanish legal order.
3.1. The articulation of international and domestic law
In the same way as in France, the Spanish legal order is intertwined 
between international law, European law and national law. For the sake of clar-
ity, it is therefore important to distinguish between the systems of integration 
of public international law and EU law into the Spanish legal order, as they 
reflect the specific character of EU law in domestic law.
3.1.1. Public International Law
The Spanish Constitution organizes the articulation of the different 
norms into the Spanish legal order. When it was adopted in 1978, the choice to 
make it open to international law was made. In this context, the norms deriv-
197 For the Catalan example, see: Xavier Pons Rafols et al., La acción exterior y europea de la Generalitat 
de Cataluña. Desarrollo normativo e institucional, Madrid, Marcial Pons/Centro de Estudios Inter-
nacionales, 2012. 
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ing from international law benefit from a supra-legislative status but remain 
inferior to the Constitution.
Concretely, a distinction shall be made between customary and treaty 
norms. Regarding the former, the Constitution does not expressly regulate 
them even though there are indirect references 198. In particular, the pream-
ble refers to the cooperation «in the strengthening of peaceful relations and 
effective cooperation among all the peoples of the earth» 199 and article 10(2) 
recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international trea-
ties and agreements ratified by Spain as criteria for the interpretation of the 
rights contained in the Constitution 200. Against this background, the practice 
of Spanish courts has been to consider these norms of international law as 
supra-legislative norms.
As for treaty law, its integration in the Spanish legal order is regulated 
by article 96(1) of the Constitution, article 1(5) of the civil code, and Act 
nº 25/2014 of 27 November 2014 201. In particular, article 96(1) seems to 
enshrine a monist approach to international law as it states that the interna-
tional treaties validly concluded and officially published in the Spanish official 
journal (Boletín oficial del Estado) shall be part of the Spanish legal order. This 
approach is confirmed in Act nº 25/2014 202. According to Oriol Casanovas 
and Ángel J. Rodrigo, the publication in the official journal is not the instru-
ment that allows the integration of treaty norms into Spanish law; conversely, 
the international treaties and conventions ratified by Spain are automatically 
integrated and produce effects in Spain since their entry into force. They argue 
that the publication in the official journal is a means of publicity that ensures 
legal certainty. Thus, the publication authorizes the direct application of the 
198 Oriol Casanovas and Ángel J. Rodrigo, Compendio de derecho internacional público, 5th ed., Madrid, 
Tecnos, 2016, p. 140.
199 Spanish Constitution, BOE nº 311, 29 December 1978, pp. 29313-29424, preamble: «[c]olaborar 
en el fortalecimiento de unas relaciones pacíficas y de eficaz cooperación entre los pueblos de la 
Tierra».
200 Spanish Constitution, BOE nº 311, 29 December 1978, pp. 29313-29424, article 10(2): «Pro-
visions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be 
construed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international 
treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain». 
201 Casanovas and Rodrigo, Compendio de derecho internacional público, op. cit., 2016, p. 141.
202 Act nº 25/2014 of 27 November 2014 (Ley 25/2014, de 27 de noviembre, de Tratados y 
otros Acuerdos Internacionales), BOE nº 288, of 28 November 2014, pp. 96841-96859, article 
23(3).
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provisions that are self-executing and – where relevant – the invocation of the 
rights and obligations contained therein by individuals. As such, the Spanish 
legal order is described as a soft monist system («sistema monista moderado») 
insofar as the integration into domestic law is automatic and the full effect of 
international norms solely requires the official publication 203. It is also worth 
noticing that article 30(1) of Act 25/2014 establishes a presumption of direct 
applicability. In those cases where applicability is conditioned by the adoption 
of transposing measures, the government shall present the relevant draft bills 
to the Parliament 204.
As observed by Oriol Casanovas and Ángel J. Rodrigo, the Constitution 
enshrines the primacy of international law over domestic law 205, to the extent 
that article 96(1) admits that the provisions of international may be repealed, 
amended, or suspended in accordance with the norms contained in interna-
tional law. However, this primacy does not apply to constitutional norms 206. In 
the event of conflict, ordinary courts are the ones in charge of ensuring that 
international norms prevail 207.
3.1.2. EU Law
The integration of EU law in the Spanish legal order obeys to different 
rules, due to its particular nature. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
participation of the Kingdom of Spain in the European Union is codified in 
the Constitution, by means of article 93 208. Thus, the acts of the EU shall be 
203 Casanovas and Rodrigo, Compendio de derecho internacional público, op. cit., 2016, p. 141.
204 Act nº 25/2014 of 27 November 2014 (Ley 25/2014, de 27 de noviembre, de Tratados y 
otros Acuerdos Internacionales), BOE nº 288, of 28 November 2014, pp. 96841-96859, article 
30(3).
205 Casanovas and Rodrigo, Compendio de derecho internacional público, op. cit., 2016, p. 143.
206 Act nº 25/2014 of 27 November 2014 (Ley 25/2014, de 27 de noviembre, de Tratados y otros 
Acuerdos Internacionales), BOE nº 288, 28 November 2014, pp. 96841-96859, article 31. 
207 Tribunal Constitucional, Case 28/1991, para. 5. 
208 Spanish Constitution, BOE nº 311, 29 December 1978, pp. 29313-29424, article 93: «Mediante 
ley orgánica se podrá autorizar la celebración de tratados por los que se atribuya a una orga-
nización o institución internacional el ejercicio de competencias derivadas de la Constitución. 
Corresponde a las Cortes Generales o al Gobierno, según los casos, la garantía del cumplimiento 
de estos tratados y de las resoluciones emanadas de los organismos internacionales o supranacio-
nales titulares de la cesión».
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integrated into the Spanish legal order in accordance with the rules contained 
in the EU founding treaties.
In this context, the principles of primacy and direct effect of EU law with 
regard to domestic legislation have been well integrated into the Spanish legal 
order. In this respect, the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) had already con-
firmed in 1990 that the primacy of EU law over domestic law means that ordi-
nary courts shall make EU law prevail 209. This position was further confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), who clearly endorsed 
the case-law of the Court of Justice in 1991 210, regardless of the date of adop-
tion of the legislative act. In this context, the Constitutional Court referred to 
the infra-constitutionality of EU law in order to exclude it from the param-
eters of the control of constitutionality of legislative acts 211. The standard of 
validity of EU law is not the Constitution, but the founding treaties so that the 
Constitutional Court shall not control the legality of EU secondary law.
The Constitutional Court recently confirmed and detailed these aspects 212. 
Indeed, it reiterated that EU primary and secondary law are not vested with 
constitutional character in the Spanish legal order 213; nonetheless, the Consti-
209 Tribunal Supremo, Case of 24 April 1990: «las normas anteriores que se opongan al Derecho 
comunitario deberán entenderse derogadas y las posteriores contrarias habrán de reputarse in-
constitucionales por incompetencia –artículos 93 y 96.1 de la Constitución española– pero no 
será exigible que el juez ordinario plantee la cuestión de inconstitucionalidad (art. 163 de la CE) 
para dejar inaplicada la norma estatal, porque está vinculado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal 
de Justicia que tiene establecido el principio pro communitate».
210 Tribunal Constitucional, Case 28/1991, 14 February 1991, para. 4: «a partir de la fecha de su adhe-
sión, el Reino de España se halla vinculado al Derecho de las Comunidades Europeas, originario 
y derivado, el cual –por decirlo con palabras del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Euro-
peas– constituye un ordenamiento jurídico propio, integrado en el sistema jurídico de los Estados 
miembros y que se impone a sus órganos jurisdiccionales (Sentencia Costa/ENEL, de 15 de julio 
de 1964)». Balaguer Callejón (coord.), Manual de Derecho Constitucional, op. cit., 2012, p. 249. 
211 Óscar Alzaga Villamil et al., Derecho político español según la Constitución de 1978. Vol. I Constitución 
y fuentes del Derecho, 6th ed., Madrid, Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces, 2016, p. 698. 
212 Tribunal Constitucional, Case 215/2014, of 18 December 2014. BOE nº 29, 3 February 2015, 
pp. 107-147; Tribunal Constitucional, Case 232/2015, of 5 November 2015. BOE nº 296, 11 
December 2015, pp. 117134-117149. 
213 Tribunal Constitucional, Case 232/2015, of 5 November 2015. BOE nº 296, of 11 December 
2015, pp. 117134-117149: «En el examen de este motivo principal hemos de comenzar recor-
dando que, según ha reiterado este Tribunal, ni el fenómeno de la integración europea, ni el art. 
93 CE a través del que ésta se instrumenta, ni el principio de primacía del Derecho de la Unión 
que rige las relaciones entre ambos ordenamientos han dotado a las normas del Derecho de la 
Unión Europea, originario o derivado, «de rango y fuerza constitucionales» [por todas, STC 
215/2014, de 18 de diciembre, FJ 3 a), con cita de otras]».
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tutional Court is in charge of ensuring respect for the principle of primacy of 
EU law, especially when the Court of Justice of the EU has already adjudicated 
on the issue at stake 214.
EU secondary law is therefore integrated into Spanish law as soon as it is 
published in the EU official journal, without requiring the adoption of specific 
techniques of implementation 215. It is worth mentioning that due to the inter-
nal structure of Spain, the transposition of EU directives may fall on State and/
or regional authorities, in accordance with the internal distribution of compe-
tences established in the Constitution and respective Statutes of Autonomy 216.
In case of conflict between constitutional norms and EU law, the situation 
is a little more complex 217. EU treaties are understood to prevail over any inter-
nal norm regarding the competences that fall under the EU’s remit. Indeed, the 
Constitution remains the supreme norm in those areas that fall under national 
sovereignty, while the areas for which the EU is competent in accordance with 
the principle of attribution are regulated by the EU founding treaties 218. As a 
result, in case of conflict between a norm contained in the EU treaties and the 
Constitution, it shall be scrutinized through the prism of article 93 of the Con-
stitution, with a view to assess whether the attribution of competence required 
by the treaties falls under the remit of article 93 or if, conversely, it goes beyond 
it and requires an amendment to the Constitution 219. In case of conflict between 
EU secondary law and the Constitution, the Constitutional Court recognized 
that EU norms could not be challenged before Spanish courts 220; therefore, if 
214 Ibid.
215 Casanovas and Rodrigo, Compendio de derecho internacional público, op. cit., 2016, p. 145. 
216 Tribunal Constitucional, Case nº 252/1988. Quoted in Casanovas and Rodrigo, Compendio de 
derecho internacional público, op. cit., 2016, p. 145. 
217 Balaguer Callejón (coord.), Manual de Derecho Constitucional, op. cit., 2012, p. 251.
218 Araceli Mangas Martín and Diego Liñán Nogueras, Instituciones y Derecho de la Unión Europea, 
7th ed., Madrid, Tecnos, 2012, p. 476.
219 Ibid.
220 Tribunal Constitucional, Case 64/1991, of 22 March 1991, BOE nº 98, 24 April 1991: «Es por ello 
evidente que no cabe formular recurso de amparo frente a normas o actos de las instituciones de 
la Comunidad, sino sólo, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el art. 41.2 LOTC, contra disposiciones, 
actos jurídicos o simple vía de hecho de los poderes públicos internos. Y es asimismo patente que 
los motivos de amparo han de consistir siempre en lesiones de los derechos fundamentales y liber-
tades públicas enunciadas en los arts. 14 a 30 C.E. [arts. 53.2 y 161.1 b), C.E. y Título III LOTC], 
con exclusión, por tanto, de las eventuales vulneraciones del Derecho comunitario, cuyas normas, 
además de contar con específicos medios de tutela, únicamente podrían llegar a tener, en su caso, el 
valor interpretativo que a los Tratados internacionales asigna el art. 10.2 C.E». 
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there is a risk of violation of fundamental rights, EU Member States should 
bring legal actions before the Court of Justice 221.
It should be noted in this respect that the Constitutional Court held in 
2004, on the occasion of the late Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
that the codification of the principle of primacy in the Treaty did not infringe 
upon the Spanish Constitution’s supremacy 222. Pursuant to the reasoning of the 
Court, primacy and supremacy are two distinct categories operating on different 
levels: the former deals with the application of valid norms whereas the latter 
deals with the process of enactment of legislation. Supremacy is founded on the 
principle of hierarchy and therefore gives validity to the norms that are inferior 
to it. Consequently, if an inferior norm contradicts it, it is invalid. In contrast, 
the primacy of EU law, the Court argued, is not necessarily founded on hierar-
chy but rather on the distinction between the scopes of application of different 
norms. While all these norms are valid, some of them may displace others because 
they benefit from preferential application. Supremacy normally entails primacy, 
except in those cases where the Constitution itself provides for its lack of appli-
cation. The Constitution’s supremacy is therefore compatible with the regimes 
of application which grant preferential application to the norms of another legal 
order, as long as it is provided by the Constitution. This is the case with regard to 
EU law in accordance with article 93 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court opposed limitations to the attri-
bution of competences to the EU, in order to oppose constitutional nucleuses 
of resistence to EU law 223. On the one hand, it seems to refer to the attribution 
of the exercise of competences 224. On the other hand, it stipulated limitations 
deemed to safeguard the fundamental principles of the social and democratic 
State based on the rule of law. Thus, the Constitution establishes implicit mate-
221 Mangas Martín and Liñán Nogueras, Instituciones y Derecho de la Unión Europea, op. cit., 2012, 
p. 479.
222 Tribunal Constitucional, Declaration 1/2004, of 13 December 2004, BOE nº 3, 4 January 2005, 
pp. 5-21: «Pues bien, la proclamación de la primacía del Derecho de la Unión por el art. I-6 del 
Tratado no contradice la supremacía de la Constitución». 
223 Balaguer Callejón (coord.), Manual de Derecho Constitucional, op. cit., 2012, p. 252.
224 Tribunal Constitucional, Declaration 1/2004, of 13 December 2004, BOE nº 3, 4 January 2005, 
pp. 5-21: «Por lo demás nuestra jurisprudencia ha venido reconociendo pacíficamente la pri-
macía del Derecho comunitario europeo sobre el interno en el ámbito de las “competencias 
derivadas de la Constitución”, cuyo ejercicio España ha atribuido a las instituciones comunitarias 
con fundamento, como hemos dicho, en el art. 93 CE». 
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rial limits such as State sovereignty, its basic constitutional structures, and the 
fundamental values and principles guaranteed under the Constitution 225. Con-
sequently, article 93 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as carte blanche 
in the attribution of competences.
3.2. Common Article 1 in national law
Spain has ratified most treaties and conventions in the field of IHL and 
has adopted the necessary legislative measures to complement them. While this 
demonstrates an active commitment towards IHL, it appears from the analy-
sis of the legislation and policy documents that the Spanish authorities have 
not explicitly recognized Common Article 1 as an institutional mechanism of 
compliance.
3.2.1. A satisfactory ratification of IHL treaties
Spain has ratified most treaties in the field of IHL. Concretely, Spain rat-
ified the Geneva Conventions already in 1952 226. It formulated a reservation 
according to which it understood the expression «under international law in 
225 Ibid.: «Esa interpretación debe partir del reconocimiento de que la operación de cesión del ejerci-
cio de competencias a la Unión europea y la integración consiguiente del Derecho comunitario 
en el nuestro propio imponen límites inevitables a las facultades soberanas del Estado, aceptables 
únicamente en tanto el Derecho europeo sea compatible con los principios fundamentales del 
Estado social y democrático de Derecho establecido por la Constitución nacional. Por ello la ce-
sión constitucional que el art. 93 CE posibilita tiene a su vez límites materiales que se imponen a 
la propia cesión. Esos límites materiales, no recogidos expresamente en el precepto constitucional, 
pero que implícitamente se derivan de la Constitución y del sentido esencial del propio precepto, 
se traducen en el respeto de la soberanía del Estado, de nuestras estructuras constitucionales básicas 
y del sistema valores y principios fundamentales consagrados en nuestra Constitución, en el que los 
derechos fundamentales adquieren sustantividad propia (art. 10.1 CE), límites que, como veremos 
después, se respetan escrupulosamente en el Tratado objeto de nuestro análisis». 
226 Instrumento de Ratificación del Convenio de Ginebra para mejorar la suerte de los heridos y 
enfermos de las fuerzas armadas en campaña de 4 de Julio de 1952, BOE nº 236, 23.08.1952, 
pp. 3822-3830; Instrumento de Ratificación del Convenio de Ginebra para mejorar la suerte de 
los heridos, enfermos y náufragos de las fuerzas armadas en el mar de 4 de Julio de 1952, BOE 
nº 239, 26.08.1952, pp. 3870-3876; Instrumento de Ratificación del Convenio de Ginebra rela-
tivo a la protección de personas civiles en tiempo de guerra de 4 de Julio de 1952, BOE nº 246, 
02.09.1952, pp. 3997-4017; Instrumento de Ratificación del Convenio de Ginebra relativo al trato 
de los prisioneros de Guerra de 4 de Julio de 1952, BOE nº 249, 05.09.1952, pp. 4045-4069. 
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force» contained in article 99 of GC III as «that which arises from contractual 
sources or which has been previously elaborated by organizations in which it 
participates» at the moment of ratification. Nonetheless, it withdrew it upon 
the establishment of democracy, in 1979 227. Spain later ratified the Geneva 
Conventions’ Additional Protocols of 1977 in 1989 228, and Additional Protocol 
III in 2005 229.
In the same way as France, it is therefore more relevant to underline 
which are the IHL treaties to which Spain is not a party, namely, the UN 
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity of 26 November 1968 230 and its equivalent in 
Europe 231. It should also be noted that – contrarily to France – Spain has 
accepted the competence of the IHFFC.
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the entry into force of an international 
treaty and its publication in the official bulletin are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for them to be self-executing 232, as the provisions at stake must be 
sufficiently clear and precise and do not need further legislative developments. 
Fernando Pignatelli y Meca considers that the bulk of IHL is self-executing 
in the Spanish legal order, with the exception of the provisions dealing with 
the criminalization of the grave breaches and serious violations 233. Further-
227 Convenio de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949 para la protección de las víctimas de guerra: Re-
tirada por parte de España de una Reserva al párrafo 1 del artículo 99, BOE nº 182, 31.07.1979, 
pp. 17951-17951. 
228 Instrumentos de Ratificación de los Protocolos I y II adicionales a los Convenios de Ginebra de 
12 de agosto de 1949, relativos a la protección de las víctimas de los conflictos armados inter-
nacionales y sin carácter internacional, hechos en Ginebra el 8 de junio de 1977, BOE nº 177, 
26.07.1989, pp. 23828-23863.
229 Instrumento de Ratificación del Protocolo adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de 
agosto de 1949 relativo a la aprobación de un signo distintivo adicional (Protocolo III), hecho en 
Ginebra el 8 de diciembre de 2005, BOE nº 42, 18.02.2011, pp. 18278-18285.
230 Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity, New York, 26 November 1968, U.N.T.S. vol. 754, p. 73. See: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-6&chapter=4&lang=en (Accessed: 19.04.2017). 
231 European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Hu-
manity and War Crimes, Strasbourg, 25 January 1974, ETS nº 082. See: https://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/082/signatures?p_auth=8vg02f3C (Accessed: 
19.04.2017).
232 Fernando Pignatelli y Meca, La sanción de los crímenes de guerra en el Derecho español: Consideraciones 
sobre el Capítulo III del Título XXIV del Código Penal, Madrid, Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría 
General Técnica, 2003, p. 87.
233 Ibid., p. 92.
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more, the judicial practice demonstrates that Spanish courts are more likely to 
apply directly the Geneva Conventions than other States, such as France. Even 
though it has already been mentioned that Common Article 1 could hardly 
pretend to self-executing status, the Spanish legal order seems to be more open 
to IHL than the French one.
In this context, the integration of IHL in the Spanish legal order is com-
pleted with specific provisions contained in the Act on National Defense (Ley 
de Defensa Nacional), the Royal Ordinances on the Armed Forces (Reales 
Ordenanzas para las Fuerzas Armadas), the criminal code (Código Penal), the 
military penal code (Código Penal Militar), Organic Act on the disciplinary 
regime of armed forces (Ley Orgánica de Régimen Disciplinario de las Fuerzas 
Armadas), Organic Act on the Competence and organization of the Military 
(Ley Orgánica de Competencia y Organización de la Jurisdicción Militar), as 
well as Organic Act on the cooperation with the ICC (Ley Orgánica 18/2003, 
de 10 de diciembre, de cooperación con la Corte Penal Internacional) 234.
3.2.2. The lack of explicit recognition of Common Article 1 as a mechanism 
of compliance
For present purposes, it is particularly worth mentioning Chapter VI of 
the Royal Ordinances on the Armed Forces, which deals with ethics during 
operations. This chapter enshrines some of the most fundamental principles 
of IHL. In particular, article 106 expressly refers to Common Article 1 in its 
internal dimension:
El militar conocerá y difundirá, así como aplicará en el transcurso de cual-
quier conflicto armado u operación militar, los convenios internacionales 
ratificados por España relativos al alivio de la suerte de heridos, enfermos o 
náufragos de las fuerzas armadas, al trato a los prisioneros y a la protección de 
las personas civiles, así como los relativos a la protección de bienes culturales 
y a la prohibición o restricciones al empleo de ciertas armas 235.
234 Spanish Ministry of Defense, Orientaciones – El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo III, 
OR7-004 (2ª ed.), 02.11.2007, p. 6-1. 
235 Royal Ordinances on the Armed Forces (Real Decreto 96/2009, de 6 de febrero, por el que 
se aprueban las Reales Ordenanzas para las Fuerzas Armadas), BOE nº 33, 07 February 2009, 
art. 106. 
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As for the external dimension of Common Article 1, the situation is not 
so clear. While it is not expressly established in legally binding documents, 
indirect references may be found. In this respect, the Ministry of Defense pub-
lished Guidelines on the Law of Armed Conflicts (Orientaciones – El Derecho de 
los Conflictos Armados) in which a reference is made to the «primary and collec-
tive responsibility» of State parties to IHL treaties to safeguard victims’ rights 236, 
thus seemingly alluding to the system of collective responsibility established by 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL.
Furthermore, while no strategy has been found on Spain’s foreign pol-
icy, it is possible to refer to other documents issued by the Ministry for 
foreign affairs in order to define the contours of its foreign policy and the 
position occupied by Common Article 1 therein. In this regard, Spain’s for-
eign policy is undoubtedly placed under the umbrella of multilateralism and 
the UN. Indeed, these elements are the «fundamental cornerstone of Spain’s 
foreign policy» 237. For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth mentioning 
Spain’s Priorities for the United Nations, which are issued on an annual basis. 
No explicit reference is made to Common Article 1. Nonetheless, Spain’s 
commitment to the Responsibility to Protect as well as to «furthering the 
effective protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian 
law» is highlighted 238. Furthermore, several aspects of IHL related to Com-
mon Article 1 are stipulated, such as the protection of civilians, the protec-
tion of specific groups, medical staff and facilities, and humanitarian person-
236 Spanish Ministry of Defense, Orientaciones – El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo I, 
OR7-004 (2ª ed.), 02.11.2007, pp. 1-7: «La responsabilidad primera y colectiva de los Estados 
partes en los Convenios de Derecho Internacional Humanitario». 
237 Official website of La Moncloa: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/espana/spainto-
day2015/foreignpolicy/Paginas/index.aspx (Accessed: 19/04/2017). 
238 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperacion. Spain’s Priorities for the United Nations 
71st Session of the General Assembly, available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/
PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/NacionesUnidas/Documents/Spanish%20Priorities%20for%20
the%2071%20UNGA.pdf (Accessed: 15.05.2017); Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de 
Cooperacion. Spain’s Priorities for the United Nations 70th Session of the General Assembly, 
available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/Nacione-
sUnidas/Documents/Prioridades%20Espa%C3%B1a%20en%20NNUU%2070%20AGNU%20
versi%C3%B3n%20en%20ingl%C3%A9s.pdf (Accessed: 15.05.2017); Ministerio de Asuntos Ex-
teriores y de Cooperacion. Spain’s Priorities for the United Nations 69th Session of the General 
Assembly, available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/
NacionesUnidas/Documents/Prioridades%20Espa%C3%B1a%2069%20AGNU%20ENG.pdf 
(Accessed: 15.05.2017).
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nel, unrestricted humanitarian access as well as accountability and the fight 
against impunity. These elements are reiterated every year.
In addition, the position of Spain with regard to the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL may be inferred from the pledges it makes to the international 
conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. In this context, the 30th 
International Conference held in Geneva from 26 to 30 November 2007 is 
especially worth mentioning, as Spain adhered to the joint pledge on ‘National 
implementation and enforcement’ made by the EU 239. On this basis, it pledged 
to the following, in line with the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance 
with IHL:
– to promote ratification of IHL conventions and in particular of the addi-
tional protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
– to support states in their efforts to adopt relevant national legislations 
pertinent to the IHL obligations.
– to support the existing IHL mechanisms such as the International Fact-
Finding Commission foreseen in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I.
– to pursue its close cooperation with the International Criminal Court 
in order to enforce IHL and ensure repression of grave breaches of 
IHL 240.
Therefore, while there is no exact transcription of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL in these documents, there is a willingness to integrate it as one 
of the priorities of Spain’s foreign policy and to integrate Spain’s approach in 
the EU context.
3.3. The Spanish Commission on International Humanitarian Law
On the occasion of the 28th international conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent of 2-6 December 2003, Spain undertook the voluntary 
unilateral pledge of creating and implementing a national coordination and 
239 Milena Costas Trascasas, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law. Spain country report, ATLAS, 2009, p. 10. 
240 See: https://rcrcconference.icrc.org/applic/pledges/p130e.nsf/pbk/PCOE-79CKBW?open-
Document&section=PBP (Accessed: 26/04/2017). 
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consultation mechanism for the application and promotion of IHL 241. It is on 
this basis that the Spanish Commission on IHL (Comisión Española de Dere-
cho Internacional Humanitario) was created in 2007 242.
The Spanish Commission on IHL is an advisory body to the government 
in IHL matters. Article 1 of Royal Decree 1513/2007 specifies that the Com-
mission shall advise the government with regard to the norms contained in 
the four Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, the other 
instruments of IHL ratified by Spain, new ratifications of international trea-
ties on this matter, as well as any other measures that should be adopted to 
ensure the application and dissemination of IHL in Spain. It is placed under 
the authority of the Ministry of foreign affairs.
Its objectives are the following: a) to promote the signature, ratification or 
adhesion of Spain to IHL treaties; b) to prepare and monitor Spain’s position 
and commitments at the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent and other international conferences relating to IHL; c) to act as a per-
manent link with the ICRC and other national commissions; d) to strengthen 
respect for and application of IHL by advising government authorities on the 
drafting of new legislation necessary at national or international level; e) to 
advise authorities on the dissemination of IHL and training programs among 
the military, security personnel, civil servants, humanitarian organizations, legal 
and medical professionals, universities and teaching centers, the media, and 
society in general; f) inform on aid programs that may be established through 
Spanish international cooperation to promote the application of IHL in third 
States; g) to stimulate the action of public authorities and other organizations 
and institutions in the application of IHL by establishing guidelines and gen-
eral criteria with a view to facilitate the coordination of public authorities in 
IHL matters; h) to act as a consultant to the government in IHL matters; i) to 
issue reports and opinions whenever they are required; and j) to evaluate pro-
gress on this matter on a periodic basis 243.
In parallel, it should be noted that a Center of Studies on IHL (Centro 
de Estudios de Derecho Internacional Humanitario [CEDIH]) was created 
241 Royal Decree 1513/2007 of 16 November 2007 (Real Decreto 1513/2007, de 16 de noviem-
bre, por el que se crea y regula la Comisión Española de Derecho Internacional Humanitario), 
BOE nº 283, pp. 48303-48305, Preamble.
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid., article 2. 
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within the Spanish Red Cross in 1984. Its objective is to conduct teaching, 
dissemination, and research activities as well as to contribute to the develop-
ment of IHL combining both professional and scholar perspectives. As such, 
it conducts consultancy activities and publishes on matters relating to IHL. It 
comprises members from the academia, the judiciary, the military, the legal and 
medical professions, security and armed forces, as well as qualified personnel 
from the Spanish Red Cross 244.
To conclude, Spain has established the necessary conditions in its legal 
order to integrate IHL as appropriately as possible. It has ratified the great 
majority of the relevant treaties and conventions, many of which are self-exe-
cuting, and has created a Commission on IHL. A consequence of these ratifica-
tions is that Common Article 1 undeniably applies to Spain, so that it is subject 
to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. However, an express endorsement 
of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL itself and its current meaning are 
harder to find. There are no express references found in the legislation or in 
policy documents. In spite of that, indirect references may be found in policy 
documents relating to IHL and foreign policy. In this sense, it is uncertain 
whether Spanish authorities have integrated Common Article 1 as an instru-
ment of enforcement of IHL, as they seem to focus more on the enforcement 
of specific issues relating to IHL rather the means to enforce them.
244 See: http://www.cruzroja.es/principal/web/cedih/cedih (Accessed: 21/04/2017).
Section 2 
PRACTICE OF THE EU, FRANCE, AND SPAIN
... [I]f the international community acts early enough, 
the choice need not be a stark one between doing 
nothing or using force 245.
In the first section of this chapter, the issue of transposition of Common Arti-
cle 1 was analyzed. This question is of utmost relevance with regard to Com-
mon Article 1 specifically, to the extent that it relies on States to be effectively 
enforced. Furthermore, how the EU, France, and Spain have decided to in-
tegrate Common Article 1 in their respective legal order likewise constitute 
an indication of their opinio juris on this matter. In this line of argument, the 
objective of this second section is to analyze the practice of the three actors in 
ensuring respect for IHL.
Indeed, State practice constitutes a key aspect of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL. Firstly, the analysis of State practice allows assessing the obliga-
tion’s effectiveness, as it permits to assess whether the objectives of the obliga-
tion are indeed met. Secondly, it assists in interpreting the norms themselves 246 
and may contribute to the crystallization of customary norms, as it is one of 
the two constitutive elements together with opinio juris.
Therefore, the practice of the EU, France, and Spain to prevent and end 
violations of IHL is analyzed below. Such practice is protean insofar as they use 
a wide range of measures, from diplomatic to military action, to ensure respect 
for IHL. The use of such a wide range of measures reflects their different facets, 
depending on the magnitude of the violations of IHL at stake. As diplomatic 
actors, they make use of their declaratory policy to promote IHL but also 
to denounce its violations. As economic actors, they establish conditionality 
schemes to prevent breaches and adopt restrictive measures towards third coun-
tries and individuals when breaches indeed occur. Finally, if all these measures 
are not sufficient, they may resort to military intervention or crisis-manage-
245 Report of the Secretary General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’, A/63/677, 
12.01.2009, para. 11.
246 VCLT, article 31.3.b): «Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation» shall be taken into account, together 
with the context when interpreting treaties».
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ment operations. While France and Spain benefit from all the traditional tools 
of a State’s foreign policy, the EU has also developed an arsenal of tools in this 
sense. These are detailed in the Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL 
and include, inter alia: political dialogue, general public statements, démarches 
and public statements about specific conflicts, crisis-management operations, 
training, and regulation on the export of arms 247. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that France benefits from additional leverage in its quality of permanent 
member of the UNSC.
Since the primary focus of this study is on the EU, the temporal scope 
of this section is limited from the date of adoption of the EU Guidelines on 
promoting compliance with IHL, with a particular focus on the action of the 
three actors upon the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. In this regard, the cases 
presented below are solely examples of the practice of the three actors, which 
confirm the legal rule, and do not intend to be exhaustive.
Prior to the analysis of practice, the institutional framework of the EU’s 
external action to promote compliance with IHL is provided. In this respect, 
it should be noted that IHL has been treated as a subset of the promotion 
of human rights in the EU external action. It is therefore mainly within the 
frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy that the EU implements 
this duty.
1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU’S ACTION TO PROMOTE 
COMPLIANCE WITH IHL
It is necessary to present the institutional framework of the EU external action, 
only insofar as it entails the EU action to promote compliance with IHL. In 
this regard, the EU has equipped itself with a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, which came into existence only in 1992 and which is still very sensi-
tive. It certainly is a domain affecting sovereignty and where Member States 
are willing to preserve their interests. Although far from being perfect, the EU 
has progressively but undeniably integrated IHL in the CFSP even before the 
adoption of the IHL Guidelines, so that the EU’s action in IHL matters is now 
one of the elements that identify the EU external action. While the CFSP is 
247 IHL Guidelines. 
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the main forum where the EU promotes compliance with IHL, the European 
Commission has also integrated this concern into its action on development 
aid and humanitarian cooperation.
The CFSP constitutes a specific part of the more general external action of 
the EU. The Lisbon Treaty dedicates separate sections to the latter, namely, Title 
V TEU and Part Five TFEU. The writers of the Lisbon Treaty thus intended to 
make the EU external action more coherent by grouping it together. In par-
ticular, Article 21 TEU enumerates the principles and objectives that are com-
mon to all the EU external action, including the CFSP. However, the CFSP 
remains a specific regime that falls under the intergovernmental rules despite 
its «architectural link with the main body of external action» 248. Proof of that is 
that while the CFSP is described in the TEU, the remainder of the EU exter-
nal action (common commercial policy; cooperation with third countries and 
humanitarian aid; restrictive measures; international agreements; relations with 
international organizations and third countries and Union delegations; and the 
solidarity clause) is described in the TFEU.
The evolution of the CFSP underlines that despite commendable inten-
tions, it has evolved with difficulty. Indeed, Member States are willing to 
keep this policy under their control as its decision-making, deeply marked by 
inter-governmentality, has shown.
1.1. The evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
The CFSP was established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. It has a 
somewhat chaotic past and has been shaken by various failures. Many projects 
regarding European foreign policy have emerged but so far, none has been 
entirely satisfactory, the most symbolic example being the rejection of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1952 establishing a Common Defence in Europe 249. Upon 
248 Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 381. 
249 In 1950, the Pléven Plan proposed to create an integrated European army under joint com-
mand. This plan was subject to negotiation among the Member States of the European Coal 
and Steel Community from 1950 to 1952 and led to the signature of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Defence Community (EDC). The ECD was assorted with a project of 
European Political Community which was to have important powers and responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the project was rejected by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954. 
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that failure, it was decided that this matter should be abandoned to the Western 
European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, 
‘NATO’).
Cooperation in foreign policy nonetheless became a necessity and emerged 
from the Member States’ practice, starting from the early 70’s 250. EU Member 
States decided to establish an intergovernmental commission in charge of ana-
lyzing political cooperation-related issues in 1961, on the occasion of the Paris 
Summit, a concern reiterated on the adoption of the Declaration of Bonn. In 
response to this preoccupation, the ‘Fouchet Plans’ 251 were drafted. They called 
for closer political cooperation, a union of States, and common foreign and 
defense policies. These proposals were eventually rejected.
More importantly, the ‘Davignon Report’ 252 marked the creation of the 
‘European Political Cooperation’ (hereafter, ‘EPC’). The EPC aimed:
(a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major 
issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting 
regularly;
(b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, 
concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and de-
sirable. 253
Thus, the Report acknowledged the need to speak with one voice at 
the international level, to build a political union, and to grant the European 
Communities with external competences that reflect their internal compe-
tences. The Report, in which the Member States committed to consult each 
other on foreign policy issues, was elaborated and adopted on 27 October 




250 On the occasion of the Paris Summit of the 19th and 21st of October 1972, the Nine confirmed 
their will to strengthen political cooperation and to give the EU the means to act as a coherent 
political entity at the international level.
251 The Fouchet Plans, named after the French Christian Fouchet, proposed the idea of a political 
union, while preserving the States’ autonomy. 
252 Davignon Report, Luxembourg, 27/10/1970, Bulletin of the European Communities, Novem-
ber 1970, n° 11. 
253 Ibid., Part II, Objectives. 
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In addition, new events in international relations obliged the Member 
States to move one step forward. Indeed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
the Islamic revolution in Iran emphasized the European Community’s grow-
ing impotence at international level 254. Faced with this situation, the Member 
States approved a series of reports and initiatives that reinforced the EPC. First, 
the 1981 London Report required prior joint consultation between Member 
States and the European Commission on all the foreign policy matters that 
would affect all the Member States 255. Second, in 1982, the Genscher-Colombo 
initiative proposed a draft ‘European Act’ which eventually led to the adoption 
of the 1983 Stuttgart ‘Solemn Declaration on the European Union’ 256. The 
Declaration explicitly refers to the necessity to «search for common policies in 
all areas of common interest, both within the Community and in relation to 
third countries». In particular, one of its objectives is the following:
to strengthen and develop European Political Cooperation through the 
elaboration and adoption of joint positions and joint action, on the basis 
of intensified consultations, in the area of foreign policy, including the 
coordination of the positions of Member States on the political and eco-
nomic aspects of security, so as to promote and facilitate the progressive 
development of such positions and actions in a growing number of foreign 
policy fields 257.
Therefore, the Declaration set forth different means of cooperation 
among Member States that would allow them to effectively implement the 
EPC and emphasized the necessity to consult each other and act in concert.
After different failed attempts of institutionalization, the EPC was finally 
enshrined in the Single European Act, signed on 17 February 1986. The 
so-called ‘Dooge Committee Report’ 258 contained several proposals relating 
254 European Union, «Summaries of EU legislation, Common Foreign and Security Policy». Avail-
able at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:a19000 (Accessed: 
03.11.2015). 
255 Ibid. 
256 European Council, Solemn Declaration on European Union, Stuttgart, 19/06/1983, Bulletin of 
the European Communities, Nº 6/1983. 
257 Ibid., para. 1.4.2.
258 James Dooge, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs to the European Council, Brus-
sels, European Council 29-30 March 1985. Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/997/1/Dooge_fi-
nal_report.pdf (Accessed: 03.11.2015). 
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to foreign policy and called for, inter alia, the creation of a permanent secre-
tariat. Although the provisions contained in the Single European Act did not 
go as far as the Dooge Committee proposals, they established the institutional 
basis for the EPC 259 and codified it for the first time in EU primary law. 
They included the amendments applied to the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and formalized European cooperation in matters of for-
eign policy in Title III 260.
The EPC fostered agreement among Member States but remained 
quite limited. By way of example, it did not cover defense and security 
issues; no operational aspects were envisaged and the positions common to 
the Member States were merely declaratory. The wording of the Member 
States’ obligation was quite unclear, insofar as they committed to consult 
each other for «foreign policy issues of general interest», thus leaving a great 
margin of maneuver and interpretation in the Member States’ hands. This 
absence of clearly established legally binding obligations led to situations 
where a Member State, the United Kingdom, lifted the economic sanctions 
imposed against South-Africa even though they were decided by the Mem-
ber States in 1986 261.
Against this background, a specific Title on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy replaced the EPC and was enshrined in the newly created 
TEU. The CFSP was created mainly because of two parallel phenomena.
Firstly, the EU – and before that the European Community – had pur-
sued a profound process of economic integration. This process highlighted a 
discrepancy between the latter and the absence of political integration. This 
gap highlighted the need for politicization, legitimization, and democratiza-
tion. However, politicization also refers to foreign policy, a traditional char-
acteristic of nation-States and State sovereignty. In this regard, EU Member 
States have been reluctant to establish a European foreign policy, not to say a 
European defense, because of divergent diplomatic traditions. By way of exam-
259 European Union, «Summaries of EU legislation, Common Foreign and Security Policy», op. cit. 
260 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1 (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
261 Xavier De Villepin, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la 
défense et des forces armées sur la politique étrangère commune de l’Union européenne, Paris, Sénat fran-
çais, 30 May 1996, p. 11. Available at: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r95-394/r95-3941.pdf (Accessed: 
13.05.2013). 
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ple, some States have the nuclear bomb 262, some are permanently represented 
in the UNSC, some have a long-standing tradition of neutrality, while others 
prefer to refer to NATO and to the United States when they have to deal with 
defense matters. This gap between economic and political integration needed 
to be addressed and the EU could no longer remain an incontrovertible eco-
nomic actor but a ‘political dwarf ’. If the European economic power and the 
unity of the single market are not questioned at the international level, the 
idea of the EU as a common political bloc able to assert its political will on 
the international scene is. Thus, in order to be a relevant and powerful actor 
at the international level, the EU needed to develop the political aspects of its 
foreign policy.
Secondly, a dramatic international crisis urged the EU to become an 
international actor. Following the collapse of communism in Central and East-
ern Europe, the Balkans were the scene of many atrocities. The end of these 
wars was about to determine the fate of the EU for various reasons: wars were 
taking place on the doorstep of the 15’s territory and it seemed likely that 
these countries would be inclined to enter into the EU afterwards. Despite 
these crucial challenges, the EU did not manage to play its part in the process 
as such. It was unable to adopt a common position and to speak with one voice 
while atrocities were being committed. Eventually, the conflict was resolved 
thanks to extra-EU systems: the UN and NATO, and behind them the influ-
ence of the United States. Although the EU was expected to act and play its 
part in the conflict’s resolution, it just showed inertia and incapacity to do so. 
Therefore, this dramatic event emphasized the necessity to institutionalize a 
European foreign policy, in order to effectively speak with one voice and act 
in concert in case of such a crisis 263.
In this context, the CFSP was established in 1992 and constituted the 
second pillar of the EU. Pursuant to Title V TEU, its main objective was to 
assert the EU’s identity on the international scene. The CFSP covered all the 
domains of foreign and security policy, including the framing of a common 
defense policy 264. Its aims were the following:
262 Both France and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom was one of the submitters and ratified it on the 5th of 
March 1970. France acceded to it on the 3rd of August 1992. 
263 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Guide de la PESC, Paris, August 2006, p. 2. 
264 Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, article B.
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– to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independen-
ce of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and of its Member States in all 
ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms 265.
Nevertheless, the Member States’ joint actions under Title V were not 
satisfactory, so that the 1996 intergovernmental conference was mandated to 
introduce the institutional reforms needed to make the CFSP effective in the 
new treaty. Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty intended to provide a new dimen-
sion to the CFSP: it created the High Representative for the CFSP 266, and 
equipped the CFSP with operational aspects, through the establishment of the 
policy planning and early warning unit. The Amsterdam Treaty thus offered 
better visibility and coherence in terms of the EU’s external action.
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty brought new instruments to support the EU 
in establishing an effective foreign policy. One main priority was to ensure 
coherence in the EU’s external action 267. Therefore, the pillars’ structure dis-
appeared, which implies that the foreign policy is placed on an equal footing 
with the other policies. It also means that it may eventually constitute an inte-
grated policy in the long-term. Some principles 268 and objectives common to 
all the aspects of the EU’s external action are defined and serve to enhance this 
coherence. With the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP’s objectives are enlarged:
(to)
- safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity;
265 Ibid., article J.1.
266 Ibid., article 26. 
267 TEU, article 21(3).
268 Ibid., article 21(1): «The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks 
to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law».
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- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law;
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security 
(...);
- foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development 
of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, in-
cluding through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
trade;
- help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality 
of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural 
resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-
made disasters; and
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral coope-
ration and good global governance.
In addition, the fact that the EU itself now has legal personality 269 is an 
important feature, insofar as it transforms it into a single subject of international 
law, at the center of the assertion of its rights and obligations. In this regard, the 
EU is a full member of some international organizations, in particular where 
it has an exclusive competence, e.g., in the World Trade Organization. This 
reality should not overshadow the fact that the EU full membership in inter-
national organizations remains the exception 270, and the EU has obtained the 
enhanced observer status rather than full membership in the UN. Lastly, the 
Lisbon Treaty created two important novelties: the High Representative and 
the European External Action Service, described below.
1.2. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
As mentioned earlier, the idea of a true common defense was aban-
doned with the rejection of the Treaty establishing a European Common 
269 Ibid., article 47.
270 Wanda Troszczynska-Van Genderen, In-depth analysis on The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on CFSP/
CSDP State of implementation, Brussels, European Parliament, 2015. Available at: www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570446/EXPO_IDA(2015)570446_EN.pdf 
(Accessed: 27/01/2016).
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Defence in 1954. In spite of that, the EU has been pushed to develop an 
embryonic common defense. Certain policies had already been considered 
important in 1992: disarmament policies, nuclear non-proliferation and the 
arms exportation’s control. Then the Amsterdam Treaty made the European 
Security and Defence Policy evolve following the adoption of the 1998 
Saint-Malo Declaration 271. The Lisbon Treaty subsequently formalized the 
European Security and Defence Policy and renamed it. The CFSP now 
includes a Common Security and Defence Policy 272(hereafter, ‘CSDP’), 
which may eventually lead to an integrated common defense in the future 273. 
As of today, the actors, procedures and instruments of the CSDP differ from 
the CFSP ones 274.
Firstly, the EU used to rely on the Western European Union capaci-
ties in defense matters. The latter was created in 1948 in order to provide 
the framework for the creation of a European defense policy 275. It was made 
of 10 Member States, namely: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. In this 
regard, the Western European Union approved the ‘Petersberg tasks’ on the 
occasion of the Bonn Ministerial Petersberg Declaration 276, whereby Mem-
ber States declared their readiness to make available to the Western European 
Union, NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their 
conventional armed forces. A major step regarding the relationship between 
IHL and the EU is therefore the integration of the Western European Union 
functions in crisis prevention and management within the EU in the late 
2000’s. Watching missions were also established together with a rapid-reaction 
force for the accomplishment of the Petersberg tasks, which were enshrined in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam 277 and have been from now on under the authority 
271 Joint declaration issued at the British-French summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998.
272 The idea of an ESDP emerged on the occasion of the Cologne European Council of June 1999.
273 TEU, article 42(1 and 2).
274 Directorate-General for external policies, Study on ‘Supporting European security and defence with 
existing EU measures and procedures’, Brussels, European Parliament, 2015, p. 11. Available at: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534993/EXPO_STU(2015)534993_
EN.pdf (Accessed: 28.01.2016). 
275 See: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/weu/index_en.htm (Accessed: 28.01.2016). 
276 Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19th June 1992. Available at: www.assembly-weu.org/en/docu-
ments/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php (Accessed: 28.01.2016).
277 Treaty of Amsterdam, article J.7. 
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of the EU. In accordance with Article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 278, the 
Petersberg tasks can be deployed for three purposes: «humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making» so that the term ‘humanitarian’ is enshrined in EU 
primary law for the first time. This article is now codified in article 43 TEU 
under the Lisbon Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty thus permitted the develop-
ment of the operational force of the EU, although there was a discrepancy 
between this force and its institutional developments.
Against this background, the EU security policy has developed at insti-
tutional level. The Helsinki European Council of 10/11 December 1999 
approved the establishment of new permanent political and military bodies. 
Firstly, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) was established in 2001 279. 
It is made up of national representatives at senior/ambassadorial level and it 
deals with all the aspects of the CFSP. It is responsible for the political control 
and strategic direction of any military crisis management operation, under 
the authority of the Council. Secondly, the Military Committee of the EU 
(EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defense and is represented by their 
military delegates. The EUMC gives military advice, makes recommenda-
tions to the PSC, and gives military direction to the Military Staff of the EU 
(EUMS). The latter provides military expertise and support to the CSDP, and 
performs early warnings, situation assessment, as well as strategic planning for 
the Petersberg tasks 280. Crisis prevention and management, the fight against 
terrorism, and arms control are also settled as new priorities. Another element 
that is worth mentioning is the creation of the European Defence Agency 281, 
278 TEU, article 43: «The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may 
use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisa-
tion. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third 
countries in combating terrorism in their territories».
279 Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). 
280 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. Available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (Accessed: 
27/01/2016). 
281 On the occasion of the Thessaloniki European Council, the Member States tasked «the appro-
priate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary actions towards creating, in the course 
of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, 
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 197
an intergovernmental agency of the European Council, following the adop-
tion of the Nice Treaty on 12 July 2004.
Lastly, the Lisbon Treaty has brought important novelties concerning 
European defense. The CSDP has indeed become part of the TEU and is part 
of the overall CFSP: it is now regarded as ‘common’ and as an integral part of 
the CFSP 282. In this context, it follows the objectives and principles of the EU’s 
external relations, as set out in article 21 TEU 283, thus reinforcing the coher-
ence of the EU external action.
The CSDP missions have expanded as the EU is now competent in 
disarmament, military assistance missions, and in conflict prevention and sta-
bilization. In particular, article 43(3) TEU provides that Member States shall 
make civilian and military capabilities available to the EU for the implemen-
tation of the CSDP, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council, 
and to make available to the CSDP the multinational forces that they estab-
lish. In this line, EU Member States also commit to progressively improve 
their military capabilities and to draw on the expertise of the European 
Defence Agency 284.
Furthermore, there is room for further cooperation for the Member 
States willing to do so. In this respect, article 42(6) TEU provides that the 
Member States:
whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made 
more binding commitments to another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation 
(PESCO).
The objectives of such system are further explained in the Protocol on 
PESCO attached to the Lisbon Treaty 285.
acquisition and armaments». Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council on 
19 and 20 June 2003, Brussels, 1 October 2003, 11638/03.
 Following this statement, the Council of the European Union adopted a Joint action 2004/551/
CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency.
282 TEU, article 42(1). 
283 Directorate-General for external policies, Study on ‘Supporting European security and defence with 
existing EU measures and procedures’, op. cit., 2015, p. 12. 
284 TEU, article 45. 
285 Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
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In addition, European solidarity is reinforced by two means: through 
the solidarity clause enshrined in article 222 TFEU 286 and the mutual 
defense clause recognized in article 42(7) TEU 287. Those elements underline 
the evolution of the EU towards a political union, as the Member States 
commit to help and to render assistance to one another in case of terrorist 
attack or a natural or man-made disaster (solidarity clause), and to aid and 
assist each other by all the means in their power 288 in case of armed aggres-
sion (mutual defense clause). France invoked the latter for the first time on 
the occasion of the terrorist attacks that stroke Paris in November 2015. The 
fact that France decided to turn to the EU instead of NATO is particularly 
significant, as it underlines the State’s preference to the creation of a Euro-
pean defense policy.
Nonetheless, there still are important limitations to the CSDP. In particu-
lar, the CSDP «shall not prejudice the specific character of security and defence 
policy of certain Member States» and must respect their obligations arising 
from NATO, which, for those who are members, «remains the foundation of 
their collective defence» 289. Furthermore, the EU does not have its own army 
or civilian officials and relies on its Member States’ capabilities. This entails sev-
eral problems, just to cite a few: only a small number of the EU Member States’ 
soldiers is actually deployable; Member States face difficult choices regarding 
security framework choices (NATO or EU); and the EU international mission 
need to be especially attractive for officers on the ground 290.
The evolution of the CFSP thus highlights the will to assert the EU’s 
identity on the international scene and the Lisbon Treaty has provided the 
EU with important instruments in the form of, in particular, the High Rep-
286 TFEU, article 222: «The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if 
a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disas-
ter. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources 
made available by the Member States [...]».
287 TEU, article 42(7): «If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means 
in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall 
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States».
288 In accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter. 
289 TEU, article 42. 
290 Directorate-General for external policies, Study on ‘Supporting European security and defence with 
existing EU measures and procedures’, op. cit., 2015, p. 16. 
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resentative and the EEAS, which should enable the EU to reach its objec-
tives. Nevertheless, foreign policy and defense matters remain a sensitive 
area where the States wish to keep their sovereignty as the decision-making 
demonstrates.
1.3. A decision-making respectful of national interests
The CFSP is not an integrated policy and has been largely given over to 
the discretion of the Member States. As emphasized by Paul James Cardwell, 
the choice made during the debates on changes to the EU’s constitutional 
structure was not to bring the CFSP at the supranational level. In this regard, 
the position of the then UK Foreign Secretary is significant:
Common foreign and security policy remains intergovernmental and in 
a separate treaty. Importantly... the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction 
over substantive CFSP policy is clearly and expressly excluded. As agreed 
at Maastricht, the ECJ will continue to monitor the boundary between 
CFSP and other EU external action, such as development assistance. But 
the Lisbon treaty considerably improves the existing position by making 
it clear that CFSP cannot be affected by other EU policies. It ring-fences 
CFSP as a distinct, equal area of action 291.
Due to its sensitive nature, EU Member States want to be able to safe-
guard their national interests, a situation which has remained unchanged with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In this respect, the Iraq war under-
lined the diverging opinions and tendencies of EU Member States. Some 
states such as France were against the war, while others, such as the United 
Kingdom, sent troops alongside the United States. Again, others remained 
neutral. This event served to highlight that the Member States were not 
ready to speak with one voice in defense matters and are willing instead to 
maintain the rule of unanimity in this area. The Lisbon Treaty therefore took 
291 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband), HC Debs 20 Feb-
ruary 2008, col 378. Quoted in Paul James Cardwell, «On ‘ring-fencing’ the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy in the legal order of the European Union», The Northern Ireland legal quarterly, 
vol. 64(443), 2013, p. 1.
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due note of it and kept the principle of unanimity in the CFSP, especially in 
the area of defense.
A consequence of this risk of divergence is that the CFSP follows a 
derogatory regime. The central institution is the Council 292, not the Commis-
sion; this choice underlines the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. The 
European Council defines the general trends of the EU’s foreign policy and 
the Council implements them, acting unanimously, except where the treaties 
pertain otherwise.
1.3.1. An intergovernmental system
According to the Lisbon Treaty, three institutions are accorded major 
importance, those being the Council, the European Council, and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High 
Representative) 293. Conversely, supranational institutions have a limited role in 
this area.
The preponderance of national interests in the CFSP is highlighted by 
the role accorded to the institutions representing States’ interests, namely the 
European Council and the Council. Moreover, Member States are also con-
sidered individually. First, the central role of the European Council in the EU 
external action is set out in Article 22(1):
On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the 
European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union.
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objec-
tives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy 
and to other areas of the external action of the Union. [...]
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation 
from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down 
for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be implemented 
with the procedures provided for in the Treaties 294.
292 TEU, article 24.
293 Ibid., article 24(1). 
294 Ibid., article 22(1). 
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Moreover, the importance of the European Council is reinforced by Arti-
cle 26, which deals specifically with the CFSP. It is up to the European Coun-
cil to:
identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives of and 
define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, in-
cluding for matters with defence implications 295.
Second, the Council frames the CFSP and adopts the decisions to define 
and implement it on the basis of the guidelines established by the European 
Council 296. Together with the High Representative, it holds responsibility 
for ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the EU action 297. The 
Council adopts decisions that define the EU’s approach to a particular matter 
of a geographical or thematic nature, the corollary being that Member States 
must «ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions» 298. 
It adopts decisions that require operational action and commit the Member 
States to take the agreed action 299.
Third, as an intergovernmental structure, the CFSP requires the Mem-
ber States’ cooperation. They actually are the main actors of the policy. The 
Lisbon Treaty foresees a duty of cooperation and consultation among Mem-
ber States. They must consult with one another within the European Coun-
cil and the Council about any matter of foreign and security policy which 
would be of general interest in order to determine a common approach, and 
before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into 
any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests 300. Furthermore, in 
international organizations and at international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate, those which do take part must uphold the Union’s 
positions 301. This is a logical consequence of the legally binding character of 
the CFSP decisions on EU’s Member States.
295 Ibid., article 26(1). 
296 TEU, article 26(2). 
297 Ibid., article 26(2). 
298 Ibid., article 29.
299 Ibid., articles 28(1) and 28(2).
300 Ibid., article 32. 
301 Ibid., article 34.
202 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
However, the Lisbon Treaty is relatively ambiguous to the extent that two 
of the appended declarations to the Treaties restrain the Member States’ obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the CFSP 302. In accordance with Declaration 13, the TEU provi-
sions dealing with the CFSP do not affect the responsibilities of the Member 
States as they currently exist for the formulation and conduct of their for-
eign policy, nor regarding their national representation in third countries and 
international organizations. The provisions on the CSDP do not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defense policy of the Member States. The 
declaration stresses that the EU and its Member States remain bound by the 
UN Charter and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the UNSC and 
of its members for the maintenance of international peace and security.
In the same way, Declaration 14 stipulates that in addition to the specific 
rules and procedures referred to in article 24(1) TEU, the provisions covering 
the CFSP, including in relation with the High Representative and the EEAS, 
do not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Mem-
ber State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its 
national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in 
international organizations, including a Member State’s membership in the 
UNSC. It further provides that the provisions on the CFSP do not grant new 
powers to the European Commission to initiate decisions or increase the role 
of the European Parliament. The final paragraph of the Declaration provides 
that the provisions governing the CSDP do not prejudice the specific charac-
ter of the security and defense policy of the Member States.
The absence of the European Commission as a leading institution empha-
sizes the fact that the CFSP remains largely governed by Member States. As 
Paul Craig has shown, the changes in the role played by the institutions are 
most noticeable regarding the European Commission: with the Lisbon Treaty, 
it is not associated anymore with the CFSP work, and the Council cannot 
request the Commission to submit proposals relating to the implementation of 
joint actions. In addition, the Commission loses the ability to assist the Council 
in its power to make international agreements relating to the CFSP 303.
As for the European Parliament, it remains excluded from the deci-
sion-making process. Its involvement is limited to a right to information and 
302 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, op. cit., 2010, pp. 44-45. 
303 Ibid., p. 412. 
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consultation by the High Representative on the main aspects and basic choices 
of the CFSP and CSDP, including the evolution of these policies 304. Addition-
ally, according to Article 36 TEU, the High Representative «shall ensure that 
the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration» 305 
although it does not detail by which means. As an active actor, it may address 
questions and make recommendations to the Council and High Representa-
tive 306. It must also hold a debate on the progress in the implementation of the 
CFSP twice a year 307.
Lastly, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, ‘CJEU’) 
does not have jurisdiction to review the CFSP acts, as provided by Articles 
24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU:
The Court of Justice of the EU shall not have jurisdiction with respect 
to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor 
with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions 308.
Nonetheless, the Treaties foresee exceptions. Firstly, the CJEU may 
review the legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons 
adopted under the CFSP provisions 309. This exception is a codification of 
the Kadi case, already mentioned 310. Secondly, the Court has jurisdiction to 
monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU 311. Thirdly, it may review whether 
a proposed agreement is compatible with the treaties 312. Apart from these 




308 TFEU, article 275. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 Septem-
ber 2008, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I-6351. 
311 TFEU, article 275. Article 40 TEU provides as follow: «The implementation of the common 
foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the 
powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences 
referred to in Article 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, 
the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences under this chapter».
312 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, op. cit., 2010, p. 415. 
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exceptions, the Court does not have jurisdiction, which is problematic within 
the frame of a Union based on the rule of law, a foundational principle of 
the EU.
Against this background, it is worth noting that the IHL Guidelines 
refer mostly to inter-governmental institutions. Nevertheless, it is also worth 
mentioning that supranational institutions are important actors of the EU 
external action in human rights. In particular, the European Commission is 
omnipresent in the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for the 
period 2015-2019 as one of the implementing authorities. Furthermore, the 
«close involvement of the European Parliament» is foreseen (paragraph 5) 313. 
It demonstrates the willingness to include the European Parliament, albeit it 
does not formally hold an important role in CFSP matters. Thus, while most 
of the EU action to ensure compliance with IHL is governed by intergov-
ernmental institutions, the role of supranational institutions should not be 
overlooked.
Finally, it is important mentioning the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a figure created by the Lisbon Treaty 314 
as a result of the fusion of the late High representative for the CFSP and the 
foreign relations Commissioner. This position is held by Federica Mogherini 
at the time of writing. Generally speaking, her role is intended to put a ‘name 
and face’ on the EU foreign policy and to help the EU to become a consistent, 
capable and strategic international actor. The incumbent conducts the CFSP, 
contributes to its formulation and ensures its implementation 315; chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council 316; represents the EU for matters relating to the CFSP, 
conducts political dialogue with third countries, and expresses the EU posi-
tion at international organizations and international conferences 317; consults 
and informs the European Parliament 318. Moreover, as vice-president of the 
Commission 319, the incumbent must guarantee a better coherence of the EU’s 
external action.
313 Council of the European Union, Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and De-
mocracy 2015-2019, Brussels, 20 July 2015 (OR. En), 10897/15. 
314 TEU, article 18.
315 Ibid., articles 18(2) and 27(1). 
316 Ibid., article 27(1). 
317 Ibid., article 27(2). 
318 Ibid., article 36.
319 Ibid., article 18(4). 
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The High Representative is assisted by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) 320, a sort of EU diplomatic service. It was established by Coun-
cil Decision of 26 July 2010 321 and officially launched in January 2011. The 
EEAS is a functionally autonomous body, separate from the General Secre-
tariat of the Council and from the European Commission; it has the legal 
capacity to perform its tasks and attain its objectives 322 and is placed under the 
authority of the High Representative. It comprises a central administration 
based in Brussels and the EU Delegations established in third countries and 
international organizations 323. The principal mission of the EEAS is to support 
the High Representative in their mandate 324. In addition, the EEAS assists the 
President of the European Council and the Commission, including its Presi-
dent, in their respective functions relating to external affairs 325; lastly, it ensures 
close cooperation with the Member States 326.
Coherence is therefore enhanced thanks to institutional cooperation and 
the EEAS enables better coordination of national and European policies, which 
may eventually lead to a fully-fledged European diplomacy in the long run.
1.3.2. A special nomenclature
Another manifestation of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP is 
that it establishes a category of acts on its own instead of following the normal 
nomenclature established under ordinary EU law. Article 25 TEU enumerates 
the different types of acts the EU may adopt in the frame of the CFSP:
The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:
- defining the general guidelines
- adopting decisions defining
320 Ibid., article 27(3).
321 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service, OJ L 201/30, 03.08.2010. 
322 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service, OJ L 201/30, 03.08.2010, article 1(2). 
323 Ibid., article 1(4). 
324 Ibid., article 2.
325 Ibid.
326 EEAS official website, «What we do». Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/index_
en.htm (Accessed: 20.03.2013). 
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- actions to be undertaken by the Union
- positions to be undertaken by the Union
- arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in 
points (i) and (ii)
and by
- strengthening systematic cooperation between MS in the conduct of 
policy 327.
With the Lisbon Treaty, there is a change of denomination since all the 
CFSP acts are called ‘decisions’ and thus seem to fit into the ordinary nomen-
clature of EU acts. However, the exclusion of the European Commission in 
the decision-making process demonstrates that the CFSP decisions do not 
have the same legal value as those described in Article 288 TFEU. Actually, the 
new denomination maintains to some extent the old classification.
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s legal acts in CFSP matters were the 
common positions, joint actions, and common strategies. Nowadays, the Euro-
pean Council defines the general guidelines by means of decisions 328 and 
adopts decisions on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union, defining 
their duration and the means to be made available by the EU and its Member 
States 329. In addition, the common positions are replaced by the «positions to 
be undertaken by the Union» and the joint actions are replaced by the «actions 
to be undertaken by the Union». The latter are adopted where operational 
action by the EU is required. The Council must define their objectives, scope, 
the means to be made available to the EU, their duration if necessary, and 
the conditions for their implementation 330. The former common strategies are 
removed. Their objective was to create a «general policy framework [...] lead-
ing to more coherent and unified CFSP actions» 331. Article 22 TEU gives the 
European Council the power to adopt decisions on the strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union, a comparable instrument to a common strategy.
Despite the change of denomination, these acts remain exempt from 
jurisdictional control under the Lisbon Treaty 332. That being said, the new 
327 TEU, article 25.
328 TEU, articles 25(a) and 26(1). 
329 Ibid., article 26.
330 Ibid., article 26.
331 Piet Eeckhout, EU external relations law, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 470. 
332 TEU, article 24(1), and TFEU, article 275. 
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denomination demonstrates a change: there is a willingness to integrate the 
CFSP into the ordinary EU legal system. It shows that CFSP decisions might 
end up following the ordinary regime in the long term.
In addition, even though the Treaty of Lisbon introduced some changes in 
the CFSP, the voting system still largely preserves national interests. In accord-
ance with article 31(1) TEU, which describes the ordinary voting procedure 
under the CFSP, the European Council and Council adopt their decisions 
unanimously and the adoption of legislative acts is excluded 333.
Nevertheless, some mechanisms exist in order to overcome the neces-
sity to reach unanimity, such as the ‘constructive abstention’. It enables some 
Member States to abstain in a vote without impeding the adoption of the act. 
Any member of the Council may abstain but in such a case, they will accept 
that the decision commits the Union and will refrain from any action likely 
to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision although they 
will not be obliged to apply the decision 334. Thus, initiatives having a broad 
measure of support may be adopted more easily.
Furthermore, the Council may act in exceptional circumstances using 
a qualified majority when adopting a decision a) defining a Union action 
or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council, b) defining a 
Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative has 
presented following a specific request from the European Council, c) imple-
menting a decision defining a Union action or position and d), when appoint-
ing a special representative 335.
In case the Member States cannot unanimously agree on CFSP matters, 
they may use the enhanced cooperation system. It applies to all the CFSP, 
including defense matters, and allows Member States willing to advance in the 
EU’s foreign policy to do so. Nonetheless, even in relation to these exceptions 
to unanimity, national interests remain preserved. Firstly, the decision cannot 
be adopted in case the Council Members using the ‘constructive abstention’ 
scheme represent at least one third of the Member States and comprise at least 
one third of the EU population. Secondly, if a Member State declares that it 
opposes the adoption of a decision to be taken by a qualified majority for «vital 
333 TEU, article 31(1).
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid., article 31(2).
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and stated reasons of national policy», the High Representative will try to find 
an acceptable solution with the Member State at stake 336. If (s)he does not 
succeed, the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council for a decision by unanimity 337.
This is within this restrictive framework, the CFSP and the CSDP, that 
the EU has developed most of its action to ensure respect for IHL. As observed 
by Tristan Ferraro, the EU has repeatedly referred to IHL in its CFSP instru-
ments, only three years after the establishment of the CFSP most likely due 
to the increasing level of violence that took place in the former Yugoslavia, 
notably in Srebrenica 338. Furthermore, following the path of the EU policy 
on human rights, the EU uses different tools of its external action to promote 
compliance with IHL, as explained below.
2. PREVENTING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
As explained in Chapter 1, one constitutive element of the obligation to en-
sure respect for IHL is prevention. An important number of measures may be 
adopted in this sense, ranging from disseminating IHL among the civilian and 
military populations to promoting the ratification of IHL treaties. The action 
of DG ECHO in this sense is also worth mentioning.
2.1. Promoting and disseminating IHL
State parties are subject to a duty to promote and disseminate IHL, which 
can be understood as one aspect of the preventive dimension of Common 
Article 1. In this regard, the EU, France and Spain have undertaken important 
efforts in training and education. Furthermore, they all have adopted a policy 
of promotion of IHL treaties and principles on the international stage.
336 Ibid.
337 TEU, article 31(2).
338 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Situation in Srebrenica, 
13/07/1995; Council Conclusions on Former Yugoslavia, 17.07.1995.
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2.1.1. Training and education
Training and education are key aspects in ensuring respect for IHL. In 
this regard, the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL hold the 
following:
Training in IHL is necessary to ensure compliance with IHL in time of 
armed conflict. Training and education must also be undertaken in peaceti-
me. This applies to the whole population, although special attention should 
be given to relevant groups such as law enforcement officials. Additional 
obligations apply to the training of military personnel. The EU should 
consider providing or funding training and education in IHL in third cou-
ntries including within the framework of wider programmes to promote 
the rule of law 339.
This element has proven to be one of the key aspects of the cooperation 
between the ICRC and the EU. This cooperation is not new but has logically 
increased over the last 15 years, with the greater involvement of the EU in IHL 
matters. The relationship evolved in 1999 with the establishment of the ICRC 
office in Brussels together with the developments of the CFSP and the ESPD. 
It also corresponds to the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary 
of the Geneva Conventions where EU Member States reaffirmed their will-
ingness to respect and promote IHL. The cooperation between the EU and 
the ICRC could be effective on this basis 340. On one hand, the recognition 
of IHL as part of the EU’s action supports the fundamental objectives of the 
ICRC. On the other hand, the ICRC had to respond to the EU’s activity in 
conflict resolution, notably to make sure that IHL was observed and respected 
by EU forces 341.
In this context, the ICRC offers the EU’s institutions training opportu-
nities. By way of example, the year 2009 marked the tenth anniversary of the 
Bruges Colloquium on IHL, where the ICRC and the College of Europe 
339 IHL Guidelines, point (h). 
340 Stéphane Kolanowski, «La collaboration de l’union et du comité international de la Croix-
Rouge», in Millet-Devalle, L’Union européenne et le Droit International Humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, 
p. 182
341 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Implementation of International Humanitar-
ian Law and International Human Rights Law in the European Union, ATLAS, July 2009.
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provide training for students. Subsequently, in order to better promote human-
itarian issues and actions at the European level, the ICRC and ECHO imple-
mented a joint communication plan. Finally, the ICRC gave presentations on 
IHL during training activities aimed at EU forces 342.
On the occasion of the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent, the EU and its Member States, including France and Spain, 
adopted a pledge in which they:
underline[d] that proper training in, and dissemination of, international 
humanitarian law is required to ensure better compliance with internatio-
nal humanitarian law in time of armed conflict 343.
In this context, they committed to actions at EU and national levels. At 
EU level, basing their action on the IHL Guidelines and the 2007 European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, they committed to promote the dissemi-
nation and training of IHL in third countries. This pledge is extensive, as it 
applies both in wartime and peacetime, and is applicable to State authorities, 
but also non-State armed actors and humanitarian actors. At national level, the 
emphasis is put on action «inside the EU, in particular to military and civilian 
personnel, involved in crisis management operations». In addition, EU Mem-
ber States commit to pursue their efforts in advocating for the respect of IHL, 
on a constant and strong basis 344.
In the same line, the Spanish Red Cross pledged to promote training in 
IHL and international criminal justice among the members of the judiciary 
and lawyers 345. Likewise, France vowed to exchange know-how on the pro-
tection of cultural goods in situation of armed conflicts, to cooperate with 
the French Red Cross in the training of the military in IHL and international 
criminal law, to contribute to the dissemination of IHL in secondary educa-
342 See, inter alia: ICRC, Annual Report 2009, Geneva, ICRC, May 2010, pp. 299-301, available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/annual-report/icrc-annual-report-2009.htm 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); ICRC, Annual Report 2010, Geneva, ICRC, May 2010, pp. 352-355, 
available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2440.pdf (Ac-
cessed: 25.05.2017).
343 Pledge by the European Union and its Member States nº OP320039, Promotion and dissemi-
nation of international humanitarian law. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Pledge by the Spanish Red Cross nº OP320052, Formación y Difusión del Derecho Internacio-
nal Humanitario. 
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tion, to support foreign National Societies willing to disseminate IHL among 
the youth 346, as well as to disseminate IHL relating to the protection of jour-
nalists in their training 347.
2.1.2. Promotion of IHL treaties and related principles
The EU, together with France and Spain, normally makes use of public 
declarations to promote the ratification, respect, and implementation of IHL 
treaties. Furthermore, some aspects related to IHL have been especially impor-
tant for the three actors, thus leading to the adoption of specific policies. In 
this respect, the issues of women in armed conflicts and regulation of weapons 
are briefly analyzed.
2.1.2.1. Multilateral diplomacy
The EU develops its IHL declaratory policy promoting the respect for IHL 
in general public statements, as the IHL Guidelines so provide: «[i]n public state-
ments on issues related to IHL, the EU should, whenever appropriate, emphasise 
the need to ensure compliance with IHL». Public statements or declarations may 
be issued by the High Representative or by the Presidency. According to the 
EU annual reports on human rights, the EU makes extensive use of public state-
ments to give them the broadest audience possible. They are agreed on unani-
mously 348. Moreover, the Council may adopt conclusions, which are not legally 
binding but can nonetheless be referred to as reflecting the EU’s policy on the 
matter. In addition, in its 2012 Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy, the EU pledged to make more systematic use of political 
dialogue and démarche campaigns to encourage third countries to ratify core IHL 
instruments and implement IHL obligations 349. As evidenced by Tristan Ferraro, 
346 Pledge by the French Red Cross and France nº SP320015, Promotion et diffusion du Droit 
international humanitaire. 
347 Pledge by the French Red Cross nº SP320044, Promotion et diffusion du Droit international 
humanitaire auprès des journalists. 
348 EEAS, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2011, Brussels, European 
Union, 2012, p. 18. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2011_human-rights-an-
nual_report_en.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017). 
349 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy 
(11855/12), Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, point 21(c). 
212 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
this declaratory policy promoting compliance with IHL turns into a declaratory 
law (droit déclaratoire), which helps developing an opinio juris.
The cornerstone of the EU’s declaratory policy can be found in the ‘Dec-
laration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949’, which exclusively refers to IHL for the first time 350. The 
EU «recalls the primary importance that it attaches to the four Geneva Con-
ventions as the basic treaties of international humanitarian law», makes clear 
the necessity «to promote the implementation of international humanitarian 
law in armed conflicts» as the «Member States of the Union seize this oppor-
tunity to reaffirm their commitment to respect and promote international 
humanitarian law» and «calls upon all countries that have not yet done so to 
become a party to the Geneva Conventions as well as to all major treaties in 
the humanitarian field» 351.
After this fundamental declaration, the EU has increasingly referred to 
IHL in its common positions and joint actions. Sometimes, IHL was not for-
mally referred to but the application of some of its rules can be recognized 352. 
By way of example, the EU refers to «serious violations of international law 
involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, 
including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displace-
ment» and to «recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in violation of 
applicable international law» 353. References can be made to the general princi-
ples of IHL 354, or more generally, to the principles of International Law, which 
include IHL 355.
These references may be abstract and general, but they can also detail the 
sources of IHL which are taken into account 356. By way of example, in the 
350 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 438.
351 Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, BUE 7/8-1999, 12.08.1999.
352 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 438.
353 Council Common Position 2009/66/CFSP of 26 January 2009 amending Common Position 
2008/369/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
354 Afghanistan EU Common position, 2158th Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 25 Jan-
uary 1999. Available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/99/st05/st05455.en99.pdf 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017).
355 Ibid.
356 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 442.
 See for example: Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, BUE 7/8-1999, 12.08.1999.
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framework of the mainstreamed policy on the rights of the child 357, the EU has 
developed a set of Guidelines and an implementation Strategy on the prohibi-
tion of child soldiers 358. The EU also mentions specific rights and obligations 
stemming from IHL, albeit this is not clearly stated.
Additionally, the EU has been playing an important part in disarmament 
and has adopted various strategies in this sense: the European Security Strat-
egy 359 in which it recognizes proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as 
potentially the greatest threat to European security; the Strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 360 according to which the EU 
must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal and the 
need to eliminate them is enhanced; and the Strategy to combat illicit accu-
mulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their accumu-
lation 361 in which the means available to the EU at multilateral and regional 
levels, within the EU and in the EU’s bilateral relations are exploited.
Afterwards, the EU has always confirmed this commitment towards IHL, 
calling for the ratification of and the respect for IHL instruments by all parties. 
From among the numerous declarations on the topic, the most important are 
the ‘Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of 
the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Solferino’ 362 and the ‘Declaration of the 
Presidency on the occasion of the 60th anniversaries of the adoption of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949’ 363, both issued in 2009.
The International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent also 
constitute fora where the EU, together with its Member States, publicly com-
357 Communication from the Commission, Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, 
COM(2006) 367 final, 04.07.2006.
358 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, General 
Affairs Council of 16 June 2008.
359 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strat-
egy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
360 Council of the European Union, Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
– EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (15708/03), Brussels, 10 
December 2003.
361 Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of 
SALW and their ammunition (5319/06), Brussels, 13 January 2006.
362 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Occasion of the 150th 
Anniversary of the Battle of Solferino, 11280/09 (Press 192), Brussels, 24 June 2009.
363 Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 
adoption of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, 12535/1/09 REV 1 (Presse 241), Brussels, 12 
August 2009.
214 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
mits to take action to ensure respect for IHL. For example, on the occasion of 
the 31st and 32nd International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent, the EU and its Member States made the pledge to support States in their 
efforts to adopt relevant national legislation pertinent to their international 
humanitarian law obligations and to support the promotion and dissemination 
of IHL 364.
Besides these ‘unilateral’ statements aiming to promote IHL, the EU also 
makes use of its status of special observer at the UN to promote this agenda. In 
this respect, the IHL Guidelines provide the following:
Where appropriate, the EU should cooperate with the UN [...] for the 
promotion of compliance with IHL. EU Member States should also, whe-
never appropriate, act towards that goal as members in other organisations, 
including the United Nations. [...] Consultations and exchange of infor-
mation with knowledgeable actors, including [...] the UN [...], should be 
considered when appropriate.
According to the Guidelines, it is the duty of both the EU and its Mem-
ber States to cooperate with the UN on IHL matters. This is particularly rel-
evant for the Security Council Permanent Members, namely France and the 
United Kingdom. Cooperation is two-fold. Firstly, it has to be apprehended 
from a legal point of view, as the UN and in particular the Security Council, is 
an international normative actor. Secondly, cooperation is also envisaged from 
an operational point of view, i.e. when the EU acts in the framework of IHL. 
The UN’s predominant position in the IHL system was already acknowledged 
in 2003 in the European Security Strategy, a comprehensive framework for 
EU security in which the UN Charter is described as «the fundamental frame-
work for international relations» 365.
364 Pledge by European Union and its Member States nº OP320033, Strengthening compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law: «The EU and its Member States will strongly support 
the establishment of an effective mechanism on strengthening compliance with international 
humanitarian law. The EU and its Member States will assess and as necessary enhance the imple-
mentation of the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law 
in light of the ongoing discussions on establishing an international humanitarian law compliance 
mechanism».
365 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9. 
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IHL mainstreams EU-UN cooperation and relies on numerous docu-
ments. By way of example, policy dialogue, greater cooperation in the field, 
better crisis management and prevention, and strategic partnerships between 
the Commission and some UN organizations are made possible thanks to the 
Commission’s communications on ‘Building an effective partnership with the 
United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs’ 366 and 
on ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of Multilater-
alism’ 367. More specifically, the Swedish Presidency of 2001 developed a docu-
ment entitled ‘EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment’ which identified three forms of cooperation: conflict prevention, civilian 
and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues 368. On 
this basis, both organizations furthered their cooperation notably thanks to the 
2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis management where 
it is stated that cooperation should be explored in the fields of planning, train-
ing, communication and best practices 369. Although this domain is not strictly 
part of IHL, it participates in it.
In this context, the EU does not hesitate to promote the respect for 
IHL within the UN 370. In fact, IHL is presented as one of the EU’s priorities 
to the UN. Indeed, the EU priorities at the UN and the 71st UN General 
Assembly refer to IHL within the frame of migratory and refugee flows 371 or 
366 Ibid.
367 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Eu-
ropean Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 final, 10 
September 2003.
368 Göteborg European Council, EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment, Annex to the Presidency conclusions, June 2001. The conclusions of this joint declaration 
were based on experiences with recent developments in EU-UN cooperation in crisis manage-
ment.
369 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in crisis-manage-
ment (12730/03), Brussels, 19 September 2003. 
370 See, e.g.: Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States by Mr. Eduardo 
Fernandez Zincke, Counsellor, Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, at 
the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians and Healthcare in Armed 
Conflict, New York, 25 May 2017; Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. Mr. 
Pedro Serrano, Acting Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, 
at the Security Council Open Debate on ‘Protection of civilians in armed conflicts’, New York, 
10 May 2011. 
371 «The EU will draw on the frameworks set out by the United Nations, including the 2030 
Agenda and the forthcoming UN Summit on Addressing the Large Movements of Refugees 
and Migrants, towards the establishment of a global and efficient cooperation framework. It 
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humanitarian action 372 and especially underlines its role as a global promoter 
of IHL:
The EU will continue to support the leading role of the UN in the 
coordination and delivery of international humanitarian assistance as well 
as continue to advocate for the respect of the humanitarian principles, 
International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and Refugee Law 373.
This last expression has become a leitmotiv repeated in the previous EU 
priorities at the UN 374.
Against this background, the Presidency has called for the accession to 
the Protocols of the Geneva Conventions 375 as well as accepting the com-
petence of the IHFFC in response to the above-mentioned UN periodic 
reports and resolutions on the status of the Additional Protocols 376. In the 
last statement on the matter, the Presidency recalled the universal acceptance 
of the Geneva Conventions, their customary character, as well as the cus-
tomary nature of «many of the provisions contained in the 1977 Additional 
should be based on shared responsibilities, capable of addressing migration and displacement 
challenges worldwide, underscored by a renewed commitment to international humanitarian 
law».
372 «Humanitarian action has for several years been faced with serious challenges. Recent conflicts 
have been characterised by longer duration, brutality and blatant disregard for norms includ-
ing International Humanitarian Law, unprecedented levels of suffering and forced displacement 
internally or across international borders, as well as increasing deliberate targeting of civilian 
infrastructure, humanitarian workers and restrictions on humanitarian access». 
373 EU priorities at the United Nations and the 71st UN General Assembly, Brussels, 18 June 
2016. Available at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-priorities-united-nations-71st-unga/ (Accessed: 
29.05.2017). 
374 See, e.g.: EU Priorities for the 70th UN General Assembly, Luxembourg, 22 June 2015, avail-
able at http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-priorities-for-the-70th-un-general-assembly-2/ (Accessed: 
29.05.2017); EU Priorities for the UN General Assembly 69th General Assembly, available at 
http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-priorities-for-the-un-general-assembly-69th-general-assembly/ 
(Accessed: 29.05.2017); EU Priorities for the UN General Assembly 68th General Assembly, 
available at http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-priorities-for-the-68th-un-general-assembly/ (Ac-
cessed: 29.05.2017); EU Priorities for the UN General Assembly 67th General Assembly, avail-
able at http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-priorities-for-the-67th-united-nations-general-assembly/ 
(Accessed: 29.05.2017). 
375 Statement by Ms. Anna Sotaniemi, Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission of Finland to the United 
Nations, on behalf of the European Union, UN 61st Session, VI Committee, Agenda Item 75: 
Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the pro-
tection of victims of armed conflicts, New York, 2005.
376 See, supra, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
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Protocols». Furthermore, it constituted an occasion to renew the EU’s com-
mitment to IHL:
Ensuring improved compliance with international humanitarian law 
remains a priority for the European Union and its Member States. To 
this end, at the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent in November 2011, we pledged to emphasize our commitment 
to promoting dissemination and training in international humanitarian 
law. In line with the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with inter-
national humanitarian law, the EU Member States also pledged to work 
towards further participation in the principal international humanitarian 
law instruments and to support States in their efforts to adopt relevant 
national legislation pertinent to their international humanitarian law 
obligations.
In addition, the statement underlined the work developed by the ICRC, 
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and States «to strengthen and 
to promote the dissemination» of IHL and its implementation. Further men-
tion is made to accountability, labelled as «crucial to secure compliance», and 
to the need «to preserve the integrity and to promote the universality of the 
Rome Statute». Lastly, IHL is termed «one of the strongest tools at the disposal 
of the international community to ensure the protection and dignity of all 
persons affected by armed conflict» and support thereto «an issue of common 
interest and shared responsibility for all UN Member States», thus reflecting 
the erga omnes nature of Common Article 1 377.
It should be noted that in these statements made at the UN, some third 
States indicate that they align themselves with the EU’s position. This is most 
often the case of candidate or potential candidate countries – especially Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Albania – EFTA countries, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of 
Moldova.
With regard to France specifically, its position as a permanent member of 
the UNSC puts it at the forefront of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL 
377 EU Statement – United Nations 6th Committee: Status of Protocols Additional to Gene-
va Conventions, 22 October 2012. Available at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-unit-
ed-nations-6th-committee-status-of-protocols-additional-to-geneva-conventions/ (Accessed: 
29.05.2017). 
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at the UN. It is worth noting that the protection of civilians was one of the 
main priorities of the French presidency of the UNSC during June 2016 378. 
In this context, the above-mentioned French-Mexican initiative on UNSC 
permanent members refraining from using their right to veto in case of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing is encouraging, 
insofar as it highlights the shift from an exclusively State-centered approach to 
a more human-centered approach of international relations.
As for Spain, its external action reflects its commitment to ensure respect 
for IHL. It took advantage of its membership in the UNSC in the years 2015-
2016 to advance on crucial topics such as the protection of civilians, with a 
special focus on the most vulnerable groups, on women and children 379. In 
addition, Spain has supported the initiative proposed by France and Mexico on 
UNSC permanent members refraining from using their right to veto in case of 
mass atrocities. In this context, it signed the Code of Conduct and pledged not 
to vote against a draft resolution proposing action to end to prevent core inter-
national crimes 380. This commitment is also reflected in the different attempts 
by the French and Spanish authorities to adopt resolutions within the UNSC 
with regard to the armed conflict in Syria.
2.1.2.2. Specific issues: the example of sexual and gender-based violence 
in armed conflicts
All three actors have defended some aspects of IHL more than others. In 
particular, it is possible to mention their special promotion of the protection of 
women in armed conflicts. The protection due to women in armed conflicts 
constitutes a good example of multilevel. Indeed, Spain has promoted this 
agenda on the international stage, which has in turn been endorsed by the 
UNSC, thus necessitating France’s approval, and confirmed at EU level.
378 See: Conférence de presse de présentation du programme de travail de la présidence française du 
Conseil de sécurité, Intervention de M. François Delattre, représentant permanent de la France 
auprès des Nations unies, 01.06.2016. Available at: http://www.franceonu.org/Le-maintien-de-
la-paix-colonne-vertebrale-de-la-Presidence-francaise-du-Conseil (Accessed: 08.06.2016). 
379 Spain in the United Nations Security Council, Review of 2015 and priorities for 2016. Available 
at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Documents/2016_EN-
ERO_BALANCE%20CSNNUU%20ENG.PDF (Accessed: 02.06.2017). 
380 Spain in the United Nations Security Council, Review of 2015 and priorities for 2016. Available 
at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Documents/2016_EN-
ERO_BALANCE%20CSNNUU%20ENG.PDF (Accessed: 02.06.2017). 
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In particular, the UNSC operated an important step in the recogni-
tion of the role of women and girls in armed conflicts through Resolution 
1325(2000). This resolution is essential insofar as it offers a gender-based per-
spective of peace and security. For present purposes, it reaffirms «the need to 
implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that pro-
tects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts» and calls on 
warring parties «to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee 
camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women 
and girls, including in their design». In addition, it highlights the scourge of 
gender-based and sexual violence:
10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to 
protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and 
other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations 
of armed conflict;
11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity 
and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes including those relating to sexual violence against women and 
girls, and in this regard, stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where 
feasible from amnesty provisions 381.
For the first time, sexual and gender-based violence is recognized as a 
tactic of warfare, a matter of international peace and security, and a war crime. 
This resolution has been completed by seven resolutions, until the adoption of 
UNSC Resolution 2242 (2015), sponsored by Spain. Likewise, France, in its 
quality of permanent member of the UNSC, has actively supported the resolu-
tions sustaining the ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ agenda. In particular, it «has 
been a leading proponent of certain issues therein (fight against impunity and 
the [ICC], health and sexual and reproductive rights in particular)» 382.
In the preamble of Resolution 2242 (2015), it is acknowledged that sex-
ual violence may be «used or commissioned as a method of war or as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations». It interestingly 
notes that the UNSC should:
381 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1325 (2000), 31 October 2000.
382 Ministère des affaires étrangères et du développement international. France’s second national 
action plan. Implementation of United Nations Security Council «Women, peace and security», 
Resolutions 2015-2018. 
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when adopting or renewing targeted sanctions in situations of armed con-
flict, [...] consider designating, as appropriate, those actors, including those 
in terrorist groups, engaged in violations engaged in violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, inclu-
ding sexual and gender-based violence, forced disappearances, and forced 
displacement, and commits to ensuring that the relevant expert groups for 
sanctions committees have the necessary gender expertise 383.
The need to ensure the fight against impunity regarding sexual and gen-
der-based violence is further emphasized.
The EU contributes to the implementation of these resolutions, notably 
through the development of a Comprehensive Approach on this matter 384, a 
‘Guide to Practical Actions at EU level for Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict’ 
adopted in 2014, and a Joint EU Gender Action Plan for the period 2016-
2020. In particular, it mainstreams women’ rights in all its policies and particu-
larly addresses the issue of women in armed conflicts, as well as the necessity 
to criminalize some war crimes, such as mass rape in times of armed conflicts, 
both in policy 385 and legally binding documents 386.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning the ‘Guidelines on Violence against 
women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them’ 
as they make express reference to the UNSC resolutions on this matter and 
underline the provisions of the Rome Statute on sexual violence, insofar as 
it amounts to a core international crime 387. Besides, the 2015 Action Plan on 
383 UNSC Resolution S/RES/2242 (2015), 13 October 2015. 
384 Council of the European Union, Revised indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU 
implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and 
security (12525/16), Brussels, 22 September 2016; Council of the European Union, Compre-
hensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security, Brussels, 1 December 2008. 
385 See, e.g.: Catherine Ashton EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
Vice President of the European Commission Speech on women, peace and security Conference 
on the 10th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and 
security (SPEECH/10/417), Palais d’Egmont, Brussels, 9 September 2010; Council conclusions 
on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, 2985th Foreign Affairs, Council 
meeting Brussels, 8 December 2009.
386 E.g.: Council Common Position 2009/66/CFSP of 26 January 2009 amending Common Po-
sition 2008/369/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.
387 Council of the European Union, EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and com-
bating all forms of discrimination against them, 08.12.2008. 
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Human Rights and Democracy contains some measures relating to the sup-
port of the UN in this area. By way of example, measure 20(c) foresees the:
[s]upport the work of UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, the UN team of experts and UN Action to enhance co-ordina-
tion of international efforts against sexual violence and the effective inves-
tigation and prosecution of sexual violence crimes 388.
It should also be noted that the 2009 French and 2010 Spanish Presiden-
cies have promoted this agenda at EU level 389.
Lastly, the EU and its Member States, including France and Spain, 
adopted a pledge on this matter at the 31st International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent. At EU level, they committed to prioritize 
the implementation of its 2014 ‘Guide to Practical Actions at EU level for 
Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict’ and to undertake actions «in the areas 
of prevention, support, protection and accountability, in contexts of conflict 
prevention, crisis response and humanitarian aid» as well as to promote coop-
eration in multilateral fora 390.
At national level, the emphasis is put on raising awareness on the issues 
of sexual and gender-based violence, support for the UN Secretary Gen-
eral’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence, exchange of practices and 
know-how, promotion of the International Protocol on the Documentation 
and investigation of Sexual Violence, and support for prevention and response 
activities on sexual and gender-based violence 391. Likewise, France joined two 
pledges promoted by the United-Kingdom and another one promoted by 
Canada 392. On this basis, it committed to implement the Women, Peace, and 
Security agenda 393 and to prioritize policy and practical support within States 
388 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy 2015-2019 (10897/15), Brussels, 20 July 2015. 
389 Giji Gya, Women, Peace and Security in EU Common Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, Civil 
Society Dialogue Network, 2011, p. 18.
390 Pledge by the European Union and its Member States nº OP320037, Sexual and gender-based 
violence during times of armed conflict or in the aftermath of disasters and other emergencies. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Pledge by Canada nº OP320020, Engagement du groupe francophone sur la violence sexuelle 
et sexiste dans les conflits armés et autres situations d’urgence. 
393 Pledge by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland nº OP320010, Women, 
Peace, and Security. 
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and with partner organizations in the prevention and response to sexual and 
gender-based violence in conflict and emergency situation, with a special focus 
on the fight against impunity 394.
2.1.3. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Office
The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Office «aims to save and preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering 
and safeguard the integrity and dignity of populations affected by natural dis-
asters and man-made crises» 395. ECHO «ensures rapid and effective delivery 
of EU relief assistance through its two main instruments: humanitarian aid 
and civil protection». These two areas used to be separated and were brought 
together in 2010, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Within this frame, the European Commission has developed a policy 
of promotion of IHL. Indeed, even though humanitarian aid is distinct from 
IHL, both areas are connected. The European Commission bases its action 
of promotion of compliance with IHL on two elements 396. First, IHL is 
one of the legal corpuses that govern humanitarian action. In particular, it 
is applicable to humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians, and the 
principles that guide humanitarian action – humanity, impartiality, neutrality 
and independence – also have their basis in IHL. Second, the EU is bound by 
IHL insofar as all EU Member States have ratified the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols, and the EU adopted the IHL Guidelines. In 
this section, only aspects of ECHO’s action relating to IHL will be briefly 
analyzed.
On 18 December 2007, the Presidents of the Council, the European Par-
liament and the Commission signed the European Consensus on Humani-
394 Pledge by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland nº OP320007, Prevent-
ing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and emergency situations. 
395 ECHO Website, «About the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department 
(ECHO)», 03/12/2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en (Accessed: 
15.01.2016). 
396 ECHO Factsheet, «International Humanitarian Law», European Commission, 2015. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/ihl_en.pdf (Accessed: 
15.01.2016). 
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tarian Aid 397, a document which provides the EU with a common vision and 
approach to guide its action in the provision of humanitarian assistance in third 
countries. In the Consensus, the increasing tendency to ignore or blatantly vio-
late international law, including IHL is mentioned. In this regard, the respect for 
IHL and the principles of humanitarian intervention – neutrality, impartiality, 
humanity and independence of humanitarian action – are directly connected 
to guarantee the ‘humanitarian space’ and to «ensure access to vulnerable pop-
ulations and the safety and security of humanitarian workers» (paragraph 2). 
Furthermore, it includes IHL among the common principles and good prac-
tice to be followed (paragraph 16) and refers explicitly to the Guidelines on 
promoting compliance with IHL. Another interesting element in this regard is 
the reference to the R2P as forming part of the international legal framework 
(paragraph 17). Concerning the use of civil protection and military assets and 
capabilities, the EU commits to «encourage common training in international 
law and the fundamental humanitarian principles» (paragraph 57).
Then, the Action Plan on Humanitarian Aid for the years 2008-2013 was 
adopted in 2008 398. It includes a series of practical measures to implement the 
consensus. Area 1 of the Action Plan is of particular interest for the purposes of 
this thesis. It deals with ‘Advocacy, promotion of humanitarian principles and 
international law’ and therefore includes promoting compliance with IHL, as it 
is understood to be necessary to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian 
workers and to preserve access to affected populations. In particular, one of the 
priority actions is:
general and case-specific advocacy for the respect of international law, in-
cluding IHL, Human Rights Law and Refugee Law through EU policy 
channels (statements, political dialogue, joint demarches) 399.
The idea is to raise awareness about specific situations of failure to uphold 
IHL with the responsible parties. This policy action is therefore a clear exam-
397 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 
(2008/C 25/01). 
398 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – Action Plan, Brussels, 29/05/2008, SEC(2008) 
1991. 
399 Ibid., p. 6.
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ple of how the EU fulfills Common Article 1. An element that is particularly 
interesting is that the European Commission must report on its progress. In 
this regard, the 2014 Evaluation Report of the Action Plan dedicates a specific 
evaluation question on the extent to which the implementation of the Euro-
pean Consensus contributed to promoting and upholding the fundamental 
humanitarian principles, promoting IHL and respecting the distinct nature of 
humanitarian law 400.
Against this background, the European Commission supports five kinds of 
activities to disseminate and implement IHL 401, which deal mostly with fund-
ing and awareness activities. First, it funds advocacy activities with its partners 
or does advocacy itself when it funds humanitarian assistance in response to 
conflicts and emergencies. Second, it funds training programs involving a wide 
range of stakeholders, including non-State actors. This activity is particularly 
important as many non-State actors have no knowledge of IHL and the conse-
quences of its violation. Third, it funds activities among humanitarian workers 
to raise awareness of IHL issues and the humanitarian principles applicable in 
humanitarian aid. Fourth, it «tries to raise awareness among partners world-
wide about some of the unintended consequences of new counter-terrorism 
legislation and policies», as many States have enacted legislation prohibiting the 
funding of training in IHL aimed at armed groups labeled as ‘terrorist’. Lastly, it 
plays an important role in funding and implementing information and aware-
ness campaigns of IHL among a wider public.
The action of DG ECHO is therefore particularly important in the 
implementation of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL at EU level. The 
EU is the biggest humanitarian donor and as such, it is a more credible actor 
at international level in the IHL field.
2.2. Resorting to trade agreements
Even though the IHL Guidelines do not make reference to trade agree-
ments as an operational tool at the EU’s disposal to ensure respect for IHL, 
400 ADE & King’s College London, Report on ‘Evaluation of the implementation of the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’, European Commission, 2014, pp. 55-57.
401 ECHO Factsheet, «International Humanitarian Law», op. cit., 2015.
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their potential should not be underestimated. Indeed, the Common Com-
mercial Policy (hereafter, ‘CCP’) of the EU has been used to promote human 
rights and the international criminal law, so that it could be used as well within 
the frame of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL.
The CCP falls under the exclusive competence of the EU and is regu-
lated by articles 206 and 207 TFEU. Therefore, the European Parliament and 
Council, acting under the ordinary legislative procedure, adopt the measures 
that define the framework for implementing the CCP 402. For present purposes, 
the conclusion of international agreements is especially relevant. Indeed, arti-
cle 216(1) TFEU provides that international agreements may be concluded to 
achieve the EU’s objectives:
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third coun-
tries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where 
the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within 
the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in 
the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope.
In this respect, article 207(1) TFEU states that the CCP «shall be con-
ducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action». As Paul Craig has shown, these principles include the trade liberaliza-
tion objectives codified in article 206 TFEU but also the objectives enshrined 
in articles 3(5) and 21 TEU 403. For present purposes, the respect for the rule of 
law, human rights, the principles of the UN Charter and international law can 
therefore guide the CCP. It can thus be inferred that the EU has the possibility 
to adopt international agreements to «effectuate one of the broad objectives in 
article 3 TEU or article 21 TEU» 404 within the frame of its CCP. Nonetheless, 
it should also be noted that when it comes to integrating human rights into 
trade agreements, the latter must be individually ratified by Member States, as 
this matter is not an exclusive competence of the EU 405.
402 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, op. cit., 2010, p. 390. 
403 Ibid., p. 390. 
404 Ibid., p. 399. 
405 Laura Beke, David D’hollander, Nicolas Hachez and Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, Report on the 
integration of human rights in EU development and trade policies, FRAME, 2014, p. 25. 
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2.2.1. The use of conditionality clauses to ensure respect for IHL
The EU has adopted ‘conditionality clauses’ in international agreements 
passed with third States. Pursuant to such clauses, human rights «serve as a basis 
for the implementation of positive measures on a par with other key provisions 
in an agreement» 406. The origin of conditionality clauses goes back to the late 
70’s, after a massacre occurred in Uganda 407. Ever since, the EU has been will-
ing not to provide funds that could contribute to violations of IHRL and IHL. 
To this end, it has included conditionality clauses in most of its comprehensive 
international agreements since 1995. The Cotonou agreement 408 constitutes a 
landmark in this respect. It is an agreement applicable to 79 African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific countries on the one part and the EU on the other, revised 
in 2005 and 2010, which enshrines in article 96(2)(a) the following condition-
ality clause:
If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Par-
ties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation 
stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the 
rule of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, it shall, except in cases 
of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers 
with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the 
situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. To 
this end, it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that focus on 
the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the 
situation 409.
406 EEAS, EU annual report on human rights and democracy in 2010, Brussels, European Union, 2011, 
pp. 17-18. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2010_human-rights-annual_re-
port_en.pdf (Accessed: 30.05.2017). 
407 Lorand Bartels, The application of human rights conditionality in the EU’s bilateral trade agreements and 
other trade arrangements with third countries, Brussels, European Parliament, November 2008, p. 2
408 The Cotonou Agreement ensues from the Lomé Conventions. It is the most comprehensive 
partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since 2000, it has been the 
framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm 
(Accessed: 13.05.2013). 
409 Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Com-
munity and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first 
amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, OJ L 287, 4.11.2010, pp. 1-49, article 96(2)(a). 
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In this context, it may be considered that IHL has been included in con-
ditionality clauses, through the allusion to more encompassing principles of 
international law, human rights, and the rule of law 410.
Noncompliance with conditionality clauses can result in the adoption of 
sanctions in proportion to the seriousness of the breaches 411. In particular, the vio-
lation of a conditionality clause will entail the suspension of financial aid or other 
forms of cooperation. However, these measures may be accompanied by a redi-
rection of payments to civil society bypassing the government. For example, the 
Temporary International Mechanism for direct assistance to the Palestinian pop-
ulation bypasses the Hamas government. When the EU suspends development 
aid, it intends not to target the population as a whole and tries to minimize the 
impact on the civil population. By way of example, it did so in Russia in response 
to the Chechnya conflict in 1999 and redirected aid to the civil society 412.
Furthermore, explicit mentions to IHL have been found in numerous 
international agreements of all types. In this regard, the agreements concluded 
in recent years include the same general references to the respect for interna-
tional law, the rule of law, and human rights, in addition to explicit references 
to IHL within the frame of the fight against terrorism 413.
410 See, e.g.: Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Commu-
nity, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, OJ L169, 30.06.2008, p. 13, 
article 1; Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Commu-
nity, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part – Protocols – Final Act – 
Declarations, OJ L345, 28.12.2007, p. 2., article 1; Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related 
matters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the 
other part, OJ L28, 30.01.2010, p. 2., article1; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Albania, of the other part, OJ L107, 28.04.2009, p. 166, article 2; Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, 01.01.2010, article 2.
411 EEAS, EU annual report on human rights and democracy in 2010, op. cit., 2011, pp. 17-18. 
412 Bartels, The application of human rights conditionality, op. cit., 2008, p. 21. 
413 See, e.g.: Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other, OJ L 346, 15.12.2012, pp. 3-2621, 
articles 15 and 16; Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council of 11 Novem-
ber 2016 agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities [2016/2368], OJ L 350, 22.12.2016, 
pp. 114-125; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between 
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam, of the other part, OJ L 329, 3.12.2016, pp. 8-42, preamble and article 10; Cooperation Agree-
ment on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part, OJ L 67, 14.03.2017, 
pp. 3-30, preamble; Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between the European 
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While the systematic inclusion of IHL clauses is an important step to 
ensure respect for IHL, the need to effectively implement them is equally 
important. In this regard, the European Parliament emphasized the importance 
and indispensability of human rights clauses but also called for more effec-
tive implementation, notably «through the establishment of an enforcement 
mechanism linked to benchmarks to measure implementation of human rights 
obligations» 414. This statement applies with regard to IHL as well.
2.2.2. The use of arm agreements
The EU has approved a policy of regulation of weapons with special rel-
evance for IHL 415. The EU’s policy priorities of relevance for present purposes 
deal with weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and arms export 
control. It should be noted in this respect that the position of Principal Adviser 
and Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament was created within 
the EEAS in 2013, thus demonstrating the special importance of this matter.
In the field of arms exports, the EU adopted in 2008 Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP under the French Presidency of the EU, which replaced the 
former EU Code of conduct on arms exports. Common Position 2008/944/
CFSP details the criteria applicable to the exportations of military equip-
Union and its Member States, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, OJ L 321, 
29.11.2016, pp. 3-30, article 11; Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union 
and its Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, OJ L 329, 03.12.2016, 
pp. 45-65, article 5; Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, OJ L 337I, 
13.12.2016, pp. 3-40, article 8; Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the 
other part, OJ L 29, 04.02.2016, pp. 3-150, article 13; Association Agreement between the Europe-
an Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, 
and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L 261, 30.08.2014, pp. 4-743, article 12; Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.08.2014, 
pp. 4-738, articles 11 and 19; Association Agreement between the European Union and its Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161, 29.05.2014, pp. 3-2137, articles 
13 and 29.
414 EEAS, EU annual report on human rights and democracy in 2010, op. cit., 2011, pp. 17-18. 
415 For a detailed explanation, see: Millet-Devalle, «L’UE et le droit relatif aux moyens de combat», 
L’Union européenne et le Droit International Humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, p. 217. 
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ment 416, the respect for IHL being a criterion that destination States must 
respect from a reactive and preventive perspective 417. In the event of «clear 
risk» that the military equipment in question might be used «in the commis-
sion of serious violations of IHL», EU Member States shall not issue export 
licenses. With this common position, the «EU is the only regional organiza-
tion to have established a legally binding arrangement on conventional arms 
exports» 418.
At external level, the Council adopted Decision 2012/711/CFSP in 
order to promote the principles and criteria set forth in Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP among third countries 419. Furthermore, the EU played an 
active role in the elaboration and entry into force of some international trea-
ties and conventions, most notably the UN Arms Trade Treaty in 2014 420. In 
this respect, it is worth recalling the pledge made by the EU and some of 
its Member States, including France and Spain, on the occasion of the 2015 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent with regard to 
the Arms Trade Treaty:
The EU welcomes the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty in 
December 2014. It promotes its effective implementation, which notably 
applies to the IHL related provisions of the Treaty by states parties.
Against this background, the EU and its Member States pledge:
– to continue its efforts towards effective implementation and univer-
salization of the Arms Trade Treaty;
– to work for robust and transparent reporting in accordance with the 
object and spirit of the treaty;
416 Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing 
control of exports of military technology and equipment, OJ L 335/99, 13.12.2008, article 2(2).
417 Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», op. cit., 2010, p. 72. 
418 Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, «EU Rules on Control of Arms Exports», EPthinktank, 14.12.2015. 
Available at: https://epthinktank.eu/2015/12/14/eu-rules-on-control-of-arms-exports/ (Ac-
cessed: 29.05.2017). 
419 Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP of 19 November 2012 on support for Union activities in 
order to promote, among third countries, the control of arms exports and the principles and 
criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, OJ L 321, 20.11.2012, p. 62.
420 Arms Trade Treaty, adopted through UNGA Resolution A/RES/67/234 B, New York, 2 April 
2013 (entry into force: 24 December 2014). Implementation at EU level through: Council 
Decision 2013/768/CFSP of 16 December 2013 on EU activities in support of the implemen-
tation of the Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy, OJ L 341, 
18.12.2013, pp. 56-67. 
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– to fully apply – at its domestic level – the IHL related provisions of 
the Arms Trade Treaty consistently with its own principles regarding 
respect for IHL in arms transfers as enshrined in EU Common Posi-
tion 2008/944/CFSP on arms export control.
Spain transposed its obligations arising from the common position by 
means of Act 53/2007 of 28 December 2007 421, completed with a Regula-
tion on the control of the export of defense equipment approved in 2014 422. 
The latter also incorporates elements relating to the Arms Trade Treaty. In this 
regard, it is especially worth noticing that article 7 of Royal Decree 679/2014 
refers explicitly to the serious violations of IHL as a motive for refusal, suspen-
sion or revocation of export licenses 423.
Conversely, France applies directly the provisions of Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP, without act of transposition 424. Pursuant to the French mech-
421 Act 53/2007 of 28 December 2007 (Ley 53/2007, de 28 de diciembre, sobre el control del 
comercio exterior de material de defensa y de doble uso), BOE nº 312, 29.12.2007, pp. 5360-
53676.
422 Regulation on the control of the export of defense equipement, as established by Royal Decree 
679/2014 of 28 December 2014 (Real Decreto 679/2014, de 1 de agosto, por el que se aprueba 
el Reglamento de control del comercio exterior de material de defensa, de otro material y de 
productos y tecnologías de doble uso), BOE nº 207, 26.08.2014, p. 68148.
423 Regulation on the control of the export of defense equipement, article 7: «Las autorizaciones a 
que se refiere el artículo 2 podrán ser suspendidas, denegadas o revocadas por resolución dictada 
por el titular de la Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, en los supuestos siguientes: a) Cuando exis-
tan indicios racionales de que el material de defensa, el otro material o los productos y tecnologías 
de doble uso puedan ser empleados en acciones que perturben la paz, la estabilidad o la seguridad 
en un ámbito mundial o regional, puedan exacerbar tensiones o conflictos latentes, puedan ser 
utilizados de manera contraria al respeto debido y la dignidad inherente al ser humano, con fines 
de represión interna o en situaciones de violación grave del derecho internacional de los derechos 
humanos o del derecho internacional humanitario, tengan como destino países con evidencia de 
desvíos de materiales transferidos o puedan vulnerar los compromisos internacionales contraídos 
por España. Para determinar la existencia de estos indicios racionales se tendrán en cuenta los 
informes sobre transferencias de material de defensa y destino final de estas operaciones que sean 
emitidos por organismos internacionales en los que participe España, los informes de los órganos 
de derechos humanos y otros organismos de Naciones Unidas, la información facilitada por or-
ganizaciones y centros de investigación de reconocido prestigio en el ámbito del desarrollo, la paz 
y la seguridad, el desarme, la desmovilización y los derechos humanos, así como las mejores prác-
ticas más actualizadas descritas en la Guía del Usuario de la Posición Común 2008/944/PESC 
del Consejo, de 8 de diciembre de 2008, por la que se definen las normas comunes que rigen el 
control de las exportaciones de tecnología y equipos militares».
424 Council fifteenth annual report according to article 8(2) of Council Common Position 
2008/944/cfsp defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and 
equipment, OJ C 621, 21.01.2014, p. 1, Table C. 
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anism of control, arm exports are in principle forbidden. Therefore, the State 
grants licenses, which remain under its control. The decision to grant a license 
takes into consideration the criteria established in Common Position 2008/944/
CFSP, together with concerns over international peace and stability, the safety of 
French and allied armed forces, as well as the respect for human rights 425.
While Common Position 2008/944/CFSP has been assessed as having 
a «positive impact on EU national arms export policies», some limitations 
remain. In particular, its implementation is not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU and no sanctions are foreseen in case of non-compliance 426. Fur-
thermore, diverging interpretation at national level is reported to weaken the 
effectiveness of the common position 427.
Even though France normally applies strict criteria regarding arms 
exports, there are some inconsistencies. By way of example, it has exported 
arms to countries suspected of having committed serious violations of IHL 
such as Saudi Arabia 428. The same holds true regarding Spain 429. This is par-
ticularly problematic as Saudi Arabia is suspected of having violated IHL in 
Yemen, as some attacks directed against the civilian population may amount 
to war crimes 430.
Lastly, the EU has adopted rules in related fields, even though they do not 
necessarily relate to arms exports. In the field of conventional weapons, the EU 
adopted rules on the fight against antipersonnel mines and unexploded muni-
tions 431, which creates assistance programs designed to assist non-EU countries 
425 See: Ministère de la Défense, Rapport au Parlement 2016 sur les exportations d’armement 
de la France, May 2016. Available at: https://armerdesarmer.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/rap-
port-au-parlement-en-2016.pdf (Accessed: 08.06.2017).
426 Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, EU arms exports. Member States’ compliance with the common rules. Library 
Briefing, European Parliament, 2013. 
427 Cîrlig, «EU Rules on Control of Arms Exports», op. cit., 2015.
428 See: Ministère de la Défense, Rapport au Parlement 2016 sur les exportations d’armement de la 
France, op. cit., 2016. 
429 ATT Monitor, Dealing in double standards: How arms sales to Saudi Arabia are causing human suf-
fering in Yemen. Case study 2, 2016. Available at: http://controlarms.org/en/wp-content/uploads/
sites/2/2016/02/ATT-Monitor-Case-Study-2-Saudi-Arabia-FINAL.pdf (Accessed: 08.06.2017).
430 Ibid.
431 Council Decision 2012/700/CFSP of 13 November 2012 in the framework of the European 
Security Strategy in support of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014, 
adopted by the States Parties to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, OJ L 314, 
14.11.2012, pp. 40-46. 
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in complying with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 432 to eliminate 
mines and resolve the socio-economic problems that arise. In addition, the 
EU adopted a Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of light 
weapons 433. Lastly, the EU has approved policy documents to implement and 
comply with international agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruc-
tion, most notably the Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction 434. In this context, clauses relating to weapons of mass destruction 
or small arms and light weapons have likewise been enshrined in numerous 
international agreements concluded with third countries 435.
Thus, the three actors have developed a set of tools to prevent violations 
of IHL from occurring, in accordance with the mandate established in the 
432 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Person-
nel Mines and on Their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997 (entry into force: 1 March 1999), 
2056 UNTS 211. 
433 Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of 
SALW and their ammunition (5319/06), Brussels, 13 January 2006. 
434 Council of the European Union, Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
– EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (15708/03), Brussels, 10 
December 2003. 
435 See, e.g.: Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other, OJ L 346, 15.12.2012, pp. 3-2621, 
articles 15 and 16; Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council of 11 Novem-
ber 2016 agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities [2016/2368], OJ L 350, 22.12.2016, 
pp. 114-125; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between 
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam, of the other part, OJ L 329, 03.12.2016, pp. 8-42, preamble and article 10; Cooperation 
Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part, OJ L 67, 
14.03.2017, pp. 3-30, preamble; Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between 
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other 
part, OJ L 321, 29.11.2016, pp. 3-30, article 11; Strategic Partnership Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, OJ L 329, 
03.12.2016, pp. 45-65, article 5; Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other 
part, OJ L 337I, 13.12.2016, pp. 3-40, article 8; Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, of the other part, OJ L 29, 04.02.2016, pp. 3-150, article 13; Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L 261, 30.08.2014, pp. 4-743, article 
12; Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the 
other part, OJ L 260, 30.08.2014, pp. 4-738, articles 11 and 19; Association Agreement between 
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ 
L 161, 29.05.2014, pp. 3-2137, articles 13 and 29.
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Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, in some cases, these preventive measures 
are not sufficient; they therefore need to react to violations of IHL and adopt 
all the necessary and reasonable measures to bring the offending warring party 
back to a state of compliance.
3. ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
As noted in Chapter 1, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL entails a cer-
tain number of measures that third parties to armed conflicts shall implement 
in order to put an end to violations of IHL during an armed conflict. It is clear 
that these measures cannot be interpreted as entailing an obligation of result, 
as this would be utopian and practically unfeasible. Below, some non-coercive 
and coercive measures adopted by the three actors are detailed, without clai-
ming to be exhaustive.
3.1. Non-coercive measures
As noted above, the EU regularly uses declarations and public statements 
to promote compliance with IHL in general terms: ratification of IHL instru-
ments, need to respect IHL instruments, call for end of impunity, etc. In addi-
tion, the EU also enacts statements about specific situations calling to stop 
violations of IHL. Whereas the EU seems to promote IHL as a core element 
of international law, which must be respected at all times, it becomes more 
selective when it condemns violations of IHL, and its action is not consistent.
One type of measure that may be adopted in reaction to violations of 
IHL in a given armed conflict is public denunciations. In this framework, the 
EU may adopt demarches and/or public statements about specific conflicts:
When violations of IHL are reported the EU should consider making 
démarches and issuing public statements, as appropriate, condemning such 
acts and demanding that the parties fulfil their obligations under IHL and 
undertake effective measures to prevent further violations 436.
436 IHL Guidelines, pt. 16(c)
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In this respect, the EU often uses this means to remind the parties to 
a conflict to respect IHL. When the EU adopts such a position – be it sup-
port, condemnation or silence – the parties to the conflict in question may 
reconsider their own actions. In the same way, the EU’s position may affect 
the behavior of the other members of the international community and exert 
pressure on the parties to the conflict to abide by IHL. In this context, the 
EU has issued public statements regarding the conflicts in, inter alia, Israel, 
Darfur, Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, 
Colombia, or Syria 437.
Some patterns appear from the analysis of these declarations. Indeed, the 
Council, or alternatively, the High Representative, have reiterated the need 
to respect IHL in general terms, but have also emphasized the norms under 
threat. In particular, they have referred to the EU’s «determination to support 
the prevention of crimes violating human rights and humanitarian law» 438. 
Furthermore, they have denounced violence against specifically protected 
groups such as the civilian population 439 or humanitarian personnel 440. In the 
437 With regard to Syria, the situation has been so dramatic that it is considered as posing risks 
and threats to EU core interest. Therefore, the EU adopted a Strategy on the matter. See: Eu-
ropean Commission, High Representative, Joint Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria, JOIN(2017) 11 final, Strasbourg, 
14.03.2017. 
438 Declaration by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine 
Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, 6 October 2010, 
Brussels.
439 See, e.g.: Council conclusions on Côte d’Ivoire, 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brus-
sels, 31 January 2011.
440 See, e.g.: Council Conclusions On Middle East Peace Process, 2921st External Relations Coun-
cil Meeting, Brussels, 26 27 January 2009; Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 
2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009; Council Conclusions On 
Sri Lanka, 2942nd General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 May 2009; Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation in Darfur, Brussels, 23 September 
2008, 13276/08 (Presse 267), P 120/08 (OR. fr); Council of the EU, Press release 2678th Council 
Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, General Affairs, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, 
12514/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 241), available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/
st12/st12514-re01.en05.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Statement by the spokesperson of HR 
Catherine Ashton on the liberation of FARC hostages, Brussels, 17 February 2011, A 056/11; 
Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on Libya, Brussels, 23 February 2011, 6966/1/11 REV 1 PRESSE 36; Council conclusions on 
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Libyan context, the EU called on the Libyan government to meet its respon-
sibility to protect its population. The use of sexual violence and gender-based 
violence in armed conflicts are also recurrent themes of this declaratory pol-
icy 441.
In addition, the EU has called for the adoption of a «comprehensive legal 
framework for the process of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration 
of the illegal armed groups» in line with international law within the frame of 
the Colombian armed conflict 442.
In the same way, the EU has condemned the use of chemical attacks 
in Syria in April 2017 443. The latter case is a good example of mutual efforts 
among the different actors analyzed in this thesis, through numerous attempts 
to adopt UNSC resolutions in that sense. Indeed, France also denounced the 
attacks and called for the adoption of a resolution within the UNSC to shed 
light on the events, together with the UK and the US. The project of resolu-
tion was nonetheless vetoed by the Russian Federation 444. Prior to that, the 
UNSC, which included Spain at the time, adopted unanimously Resolution 
Libya, 3082nd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 12 April 2011, available at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121499.pdf (Accessed: 
25.05.2017); Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU 
on the reported use of cluster munitions in Libya, Brussels, 29 April 2011 9544/1/11 REV 1 
PRESSE 118, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/cfsp/121882.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions on Libya, 3106th Foreign Af-
fairs Council meeting, Brussels, 18 July 2011, available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123915.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions 
on Libya, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126042.pdf 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions on Syria, 3149th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
Brussels, 27 February 2012, available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/128174.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
441 See, e.g.: EEAS, Human Rights and Democracy in the world. Report on EU action July 2008 to De-
cember 2009, Brussels, European Commission, 2010, p. 175, available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/_
human_rights/docs/2010_hr_report_fr.pdf (Accessed: 31/10/2014); Déclaration Conjointe de 
la Haute Représentante Ashton et du Commissaire UE pour le développement Piebalgs sur le 
Regain de violences au nord Kivu en RDC, 27 August 2010, Brussels. 
442 Council of the EU, Press release 2678th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Rela-
tions, General Affairs, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, 12514/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 241). Avail-
able at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st12/st12514-re01.en05.pdf (Accessed: 
25.05.2017). 
443 See, e.g.: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alleged chemical 
attack in Idlib, Syria. Brussels, 6 April 2017. 
444 See: https://www.un.org/press/fr/2017/cs12791.doc.htm (Accessed: 25.05.2017). 
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2235 (2015), on the establishment of a mechanism to identify perpetrators 
using chemical weapons in Syria 445.
In some instances, the EU has condemned the existence of behaviors 
prohibited under IHL and IHRL and noted that these could be classified 
as core international crimes 446. Finally, they have repeatedly called for the 
establishment of accountability mechanisms, be it through the establishment 
of independent inquiries 447 or of criminal proceedings 448. Furthermore, it has 
445 Spain in the United Nations Security Council, Review of 2015 and priorities for 2016. Available 
at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Documents/2016_EN-
ERO_BALANCE%20CSNNUU%20ENG.PDF (Accessed: 02.06.2017). 
446 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alleged chemical attack in 
Idlib, Syria. Brussels, 6 April 2017; Council conclusions on Syria, 3117th Foreign Affairs Council 
meeting, Luxembourg, 10 October 2011, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ued-
ocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/125011.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclu-
sions on Syria, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011, avail-
able at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126046.pdf 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions on Syria, 3110th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
Brussels, 1 December 2011, available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/126498.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
447 See, e.g.: Council Conclusions on Sri Lanka, 2942nd General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 
18 May 2009.
448 See, e.g.: Declaration by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Cath-
erine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, 6 October 
2010, Brussels; EEAS, Human Rights and Democracy in the world, Report on EU action July 2008 
to December 2009, European Commission, 2010, p. 175, available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/_hu-
man_rights/docs/2010_hr_report_fr.pdf (Accessed: 31.10.2014); Declaration by the Presidency 
on behalf of the European Union on the report by the International Commission of Enquiry 
on Darfur, Brussels, 4 February 2005, 6072/05 (Presse 19), P 008/05, available at: http://regis-
ter.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st06/st06072.en05.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Press release 
marking the conclusion of the 61st session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 14 
March to 22 April 2005, Brussels, 22 April 2005, 8394/05 (Presse 98), available at: http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st08/st08394.en05.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council con-
clusions on Côte d’Ivoire, 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 31 January 2011; 
Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union 
on Libya, Brussels, 23 February 2011, 6966/1/11 REV 1 PRESSE 36; Council conclusions on 
Libya, 3082nd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 12 April 2011, available at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121499.pdf (Accessed: 
25.05.2017); Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU 
on the reported use of cluster munitions in Libya, Brussels, 29 April 2011 9544/1/11 REV 1 
PRESSE 118, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/cfsp/121882.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions on Libya, 3106th Foreign Af-
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repeatedly called on the United Nations to take action in the Syrian context 449. 
It is worth mentioning in this respect that the EEAS has sponsored Human 
Rights Councils resolutions on the situation in Syria 450, thus reflecting the 
consensus among EU Member States on these issues. In addition, the ‘Euro-
pean Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013’ highlights that the EU members of the 
UNSC in 2012 – France, Germany, Portugal, and the UK – «maintained a high 
degree of unity and often took the initiative over Syria» despite Russian and 
Chinese opposition 451. In the same way, it is possible to mention the unani-
mous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2258 (2015), renewing authorization for 
passage of humanitarian aid in Syria and sponsored by Spain, together Jordan 
and New Zealand 452.
When the situation so requires, the EU prefers to use démarches, which are 
performed confidentially with the authorities of third countries, to the extent 
that «silent diplomacy» might be more appropriate.
In the same line, the EU may use political dialogue to promote compli-
ance with IHL. It is the privileged means of action of the CFSP so that the EU 
maintains numerous political dialogues with third countries, be it with head of 
states or by way of experts’ meetings 453. It is a classical means of action, which 
is also used for the promotion of human rights 454 in over 40 countries.
Thus far, IHL has been mentioned in an important number of meet-
ings, notably within the frame of the fight against terrorism, where the EU 
fairs Council meeting, Brussels, 18 July 2011, available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123915.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017); Council conclusions 
on Libya, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126042.pdf 
(Accessed: 25.05.2017). 
449 See, e.g.: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alleged chemical 
attack in Idlib, Syria, Brussels, 6 April 2017; Extract from the European Council conclusions on 
Syria, Brussels, 2 March 2012, available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/128522.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017). 
450 See: http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/issues/69 (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
451 See: http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/issues/75 (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
452 Spain in the United Nations Security Council, Review of 2015 and priorities for 2016. Available 
at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Documents/2016_EN-
ERO_BALANCE%20CSNNUU%20ENG.PDF (Accessed: 02.06.2017). 
453 Knudsen, «Les lignes directrices de l’UE concernant la promotion du respect du DIH et leur 
mise en oeuvre», op. cit., 2010, p. 178. 
454 See: Council of the EU. EU Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Guidelines, 
March 2009. 
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has insisted on the necessity to respect international law, human rights, and 
the rule of law 455. In some cases, it led to intensive legal dialogues, such as the 
dialogue on counterterrorism and international law started with the United 
States in 2006.
Even though no official evidence of the EU’s insistence on respecting 
human rights and IHL in the fight against terrorism can be found in Coun-
cil conclusions or Declarations, some elements demonstrate that the EU has 
placed their respect at the forefront of the dialogue with the United States, 
notably regarding the humanitarian situation in Guantanamo. For instance, a 
French Guide of the CFSP mentions the fact that the issue of Guantanamo 
prisoners and the importance to respect human rights in counterterrorism 
was discussed on the occasion of the EU-US Summit that took place in 
Vienna in 2006 456. Moreover, in a speech at the European Parliament, the 
then European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neigh-
borhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner expressed these concerns quite 
clearly:
All anti-terrorist measures must be consistent with both international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is our firm belief 
that the Geneva Conventions apply to all persons captured on the field of 
battle [...]. It is vital that the international community seeks to re-assert 
full adherence to international law, including human rights and humanita-
rian standards, in relation to the alleged Taliban and Al-Qaida members in 
Guantanamo and elsewhere.
Furthermore, in a Joint Statement of the EU and the United States on the 
Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention facility and Future Counterter-
rorism Cooperation, the EU and the United States committed to pursue the 
dialogue following these principles:
Taking into account that the action against international terrorism raises 
important legal questions, we recognize the importance of deepening our 
dialogue on international legal principles relevant to combating terrorism. 
455 Knudsen, «Les lignes directrices de l’UE concernant la promotion du respect du DIH et leur 
mise en oeuvre», op. cit., 2010, p. 178. 
456 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Guide de la PESC, op. cit., 2006, p. 52. 
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In particular, we will continue working together in semi-annual meetings 
involving the Legal Advisers to the Foreign Ministries of the European 
Union Member States (COJUR), representatives of the General Secreta-
riat of the Council of the European Union and the European Commis-
sion, and the U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, with the objective 
of furthering an improved mutual understanding of our respective legal 
frameworks, and developing common ground from which we can work 
more effectively in combating terrorism 457.
To date, the EU-United States dialogue is the longest and most systematic 
the EU has had with third countries, but it is not the only one. For instance, 
within the Georgia and African Union human rights dialogues, the EU made 
reference to some specific aspects of IHL, namely the «rights of internally 
displaced persons and the human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia and 
South Ossetia, Georgia» 458 or the «full realization of UN Security Council 
Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security» 459, which contains references to 
gender-based and sexual violence in armed conflicts.
Although multilateral and bilateral diplomacy do not always take the 
form of legally binding acts, their actions, initially non-binding, participate 
in the evolution of IHL and acquire legal effects 460. First, one should notice 
that the ICTY used EU Declarations on Liberia and Chechnya in the Tadic 
Case of 2 October 1995 461. They were used as interpretative elements so as 
to determine whether some principles are applicable to NIACs. Second, the 
practice of the three actors, especially the EU, offers a new way to partici-
pate in the normative creation of IHL thanks to its precursory declaratory 
457 Council of the European Union, Joint Statement of the European Union and its Member States 
and the United States of America on the Closure of Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and 
future Counterterrorism Cooperation, based on Shared Values, International Law, and Respect 
for the Rule of Law and Human Rights. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108455.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
458 Council of the EU, EU-Georgia Human Rights Dialogue, 9 July 2010, Tbilisi, Brussels, 9 July 
2010 (OR. En), 12444/10, PRESSE [210].
459 Council of the EU, 6th African Union-European Union Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels, 7/11 
May 2010, 9721/10 (Presse 120). 
460 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 144.
461 ICTY, Judgement of 2 October 1995, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, alias «Dule», paras. 13 and 115. 
Quoted in Michel Veuthey, «L’Union européenne et l’obligation de faire respecter le droit in-
ternational humanitaire», in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, 
p. 209.
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law («droit déclaratoire précurseur») 462. This practice is therefore of utmost 
importance when considering the creation and consolidation of custom-
ary IHL.
3.2. Coercive measures
Firstly, the three actors may adopt restrictive measures against the States 
and individuals violating IHL. Furthermore, if these measures are not suffi-
cient, the resort to military intervention is possible, provided that it is author-
ized under international law and the UN Charter.
3.2.1. Economic sanctions
Restrictive measures (or sanctions) are a classical means of sanction in 
international law with which the EU, a global economic power, is familiar. 
As observed by Alain Pellet, the European Community started to adopt sanc-
tions against third States whose behavior posed a threat to international peace 
and security, even in the absence of express legal basis in the founding trea-
ties 463. The question of sanctions was decided on the basis of a consultation 
foreseen by article 297 (now article 347 TFEU), and specific measures could 
be approved by the Community within the frame of its CCP on the basis 
of article 133 (now article 207 TFEU) 464. Nowadays, economic sanctions are 
regulated by article 215 TFEU. Pursuant to this provision, the Council is com-
petent to adopt restrictive measures, acting on a joint proposal from the High 
Representative and the Commission. Decisions are adopted at unanimity and 
the European Parliament must be informed. In contrast with the ordinary acts 
adopted under the framework of the CFSP, the Court of Justice is competent 
to review the legality of restrictive measures. From a multilevel perspective, it 
462 Ibid.
463 Alain Pellet, «L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix», in Myriam Benlolo-Carabot, Ulas 
Candaş and Eglantine Cujo (dir.), Union européenne et droit international, Paris, Pedone, 2012, 
p. 431. 
464 Pellet, «L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix», op. cit., 2012, p. 432.
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is worth noticing that the implementation of EU sanctions falls primarily on 
EU Member States.
The European Commission defines restrictive measures as follows:
[A]n instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which seek to 
bring about a change in activities or policies such as violations of interna-
tional law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law 
or democratic principles [...].
They may comprise arms embargoes, other specific or general trade res-
trictions, financial restrictions, restrictions on admission, or other measures, 
as appropriate 465.
Furthermore, article 215(2) TFEU expressly recognizes the possibility to 
adopt these measures against «natural or legal persons and groups or non-State 
entities» 466. Restrictive measures may be adopted to fulfill the CFSP’s objec-
tives: «peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and 
international law» 467.
Once again, the adoption of restrictive measures constitutes a good 
example of multilevel in action. Indeed, by virtue of articles 2, 21, and 42 TEU, 
read in conjunction with Declaration 13 concerning the common foreign 
and security policy 468, the EU is bound by the coercive measures adopted by 
the UN 469. Therefore, the EU has adopted restrictive measures in compliance 
with the measures decided at UN level, thus allowing EU Member States to 
enforce their obligations arising from international law. That being said, the 
EU has also adopted such measures outside of the UN framework 470. There-
fore, restrictive measures are the result of a two-fold State mediation: the one 
465 European Commission, Restrictive measures – Factsheet, 2008. Available at: http://eeas.europa.
eu/archives/docs/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
466 Paul James Cardwell (ed.), EU external relations law and policy in the Post-Lisbon era, The Hague, 
TMC Asser Press/Springer, 2012, pp. 109-110. 
467 Council of the European Union, EU restrictive measures – Factsheet, Brussels, 29 April 2014a. Avail-
able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.
pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017).
468 «It stresses that the European Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council and of its Members for the maintenance of international peace and security». 
469 Pellet, «L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix», op. cit., 2012, p. 434. 
470 Ibid., p. 434.
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resulting from States as enforcers of the decisions of the UNSC, and the one 
resulting from the EU institutions as enforcers of State obligations 471.
Against this background, EU Member States foresaw its use to ensure 
respect for IHL in the Guidelines:
The use of restrictive measures (sanctions) may be an effective means 
of promoting compliance with IHL. Such measures should therefore be 
considered against State and non-parties to a conflict, as well as individuals, 
when they are appropriate and in accordance with international law 472.
The last sentence underlines the fact that, most of the time, the adoption 
of restrictive measures is taken on the basis of a UNSC resolution. However, 
they can also come about when the UN fails to act, thus complementing the 
UN’s practice 473. Within the frame of the promotion of IHL, the EU can act by 
way of two means. Either, it adopts ordinary restrictive measures because of the 
infringement or potential infringement of IHL by a third country. Alternatively, it 
can adopt sanctions on the basis of the infringement of the conditionality clauses.
In this context, the EU has adopted restrictive measures in response to the 
lack of respect of IHL in several conflicts. Well before the adoption of the IHL 
Guidelines, the EU adopted an arms embargo 474 implementing UNSC Res-
olution 1171 (1998) on the situation in Sierra Leone 475. Then, this instrument 
has been increasingly used 476.
471 «Par l’intermédiaire de l’Union européenne, les Etats membres défèrent à l’obligation qui ré-
sulte pour eux de leur appartenance parallèle à l’Organisation des Nations Unies (art. 25 de la 
Charte). L’adoption d’une décision PESC (UE), c’est-à-dire sur le mode intergouvernemental, 
préalablement à la phase communautaire (CE), met en évidence le rôle de pivot joué par les Etats 
dans cette procédure. Si le recours au droit communautaire s’impose aux Etats comme moyen 
de mise en œuvre des obligations étatiques vis-à-vis des Nations Unies, c’est en raison du trans-
fert à la Communauté européenne des compétences étatiques correspondant matériellement au 
domaine des mesures adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité». H. Ascensio, «Les fins de la sanction 
externe», in I. Pingel (dir.), Les sanctions contre les Etats en droit communautaire, Paris, Pedone, 2006, 
p. 76. Quoted in Pellet, «L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix», op. cit., 2012, p. 436.
472 IHL Guidelines, para. 16(d). 
473 Clara Portela, «Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?», Politique européenne, vol. 3(17), 
2005, p. 85.
474 Common Position of 29 June 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union concerning Sierra Leone (98/409/CFSP). 
475 UNSC Resolution 98/RES/1171 (1998), 05.06.1998. 
476 The full list of restrictive measures currently in force is available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/
eeas/files/restrictive_measures-2017-04-26-clean.pdf (Accessed: 30.05.2017). 
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The former Yugoslavia case is emblematic. The EU adopted a significant 
number of restrictive measures against the persons who helped ICTY indictees 
to evade justice 477. Moreover, regarding Serbia and Montenegro specifically, the 
EU adopted restrictions on the admission of former President Milosevic and 
natural persons associated with him 478. In the same way, the restrictive measures 
taken in 2005 related to the conflict in Sudan are illustrative insofar as they 
explicitly mention «violations of international humanitarian or human rights 
law or other atrocities» 479.
Likewise, the EU adopted restrictions with regard to the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, which have been revised on several 
occasions 480. In this case, infringements of IHL are well detailed and include 
the violation of the embargo on arms and related measures, the impediment 
of disarmament, voluntary repatriation or resettlements of combatants, partic-
ipation of combatants in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration pro-
cesses, the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict, serious violations 
of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations 
of armed conflict, the obstruction of provision of humanitarian assistance to 
the eastern part of the DR Congo, and the support for illegal armed groups in 
the eastern part of the DR Congo through illicit trade of natural resources. In 
477 Council Decision 2010/145/CFSP renewing measures in support of the effective implementa-
tion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
OJ L 58, 09.03.2010, p. 8.
478 Council Decision 2008/733/CFSP of 15 September 2008 implementing Common Position 
2004/694/CFSP on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the man-
date of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 247/63, 
16.09.2008; Council Regulation (EC) nº 1763/2004 of 11 October 2004 imposing certain 
restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 315/14, 14.10.2004. See: infra, Chap-
ter 4, Section 2.
479 Council Common Position 2005/411/CFSP of 30 May 2005 concerning restrictive measures 
against Sudan and repealing Common Position 2004/31/CFSP, OJ L 139/25, 02.06.2005.
480 See, e.g.: Council Common Position 2008/369/CFSP of 14 May 2008 concerning restrictive 
measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, OJ L 127, 15.05.2008, p. 84; Council 
Decision 2010/788/CFSP of 20 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and repealing Common Position 2008/369/CFSP, OJ L 
336, 21.12.2010, pp. 30-42; Council Decision 2014/147/CFSP of 17 March 2014 amending 
Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, OJ L 79, 18.03.2014, pp. 42-43; Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2231 of 12 De-
cember 2016 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, OJ L 336I, 12.12.2016, pp. 7-14.
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2010, the EU adopted sanctions against persons and entities in Somalia who 
acted in violation of the arms embargo against Somalia and obstructed the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance 481. Restrictive measures have been adopted 
on similar grounds, with explicit reference to violations of IHL regarding the 
situations in Central African Republic 482, South Sudan 483, or Darfur 484.
For more notorious examples, it is possible to refer to the Syrian and 
Libyan cases. In the latter case, the Council has approved sanctions on the 
basis of UNSC resolutions 1970 (2011), 2174 (2014), and 2213 (2015) 485. In 
this respect, Council Decision 2015/1333/CFSP refers to explicit rules of 
IHL derived from the principle of distinction or the conduct of hostilities as 
grounds justifying the adoption of the sanctions 486.
481 Council Decision 2010/231/CFSP of 26 April 2010 concerning restrictive measures against 
Somalia and repealing Common Position 2009/138/CFSP, OJ L 105/17, 27.04.2010. 
482 Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/412 of 7 March 2017 amending Decision 2013/798/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against the Central African Republic, OJ L 63, 09.03.2017, 
pp. 102-104.
483 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/402 of 7 March 2017 implementing Article 
20(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/735 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the situation 
in South Sudan, OJ L 63, 09.03.2017, pp. 7-14.
484 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/401 of 7 March 2017 implementing Article 
15(3) of Regulation (EU) Nº 747/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation 
in Sudan, OJ L 63, 09.03.2017, pp. 3-6.
485 Council Decision 2015/1333/CFSP of 31 July 2015 concerning restrictive measures in view 
of the situation in Libya, and repealing Decision 2011/137/CFSP, OJ L 206, 01.08.2015, p. 34; 
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/44 of 18 January 2016 concerning restrictive measures in view 
of the situation in Libya and repealing Regulation (EU) nº 204/2011. 
486 Ibid., article 8: «2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or 
transit through, their territories of persons:
 a)  involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of 
serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved or com-
plicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international 
law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or persons acting 
for or on their behalf or at their direction;
 b)  identified as having been involved in the repressive policies of the former regime of Muam-
mar Qadhafi in Libya, or otherwise formerly associated with that regime, and who pose a 
continued risk to the peace, stability or security of Libya, or the successful completion of its 
political transition;
 c)  engaged in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, 
or obstructing or undermining the successful completion of its political transition, including 
by:
 a.  planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights 
law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in 
Libya;
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In the Syrian case, the EU started with a suspension of its cooperation 
with the Syrian government under the European Neighborhood Policy 487. 
Then, it has adopted restrictive measures, which have gradually been extended. 
They range from the export and import of «certain equipment, goods and tech-
nology which might be used for internal repression [...] or for the manufacture 
and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression» 
to restrictions on admission or freezing of funds and economic resources 488. 
For present purposes, among the reasons for the adoption of these measures 
appears the involvement in the repression and violence against the civilian 
population, in violation of IHRL and IHL. In the same way, the EU added 
four high-level Syrian military officials to the sanctions list for their role in the 
use of chemical weapons against the civilian population in March 2017 489. It is 
worth mentioning that, in line with the EU’s approach on restrictive sanctions, 
the EU also provided for exceptions in order to facilitate humanitarian relief 
or assistance to the civilian population 490. All in all, the EU has adopted sanc-
 b.  providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation 
of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya;
 [...]
 c.  violating, or assisting in the evasion of, the provisions of the arms embargo in Libya esta-
blished in UNSCR 1970 (2011) and Article 1 of this Decision;
 d. acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of listed persons or entities;
 d)  that own or control Libyan State funds misappropriated during the former regime of Muam-
mar Qadhafi in Libya which could be used to threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, 
or to obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition».
487 Council conclusions on Syria, 23 May 2011, para. 6: «As part of the ongoing review of all aspects 
of its cooperation with Syria, the EU has decided to suspen all preparations in relation to new 
bilateral cooperation programs and to suspend the ongoing bilateral programs with the Syrian 
authorities under ENPI and MEDA instruments. The EU Member States stand ready to review 
their bilateral cooperation in this regard. The Council invites the EIB to not approve new EIB 
financing operations in Syria for the time being. The EU will consider the suspension of further 
Community assistance to Syria in light of developments». Available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122168.pdf (Accessed: 29.05.2017). 
488 See, inter alia: Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive mea-
sures against Syria, OJ L 147, 01.06.2013, p. 14; Decision 2014/309/CFSP of 28 May 2014 
amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, OJ L 160, 
29.05.2014, p. 37; Council Decision 2015/837/CFSP of 28 May 2015 amending Decision 
2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, OJ L 132, 29.05.2015, pp. 82-85.
489 EEAS, The EU and the crisis in Syria, factsheet, Brussels, 04.04.2017.
490 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/2137 of 6 December 2016 amending Regulation (EU) Nº 
36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, OJ L 332, 07.12.2016, 
pp. 3-6.
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tions against the Syrian government and supporters, including 235 people and 
67 entities «targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze» 491.
In this context, the Qosmos case in France is worth mentioning. Indeed, 
two associations – the FIDH and LDH – lodged a complaint against the Qos-
mos company in 2012, regarding the provision of equipment used for surveil-
lance to the Syrian regime in violation of the restrictive measures adopted at 
EU level 492. The case is still being investigated at the time of writing.
Hence, the EU, together with its Member States, is able to adopt restric-
tive measures to punish the disrespect for IHL and exert pressure on the war-
ring party in question. Whenever this solution is not efficient enough and if 
the situation is critical, they may send out management-crisis operations to 
ensure respect for IHL or to prevent further breaches.
3.2.2. Peace operations and military intervention
Peace operations and military intervention is arguably the last type of 
measures that State parties to the Geneva Conventions may use to ensure 
respect for IHL. It is likewise the type of measure for which the three actors 
are not on the same footing. Indeed, the EU is much more limited than its 
Member States because of legal and political obstacles. Furthermore, this is an 
area where France has been more proactive than other States, notably in its 
quality of permanent member of the UNSC. This is also an area where mul-
tilevel appears clearly as military interventions must first be authorized by the 
UNSC, which includes France. On this basis, Member States may fulfill their 
obligations within the frame of the UN peacekeeping operations, but also 
under the auspices of the EU. Likewise, the EU may implement autonomous 
operations providing support, even though they are not authorized to resort 
to lethal force.
3.2.2.1. UN operations
At the time of writing, 16 peacekeeping operations are led by the UN 
worldwide. Among those, at least eight missions – in the Central African 
491 EEAS, The EU and the crisis in Syria, factsheet, op. cit., 2017.
492 «Syrie: la justice française enquête sur la société Qosmos», Le Monde, 11.04.2014. 
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Republic 493, Côte d’Ivoire 494, Darfur 495, the Democratic Republic of Congo 496, 
Liberia 497, Mali 498, the Abyei area in Sudan 499, and South Sudan 500 – include in 
their mandate one aspect of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Their 
mandates typically include the obligation to promote and protect IHL, to 
ensure humanitarian access, to respect the principle of distinction and to pro-
tect civilians, to protect women and children, humanitarian and UN person-
nel, to prevent sexual and gender-based violence, or to protect historical and 
cultural sites.
Among those missions, both France and Spain participate in the mission 
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); in addition, France participates 
in the missions in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) 501. It should likewise be noted that the UNSC authorized the 
French forces «to use all necessary means» to support MINUSMA «when 
under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary General» 502.
3.2.2.2. EU operations
In parallel, the EU has developed autonomous peace operations. The pos-
sibility for the EU to send out management-crisis operation reflects its own 
evolution. The EU is no longer a mere politico-normative actor contributing 
to the promotion and development of IHL; it is becoming a real subject of 
493 MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/2301 
(2016), 26 July 2016.
494 UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/2226 (2015), 25 June 2014.
495 UNAMID in Darfur, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/1769 (2007), 31 July 2007.
496 MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, established by UNSC Resolution 
S/RES/1925 (2010), 28 May 2010.
497 UNMIL in Liberia, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003. 
498 MINUSMA in Mali, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/2164 (2014), 25 June 2014.
499 UNISFA, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/1990 (2011) regarding the disputed Abyei 
Area, in Sudan.
500 UNMISS in South Sudan, established by Resolution S/RES/2155 (2014), 27 May 2014.
501 UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country, 30 April 2017. Available at: http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/apr17_3.pdf (Accessed: 31.05.2017).
 Spain withdrew from MONUSCO in 2012. See: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/Po-
liticaExteriorCooperacion/CSNU2015-2016/Documents/MAPAMANTENIMIENTOPAZ.
pdf (Accessed: 31.05.2017).
502 MINUSMA in Mali, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/2164 (2014), 25 June 2014, para. 
26. Indeed, France answered positively to the calls of the Malian State to fight against jihadist 
terrorists within the frame of the Serval operation, then replaced with Barkhane operation. 
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IHL 503. Theoretically, in case where simple diplomacy is not enough to ensure 
respect of IHL, the EU foresees the possibility to constrain a reluctant State or 
party to the conflict to abide by IHL by sending out crisis-management oper-
ations. In this respect, the IHL Guidelines read as follow:
The importance of preventing and suppressing violations of IHL by 
third parties should be considered, where appropriate, in the drafting of 
mandates of EU crisis-management operations. In appropriate cases, this 
may include collecting information which may be of use for the ICC or in 
other investigations of war crimes.
Some missions have been launched in support of humanitarian assistance 
operations. This possibility is in line with international practice as peacekeeping 
operations in general now include a humanitarian dimension. Their objective 
is the application of IHL provisions aiming at the protection of the civilian 
population and humanitarian agents assisting them. From now on, civilians’ pro-
tection as well as support and protection of humanitarian aid are at the heart of 
peacekeeping operations and justify the use of lethal force in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 504. As observed in Chapter 1, authorization to 
intervene on humanitarian grounds is possible only within the frame of the UN 
Charter 505. In that regard, EU crisis management operations are usually based on 
a UN mandate, peace agreement, and/or State consent 506.
At the time of writing, there are six EU military operations/missions and 
nine EU civilian missions deployed all over the globe. Some of them touch 
upon the respect for IHL in their mandate. For example, the unarmed civilian 
monitoring mission EUMM Georgia, created on 15 September 2008, shall 
contribute to, inter alia, stabilization, defined as:
Monitor[ing], analy[zing] and report[ing] on the pertaining to the stabi-
lisation process, centered on full compliance with the six-point Agreement, 
503 Valentina Falco, «L’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire à l’Union européenne: évolu-
tions normatives», in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, p. 88.
 However, the aspect of the applicability of IHL to EU operations falls outside of the scope of this 
thesis. 
504 Louis Balmond, «Les positions des Etats Membres relatives au DIH», in Millet-Devalle, L’UE et 
le droit international humanitaire, op. cit., 2010, p. 38
505 Peters, «Humanity as the A and Ώ of sovereignty», op. cit., 2009, p. 537. 
506 Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, op. cit., 2010, p. 99.
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including troop withdrawals, and on freedom of movement and actions by 
spoilers, as well as on violations of human rights and international huma-
nitarian law 507.
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also worth mentioning. The EU 
established a military operation (EUFOR Althea) 508 on the basis of UNSC 
Resolution 1575(2004) 509. This resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, authorized the EU to establish a multinational stabilization 
force to succeed SFOR, under NATO command. The mandate of EUFOR 
Althea was recently renewed by the UNSC 510. The objective of EUFOR 
Althea is to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement, and 
for present purposes, with Annex 1A thereof. The latter makes some refer-
ences to IHL, notably with regard to the exchange of prisoners or humanitar-
ian access 511. The mandate established by the UNSC is broad, as it authorizes 
Member States «to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of 
and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the Peace Agreement 512 
[emphasis added]». Both France and Spain are contributors to this military 
operation.
Moreover, the EU said in 2011 that it was ready to launch a military mis-
sion called EUFOR LIBYA providing humanitarian assistance in Libya upon 
request of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The 
507 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Moni-
toring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, OJ L 248, 17.09.2008, pp. 26-31, article 3(1). 
508 Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the European 
Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ L 353, 27.11.2004, pp. 21-22.
509 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1575 (2004), 22 November 2004. 
510 UNSC Resolution S/RES/2315 (2016), 8 November 2016. 
511 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed in Dayton on 
21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, Annex 1A: Agreement on the 
Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement. 
512 UNSC Resolution S/RES/2315 (2016), 8 November 2016, para. 5. There are other references 
to the use of force in the resolution: «6. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, 
at the request of either EUFOR ALTHEA or the NATO Headquarters, in defence of the EU-
FOR ALTHEA or NATO presence respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out 
their missions, and recognizes the right of both EUFOR ALTHEA and the NATO presence to 
take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack; 7. Authorizes 
the Member States acting under paragraphs 3 and 4 above, in accordance with annex 1-A of the 
Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and proce-
dures governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to 
all civilian and military air traffic». 
250 │  ENSURING RESPECT: PREVENTING AND ENDING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
mission would have been based on the mandates of the UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and would have contributed «to the safe move-
ment and evacuation of displaced persons and support humanitarian agencies 
in their activities in the region» 513. Nonetheless, it was never activated, and 
States acted outside of the scope of the EU.
Furthermore, the EU has launched operations to provide military and 
training advice to armed forces. Within this mandate, they shall provide train-
ing on IHL, IHRL, and protection of civilians. This is the case of EUTM Mali, 
a military training mission established in February 2013, whose objective is 
«to provide military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) 
operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities» 514. It should be 
noted in this respect that UNSC Resolution expressly calls on the EU, notably 
its EUTM Mali, «to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral 
partners of Mali engaged to assist the Malian authorities in the Security Sector 
Reform» 515. Both France and Spain participate in the personnel of EUTM 
Mali.
For what concerns more specifically the launching of management-crisis 
operations in order to enhance the criminal justice system, the EU assigned 
EUPOL COPPS, in the Palestinian Territories, the mission to ensure coher-
ence and coordination of EU activities related to capacity-building, notably in 
the criminal justice field 516. Both France and Spain participate in the personnel 
of EUPOL COPPS 517. In the same line, on 4 February 2008, the EU entrusted 
EULEX Kosovo a rule of law mission whose objective was to:
ensure that cases of war crimes, [...] inter-ethnic crimes, [...] and other 
serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and en-
forced, according to the applicable law, including, where appropriate, by 
international investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with Kosovo 
513 Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in 
support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EU-
FOR Libya), OJ L 89/17, 05.04.2011. 
514 EUTM Mali website: http://www.eutmmali.eu/about-eutm-mali/mandate-concepts/ (Ac-
cessed: 31.05.2017). 
515 MINUSMA in Mali, established by UNSC Resolution S/RES/2164 (2014), 25 June 2014.
516 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police 
Mission for the Palestinian Territories, Article 2. Confirmed in subsequent decisions. 
517 See: http://eupolcopps.eu/en/content/rule-law-section (Accessed: 31.05.2017).
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investigators, prosecutors and judges or independently, and by measures 
including, as appropriate, the creation of cooperation and coordination 
structures between police and prosecution authorities 518.
On this basis, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers were established to hear 
allegations of grave violations of IHL during the conflict in Kosovo 519. EULEX 
is supported by all EU Member States, thus including France and Spain.
Therefore, there are cases where the EU has implemented CSDP oper-
ations within the frame of Common Article 1. Nonetheless, this operational 
aspect of the EU’s action is importantly limited and remains in the hands of 
EU Member States. In terms of CSDP missions aiming to put an end to vio-
lations of IHL, EU action is quite cautious and when it dares to be bold, like 
in the Libyan case, EU Member States do not follow. Therefore, it seems that 
in relation with the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, CSDP operations are 
more used to promote IHL among the armed forces of foreign countries or to 
contribute to the fight against impunity.
As observed by ECFR, there are important divergences among EU 
Member States as to the extent of EU military activity 520. By way of example, 
in the year 2015, Italy lobbied for a UN peacekeeping mission in Libya but was 
not followed by other Member States. Furthermore, France, an active player, 
complained that other Member States were not sufficiently involved in African 
missions 521.
3.2.2.3. NATO operations
Lastly, there are some instances where France and Spain have acted out-
side the frame of the EU. In this respect, the example of the ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ conducted by NATO in Kosovo is worth mentioning, as both 
518 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), OJ L 42/92, 16.02.2008, pp. 92-98, article 3 (d). Also 
observed in Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», op. cit., 2010, 
p. 71.
519 EEAS, Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union: Missions and Operations annual re-
port 2016, pp. 5, 10. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/e_csdp_annual_report1.
pdf (Accessed: 31.10.2017). 
520 European Council on Foreign Relations, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016, January 2016. 
Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR157_SCORECARD_2016.pdf (Accessed: 
31.10.2017). 
521 Ibid., p. 25. 
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France and Spain belong to NATO. In this regard, NATO deployed KFOR 
in June 1999 in response to the humanitarian crisis deriving from the armed 
conflict in Kosovo 522. KFOR is still operational, even though its mandate has 
shifted to «maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom 
of movement for all» 523. Both Spain and France have participated in the coali-
tion, even though Spain eventually withdrew from it.
Another example is the Libyan case. In response to an announced mas-
sacre of civilians in March 2011 by pro-Gaddafi forces, France, Lebanon, and 
the UK proposed the adoption of a resolution aiming to prevent attacks on 
civilians 524. The UNSC approved Resolution 1973 (2011), which authorized 
Member States to use all necessary measures to establish and enforce a no-fly 
zone over Libya, with a view to «prevent attacks on civilians» 525. On this basis, a 
NATO coalition led by France and including Spain (Operation Unified Pro-
tector) enforced Resolution 1973 (2011). While it was argued at the time that 
the UNSC Resolution represented a welcomed application of the R2P – and, 
in fine, of Common Article 1 – the results of the intervention are mixed, as it 
seems that the coalition went beyond its mandate and might have contributed 
to the destabilization of the country 526.
Conclusions 
Chapter 2
In light of these developments, all three actors, the EU, France, and Spain are 
bound by the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. While this obligation is 
treaty-based with regard to France and Spain, the EU’s obligation is of custo-
522 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
523 See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 31.10.2017). 
524 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse 
and the UK’s future policy options. Third Report of Session 2016-17, 6 September 2016, p. 10. Avail-
able at: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/119.pdf 
(Accessed: 31.05.2017).
525 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011. 
526 For a critical appraisal of the intervention, see: House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s future policy options, op. cit., 2016. 
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mary nature. In this respect, since Common Article 1 stipulates a due diligence 
obligation, it seemingly binds the three actors in differing ways. The EU is 
bound by the obligation, but only to the extent of its capabilities, which are, by 
definition, more limited than those of State parties. France on the other hand 
is probably held to a higher standard, due to its permanent membership in the 
UNSC. As for Spain, the level of demand will depend on the circumstances of 
the case, in analogy with the ICJ’s ruling on the Bosnian Genocide case.
This international duty is further reflected in the legal orders of the three 
different actors. On this matter, the EU has made a bold move when it adopted 
the Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL, as it constitutes the ‘trans-
position’ of Common Article 1 at EU level despite the absence of express 
attributed competence in this sense. Hence, the EU’s recognition of the obliga-
tion to ensure respect for IHL is actually framed by its values, which implicitly 
refer to IHL. Therefore, if the EU is sometimes criticized for its lack of ambi-
tion, this criticism does not apply at this stage. Regarding France and Spain, 
both States have ratified and adopted the necessary measures to integrate the 
Geneva Conventions into their respective legal orders. In this regard, since 
both adopt a monist approach to international law, the Geneva Conventions, 
including Common Article 1, form part of their legal orders.
Nonetheless, there are differences to the extent that this integration does 
not necessarily mean direct applicability. On this matter, Spain has proven to be 
more open to apply directly the Geneva Conventions than France. Conversely, 
in terms of express recognition of Common Article 1 as a mechanism of imple-
mentation of IHL, the position of France is much clearer than that of Spain. 
France explicitly acknowledges Common Article 1 as establishing a system of 
collective responsibility regarding IHL and it also formally recognizes the EU’s 
role on this issue. In contrast, Spain seems to support the effective implementa-
tion of key concepts of IHL, but not so much the enforcement mechanism itself.
Yet, the adoption of the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with 
IHL can also be interpreted as an elevation at EU level of its Member States’ 
interest in ensuring compliance with IHL. In this context, it is worth noticing 
that both Spain and France have supported the EU’s pledges to the ICRC 
relating to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Consequently, the EU 
level seems to have been endorsed as an efficient forum where EU Member 
States can voice their views on ensuring respect for IHL. All these elements 
are essential for the authority of Common Article 1, to the extent that they 
contribute to the formation of an opinio juris in this sense. The case of the 
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EU is particularly powerful, insofar as it represents 28 Member States which 
have all agreed on these basic principles. In addition, this strong recognition is 
strengthened by further reaffirmation at national level.
While the basic principles seem to meet general approval, some specific 
elements are problematic. In particular, the EU has adapted the language of 
Common Article 1 to transform it into an obligation to promote compliance. 
On this topic, the more limited capacities of the EU should not transform the 
obligation itself, all the more when the obligation at stake is an obligation of 
due diligence and therefore already allows flexibility in its implementation. As 
for France, two issues remain: the refusal to recognize the competence of the 
IHFFC and the lack of direct effect of the Geneva Conventions’ provisions 
in the French legal order. As mentioned above, the IHFFC is a promising 
tool that should be used by the State parties to implement their obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL, and it is regrettable that France does not follow 
this path. As for the lack of direct effect, while it is understandable regarding 
Common Article 1, it still entails problems regarding the penal repression of 
war crimes. As evidenced in Part II of this thesis, the actual suppression of 
IHL violations was made possible only with the establishment of international 
criminal jurisdictions despite a clear mandate already established in the Geneva 
Conventions. Regarding Spain, an express recognition in policy documents of 
the obligation to ensure respect, of its meaning and scope, as well as of the EU’s 
role on this matter would be desirable.
Furthermore, this commitment to Common Article 1 is reflected in prac-
tice, as all three actors have made used of the different measures at their disposal 
to implement the obligation to ensure respect for IHL on the international 
stage. In this regard, all three actors have resorted to diplomatic, economic, 
and in limited cases, military resources, to intend to prevent or respond to 
violations of IHL. This diplomatic machinery induces the parties to an armed 
conflict to abide by IHL norms. In addition, it should be highlighted that 
some themes have been especially underlined by the three actors, such as the 
protection of civilians, the protection of women and children, the fight against 
sexual and gender-based violence, humanitarian access, as well as the regula-
tion of weapons.
The breakdown of these measures further demonstrates how the dif-
ferent levels of action – international, European, or national – complement 
each other. In this regard, the EU has developed an important set of tools, 
similar to those of States, although they are not equally used. Indeed, the 
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declaratory policy remains the EU’s privileged means of action, together 
with its CCP and the corresponding adoption of sanctions. This approach 
is consistent with the capacities of the EU, an economic superpower on the 
international stage.
While the adoption of these measures constitutes a means to implement 
Common Article 1, their effectiveness should also be assessed. In this respect, 
some elements demonstrate that they have some impact. By way of example, a 
trial of rapists during the armed conflict in South Kivu was held in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo; the EU welcomed this trial and recalled that the 
fight against rape as a weapon of war is part of the cooperation partnership 
between the EU and the Democratic Republic of Congo 527. Another exam-
ple may be provided by the situation in Sri Lanka, where the Government 
modified its treatment of the internally displaced persons and initiated a rapid 
resettlement programme 528. The EU and other international actors had indeed 
advocated for the respect of humanitarian principles within this context. With 
regard to the adoption of restrictive measures however, it has been argued 
that in the absence of adequate monitoring, «it is extremely hard to tell how 
effective they are», so that there is «urgent need for better monitoring of the 
implementation and impact of EU sanctions» 529. The same may be argued with 
regard to military interventions, as the Libyan case highlights the deficiencies 
and possible abuses of this tool and therefore calls for prudence.
In addition, the three actors have – unsurprisingly – been more reactive 
regarding some situations of violations of IHL than others, thus raising the 
question of double standards. By way of example, the European Parliament has 
criticized their action with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on several 
occasions. The latter highlights the lack of unity and coordination about the 
situation and deplores the paralysis of the EU when political action has to be 
527 République Démocratique du Congo, «Un pas vers la fin de l’impunité», Brussels, 22 février 
2011, MEMO/11/108.
528 Commission Staff Working Document On the mid-term review of the European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid Action Plan: Assessing progress and priorities in the EU’s implementation of 
humanitarian action Accompanying document to the Communication on the mid-term review 
of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan – implementing effective, princi-
pled EU humanitarian action COM(2010) 722 final, p. 6.
529 Konstanty Gebert, Shooting in the Dark? EU sanctions policies, Policy Brief, London, European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, p. 1. 
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taken 530. An example is found regarding situations of occupation. For instance, 
the European Parliament called for the suspension of the EU-Israel Association 
Agreement in reaction to Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories, without 
success 531. In this regard, the UN report launched on 15 September 2009 that 
concludes to the existence of war crimes from both sides of the conflict and 
possibly of crime against humanity has not been duly taken into consideration 
by the Council. Likewise, sanctions have been adopted against private parties 
benefitting from the annexation of Crimea, but the same measures have not 
been adopted in the context of Western Sahara or the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territories. The same holds true with regard to sanctions adopted against 
States: it has been the case against Russia, but not against Morocco or Israel 532.
Despite these issues, on the overall, it can be argued that the three actors 
implement Common Article 1 pursuant to its contemporary acceptation. In 
this respect, they contribute to its crystallization as a norm of customary inter-
national law, insofar as there is «evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law» 533. This process thus nourishes a virtuous circle whereby 1) Common 
Article 1 is reinforced as an international treaty obligation; 2) IHL is better 
respected; 3) the EU projects itself as global leader through the externaliza-
tion of its values, including IHL; 4) EU Member States fulfill their obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL as State parties to the Geneva Conventions; and 5) 
Common Article 1 is reinforced as an international customary obligation.
530 Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», op. cit., 2010, p. 60.
531 Bartels, The application of human rights conditionality, op. cit., 2008, p. 21.
532 Pål Wrange and and Sarah Helaoui, Étude sur l’Occupation/annexion d’un territoire: Respect du droit 
humanitaire international et des droits de l’homme et politique cohérente de l’Union européenne dans ce 
domaine, European Parliament, 2015, pp. 10-11.
533 Statute of the ICJ, article 38(1)(b). 
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Part 2 
ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING 
VIOLATIONS OF IHL
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INTRODUCTION
Common Article 1 entails three dimensions: preventing violations of IHL from 
occurring, adopting measures to put an end to them when they effectively oc-
cur, and finally, criminalizing the violations of IHL that are tantamount to war 
crimes. The first two dimensions, foreseen in IHL and public international law, 
are thoroughly analyzed in Part I of this thesis. As a result, the third dimension 
of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL is contemplated in this second Part. 
This division into two separate parts reflects the considerable advances made 
in the criminalization of certain violations of IHL since the second half of the 
XXth century.
Indeed, the criminalization of the violations of IHL has been extensively 
developed within the frame of international criminal law in the last decades, 
notably with the establishment of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
and the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, while it is important to 
reflect in the domestic legal order the commitment of Common Article 1, 
most of the preventive and reactive measures undertaken to implement it are 
measures that resort to the external action of States. In contrast, the penaliza-
tion of IHL violations calls for specific legislative and judicial developments at 
internal level.
In Chapter 3, the different systems of international responsibility over 
violations of IHL are analyzed. Indeed, besides the obligation to prevent and 
put an end to IHL violations, Common Article 1 also calls to deter indi-
viduals and States from committing them. In this regard, Common Article 
1 connects different branches of international law, namely those regulating 
State responsibility – public international law – and individual responsibil-
ity – international criminal law. While it is not a punitive mechanism in a strict 
legal sense, State responsibility should nonetheless be briefly addressed. As for 
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individual responsibility, the Geneva Conventions themselves already estab-
lished the grave breaches regime, which is a necessary corollary of Common 
Article 1. Further developments in international criminal law have completed 
this system, so that it is now possible to prosecute war criminals at national and 
international levels.
In Chapter 4, the implementation of the system of criminal responsibility 
over war crimes at EU, French, and Spanish levels is examined. In particu-
lar, it assesses whether the EU, France, and Spain have adopted the necessary 
measures in their respective legal orders to allow the prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators of war crimes, including on the basis of universal jurisdiction if 
necessary. Besides, the implementation of the obligation of cooperation with 
international criminal jurisdictions is analyzed, with a special emphasis on 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court.
Chapter 3 
MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL
This chapter intends to answer whether the State parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions may resort to legal tools to punish IHL violations in order to comply 
with their obligation to ensure respect for IHL.
The answer to this question is in the affirmative. When all the efforts to 
influence State parties to an armed conflict have not prevented IHL violations 
from occurring, the State parties to the Geneva Conventions are still bound by 
Common Article 1 and must adopt measures in order to ensure that perpetra-
tors are brought to justice. Indeed, the concept of international responsibility 
is a corollary of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others. The system 
of international responsibility has traditionally rested upon States, as primary 
subjects of international law. In this sense, even human rights treaties impose 
obligations falling upon States while conferring rights upon individuals 1. If 
States remain the prior subjects of international responsibility, they are no 
longer its sole subjects. In particular, international organizations have become 
fully-fledged subjects of international law 2, albeit with some nuances due to 
their special nature. Further, individuals have increasingly gained importance 
1 James Crawford, «The system of international responsibility», in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and 
Simon Olleson (eds.), Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010b, p. 17. 
2 ICJ, Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the UN, ICJ reports 1949, pp. 174, 179. 
(The United Nations «is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international 
rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims 
[...] from the moment that organizations exercise legal competencies of the same type as those 
of States, it seemed logical that the same consequences should attach to the actions of both one 
and the other»).
 Nonetheless, as Alain Pellet notes, if the UN can invoke the responsibility of States and incur 
its own international responsibility, it is slightly different to the extent that it is limited by the 
principle of specialty and the limited concrete resources they have. See: Alain Pellet, «The defi-
nition of responsibility in international law», in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010, pp. 3-16. 
262 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
at the international level. While they do not benefit from the same status of 
subjects of international law as States, international criminal responsibility in 
relation to individuals has noticeably developed since World War II.
Thus, third States may resort to two mechanisms in case of violations 
of IHL. On the one hand, they may refer the case to the ICJ and invoke the 
responsibility of the State for a violation of a norm of international law owed 
to the international community as a whole. On the other hand, international 
criminal law has developed considerably since World War II, so that alleged 
perpetrators of IHL violations may incur criminal responsibility both at inter-
national and national levels.
It is submitted that if States adequately and systematically made use of 
these tools, not only they would fulfill a crucial aspect of the obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL, but this would likewise importantly participate in 
deterring individuals and public authorities from committing IHL violations.
Section 1 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: A NON-PUNITIVE MECHANISM 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
If only every State in the world would systematically and re-
gardless of all other considerations invoke the responsibility of 
the responsible State as soon as it deems a violation of IHL 
to have occurred, and would claim and reparation in the in-
terest of the victims, as it may under Draft Articles 48(2) and 
must under Common Article 1, then much would be gained 3.
IHL belongs to public international law, and as such, it obeys to its rules, 
including those regulating the consequences of its violations. The violation 
of an obligation contained in IHL treaties entails the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing State, in accordance with the rules established under public 
international law. While IHL recognizes specific rules in case of breach, in-
ternational public law already establishes the rules of responsibility for in-
ternationally wrongful acts whose regime applies to IHL too. Indeed, in 
accordance with the international case-law, an injured State by a breach of a 
treaty obligation can refer both to the rules of treaty law and to the regime of 
State responsibility 4. Yet, as James Crawford notes, these systems fulfill diffe-
rent objectives: while treaty law determines how a specific treaty obligation 
shall be interpreted, the rules deriving from the regime of State responsibility 
deal with the breach’s legal consequences, notably with regard to reparation 5. 
As a result, there is «some overlap between the two but they are legally and 
logically distinct» 6.
Firstly, the general regime of State responsibility is briefly explained and 
applied to IHL. In this respect, the most important international text with 
regard to State responsibility is the ILC’s ‘Articles on the Responsibility of 
3 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, 
p. 433. 
4 Tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration; ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case. 
Quoted in Crawford, «The system of international responsibility», op. cit., 2010b, p. 21. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
6 Ibid. 
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States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (hereafter, ‘ARSIWA’) of 2001 7 and 
approved by the UN General Assembly in 2002 8. It took about four decades 
for the ILC to adopt ARSIWA in 2001, which probably represent the ILC’s 
most important work after the VCLT. Even though ARSIWA has not been 
translated into an international treaty, it has been widely cited by the inter-
national scholarship and case-law, thus making it a fundamental element of 
the regime of State responsibility 9. Pursuant to this regime, States may incur 
responsibility whenever an internationally wrongful act is constituted.
Secondly, the invocation of State responsibility by third States to an armed 
conflict is analyzed. Indeed, ARSIWA foresees a special regime which, applied 
to IHL, completes the obligation to ensure respect for IHL.
1. DEFINITION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL
Article 1 ARSIWA stipulates the following maxim: «[e]very internationally 
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State». 
This apparent simple definition represents an important turn in the law of 
State responsibility, insofar as it leaves aside the necessity of injury. As Alain 
Pellet has shown, the traditional acceptance of responsibility used to rely on 
the model established by Grotius, who considered that from an injury caused 
«there arises an Obligation by the Law of Nature to make Reparation for the 
Damage, if any be done» 10. Consequently, this model could be assimilated to a 
‘civil’ law-model, based on bilateral relations 11. This model indeed fitted well 
with traditional international relations, as it excluded any form of criminal or 
similar punishment. Nonetheless, some form of responsibility had to exist to 
7 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 
2001, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement nº 10 (A/56/10), 
chp.IV.E.1) (hereafter, ‘ARSIWA’). Available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/in-
struments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf&lang=EF (Accessed: 22.05.2017).
8 UNGA, Resolution A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. Responsibility of States for interna-
tionally wrongful acts: «Takes note of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts, presented by the International Law Commission, the text of which is annexed to 
the present resolution, and commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice 
to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action». 
9 Crawford, «The system of international responsibility», op. cit., 2010, p. 21. 
10 Pellet, «The definition of responsibility in international law», op. cit., 2010, p. 5. 
11 Ibid. 
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the extent that if the damage was the result of a violation of international law, 
then reparation had to be made for it 12. However, the notion of State responsi-
bility has undergone important changes. In this sense, article 1 ARSIWA does 
not refer to the idea of damage, thus making the internationally wrongful act 
objectively established. The disappearance of the notion of damage contribu-
tes to the development of international law: a breach thereof can engage the 
responsibility of a State simply on this ground; there is no need to prove the 
existence of a damage and the sole fact that the conduct violated international 
law is sufficient. Thus, ARSIWA enshrines a shift towards the ‘objectivization’ 
of international law 13.
Actually, a defining characteristic of State responsibility is the absence of 
any notion of criminal responsibility, in contrast with national legislation. In 
this regard, an important change was made between the first and the second 
reading of the ILC’s Draft Articles. Indeed, in 1996, the idea of penal conse-
quences of breaches of international law was envisaged through the concept of 
‘international crimes of States’. However, this sparked controversy among the 
members of the ILC so that the concept was eventually left aside in 1998 14. 
This choice therefore emphasizes the special nature of State responsibility in 
comparison with the classical notions of responsibility in national law.
For State responsibility to be engaged at international level, several 
requirements must be fulfilled. In particular, article 2 ARSIWA provides the 
following:
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct con-
sisting of an action or omission:
a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
b)Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
It appears from this wording that two conditions must be met. On the 
one hand, there must a breach of an international obligation of the State. On 
the other hand, that breach must be attributable to the State under interna-
tional law. In any event, for the internationally wrongful act to exist, none of 
the circumstances precluding wrongfulness detailed in ARSIWA can be met.
12 Ibid., p. 6. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Crawford, «The system of international responsibility», op. cit., 2010, p. 22. 
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Luigi Condorelli and Claus Kreβ define attribution in the following 
terms:
‘Attribution’ (or ‘imputation’) is the term used to denote the legal ope-
ration having as its function to establish whether given conduct of a phy-
sical person, whether consisting of a positive action or an omission, is to 
be characterized, from the point of view of international law, as an ‘act 
of the State’ (or the act of any other entity possessing international legal 
personality). In other words, by the term ‘attribution’, reference is made to 
the body of criteria of connection and the conditions which have to be 
fulfilled, according to the relevant principles of international law, in order 
to conclude that it is a State (or other subject of international law) which 
has acted in the particular case. In that case (and only for that purpose), the 
actual author of the act, i.e. the individual, is, as it were, forgotten, and is 
perceived as being the means by which the entity acts, a tool of the State 
(or other subject of international law) in question 15.
As far as IHL is concerned, the issue that arises is therefore to what extent 
the conduct of the armed forces can be attributable to the State 16. In this 
respect, articles 3 to 11 provide details on the different circumstances under 
which a conduct may be attributable to a State. Luigi Condorelli and Claus 
Kreβ classify these articles into four categories.
The first one regards the situations provided by articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 
on the conduct of de jure organs, the conduct of persons or entities exercis-
ing elements of governmental authority and the conduct of organs placed 
at the disposal of a State by another State 17. Here, the process of attribu-
tion seems straightforward as it relies on a legally established situation, not 
subject to much debate. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the ICJ 
considered in its judgment on the merits in ‘Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ that the sta-
tus as an organ of State may be recognized even if the domestic law of the 
State provides otherwise, «provided that in fact the persons, groups or enti-
15 Luigi Condorelli and Claus Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General considerations», in Craw-
ford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010, p. 221. 
16 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, 
p. 405. 
17 Condorelli and Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General considerations», op. cit., 2010, p. 229. 
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ties act in complete dependence on the State, of which they are ultimately 
merely the instrument» 18. In the view of the Court, it is indeed necessary to 
go beyond the formal legal status in order to impede States from escaping 
international responsibility through subterfuge or a fiction 19. Furthermore, 
Article 7 is interesting from IHL’s point of view. Indeed, it refers to the «con-
duct of an organ of a State» acting in that capacity, and «even if it exceeds its 
authority or contravenes instructions». The fact that the organ of the State 
must act in that capacity is a limitation that was probably foreseen in order to 
exclude acts committed as a private person, «such as theft or sexual assaults 
by a soldier during leave in an occupied territory» 20. Marco Sassòli criticizes 
such approach as he considers that it contradicts article 3 of The Hague Con-
vention No. IV, «pertinent scholarly writings and a judicial opinion», so that 
States should assume responsibility for their armed forces’ conduct, even if 
committed in their capacity as private individuals. To support such claim, he 
explains that the IHL provision should be an exception to the general rule, as 
lex specialis. He also argues that even though one does not recognize article 3 
of the Hague Convention No. IV as lex specialis in relation to article 7 on State 
responsibility, it could be claimed that members of the armed forces are always 
on duty «in wartime and with regard to the acts governed by» IHL, insofar as 
«they would have never entered into contact with enemy nationals or acted 
on enemy territory» in their private capacity 21.
The second category covers the conduct of persons «acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of» the State 22, or de facto 
agents, and the conduct of persons or entities acting «in the absence or default 
of the official authorities» 23, or agents of necessity. In this category, interna-
tional law – not national law – directs the process of attribution 24, in contrast 
with the first category. Therefore, the process of attribution is to be made on 
18 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Re-
ports 2007, p. 205, para. 492. Quoted in Condorelli and Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General 




22 ARSIWA, article 8. 
23 Ibid., article 9. 
24 Condorelli and Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General considerations», op. cit., 2010, p. 230.
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a case-by-case analysis 25. This approach is in line with the reasoning adopted 
by the ICTY in the Tadić case, where it used the criterion of ‘overall control’ 
exercised by a foreign State over a particular organization 26.
The third category refers to the attribution of «conduct of insurrec-
tional or other movement» under article 10 27. Regarding IHL, the (il)legit-
imacy of the insurrection is irrelevant in contrast with the (il)legitimacy of 
the conduct at stake «under the applicable rules of international law» 28. This 
rule of attribution is in line with IHL, insofar as non-State armed groups 
can be held responsible for violations of IHL if they succeed in supplant-
ing the government or become the government of a new State. However, 
it is possible to wonder what happens if non-State armed groups violate 
IHL and do not succeed in becoming the new government. In this regard, 
Marco Sassòli refers to a «lack of due diligence», to the extent that it may 
be suggested that States have an obligation of due diligence «in order to 
prevent conduct contrary to international law and to prosecute and punish 
if it occurs» 29.
Finally, the fourth category refers to the attribution of «conduct acknowl-
edged and adopted by a State as its own» 30, however, the same reasoning as the 
one applied to the first category applies.
It should be noted that in accordance with the ICRC Study on ‘Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law’ the principle of State responsibility 
for violations of IHL has reached customary status. In particular, Rule 149 
refers to the different categories of conduct that may be attributable to a 
State:
A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
attributable to it, including:
(a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces;
25 ILC, Report on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April-1June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 
General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement nº 10 (A/56/10) (hereafter, 
‘Commentary to ARSIWA’), p. 48. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/en-
glish/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (Accessed: 22.05.2017).
26 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 408. 
27 Condorelli and Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General considerations», op. cit., 2010, p. 229.
28 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 410.
29 Ibid., p. 411. 
30 Condorelli and Kreβ, «The rules of attribution. General considerations», op. cit., 2010, p. 229.
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(b) violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise 
elements of governmental authority;
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its ins-
tructions, or under its direction or control; and
(d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it ack-
nowledges and adopts as its own conduct.
Then, the second requirement for an internationally wrongful act to occur 
is the existence of a violation of international law. In this respect, ARSIWA 
establishes a classification of norms of international law albeit it does not pro-
vide details about their content. It distinguishes between the general regime of 
State responsibility, where the breach of any norm of international law entails 
bilateral consequences, and the special regime of State responsibility, where 
norms of jus cogens («serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms 
of general international law» 31) are breached. The content of each category was 
voluntarily left out of the process, so as to allow the application of the regime 
of State responsibility to norms that have acquired jus cogens status after the 
adoption of ARSIWA.
Nonetheless, where those two requirements are fulfilled – breach and 
attribution – it is also necessary to scrutinize whether there are conditions 
precluding the wrongfulness of a violation of a norm of international law, as 
provided by Chapter V ARSIWA. These include consent, self-defense, coun-
termeasures, force majeure, necessity, and distress. Some of those deserve particu-
lar developments when analyzed in conjunction with IHL.
Firstly, it should be noted that the Geneva Conventions themselves stipulate 
that no State may absolve itself or another State of any responsibility incurred 
in respect of grave breaches in accordance with articles 51/52/131/148 of the 
four Geneva Conventions 32. Therefore, this common article is a confirmation 
of the principle of non-reciprocity, which also applies to the regime of State 
responsibility. Furthermore, regarding those norms of IHL that have jus cogens 
status, no motive can be invoked to preclude their wrongfulness. Concerning 
self-defense, the ILC Commentary clearly expresses that it is unacceptable 
regarding IHL norms 33:
31 ASRIWA, articles 40-41. 
32 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 413.
33 Ibid., p. 414.
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This is not to say that self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of con-
duct in all cases or with respect to all obligations. Examples relate to in-
ternational humanitarian law and human rights obligations. The Geneva 
Conventions for the protection of war victims of 12 August 1949 and 
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I) apply equally to all the parties in an international armed 
conflict, and the same is true of customary international humanitarian 
law. Human rights treaties contain derogation provisions for times of pu-
blic emergency, including actions taken in self-defence. As to obligations 
under international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable 
human rights provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness 
of conduct 34.
As for necessity, the ILC Commentary already provides that it is accept-
able regarding IHL only «where explicitly stated in some of its rules» 35:
[c]ertain humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict expressly 
exclude reliance on military necessity. Others while not explicitly exclu-
ding necessity are intended to apply in abnormal situation of peril for the 
responsible State and plainly engage its essential interest. In such a case, the 
non-availability of the plea of necessity emerges clearly from the object and 
purpose of the rule 36.
Finally, the same reasoning as the one that applies to necessity can be 
applied to distress, but at the individual level 37.
2. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
Firstly, the traditional regime, regarding legal consequences towards States, is 
analyzed and applied to IHL. Secondly, the application of this regime to war 
victims is discussed.
34 Commentary to ARSIWA, article 21, para. 3. 
35 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 415. 
36 Commentary to ARSIWA, p. 84. 
37 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 415. 
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2.1. Legal consequences towards States
If the conduct of a State breaches a norm of international law and can 
be attributed to that State, it incurs its responsibility, which in turn entails 
several legal consequences 38. In particular, the State is subject to an obliga-
tion «to cease that act» and «to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees 
of non-repetition» 39, as well as «to make full reparation for the injury caused 
by the internationally wrongful act» 40. The ILC clarifies that these legal con-
sequences «do not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to per-
form the obligation breached» 41. In addition, in the case of breach of jus cogens 
norms, additional consequences are foreseen, namely the prohibition to rec-
ognize the unlawful situation and the prohibition to render aid or assistance 
in maintaining that situation 42. These legal consequences therefore overlap to 
some extent with those deriving from the application of Common Article 1, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 1.
The issue of reparation is especially important regarding IHL. In the words 
of Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, reparation aims at «eliminating, as far as possible, 
the consequences of the illegal act and restoring the situation that would have 
existed if the act had not been committed» 43. Further, ARSIWA defines repara-
tion as consisting of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. With regard to 
IHL, Additional Protocol 1 also formally expresses the principle of reparation 
and explicitly refers to the obligation of compensation:
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. 
It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
armed forces 44.
A few examples involving reparation for violations of IHL at international 
level can be found, such as the cases in Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and the ones 
38 ARSIWA, article 28. 
39 Ibid., article 30.
40 Ibid., article 31.
41 Ibid., article 29. 
42 Ibid., article 41. 
43 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, «Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law», Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross, vol. 85(851), 2003, p. 531.
44 Additional Protocol 1, article 91. 
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involving NATO in the former Yugoslavia. According to Michael J. Matheson, 
these cases have broader consequences than simply the case in point:
[s]uch assessment can contribute in important ways to dealing with such 
violations – by providing a means of further interpreting and developing 
the law, by establishing historical responsibility for such crimes, by helping 
to deter future crimes with the prospect that entities committing violations 
would suffer adverse political and financial consequences, and by helping 
to restore the victims of such crimes by providing compensation and a 
sense of justice 45.
The case about Eritrea and Ethiopia is especially interesting, insofar as 
a Claims Commission was established to arbitrate all claims for loss, dam-
age or injury resulting «from violations of [IHL], including the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions», thus eluding questions of jurisdiction of the ICJ 46. Additionally, 
the establishment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission entails other 
advantages: the standards of evidence and proof are not as strict as those used 
by the ICJ 47. Indeed, it required «clear and convincing evidence» of violations 
but did not
accept any suggestion that, because some claims may involve allegations of 
potentially criminal conduct, it should apply an even higher standard of 
proof corresponding to that in individual criminal proceedings [...] it must 
instead decide whether there have been breaches of international law based 
on normal principles of State responsibility 48.
Besides, the Claims Commission has been less reluctant to resolve factual 
issues than the ICJ, thus being more likely to establish the truth regarding the 
alleged violations of IHL 49. Therefore, the establishment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission constitutes an encouraging precedent in light of State 
responsibility over violations of IHL. However, one crucial problem is the lack 
of true standing for war victims before international courts.
45 Matheson, «The New International Humanitarian Law and its enforcement», op. cit., 2010, p. 164. 
46 Ibid., p. 165.
47 Ibid.
48 Quoted in Matheson, «The New International Humanitarian Law and its enforcement», op. cit., 
2010, p. 167.
49 Ibid., p. 168. 
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2.2. Legal consequences towards individuals
In this context, the distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary 
rights is worth recalling. Primary rights refer to the substantive norm that 
has been breached, and which triggers the secondary right: the right to rep-
aration. Nevertheless, those two rights are incomplete, as it is necessary to 
assess whether individuals have locus standi in this respect (tertiary right) 50. As 
demonstrated by Veronika Bilkova, for individuals to claim reparation for IHL 
violations, they must therefore prove that they enjoy primary rights under 
IHL, are entitled to claim reparation whenever these rights are infringed upon 
and have the right to initiate legal proceedings on these grounds 51. The main 
issue in this sense is indeed that IHL has been edified as an inter-State body 
of law, thus establishing obligations between States for the most part. Hence, 
this obligation to pay compensation has been understood as an obligation of 
compensation towards the injured State, not victims 52.
While the existing legislation, case-law, and doctrine is not conclusive 
insofar as «various scenarios result from the possible combinations of answers 
given to these three questions» 53, it can be argued that there has been a shift 
towards a greater recognition of individuals as «active subjects of rights» 54. As 
Veronika Bilkova underlines:
As such, they are considered to have full range of both substantive and 
procedural rights. This shift has been taking place mainly under the in-
fluence of human rights law, which pushes IHL towards the adoption of 
an individual-oriented perspective, putting the victim first; and at the same 
time promotes the justiciability of any recognized rights for individuals 55.
In this regard, as Marco Sassòli observes, many IHL rules «are formulated 
in a human rights-like manner, as entitlement of war victims» 56. In particular, 
50 Veronika Bilkova, «Victims of War and their Right to Reparation for Violations of IHL», Miskolc 
Journal of International Law, vol. 4(2), 2007, pp. 2-3. 
51 Ibid., p. 1. 
52 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 418. 
53 Bilkova, «Victims of War and their Right to Reparation for Violations of IHL», op. cit., 2007, p. 1. 
54 Ibid., p. 9.
55 Ibid. 
56 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 418. 
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common article 6/6/6/7 of the four Geneva Conventions refers to the «rights» 
that are «conferred» upon individuals 57. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider 
that war victims are beneficiaries of IHL obligations and should have access 
to reparation. In this sense, the ILC Commentaries to ARSIWA explain the 
following:
[w]hen an obligation of reparation exists towards a State, reparation does 
not necessarily accrue to that State’s benefit. For instance, a State’s res-
ponsibility for the breach of an obligation under a treaty concerning the 
protection of human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the 
treaty, but the individuals concerned should be regarded as the ultimate 
beneficiaries and in that sense as the holders of the relevant rights. Indivi-
dual rights under international law may also arise outside the framework 
of human rights 58.
This reasoning can be applied to IHL. The ICJ confirmed this inter-
pretation in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall when it held that Israel was 
subject to a duty to provide restitution and compensate individuals as well as 
«all natural and legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a 
result of the wall’s construction» 59. It is therefore acknowledged that individ-
uals enjoy not only a primary – substantive – right but also a secondary right, 
that to claim reparation for the violation of their primary right under IHL. 
Nonetheless, doubts remain regarding the tertiary right. Consequently, there is 
a conflict between the entitlement war victims enjoy under IHL and the lack 
of standing in dispute settlement procedures 60.
57 Common Article 6/6/6/7 reads as follows: «In addition to the agreements expressly provided for 
in Articles 10, 15, 23, 28, 31, 36, 37 and 52, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other 
special agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate 
provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of the wounded and sick, of 
members of the medical personnel or of chaplains, as defined by the present Convention, nor 
restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
 Wounded and sick, as well as medical personnel and chaplains, shall continue to have the benefit 
of such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them, except where express provi-
sions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more 
favourable measures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the 
conflict». 
58 Commentaries to ASRIWA, article 33, para. 3. 
59 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Wall, paras. 145, 152-3. 
60 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 418. 
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However, there are elements pushing forward that «shift» 61 towards the 
justiciability of individuals’ rights. Most notably, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a soft law instrument in 2005 entitled the ‘Basic Principles and Guide-
lines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Viola-
tions of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law’ (hereafter, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines’) 62. At 
first, the drafts of the Basic Principles and Guidelines dealt only with human 
rights law, and some governments even advocated for the adoption of two 
different instruments 63. However, it was finally agreed that the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines should include both human rights law and IHL insofar as both 
bodies of law are victim-oriented and the protection awarded to victims tends 
to overlap in some respects 64. It is worth mentioning that the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines were understood as a codification of the existing law, not a 
development of international law, an approach reflected in the preamble 65:
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein 
do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation 
of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and in-
ternational humanitarian law which are complementary though different 
as to their norms.
The most important part of the Basic Principles and Guidelines deals 
with the status and rights of victims of gross violations of human rights law 
and serious violations of IHL (principles 11-23). These principles therefore 
elaborate on the provisions of ARSIWA and apply them to individuals. Hence, 
restitution refers to measures that «restore the victim to the original situation 
before the gross violations of international human rights law and serious vio-
61 Bilkova, «Victims of War and their Right to Reparation for Violations of IHL», op. cit., 2007, p. 9. 
62 UNGA, Resolution 60/147. Basic principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of IHRL and Serious Violations of IHL. 
63 Theo Van Boven, «The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Rem-
edy and Reparation for victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law», United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2010, 
p. 2. 
64 Van Boven, «The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy», 
op. cit., 2010, p. 2. 
65 Ibid., p. 4.
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lations of international humanitarian law occurred» (principle 19). However, 
in the case of violation of IHL, restitution is difficult to obtain in most cases. 
Further, pursuant to principle 20, compensation «should be provided for any 
economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity 
of the violation and the circumstances of each case». Rehabilitation includes 
medical and psychological care, as well as legal and social services (principle 
21). As for satisfaction, it includes a wide range of measures, from those aiming 
at the cessation of violations to truth-seeking, to judicial and administrative 
sanctions (principle 22). Finally, guarantees of non-repetition include «struc-
tural measures of a policy nature» 66 (principle 23).
As Veronika Bilkova underlines, this shift is welcomed, as reparation 
constitutes a crucial element in enforcement, and arguably participates in 
deterrence. Likewise, it is a matter of justice, as war victims are entitled to 
redress, which in turns participates in the greater movement of reconcilia-
tion, particularly necessary for the maintenance of peace in the post-conflict 
situation 67.
Thus, if an affected State – and to a lesser extent, individuals – is allowed 
to invoke the responsibility of the infringing State for violations of IHL, one 
may wonder whether the same holds true regarding third States by virtue of 
their obligation to ensure respect for IHL.
66 Ibid.
 Principle 23 reads as follows: «Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, 
any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:
 (a)  Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
 (b)  Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due 
process, fairness and impartiality;
 (c)  Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
 (d)  Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and other 
related professions, and human rights defenders
 (e)  Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international humanitarian 
law education to all sectors of society and training for law enforcement officials as well as 
military and security forces;
 (f)  Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international 
standards, by public servants, including law enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psy-
chological, social service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
 (g)  Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution;
 (h)  Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law».
67 Bilkova, «Victims of War and their Right to Reparation for Violations of IHL», op. cit., 2007, p. 9. 
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3. INVOCATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BY THIRD STATES FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF IHL
Pursuant to the general regime of State responsibility, only an injured State 
is allowed to invoke the responsibility of another State; however, article 48 
ARSIWA provides an exception in the case of an obligation owed to the in-
ternational community as a whole:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the respon-
sibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including 
that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of 
the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community 
as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may 
claim from the responsible State:
(a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and
(b) performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with 
the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the bene-
ficiaries of the obligation breached.
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured 
State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility 
by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.
Scholars interpret the expression «obligation owed to the international 
community as a whole» as erga omnes obligations. James Crawford, the Special 
Rapporteur in charge of drafting ARSIWA, holds that the wording chosen in 
article 48 reflects the rejection of «the artificial idea that breach of such an obliga-
tion made all other States into individually ‘injured states’» 68. He further adds that
instead it permits the invocation of the responsibility of the wrongdoing 
State by any of the States identified – indeed, in the case of obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole, by any State 69.
68 James Crawford, «Overview of Part Three of the Articles on State Responsibility», in Crawford, 
Pellet and Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010a, p. 934.
69 Ibid. 
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Consequently, the underpinning is to act in the collective public interest, 
rather than conferring a subjective right upon all States.
It should be noted that article 48 ARSIWA deals with the invocation of 
State responsibility and should therefore be distinguished from article 40 on 
jus cogens norms. Indeed, the latter deals with the seriousness of the offense, not 
the right for States to invoke State responsibility. Yet, as many scholars argue, 
erga omnes obligations and jus cogens norms are inextricably linked 70. Antonio 
Cassese considers in this regard that:
The two categories inextricably coincide: every peremptory norm im-
poses obligation erga omnes and, vice versa, every obligation erga omnes pro-
per is laid down in a peremptory norm [...]
To contend that an obligation erga omnes may be derogated from would 
amount to denying its very nature as an obligation designed to protect 
fundamental values, the respect of which is an interest of the whole inter-
national community 71.
The shift enshrined in article 48 thus constitutes an important develop-
ment in the regime of State responsibility, insofar as it reflects the change from 
a bilateral to a multilateral perspective. It demonstrates that, in some cases, such 
as human rights or specific IHL violations, no State is injured 72, only individu-
als are. Moreover, this shift allows an interpretation according to which a third 
State would be allowed to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing State 
on behalf of an affected State or in the interest of the international commu-
nity 73. For the purposes of this thesis, it is interesting to note the parallelism 
between the regime of State responsibility and the system established by IHL, 
which aims to protect fundamental norms, including jus cogens norms, through 
Common Article 1.
70 See, e.g.: Giorgio Gaja, «States having an interest in compliance with the obligation breached», 
in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010, p. 958; 
Antonio Cassese, «The Character of the violated obligation», in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson 
(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010, pp. 415-426; Pellet, «The ILC’s Articles 
on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and Related Texts», in Crawford, Pellet 
and Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, op. cit., 2010, p. 85. 
71 Cassese, «The character of the violated obligation», op. cit., 2010, pp. 417-418.
72 Gaja, «States having an interest in compliance with the obligation breached», op. cit., 2010, p. 958. 
73 Ibid., p. 961.
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Therefore, any State may claim cessation and reparation from the wrong-
doing State 74. To do so, third States may refer the case to the ICJ in order to 
claim reparation on behalf of an injured State 75. As long as the violation of 
an erga omnes obligation can be established, third States are indeed allowed to 
do so, provided that the Court holds jurisdiction. In this regard, the Court 
expressly held that the existence of jus cogens or erga omnes obligations does not 
amount to jurisdiction. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the Court must be estab-
lished in all cases:
[...] the court deems it necessary to recall that the mere fact that rights and 
obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general international law 
(jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself constitute an exception 
to the principle that its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the 
parties... 76
While the practice of third States invoking the responsibility of wrong-
doing States before the ICJ for violations of IHL does not exist at the 
moment, it remains a possibility in accordance with the current state of 
international law.
Thus, it is possible to argue that third States may refer to the regime of 
State responsibility on behalf of injured States or war victims in case of serious 
violations of IHL. This possibility stems from IHL itself, through Common 
Article 1, but also from ARSIWA. Moreover, in the event that the IHL viola-
tions cannot be attributable to a State, the ‘second layer’ of public international 
law comes into play as the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator may be 
engaged 77.
74 Sassòli, «State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law», op. cit., 2002, p. 430. 
75 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
pp. 757-759.
76 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, Jurisdiction and admissibility, ICJ reports 2006, 
pp. 6, 50 (para. 125). Quoted in Gaja, «States having an interest in compliance with the obligation 
breached», op. cit., 2010, p. 960.




Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced  78.
One aspect of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL is the prosecution of 
war criminals. The idea of a penal response to violations of the law of war is 
not novel 79. However, it is during the XXth century that the criminalization 
of IHL violations has effectively taken place. As it is the case regarding many 
developments of public international law, World War II constitutes the starting 
point of an important movement of international repression of war crimes. 
Indeed, a movement of recognition of international criminal law has develo-
ped all over the XXth century in order to recognize the individual criminal 
responsibility of perpetrators of war crimes.
In contrast to State responsibility, the responsibility of individuals at inter-
national level has developed in criminal matters 80. In the aftermath of World 
War II, it was deemed necessary to punish the main perpetrators of atrocities. 
The creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals established 
the landmark in the development of individual criminal responsibility at inter-
national level. This movement was consolidated with the enshrinement of 
individual criminal responsibility in several international treaties and conven-
tions right after the war, including the Geneva Conventions or the Genocide 
Convention.
It should be noted that criminal responsibility at international level is 
reserved for individuals, insofar as corporations are not yet recognized criminal 
responsibility despite progress on this matter. In particular, the statutes of the 
ICTY, ICTR and the ICC restrict jurisdiction ratione personae to individual 
78 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, 14 No-
vember 1945-1 October 1946 (1947) 223. 
79 See: Yves Sandoz, «The History of the Grave Breaches Regime», Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, vol. 7, 2009, pp. 657-682.
80 There is an exception in the United States of America, where civil universal jurisdiction is es-
tablished by the Alien Tort Statute and regularly used. 
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persons 81. Nevertheless, under IHL, rebel groups may be held responsible for 
the breaches they commit if they successfully become the new government of 
the State or the government of a new State.
Thus, the development of individual criminal responsibility has led to the 
development of a new branch of international law: international criminal law. 
The latter covers a set of laws stemming from international public law whose 
aim is the protection of the international public order by prohibiting the 
behaviors that threaten it and organizing the repression of such behaviors. The 
concept of public order contains rights and values of the international com-
munity that are considered fundamental. An international public order offense 
can harm either fundamental features of the State or fundamental aspects of 
the universal human society, i.e. that affect the integrity of the human being or 
the principle of equality between all human beings. In this regard, Common 
Article 1 establishes an erga omnes obligation, binding upon the international 
community as a whole, as demonstrated in Chapter 1 and as such, it belongs to 
the fundamental rights and values of the international community. As a result, 
the violation of some IHL provisions constitutes an infringement upon the 
international public order and requires penal repression.
It should be noted that although IHL is distinct from international crim-
inal law, it participates in its development, thus leading to a mutual develop-
ment. On the one hand, international criminal law is developed by IHL as its 
‘grave breaches’ and ‘serious violations’ amount to war crimes. The infringe-
ment of IHL may indeed trigger the application of international criminal law. 
On the other hand, international criminal law contributes to the development 
of IHL as its case-law defines with more clarity some concepts of IHL. As a 
result, there is a clear relationship between IHL and international criminal law, 
even though they constitute two distinct legal sets of norms 82. 
Against this background, it is submitted in this section that Common 
Article 1 has been reinforced by further developments in the field of interna-
tional criminal law. Common Article 1 is not a free electron in international 
law, and there are penal mechanisms inside and outside of IHL that comple-
ment and reinforce it. Firstly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions themselves estab-
81 Crawford, «The system of international responsibility», op. cit., 2010, p. 17. 
82 Olivier De Frouville, Droit international pénal, Sources, Incriminations, Responsabilité, Paris, Pedone, 
2012.
282 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
lish obligations that complement Common Article 1 and allow State parties to 
adequately enforce IHL. They codify the obligation to prosecute or extradite 
(aut dedere, aut judicare) in relation to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions, thus calling State Parties to criminalize these conducts and to prosecute 
alleged war criminals, including on the basis of universality. Secondly, the tre-
mendous development of international criminal law and the creation of inter-
national criminal tribunals since World War II have significantly helped State 
Parties to implement this obligation. These mechanisms are different in their 
actors and procedures, but both consolidate the corpus of criminal sanctions in 
reaction to IHL violations.
1. ENFORCING THE GRAVE BREACHES REGIME
The concluding chapter of the four Geneva Conventions tackles the ‘repression 
of abuses and infractions’. According to these provisions, the State parties to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions have the obligation to search out, prosecute or extra-
dite the war criminals that are present on their own territory and to punish the 
grave breaches of IHL in their domestic legal orders. These provisions therefore 
enshrine the aut dedere, aut judicare principle in the Geneva Conventions, which 
can be interpreted as the «first treaty codifying war crimes» 83.
It is argued that the grave breaches regime completes the obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL and that a proper enforcement of the aut dedere, aut 
judicare obligation with respect to grave breaches also constitute one means to 
enforce Common Article 1. As a delegate to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
observed:
[The object of these articles] is to increase respect for the Conventions, and 
to strengthen them and the protection they provide by supplying a means 
of deterring people from violating their provisions and, if necessary, by 
enforcing obedience to the Conventions 84 [emphasis added].
83 James Stewart, «The future of grave breaches», Journal of International Criminal Law, vol. 7, 2009b, 
p. 856.
84 Quoted in Eve La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», in Jean-Marie Henckaerts (dir.), Updated 
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
2016, para. 2809.
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In this regard, there is a clear correspondence between Common Arti-
cle 1, which is triggered whenever serious or repeated violations of IHL occur, 
and the obligation to extradite or prosecute, which punishes grave breaches, i.e. 
the violation of a specific category of behaviors defined under IHL deemed so 
serious that they cannot go unpunished. Not only there is an obligation falling 
upon State parties to ensure respect for IHL, but they must also ensure that war 
criminals do not remain unpunished and are denied safe havens. In the same 
way that Common Article 1 establishes a decentralized system of collective 
responsibility binding upon the international community as a whole in case of 
violations of IHL, the 1949 Geneva Conventions require all the State Parties 
to take responsibility and prosecute war criminals, regardless of their national-
ity. The system established by the Geneva Conventions therefore represents a 
landmark in the evolution of universal criminal jurisdiction, as they enshrine 
universal jurisdiction applicable to IHL violations in an international treaty for 
the first time.
The grave breaches regime as established by the Geneva Conventions 
stipulates an obligation to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of grave 
breaches, a category of infractions exhaustively listed in the Geneva Conven-
tions. While this mechanism has great potential in contributing to the respect 
for IHL, it has had mixed results in light of State practice.
1.1. The obligation to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of grave 
breaches
In this subsection, the definition of the obligation to prosecute or extra-
dite and the consequences it entails at the national level are discussed.
1.1.1. Definition
The obligation to extradite or prosecute is not exclusive to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions but is present in different international treaties and con-
ventions. The origins of the obligation are traced back to Grotius, who con-
ceived it in its embryonic form through the formula aut dedere, aut punire. As 
emphasized by the ILC, the modern form of the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute refers to the State’s alternative obligation concerning the treatment 
284 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
of an alleged offender: it must extradite if it does not prosecute and prosecute 
if it does not extradite 85.
Nowadays, the obligation to extradite or prosecute is to be found in four 
categories of international treaties and conventions: extradition treaties, the 
counterfeiting convention formula, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and The 
Hague convention formula 86. The first category aims to avoid that some crimes 
remain unpunished by providing for local prosecution whenever extradition 
fails because many States refuse to extradite their own nationals. In accordance 
with this formula, if a State does not extradite, it must «submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution» 87. The following cate-
gory deals with some specific international offenses and is enshrined in article 
6(1)(d) of the 1929 Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting. As for 
The Hague Convention formula, it intends to «deny safe haven to offenders» 88, 
so that the forum State is placed under a duty to prosecute without even the 
necessity of a request for extradition by the territorial State. More importantly, 
the formula of interest for present purposes is the one contained in common 
article 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four Geneva Conventions:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their na-
tionality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance 
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial 
to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Con-
tracting Party has made out a prima facie case. Each High Contracting 
Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary 
to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches 
defined in [Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 51 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention 
III and Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV] 89.
85 ILC, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the In-
ternational Law Commission», op. cit., 2014, 
86 André Da Rocha Ferreira et al., «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judi-
care)», UFRGS Model United Nations Journal, vol. 1, 2013, p. 207.
87 Article 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft.
88 Da Rocha Ferreira et al., «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)», op. cit., 
2013, p. 207.
89 Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II, 
Article 129 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III and Article 146 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
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Thus, the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide a model where prosecution 
is an obligation, while extradition is only an option; it becomes an obligation 
only if the forum State fails to submit war criminals to prosecution. If a State 
does not wish to prosecute an alleged war criminal, then it must extradite 
them so that another State can proceed to prosecution. The forum State there-
fore has a «free choice» 90 between prosecution and extradition, so that the duty 
to prosecute may not be subsidiary to extradition. In any event, if the forum 
State refuses to extradite its own nationals, then it should proceed to prosecute 
them itself.
This mechanism has led some scholars to talk about a ‘primo prosequi, 
secundo dedere obligation’ instead of an ‘aut dedere aut judicare obligation’, as it 
appears that the grave breaches system establishes an unconditional obligation 
to prosecute 91. This interpretation was later confirmed by the ILC, in its final 
report on ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’ of 
2014 92. Basing its conclusions on the findings of the Committee against Tor-
ture in the Guengueng et al. v. Senegal case 93, and of the ICJ in the Belgium 
v. Senegal case  94, the ILC concludes that «the choice between extradition and 
submission for prosecution under the Convention did not mean that the two 
alternatives enjoyed the same weight» 95. Conversely, prosecution is understood 
as an obligation, and extradition as an option. Nevertheless, State practice tends 
to say otherwise, as it seems that there is a tendency to exercise universal juris-
diction on a subsidiary basis to extradition to States with a direct link to the 
tion IV; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3, articles 11 and 85.
90 Claus Kreβ, «Reflections on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice, vol. 7, p. 796. 
91 Moulier, «L’obligation de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, 
p. 767.
92 ILC, Final Report on ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’, 2014, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, sixty-sixth session, p. 15. Available at: http://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf (Accessed: 22.05.2017).
93 Doc. CAT/C/36/D/181/2001, 19 May 2006, para. 9.7.
94 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judg-
ment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, paras. 94-95.
95 ILC, Final Report on ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)’, 2014, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, sixty-sixth session, p. 15. Available at: http://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf (Accessed: 22.05.2017).
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crime 96. The Institut de Droit International emphasized such policy in its 2005 
resolution on universal jurisdiction:
Any State having custody over an alleged offender, to the extent that 
it relies solely on universal jurisdiction, should carefully consider and, as 
appropriate, grant any extradition request addressed to it by a State having 
a significant link, such as primarily territoriality or nationality, with the 
crime, the offender, or the victim, provided that such State is clearly able 
and willing to prosecute the alleged offender 97.
However, it should be noted that this tendency does not amount to a legal 
obligation, but only to a judicial policy, and it should not overshadow the fact 
that the Geneva Conventions clearly establish a legal obligation to prosecute 
alleged criminals of grave breaches, while extradition is solely an option.
1.1.2. Consequences at national level
Pursuant to common article 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four Geneva 
Conventions, the obligation to extradite or prosecute the grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions therefore entails several requirements at domestic level 
to be effective, namely: to provide for effective penal sanctions with respect to 
the grave breaches of national law, to search out and investigate alleged war 
criminals, to prosecute them, including on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
where necessary, and to provide for extradition mechanisms in national law.
1.1.2.1. The obligation to provide for effective penal sanctions
Firstly, the obligation calls for a legislative response, as the grave breaches 
must be criminalized in national law. In accordance with the first paragraph of 
articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four Geneva Conventions:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation neces-
sary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or orde-
ring to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention 
defined in the following article.
96 Kreβ, «Reflections on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 798.
97 Institut de droit international, 2005 Resolution on Universal Jurisdiction, article 3(c) and (d). Quot-
ed in Kreβ, «Reflections on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 798.
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The obligation therefore applies in peacetime. As emphasized by Marco 
Sassòli et al., it is necessary to enshrine penalties in national legislation, so 
that the principle nulla poena sine lege is guaranteed. National legislation is also 
essential in order to define the corresponding mechanisms, procedures, and 
jurisdictions applicable to the grave breaches regime 98. As the 1952 official 
Commentary to the Conventions mentions, the obligation to enact penal leg-
islation entails a duty to
specify the nature and extent of the penalty for each infraction, taking into 
account the principle of due proportion between the severity of the punis-
hment and the gravity of the offense 99.
The 2016 official Commentary further emphasizes the deterrent dimen-
sion of penal sanctions and holds that «they should stop ongoing violations of 
humanitarian law and prevent their repetition or the occurrence of new viola-
tions» 100. Consequently, and following general trends in the theory of criminal 
law, the celerity of penal sanctions is highlighted as a decisive element of deter-
rence, together with their appropriate visibility and dissemination 101. Another 
element, which is specific to IHL, is the necessity to equally apply penal sanc-
tions to all perpetrators, so as to avoid the so-called ‘victor’s justice’ 102.
The criminalization of the grave breaches at national level entails several 
consequences. In particular, it should be noted that there is no unique way 
of integrating the grave breaches into the national criminal legislation, and 
the weight will fall upon the legislature or the judiciary depending on the 
option chosen by the State parties to do so. As the 2016 official Commentary 
notes, there are four options. The first consists in simply «applying the existing 
military or ordinary criminal law» 103. Pursuant to this approach, the national 
criminal law already enshrines the relevant crimes and does not need to be 
amended. As Knut Dörmann and Robin Geiβ note, this option can be effec-
tive in some cases:
98 ICRC, How does the law protect in war, Part I, Chapter 3, pp. 8-10. 
99 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 364. 
100 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, para. 2842. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., paras. 2847-2851. 
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After all, life-time imprisonment for the act of murder as an ordinary 
crime would appear to be as effective a penal sanction as a life-time impri-
sonment for a willful killing in the sense of Article 50 of the First Geneva 
Convention... 104
Nonetheless, this approach remains problematic insofar as it presupposes 
that the existing legislation exactly corresponds to the conduct prohibited 
under IHL. It is quite unlikely that the existing national legislation appro-
priately takes into account the specificities of the law of armed conflicts and 
provides for sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of the offences com-
mitted. The nexus with the armed conflict and specific concepts linked to IHL 
such as ‘protected persons’ can hardly be adequately grasped by non-specific 
legislation. Consequently, some grave breaches could «neither be prosecuted 
nor effectively sanctioned» 105. Furthermore, if that first option were sufficient, 
one could wonder what purpose would be served by the obligation to provide 
for effective penal sanctions. In this sense, Knut Dörmann and Robin Geiβ 
correctly observe that:
[a]n overly strict reading of the obligation would thus contradict the prin-
ciple, anchored in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, that treaty provisions are to be interpreted in good faith and that 
unreasonable or absurd results are to be avoided. An interpretation based 
on good faith militates against any interpretation that renders a treaty obli-
gation meaningless 106.
In this line of reasoning, if the High Contracting Parties felt the need 
to enshrine an obligation to provide for effective penal sanctions in the four 
Geneva Conventions, then it would make sense to expect more than simply 
referring to existing legislation. To support this interpretation, Knut Dörmann 
and Robin Geiβ emphasize that the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR allow 
for the prosecution of a suspect already tried before a national court for acts 
constituting serious violations of IHL if the behaviors at stake were catego-
104 Knut Dörmann and Robin Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal 
Orders», Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, 2009, p. 708.
105 Ibid., p. 709. 
106 Ibid. 
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rized ordinary crimes 107. Therefore, prosecuting these acts again before the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals does not infringe upon the non bis in idem 
principle, to the extent that they were tried as ordinary crimes under national 
law. Nevertheless, if a State were to choose this model, it would be advisable 
to at least include aggravating/mitigating circumstances in order to reflect the 
special nature of the grave breaches and to ensure that the existing legislation 
is interpreted in light of international law 108.
As for the second option, it requires State parties to criminalize all serious 
violations of IHL by means of a general reference to the relevant provisions of 
IHL and international criminal law 109. This option presents several advantages: 
it is clear, economical as it prevents the legislature from translating each grave 
breach into a crime in national legislation, and it avoids distortions between 
the international and national provisions 110. This option can take the form of 
two models: the ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’ reference models 111. The former implies a 
reference to the specific relevant provisions of IHL and international criminal 
law. While this model overall responds to legality concerns, it also «automati-
cally incorporates deficiencies of the legal provision it refers to» 112, as there is 
no adaptation whatsoever at the national level. The latter entails a reference to 
the «laws and customs of war» and would consequently integrate further cus-
tomary developments 113. The advantage of this model is that it does not need 
further legislative modifications at the national level as the relevant provisions 
of international law evolve.
However, this model does present problems regarding the application of 
the principle of legality in criminal law, insofar as it may lead to the direct 
application of norms of customary international law 114. In addition, both mod-
els present difficulties, as they leave considerable room for interpretation in 
the hands of judges, who are the ones responsible for the clarification and 
107 Statute ICTR, article 9(2)(a); Statute ICTY, article 10(2)(a). Quoted in Dörmann and Geiβ, 
«The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», op. cit., 2009, p. 709. 
108 Ibid., p. 715. 
109 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2847-2851. 
110 Dörmann and Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», 
op. cit., 2009, p. 711.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 712. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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interpretation of the law in light of international law. In this respect, the obsta-
cles avoided by the legislature, such as the translation and accommodation of 
international law into national criminal law, eventually fall upon the judici-
ary 115. Therefore, the difficulties are not avoided but merely transferred from 
an authority to another.
A third option is the possibility to amend the existing national law in 
order to specifically criminalize the grave breaches in national law 116, what 
Knut Dörmann and Robin Geiβ call an «autonomous national legal basis for 
the prosecution of grave breaches» 117. They further divide this model into 
two sub-categories, as the national legal basis allowing prosecution of grave 
breaches can be integrated into criminal law or in a stand-alone national law. 
This model may present issues relating to the principle of legality only to the 
extent that the national legislation uses concepts typical of IHL, such as ‘pro-
tected person’ or ‘international/non-international armed conflict’ 118. More 
importantly, the adoption of national legislation entails the risk of deviating 
from the standards established by international law. Therefore, the differing 
definition of the grave breaches at the national level might alter their scope 
ratione materiae 119. Besides, this option also implies a greater task for the leg-
islature and involves an extensive and thorough study of the existing legal 
framework both at the national and international levels, as already observed 
in the 1952 official Commentary.
Finally, the last option is arguably the most desirable one, since it consists 
«in a mixed approach combining criminalization by a general provision with 
the explicit and specific criminalization of certain serious crimes» 120.
Nevertheless, the integration of the grave breaches into national law is 
not necessarily straightforward, as other elements that relate to principles of 
international criminal law must also be taken into account. In this respect, the 
State parties must enshrine in their legal orders the prohibition of statutory 
limits in case of commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
115 Ibid.
116 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2847-2851.
117 Dörmann and Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», 
op. cit., 2009, p. 713.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., p. 716. 
120 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2847-2851. 
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Even though the Geneva Conventions remain silent on this aspect, the UN 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity stipulates that no statutory limitations shall apply 
to them 121. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter, 
‘Rome Statute’) includes a similar provision. Indeed, article 29 provides that 
«[t]he crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any 
statute of limitations» 122. While the UN Convention on the Non-Applicabil-
ity of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity has 
been ratified by 55 States only, 124 States are parties to the Rome Statute 123, 
thus reflecting some consensus on this aspect among the international com-
munity. Therefore, the State parties should pay attention to this element and 
not provide for statutory limitations for the grave breaches in their national 
criminal legislation.
The criminalization of the grave breaches also means that individual 
criminal responsibility must be clearly recognized. While the preparatory 
works of the Geneva Conventions denote the lack of consensus on other 
forms of individual criminal responsibility, practice has evolved. In this regard, 
assisting in, facilitating or aiding and abetting to commit these crimes, as well 
as planning or instigating their commission, are now recognized as conducts 
that give rise to the individual criminal responsibility of their perpetrators. 
As for commanders, they may be held responsible for the conduct of their 
subordinates. Command responsibility must be foreseen in the event that they 
fail to ensure that all measures are taken in order to prevent their subordinates 
from committing grave breaches, or if they do not punish them. Command 
responsibility is therefore based on the commander’s failure to act. On the 
other hand, subordinates can be held responsible for following orders that 
they know are unlawful or manifestly unlawful. As a result, subordinates can-
not be relieved from their individual responsibility on the grounds that they 
121 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, 26 November 1968, article 1: «[w]ar crimes as they are defined in the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolu-
tions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, particularly the “grave breaches” enumerated in the Geneva Convention of 12 
August 1949 for the protection of war victims». 
122 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 29. 
123 See: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20
to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (Accessed: 22.06.2016). 
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simply followed orders, even though it may be taken into account as a miti-
gating factor 124.
A parallel aspect that national legislators must take into account is the 
need to prohibit or at least alter the principle of immunity, a principle derived 
from State sovereignty. There are two forms of immunity: personal and func-
tional. The former refers to the protection of the acts of specific State officials 
during their mandate and also extends to the acts adopted in their private 
capacity (immunity ratione personae). The latter refers to the acts adopted by 
State officials in their official capacity, which remain protected upon the end 
of their mandate (immunity ratione materiae). There is little doubt that the prin-
ciple of immunity is necessary and still valid today in order to ensure smooth 
international relations and avoid unnecessary interferences in other States’ 
internal affairs. Nonetheless, if understood as an absolute principle, immu-
nity may also constitute a procedural obstacle to the fight against impunity, as 
it may protect State officials accused of grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions from being prosecuted. Hence, unconditional immunity clauses have 
been condemned by different bodies, including the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights 125, and have been prohibited by the statutes of the different 
international criminal tribunals. In this respect, articles 7(2) of the ICTY Stat-
ute and 6(2) of the ICTR Statute explicitly exclude functional immunity in 
the case of international crimes in the exact same terms:
The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such 
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
The Rome Statute on the ICC goes even further and excludes all types 
of immunity, qualifying official capacity as irrelevant:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State 
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person 
124 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2853-2856. 
125 See, e.g.: Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case Barrios Altos v. Peru, 14 March 2001, 
paras. 41-44. 
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from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the offi-
cial capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person 126.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the ICJ established a distinction 
between incumbent and former ministers in the 2002 ‘Case concerning the 
Arrest Warrant’ in considering that immunity does not apply to incumbent min-
isters for foreign affairs 127. This case opposed Belgium against the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, as a Belgian judge had issued an arrest warrant against the 
then incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yerodia, on the grounds of 
inciting genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. Even though this case deals with the Convention against Torture, 
it provides guidance on the meaning and implications of the system established 
by the Geneva Conventions, to the extent that the obligation to prosecute or 
extradite is spelled out in similar terms. The Court held that incumbent minis-
ters benefit from full immunity, while former ministers «no longer enjoy all of 
the immunities accorded by international law in other States» 128. As a result, the 
arrest warrant failed to respect the immunity of Mr. Yerodia and Belgium had 
violated its obligations under international law. While this solution seems to 
contradict the wording of the Rome Statute at first sight, the Court went on 
to consider that international criminal tribunals, including the ICC, may pros-
ecute an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs 129. Consequently, 
it can be inferred that national jurisdictions cannot prosecute incumbent State 
officials and must wait until immunity is waived or a person ceases to hold a 
State office in order to enforce the system of grave breaches.
This approach is not entirely clear and remains controversial, especially in 
light of the ICC’s subsidiary competence and the objective pursued by inter-
national criminal law. On the one hand, there seems to be room for contradic-
tions or at least uncertainties, insofar as the application of the case-law of the 
126 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 27. 
127 ICJ, Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo 
v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3, para. 54. 
128 Ibid., para. 61.
129 Ibid. 
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ICJ would lead national courts not to prosecute incumbent State officials and 
oblige the ICC to act as a priority. On the other hand, allowing national courts 
to prosecute alleged war criminals only if their immunity has been waived or if 
they no longer hold a State office will likely lead the national authorities of the 
alleged war criminal precisely not to do so, in order to preserve the full effects 
of immunity. In this respect, the distinction established by the Court between 
immunity and impunity 130 seems undermined. It is also interesting to note that 
following this judgment before the ICJ, the Congolese military criminal code 
was modified so as to exclude immunity attached to official capacity in case of 
war crime or crime against humanity 131.
1.1.2.2. The obligation to search out and investigate alleged perpetrators
Criminalization at the national level is not sufficient. Indeed, State parties 
are also under a duty to search for alleged war criminals. This element differen-
tiates the grave breaches regime from the other models of aut dedere, aut judicare. 
As already observed by Jean Pictet in the 1952 official Commentary to the 
Geneva Conventions, this aspect of the obligation implies activity on States’ 
part as soon as the alleged offender is present on their territory 132. The forum 
State shall initiate an investigation whenever it finds out that a person on its 
territory is suspected to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
a grave breach of the Conventions. This is confirmed by the ILC, according 
to which the obligation to search for and submit to prosecution an alleged 
offender as provided by the 1949 Geneva Conventions «is not conditional on 
any jurisdictional consideration» 133. States are not supposed to remain passive 
130 «The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes 
they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity 
is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional im-
munity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offenses; it cannot exonerate 
the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility» (para. 60). 
131 Congolese military criminal code, ar ticle 163: «L’immunité attachée à la qualité officielle d’une 
personne ne l’exonère pas de poursuites pour crimes de guerre ou crimes contre l’humanité». 
Quoted in Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit internatio-
nal humanitaire», op. cit., 2010, p. 116.
132 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 366. 
133 ILC, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the In-
ternational Law Commission», op. cit., 2014, p. 5. 
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in the event of a grave breach but should actively search out for their respon-
sible. This means that the forum State shall not wait until it receives a request 
for extradition to initiate an investigation. As Claus Kreβ puts it, limiting the 
exercise of the obligation to the receipt of an extradition request:
would also run counter to the basic principle underlying the whole sche-
me – the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the interest of the internatio-
nal community, rather than the exercise of jurisdiction by representation 134.
The 2012 case concerning ‘Questions relating to the Obligation to Pros-
ecute or Extradite’ 135 opposing Senegal to Belgium provides guidance on the 
content of the obligation to investigate. In particular, the ICJ held that the 
obligation to investigate «must be interpreted in the light of the object and 
purpose» of the treaty at stake (para. 86). In this particular case, the object and 
purpose of the provisions on the obligation to prosecute or extradite are to 
fight against impunity and ensure that alleged war criminals do not benefit 
from safe havens.
It is worth noticing that establishing the legislation required for the 
implementation of the obligation is not sufficient, as the authorities must actu-
ally exercise their jurisdiction «starting by establishing the facts» (para. 85). 
Thus, «the authorities concerned must be just as demanding in terms of evi-
dence as when they have jurisdiction by virtue of a link with the case in 
question» (para. 84) and the preliminary enquiry must start immediately as 
soon as the authorities have reason to suspect that a person present on their 
territory may be responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
This point is reached, at the latest, when the first complaint is filed against the 
person (para. 88). Furthermore, according to the Court, the obligation entails 
the establishment of the relevant facts «in order to corroborate or not the sus-
picions regarding the person in question» (para. 83). In this respect, superficial 
questioning that solely aims to establish the alleged criminal’s identity and 
134 Kreβ, «Reflections on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 796 
(in this article, the author traces the origins of the aut dedere aut judicare principle to the exercise 
of jurisdiction by representation [principe de la eompétence déléguée, stellvertretende Strafrechtspflege]). 
See p. 791. 
135 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judg-
ment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422. 
296 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
inform them of the charges is not sufficient. Finally, the forum State should 
seek the cooperation of the authorities of the State where grave breaches took 
place or where complaints have been filed in this sense 136. In light of these 
elements, the ICJ found that Senegal had violated article 6 of the Convention 
against Torture, as it did not immediately initiate a preliminary inquiry as soon 
as it had reasons to suspect that the accused had committed acts of torture.
1.1.2.3. The obligation to prosecute, including on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction
Thirdly, State parties are subject to an obligation to prosecute, includ-
ing on the basis of universal jurisdiction where necessary. It is interesting to 
note that the ICJ considered that the forum State is required to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for prosecution, regardless of any extradition 
request 137. What is more, prosecution is understood as an international obli-
gation, «the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility 
of the State» 138. In particular, in the event that complaints «include a number 
of serious offenses», then the relevant State «is under an obligation to submit 
the allegations concerning those acts to its competent authorities for the pur-
pose of prosecution» 139. The ICJ also held that proceedings should take place 
without delay and that the forum State cannot invoke financial difficulties or 
provisions of national law to justify its breach of the obligation to prosecute 140. 
In sum, the obligation to prosecute requires the forum State to «take all meas-
ures necessary for its implementation as soon as possible, in particular, once 
the first complaint had been filed against» the suspect 141. Therefore, the time-
liness of the prosecution is important in order to allow the fulfillment of the 
Geneva Conventions’ object and purpose, i.e. to avoid safe havens for alleged 
war criminals.
Nevertheless, the fulfillment of the obligation to prosecute does not nec-
essarily mean that it will actually result in the institution of proceedings, as 
136 ILC, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the In-
ternational Law Commission», op. cit., 2014, p. 9. 
137 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judg-
ment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, para. 94.
138 Ibid., para. 95.
139 Ibid., para. 102.
140 Ibid., paras. 112-115.
141 Ibid., paras. 112-117.
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what is required from national authorities is to follow the same standards as the 
ones applied for any alleged offense under national law 142. It must also be noted 
that there cannot be an actual duty to punish, as it would infringe upon the 
presumption of innocence, a pillar of modern criminal justice systems. In this 
regard, the authorities of the forum State must always comply with the right 
to a fair trial when conducting such proceedings.
An element related to the obligation to prosecute is the obligation to 
vest national courts with universal jurisdiction over grave breaches. When the 
aut dedere aut judicare rule applies, the forum State must ensure that its courts 
can exercise all possible forms of jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction, 
in those cases in which it will not be possible to extradite the suspect to 
another State or surrender them to an international tribunal. Common Article 
49 indeed clearly establishes a system of universal jurisdiction in the repression 
of the grave breaches:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationa-
lity, before its own courts 143 [emphasis added].
Normally, tribunals’ jurisdiction is limited on the basis of the principles 
of personality, nationality, territoriality and security. In this regard, national 
criminal law usually accepts some extra-territorial application of jurisdiction 
if the acts at stake are committed by their nationals (principle of nationality or 
active personality jurisdiction), against their nationals (passive personality juris-
diction), or affect State’s security (protective principle jurisdiction) 144. Con-
sequently, these acts must entail some sort of nexus with the forum State for 
its tribunals to be competent. These rules are considered an extension of the 
principle of State sovereignty.
Conversely, universal jurisdiction, in its pure formulation, does not require 
any nexus with the prosecuting State. Pursuant to the universal jurisdiction doc-
142 Ibid., paras. 90-94.
143 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, article 49; Geneva Convention (II), 
article 50; Geneva Convention (III), article 129; Geneva Convention (IV), article 146.
144 ICRC, Factsheet https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.
pdf (Accessed: 01/04/2017).
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trine, some crimes are so heinous that their perpetrators cannot remain unpun-
ished and hide behind the shield of sovereign immunity doctrines. Universal 
jurisdiction mechanisms first emerged in relation to piracy, for States to be able 
to exercise jurisdiction over areas where they had no territorial power, the terrae 
nullis 145. The underpinning was that all States had an interest in combating mar-
itime piracy so that they enshrined universal jurisdiction in their national legal 
orders. Nowadays, universal jurisdiction may be defined as follows:
[T]he ability of the court of any State to try persons for crimes committed 
outside their territory that are not linked to the State by the nationality of 
the suspect or the victims or by harm to the State’s own national interests 146.
Universal jurisdiction also applies to other core international crimes, such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture. The establishment of univer-
sal jurisdiction mechanisms is justified by the nature of the crimes commit-
ted, which are so serious that they undermine the international legal order and 
cannot go unpunished. They constitute a blatant violation of the principle of 
humanity and undermine international peace and security, so that it is necessary 
to organize their penal repression regardless of the nationality of their authors. 
Universal jurisdiction therefore reflects the duality of public international law 
to the extent that it aims to protect human beings on the one hand, and to pre-
serve certain fundamental values that belong to the international public order 
on the other. The prohibition of these crimes is non-derogable and constitutes 
the nucleus of public international law. All States have therefore an interest in 
ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable, as observed by Roger O’ Keefe:
[The basis for such jurisdiction] had to be universality, a universality 
justified that what had been breached was a rule of international law, the 
manifestation not of the sovereign will of a single State but of the combi-
ned sovereign wills of the High Contracting Parties and thus transcending, 
inter se, the usual international limits on assertions of national criminal 
jurisdiction 147.
145 Da Rocha Ferreira, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)», op. cit., 
2013, p. 5. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Roger O’ Keefe, «The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction», Journal of Internation-
al Criminal Justice, vol. 7, 2009, p. 823.
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In this sense, universal jurisdiction constitutes the nexus between State 
sovereignty and the norms of international law dealing with international 
responsibility for violations of supranational interests; it is not an extension of 
national authorities’ jurisdiction to protect State interests, but rather the exer-
cise of State sovereignty to safeguard the interests of the international com-
munity 148.
In the case of the Geneva Conventions, the object and purpose of the 
provisions on the obligation to prosecute or extradite are to deny safe havens 
to alleged war criminals. As a result, the nationality of the suspect becomes 
irrelevant and national tribunals are required to initiate proceedings anyway. 
No mention is made either to the place where the grave breaches took place 
or to the nationality of the victims. It is interesting to note that the universal 
jurisdiction clause enshrined in the Geneva Conventions is not optional. On 
the contrary, State parties are under a clear mandate to enact national legisla-
tion that allows national judges to prosecute alleged war criminals regardless of 
their nationality. It is likewise important to note that the obligation to enshrine 
universal jurisdiction in national law applies to all State parties and not only to 
the parties to the armed conflict where the grave breaches have taken place 149.
This interpretation is sustained by State practice. As observed by the ICRC, 
the provisions on universal jurisdiction over grave breaches have not become 
a dead letter, as more than 100 States have established «some form of universal 
jurisdiction over serious violations IHL in their national legal order» 150. What is 
more, national provisions have also had an impact, as «investigation and prose-
cution on the basis of universal jurisdiction has increased», and «recent national 
court decisions and State initiatives have demonstrated that the exercise of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction is gaining more acceptance» 151.
According to the ICRC 152, national legislation must clearly indicate the 
conditions that may trigger the proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdic-
148 Abraham Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, Madrid, Instituto 
Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado de investigación sobre la Paz, la Seguridad y la Defensa, 
2015, p. 148.
149 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 814. 
150 UNGA, «The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction», Report of the 
Secretary General, 23.07.2014, A/69/174, p. 14. 
151 Ibid., p. 14. 
152 ICRC, Universal jurisdiction over war crimes – Factsheet, March 2014. Available at: https://www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf (Accessed: 05.07.2016).
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tion or justify their rejection. In any case, these conditions should not have 
the effect of impeding the effective prosecution of alleged war criminals. In 
this respect, common article 49 is quite vague and does not provide much 
detail as to how universal jurisdiction should be exercised. While the Geneva 
Conventions seem to provide for absolute universal jurisdiction, State practice 
demonstrates that some conditions have been associated with its exercise in 
many national legal orders. In particular, the presence of the suspect on the 
territory of the forum State is considered by many States as a precondition 
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. According to the ICRC’s National 
Implementation Database, more than 40 States require the presence of the sus-
pect on their territory before initiating proceedings 153, even though in some 
cases, this condition is interpreted with some degree of flexibility: in absentia 
prosecution may take place if presence can be demonstrated at least once 
during the investigation or trial 154. While this condition seems to contradict 
the letter of common article 49, it is reasonable from a practical standpoint. 
As rightly observed in the 2016 official Commentary to the First Geneva 
Convention:
[i]n practice, State parties cannot effectively prosecute alleged perpetrators 
unless they were present in their territory or in places under their jurisdic-
tion at some point in time 155.
In the same line of reasoning, some States require the consent of a gov-
ernmental or legal authority for prosecution to take place on the basis of 
UJ 156. The ICRC likewise emphasizes that universal jurisdiction is normally 
understood as a «subsidiary jurisdictional basis» 157. In this regard, States nor-
mally understand universal jurisdiction as a way to avoid impunity in those 
cases where the national courts competent to «prosecute on the basis of ter-
ritoriality or nationality, refuse or are not able to do so» 158.
153 National Implementation Database, ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian 
Law. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat (Accessed: 05.07.2016). Quoted in UNGA, «The 
scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction», op. cit., 2014, p. 15.
154 UNGA, «The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction», op. cit., 2014, p. 15. 
155 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, para. 2866.
156 UNGA, «The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction», op. cit., 2014, p. 15.
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
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It should be noted that there is wide agreement among scholars that 
the obligation to vest national courts with universal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches has reached customary status, notably as a result of the universal ratifi-
cation of the Geneva Conventions 159. The ICRC Study on ‘Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’ also enshrines this norm in Rule 157 on ‘juris-
diction over war crimes’ 160, and this interpretation is shared among different 
learned societies such as the International Law Association and the Institut 
de Droit International 161. This position is likewise endorsed by the ICTY 162. 
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between the obligation to provide 
for universal jurisdiction over grave breaches and the right to provide for uni-
versal jurisdiction over war crimes, which therefore applies to serious violations 
of IHL too, including Common Article 3. Universal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches is a duty that falls upon all States as a treaty obligation deriving from 
the Geneva Conventions and which has acquired customary status. Conversely, 
international custom solely authorizes States to establish universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes. Pursuant to the current state of international law, there is no 
treaty or customary obligation, only a right to create a universal jurisdiction 
system over war crimes. Nevertheless, «[t]his right in no way diminishes the 
obligation existing under the Geneva Conventions to vest universal jurisdic-
tion over grave breaches. This is not optional, but obligatory» as Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts notes 163.
159 See, e.g.: Jean-Marie Henckaerts, «The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International 
Law», Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, 2009, pp. 603-701; Moulier, «L’obligation 
de ‘faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010b, p. 767; Momtaz, «Les défis 
des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international humanitaire», op. cit., 2010, 
p. 115. 
160 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2005, Rule 
157: «States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes». 
161 Momtaz, «Les défis des conflits armés asymétriques et identitaires au droit international huma-
nitaire», op. cit., 2010, p. 115. 
162 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of The Republic of Croatia for 
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case IT-95-14-AR, 29 October 
1997, para. 29: «The International Tribunal does not have the mission of replacing the jurisdic-
tion of any State. By virtue of Article 9 of the statute, the International Tribunal and the national 
jurisdictions are concurrently competent. The national jurisdictions of the States of ex-Yugosla-
via, as those of all States, are required by customary law to judge or to extradite those persons 
Isponsable for grave violations of international humanitarian law. The primacy of the Tribunal 
foreseen in Article 9(2) is applicable to all national jurisdictions or, if these jurisdictions lack this 
customary obligation, it can intervene and judge».
163 Henckaerts, «The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law», op. cit., 2009, p. 698.
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1.1.2.4. The obligation to provide for extradition mechanisms
Finally, the fourth element of the obligation to prosecute or extradite is 
the obligation to make the grave breaches extraditable. In the event that the 
forum State decides to proceed to extradition, some conditions must always be 
fulfilled. On the one hand, the State requesting the extradition must provide 
evidence that the charges brought against the alleged offender are «sufficient», 
i.e. that a prima facie case is made against the accused 164. The 2016 official Com-
mentary underlines that this requirement aims:
not only to protect individuals against excessive or unjustified requests, but 
also to ensure that the penal proceedings envisaged will not be frustrated or 
reduced in scope as a result of transfer to another State Party 165.
Since the objective of the grave breaches regime is to deny safe havens 
for alleged perpetrators, then a request for extradition intending to «protect 
its own nationals, and conduct a sham trial» should be refused 166. In any case, 
whenever the alleged perpetrator is a national and the internal legislation does 
not authorize extradition, this should lead to prosecution before their own 
tribunals. As observed in the above-mentioned case concerning ‘Questions 
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite’, extradition may only 
be to a State that has jurisdiction in some capacity to prosecute and try the 
alleged offender pursuant to an international legal obligation binding on the 
State in whose territory the person is present 167. On the other hand, it must 
demonstrate that the accused will benefit from a fair trial and that their rights 
of defense will be safeguarded:
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of 
proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those 
provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 168.
164 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 365. 
165 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, para. 2882. 
166 Ibid. 
167 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judg-
ment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, para. 120. 
168 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, article 49 (4). 
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These safeguards comprise the principles of non bis in idem, nullen crimen 
sine lege, specialty, non-extradition of the suspect to stand trial on the grounds 
of ethnic origin, religion, nationality or political views, as well as the respect 
for the principle of nonrefoulement. As emphasized by the ILC, extradition can-
not be substituted by «deportation, extraordinary rendition or other informal 
forms of dispatching the suspect to another State» 169.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the obligation to extradite may 
be fulfilled through the surrender of the suspect to a competent international 
criminal jurisdiction. The relatively recent developments in international law 
have underlined a third alternative obligation, that to surrender the alleged 
offender to international criminal courts rather than prosecute itself or extra-
dite to another State. As observed by Jean Pictet in the 1952 official Com-
mentary, nothing in the paragraph excludes such possibility 170. In this respect, 
the creation of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals by the UNSC and, 
to a greater extent, the establishment of the ICC underline the consensus at 
international level on the validity of this alternative. As Claus Kreβ holds, «the 
grave breaches regime has thus undergone an evolution through subsequent 
practice» 171.
1.2. From ‘grave breaches’ to ‘war crimes’
The obligation to extradite or prosecute contained in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions refers to the grave breaches 172, an exhaustive list of behaviors 
which must be repressed in national legislation. However, the scope of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility has broadened throughout the years and now 
includes ‘serious violations’ of IHL. Nowadays, both categories – grave breaches 
and serious violations – constitute war crimes, so that the violations of IHL 
occurring both in IACs and NIACs may be repressed under international or 
169 ILC, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the In-
ternational Law Commission», op. cit., 2014, p. 10.
170 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 366.
171 Kreβ, «Reflections on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 799.
172 Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I; Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II; 
Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III, and Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion IV.
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national criminal law. This evolution of international law is desirable. Indeed, 
prosecution over grave breaches may take place vis-à-vis behaviors occurring 
in IACs only, so that the same behavior could go unpunished simply because 
it was framed in an NIAC.
It should be noted in this regard that instead of providing for an interna-
tional criminal liability for grave breaches in general, the Geneva Conventions 
create a list of offences deemed so serious that State parties «agreed to enact 
domestic penal legislation, search for suspects, and judge them or hand them 
over to another State for trial» 173.
Since some violations of the Geneva Conventions are described as ‘grave 
breaches’, there are other violations of IHL that do not enter into this cate-
gory. This raises a question: one may indeed wonder what happens with regard 
to these other violations of the Geneva Conventions. Article 29 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention already referred to the punishment of ‘all’ acts contrary to 
the Convention. As observed in the 1952 official Commentary, the intention 
of the members of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was at least to maintain 
the threshold already established in 1929, so that all breaches to the Conven-
tions should be punished by national law 174, with a large discretion left to the 
State parties on how to organize such punishment. Therefore, State parties are 
under an obligation to ensure that these other violations cease, but not neces-
sarily to provide for penal sanctions for all these violations.
This distinction between grave breaches and the other violations of IHL 
is justified on the grounds that not all violations of IHL are of concern for the 
international community due to the level of details of such rules. As under-
lined by Yves Sandoz, accusing a person in charge of a canteen of a war crime 
because tobacco is sold at a higher price than local market prices (article 87 
GC IV) is manifestly unjustified 175. Consequently, the system established by the 
1949 Geneva Conventions distinguishes between the penal repression of the 
«grave breaches», which is organized at the international level notably through 
the enforcement of the aut dedere, aut judicare principle, and the penal repression 
of the other breaches, which falls under national legislation. The inclusion of 
the definition of the grave breaches in the Conventions’ text responded to the 
173 Marko Divac Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», International Re-
view of the Red Cross, vol. 91(873), 2009, p. 165. 
174 Pictet (dir.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I, op. cit, 1952b, p. 367. 
175 Sandoz, «The History of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 674. 
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necessity to ensure universality in the treatment in their repression. As a result, 
the agreement among the State parties to the Geneva Conventions on the 
necessity to adopt legislation to enforce this provision highlights the consen-
sus among the international community regarding the universal opprobrium 
of the grave breaches 176. Establishing a list of offences for which individual 
criminal responsibility is incurred at international level arguably responds to 
considerations of legal certainty with respect to offenders too.
The grave breaches are therefore exhaustively listed in articles 50, 51, 130 
and 147 of the four Geneva Conventions. Concretely, if committed against 
persons or property protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the grave 
breaches include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including bio-
logical experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified 
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, compelling a 
prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, willfully depriving 
a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Con-
vention, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a pro-
tected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
Power, willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular 
trial prescribed in the present Convention, or taking of hostages 177. The 1949 
Geneva Conventions have therefore codified a certain number of violations of 
IHL and imposed an obligation upon all States to punish them.
The scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute has evolved ever 
since. Additional Protocol I, adopted in 1977, defines the grave breaches in 
articles 11 and 85, in the following terms:
Seriously endangering, by any willful and unjustified act or omission, 
physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power 
of the adverse Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived 
of liberty as a result of an armed conflict, in particular physical mutilations, 
medical or scientific experiments, removal of tissue or organs for trans-
plantation which is not indicated by the state of health of the person con-
cerned or not consistent with generally accepted medical standards which 
176 Colleen Enache-Brown and Ari Fried, «Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation 
of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law», McGill Law Journal, vol. 43, 1998, p. 622.
177 Article 50 GC I; article 51 GC II; article 130 GC III; article 147 GC IV. 
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would be applied under similar medical circumstances to persons who are 
nationals of the Party conducting the procedure and in no way deprived 
of liberty 178;
When committed willfully and if they cause death or serious injury to 
body and health:
– making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of 
attack;
– launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population 
or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause exces-
sive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects;
– launching an attack against works or installations containing dange-
rous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss 
of life, injury to civilians or damage civilian objects;
– making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of 
attack;
– making a person the object of an attack in the knowledge that he is 
hors de combat,
– the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross and red 
crescent or other protective signs 179;
When committed willfully and in violation of the Conventions and the 
Protocol:
– the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian po-
pulation into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer 
of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or 
outside this territory;
– unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
– practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices in-
volving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
– attacking clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or pla-
ces of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
peoples and to which special protection has been given, causing as a 
result extensive destruction thereof when such objects are not loca-
ted in the immediate proximity of military objectives or used by the 
adverse party in support of its military effort;
– depriving a person protected by the Conventions or by Protocol l of 
the rights of fair and regular trial 180.
178 Additional Protocol I, article 11(4). 
179 Additional Protocol I, article 85(3).
180 Ibid., article 85(4).
MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL │ 307
As a result, Additional Protocol I clarifies some aspects. It adds new grave 
breaches to the list of the Geneva Conventions and criminalizes some viola-
tions of The Hague Law. In light of these elements, a few comments should 
be made relating to the content of the grave breaches and their corresponding 
scope.
Firstly, the grave breaches regime applies to IACs only. At the time when 
the Geneva Conventions were adopted, the State parties agreed to repress 
violations of IHL taking place in IACs only. Even though Common Article 
3 establishes some behaviors which are prohibited at all times 181, the State 
parties decided not to include these offences into the list of ‘grave breaches’ 
in 1949, thus seemingly establishing a distinction of treatment between the 
breaches occurring in IACs and NIACs. The former called for a national 
penal response in line with international standards, while the penal repression 
of the latter was left to the discretion of the State parties. As highlighted by 
Yves Sandoz:
The provision, in common Articles 50, 51, 130 and 147, that graves 
breaches have to be committed ‘against persons or property protected by 
181 Common Article 3 reads as follows: «In the case of armed conflict not of an international charac-
ter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
 (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed ‘ hors de combat ‘ by sickness, wounds, detention, or 
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
 To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
 (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture;
 (b) Iing of hostages;
 (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
 (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are rec-
ognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
 (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
 An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may 
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeav-
our to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the 
present Convention.
 The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict».
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the Convention’ has to be taken in the narrow sense of the notion of 
‘protected persons or property’, which are those precisely defined by the 
Conventions as applicable to international armed conflicts 182.
Despite advances, NIACs were not included within the scope of the grave 
breaches as defined by the Additional Protocols. The violations of Additional 
Protocol II were not considered ‘grave breaches’ and therefore fell outside of 
the scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Nonetheless, while the 
existence of an exhaustive list of war crimes is essential for the credibility of 
international criminal law, and in particular with regard to legality and cer-
tainty concerns, this does not mean that the list should be immutable 183. Inter-
national law, including international criminal law, must adapt and take note of 
subsequent evolution.
A solution to fill in this gap could be to refer to customary international 
law. Nonetheless, the applicability of the grave breaches regime to NIACs on 
the basis of customary international law remains subject to debate, as the case-
law of the ICTY has shown. Indeed, the ICTY was called on answering this 
question in the Tadić case. The United States Government submitted an amicus 
curiae brief supporting the application of the grave breaches regime to NIACs 
on the basis of customary international law 184, and Judge Abi-Saab endorsed 
this interpretation in his separate opinion 185. However, this view was not shared 
by the majority, and the Appeals Chamber therefore excluded Common Arti-
cle 3 from the scope of the grave breaches (para. 83) and held that a different 
182 Sandoz, «The History of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 675.
183 Ibid., p. 676. 
184 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a «Dule», Case (IT-94-1), Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.
 According to the amicus curiae, «the ‘grave breaches’ provisions of article 2 of the International 
Tribunal Statute apply to armed conflicts of a non-international character as well as those of 
an international character» (paras. 35-36). Quoted in Dieter Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave 
Breaches Regime», Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, 2009, p. 838. 
185 «As a matter of treaty interpretation... it can be said that this normative substance has led to a 
new interpretation of the Geneva Conventions as a result of the ‘subsequent practice’ and opinio 
juris of the State parties: a teleological interpretation of the Conventions in the light of their 
object and purpose to the effect of including internal armed conflicts within the regime of 
grave breaches. The other possible rendering of the significance of the new normative substance 
is to consider it as establishing a new customary rule ancillary to the conventions, whereby the 
regime of grave breaches is extended to internal conflicts. But the first seems to me as the better 
approach». Quoted in Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 838. 
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solution would constitute a violation of the principle of sovereignty 186. Thus, 
as Dieter Fleck highlights, at least as regards the jurisdiction of the ICTY, the 
IAC criterion is necessary to trigger the grave breaches regime because article 
2 of the Statute sticks to the wording of the Geneva Conventions 187.
In the same way, the debate over the customary nature of universal juris-
diction over grave breaches occurring both in IACs and NIACs has not been 
solved. The ICRC Study on ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’ 
states in Rule 157 the right to vest universal jurisdiction over war crimes, 
regardless of the nature of the armed conflict. As noted above, this is not an 
obligation, but a permissive rule. Nonetheless, this constituted one of the 
points of discrepancy between the United States and the ICRC, as the for-
mer objected to this rule 188. As Dieter Fleck observes, the ICRC answered 
that no objection against the exercise of universal jurisdiction for war crimes 
taking place in IACs and NIACs were formulated by the affected States, most 
notably by the suspect’s State of nationality 189. Hence the ICRC concluded 
that the principle of universal jurisdiction over all serious violations of IHL, 
including those occurring in NIACs, had been asserted as a permissive rule 
pursuant to customary international law. While universal jurisdiction over 
grave breaches is only one component of the grave breaches regime, this 
debate underlines the uncertainty surrounding its application to NIACs on 
the basis of customary law.
Secondly, even though at the time when the Geneva Conventions were 
drafted the intent of the State parties was not to establish international crimi-
nal responsibility over the grave breaches, this is no longer the case. Indeed, the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not entail criminal consequences in 
186 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a «Dule», Case (IT-94-1), Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 80: «The international 
armed conflict element generally attributed to the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions is merely a function of the system of universal mandatory jurisdiction that those 
provisions create. The international armed conflict requirement was a necessary limitation on the 
grave breaches system in light of the intrusion on State sovereignty that such mandatory univer-
sal jurisdiction represents. State parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not want to give 
other States jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
their internal armed conflict – at least not the mandatory universal jurisdiction involved in the 
grave breaches system».
187 Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 840. 
188 Ibid., p. 851. 
189 Ibid., p. 852. 
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international law, but in domestic law 190. Therefore, whenever grave breaches 
are committed, a rule of international law is violated, but the criminal conse-
quences must be established by the national law in accordance with the spirit 
of the Geneva Conventions. In this regard, the provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions serve as some sort of guidelines for national authorities. This element 
must be connected with the fact that at the time the Geneva Conventions 
were drafted, the expression ‘war crime’ was explicitly refused on the grounds 
that such expression should be reserved for the violations of The Hague Con-
ventions 191. A simple definition of war crime could be the following: «acts 
and omissions that violate international humanitarian law and are criminalized 
in international criminal law» 192. Therefore, war crimes, contrarily to grave 
breaches, entail criminal responsibility at international level. This element is 
important insofar as the grave breaches provisions lack some indispensable 
elements of a proper criminal law, such as mens rea, modes of liability, defenses, 
penalties, rules of procedure 193, etc.
However, this changed with the adoption of Additional Protocol I, which 
describes grave breaches as ‘war crimes’, as a matter of codification of custom-
ary international law. The connection between the grave breaches and interna-
tional criminal law is therefore established, and the grave breaches are officially 
recognized as a category of war crimes. Additional Protocol I thus acknowl-
edges that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on the grave breaches 
entail criminal consequences not only at domestic level but also at interna-
tional level. This movement has been further developed with the adoption 
of the statutes of the different international criminal tribunals. In particular, 
article 2 of the Statute of the ICTY replicates the formula of the Geneva Con-
ventions provisions on the grave breaches, thus confirming that the latter had 
become international crimes 194. Likewise, the Statute of the ICC enshrines the 
grave breaches in article 8(2)(a), albeit the grave breaches contained in Addi-
tional Protocol I are codified separately, in article 8(2)(b) 195. It is therefore on 
190 Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 166. 
191 Sandoz, «The History of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 675. 
192 Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 164. 
193 Ibid., p. 166. 
194 Ibid., p. 168. 
195 This separation can be explained by the fact that the Geneva Conventions have been universally 
ratified, while Additional Protocol I has not. See: Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into 
war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 168. 
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this basis that charges based on the grave breaches provisions have been filed 
before different international tribunals 196.
However, the convergence or ‘absorption’ 197 of the grave breaches in war 
crime law is problematic regarding the lack of clear mens rea contained in the 
Geneva Conventions provisions. In this respect, the ICRC has held that the 
term ‘willful’, which is established in some grave breaches, include «interna-
tional and reckless conduct, but excludes negligence» 198, a position confirmed 
by the ICTY 199. It should also be noted that the Rome Statute has solved sev-
eral issues, insofar as it provides for the same modes of liability regarding the 
grave breaches and the other war crimes 200.
As a consequence, grave breaches are no longer ‘guidelines’ for national 
authorities; they constitute war crimes themselves and may therefore be pros-
ecuted both at national and international levels.
1.3. A mechanism with mixed results
The system established by the Geneva Conventions in order to repress 
IHL violations could have been groundbreaking. In some respects, it is; none-
theless, it also suffers from important deficiencies.
The grave breaches regime was groundbreaking at the time it was codified 
into the Geneva Conventions. As the first international treaty that enshrines 
universal jurisdiction over some violations of IHL, it was considered a promis-
ing mechanism to fight against impunity. Just like Common Article 1, it estab-
lishes a decentralized system whereby all States are vested with a legal interest 
in prosecuting alleged perpetrators of grave breaches. It therefore very much 
196 See, e.g.: ICC, The prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case nº ICC-
01/04-01/07, amended document containing the charges pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of the 
Statute, 26 June 2008, Annex 1A; Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Kaing 
Guek Eav, OCIJ, Closing order indicting Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, 8 August 2008, p. 44. 
Quoted in Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 182. 
(In the Dutch case, the author notes that this choice was probably due to the greater acceptance 
of Cambodia of grave breaches).
197 Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009. 
198 Ibid., p. 173.
199 ICTY, Celebici Case, IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 422. Quoted in 
Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 173. 
200 Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 177.
312 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
reflects the idea that IHL stipulates erga omnes obligations, even in some cases, 
jus cogens obligations, so that the legal interest to prosecute alleged perpetrators 
of grave breaches becomes objective and universal. Following this line of rea-
soning, because of the special nature of the norms that are violated, the right 
to take legal action extends to all States, including non-specially affected States. 
It was therefore understood as a promising mechanism, effective in fighting 
against impunity.
In this respect, it seems that the obligation to prosecute or extradite in rela-
tion to the grave breaches has acquired customary status under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. As Jean-Marie Henckaerts demonstrates, while it is normally 
understood that only the ‘substantive’ rules of a treaty can reach customary sta-
tus, the obligation to enact effective penal sanctions, the obligation to search and 
prosecute or extradite, and the obligation to establish universal jurisdictions over 
grave breaches should not be considered purely technical rules and can therefore 
aim to customary status 201. Indeed, the purpose of these provisions is «to prevent 
and punish the commission of grave breaches», and to «avoid safe havens for 
persons suspected of grave breaches», and therefore «to combat impunity for 
grave breaches». These rules are consequently «fundamental to the respect of the 
human person» and cannot be categorized as technical rules, «purely related to 
the operation» of the Geneva Conventions and «self-contained within the treaty 
regime» of the Geneva Conventions. For all these reasons, it can be assumed that 
these rules may be considered customary rules of international law 202.
On the one hand, some have criticized the lack of actual State practice 
to support such claim. And it is true that national authorities have not been 
very active in this regard, especially during the cold war, to the point that 
Antonio Cassese described the provisions on national prosecution over grave 
breaches as «a dead letter» 203 in 1998. In 1965, the ICRC deplored that «it is 
to be admitted that in many countries the regulations for the repression of 
violations of the Geneva Conventions are not adequate» 204. The same con-
201 Henckaerts, «The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law», op. cit., 2009, 
pp. 693-701. 
202 Ibid., pp. 693-694/699. 
203 Antonio Cassese, «On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law», European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, 1998, p. 5. 
204 ICRC, Respect of the Geneva Conventions. Measures taken to repress violations (vol. 1, 1965) 
ICRC doc. Conf. D 4a/1. Quoted in Dörmann and Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave 
Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», op. cit., 2009, p. 704. 
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cerns were expressed in 1998, on the occasion of the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, where the ICRC stated that «the obligation to prosecute war crimi-
nals already exists, but frequently remains a dead letter» 205. It is worth recall-
ing that the ILC was quite cautious about the recognition of the customary 
status of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in the ‘Draft Code of crimes 
against the peace and security of mankind’. Indeed, the then Special Rap-
porteur Galicki proposed a draft article in this sense which was eventually 
rejected:
1. Each State is obliged either to extradite or to prosecute an alleged 
offender if such an obligation is deriving from the customary norm of 
international law.
2. Such an obligation may derive, in particular, from customary norms of 
international law concerning [serious violations of international huma-
nitarian, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes].
3. The obligation to extradite or prosecute shall derive from the peremp-
tory norms of general international law accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States (jus cogens), either in the form of 
international treaty or international custom, criminalizing any one of 
acts listed in paragraph 2 206.
In particular, there seemed to be general disagreement on the fact that 
the customary status of aut dedere aut judicare could derive from the existence 
of customary rules proscribing specific international crimes 207. Therefore, the 
customary status of the prohibition of these crimes cannot solely constitute the 
basis of the customary nature of the obligation to prosecute or extradite. Nev-
ertheless, the ILC underlines in its Final Report on the obligation to prosecute 
or extradite that «there may have been further developments in international 
law that reflect State practice and opinio juris in this respect» so that no hasty 
conclusions should not be made on the basis of this rejection. Furthermore, 
the ICJ did not adjudicate on the customary international law status of the 
205 Dörmann and Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», 
op. cit., 2009, p. 705.
206 Special Rapporteur Galicki, Fourth Report, A/CN.4/648, para. 95. Quoted in ILC, «The obli-
gation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the International Law 
Commission», op. cit., 2014, p. 16. 
207 ILC, «The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), Final report of the In-
ternational Law Commission», op. cit., 2014, p. 17.
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obligation to extradite or prosecute in the case concerning ‘Questions relating 
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite’, as the dispute between Belgium 
and Senegal did not relate to breaches of obligations under customary inter-
national law when Belgium filed the application 208. All these elements point 
to the uncertain customary status of the obligation to prosecute or extradite.
On the other hand, some scholars argue that the obligation to prosecute 
or extradite over grave breaches is supported by both State practice and opinio 
juris. In particular, the ICRC Study on ‘Customary International Humanitarian 
Law’ endorses such approach as Rule 158 on ‘prosecution of war crimes’ states 
the following:
States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their natio-
nals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the 
suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have 
jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects 209.
To support such claim, the ICRC Study on ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’ relies on the integration of the obligation to investigate 
and prosecute in several international treaties, numerous military manuals, 
national legislation and practice of national investigations and prosecutions of 
suspected war criminals. It also relies on the practice of different UN bodies, 
namely the UNSC, the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on 
Human Rights. At judicial level, Claus Kreβ notes that the conflict in the for-
mer Yugoslavia triggered the reaction of national courts, so that:
la base factuelle nécessaire pour pouvoir assumer l’existence d’une règle 
coutumière, est venue compléter l’opinio juris qui avait trouvé son reflet 
dans les textes conventionnels 210.
Moreover, with the further creation of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals and the establishment of the ICC, several States have adopted differ-
208 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judg-
ment of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, paras. 53-55, 122. 
209 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2005, p. 607. 
210 Christian Tomuschat, «La cristallisation coutumière», in H. Ascensio, H., Emmanuel Decaux and 
Alain Pellet (eds.), Droit International Pénal, Pedone, Paris, 2000, p. 28. Quoted in Kreβ, «Reflec-
tions on the Iudicare Limb of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 793.
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ent laws of cooperation, which have had the effect of enhancing this practice 
of national prosecution. Thus, the opinio juris already reflected in treaty law 
has been completed by State practice, which can lead to the crystallization of 
customary international law.
In spite of this, the effective implementation of the grave breaches 
regime remains subject to important obstacles. These obstacles are both legal 
and political. First, there are limitations inherent in the grave breaches sys-
tem. Arguably, the most important limitation is the exclusion of NIACs from 
the scope of the grave breaches regime as neither the Geneva Conventions 
nor the Additional Protocols provide for jurisdiction in the case of NIAC. 
As Dieter Fleck has shown, this exclusion entails two difficulties: on the one 
hand, it is too burdensome for international and national jurisdictions to 
assess whether an armed conflict is international or not in practice. In the 
same way, this means that national and international courts must prove that 
the victims are protected persons or protected property under the Geneva 
Conventions, i.e. an additional burdensome task. On the other hand, it is 
hardly understandable not to prosecute the atrocities that are committed in 
NIACs, albeit the same behaviors as the ones described in the grave breaches 
provisions are perpetrated 211.
Nonetheless, this exclusion from the grave breaches regime does not 
equate to an absolute exclusion of criminal responsibility in case of NIAC. 
Indeed, the international legal framework has evolved: it is now admitted that 
some ‘serious violations’ of IHL taking place in NIACs constitute war crimes 
over which national and international criminal courts may exercise jurisdic-
tion. The difference therefore lies in the fact that this prosecution does not 
take place on the basis of the grave breaches. Pursuant to the statutes of the 
different international criminal tribunals, certain violations of IHL occurring 
in times of NIACs constitute war crimes, punishable under international crim-
inal law. In this respect, the ICTY recognized that some violations to the law 
governing NIACs indeed constituted war crimes in the Tadić case 212. Although 
this was a particular case, it set an important precedent. In the same way, the 
Statute of the ICTR, which was established one year after the ICTY, included 
211 Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 837. 
212 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a «Dule», Case IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995. 
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NIACs’ violations for the first time in article 4 213. Nowadays, the most impor-
tant effort of codification of war crimes is to be found in the Rome Statute, 
which defines four international crimes, including war crimes. The latter con-
tains the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, «other serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts», serious 
violations of Common Article 3, as well as «other serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character» 214. 
International legal developments and practice have therefore filled in the gap 
codified in the Geneva Conventions, through the recurrent use of Common 
Article 3 and some alignment of the regime of NIACs on that of IACs.
One consequence is that the grave breaches regime has been supplanted 
on different occasions by Common Article 3, which has been used «as a mini-
mum yardstick in all armed conflicts» notably by the ICTY 215. This solution is 
not surprising insofar as it avoids the arduous determination of the nature of 
the armed conflict before actually scrutinizing the violations of IHL at stake. 
Therefore, the only advantage of the grave breaches over the other categories 
of war crimes is the fact that the list of grave breaches is clear, benefits from 
universal endorsement and is clearly binding upon all States, in comparison 
with «the nebulous customary law origins of war crimes» 216. Nonetheless, as 
Marko Divac Öberg emphasizes, the crystallization of war crimes in accepted 
international law will undermine this advantage 217.
Secondly, while universal jurisdiction over grave breaches has been cod-
ified in many domestic legal orders in practice, it remains unclear whether 
213 UN Doc. S/RES/955, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 08/11/1994, article 4: 
«The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing 
or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 
June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: a) Violence to life, health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such 
as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; b) Collective punishments; c) Taking 
of hostages; d) Acts of terrorism; e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; f) Pillage; 
g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are rec-
ognised as indispensable by civilised peoples; h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts». 
214 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 8.
215 Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 839.
216 Öberg, «The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law», op. cit., 2009, p. 182. 
217 Ibid. 
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the same holds true vis-à-vis the obligation to prosecute or extradite, and as to 
whether the relevant national authorities are aware of the fact that they have 
the duty to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of grave breaches as soon 
as they are on their territory 218. This obstacle to the effective enforcement of 
the grave breaches regime stems from the confusion that often exists between 
the obligation to prosecute or extradite and universal jurisdiction. While these 
two concepts complement each other and are consequently spelled out in the 
same provision in the Geneva Conventions, they are not strictly equivalent and 
should not be confused. As noted by Roger O’Keefe:
The obligation aut dedere aut judicare is as much applicable when the 
underlying jurisdiction is based on territoriality, nationality, passive perso-
nality, the protective principle or any other basis of criminal jurisdiction 
provided for in the treaty in question 219.
Indeed, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts is not a 
precondition for the enforcement of the obligation to prosecute or extradite. 
On the contrary, universal jurisdiction merely bestows national courts with the 
power to prosecute suspects if national courts cannot do so on the basis of ter-
ritoriality, nationality, passive personality or the protective principle. Hence the 
distinction between jurisdiction and prosecution is essential. Along the same 
line, the fact that the obligation to prosecute or extradite presupposes the pres-
ence of the suspect on the territory of the forum State at the time of the trial 
does not mean that the exercise in absentia of universal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches is formally prohibited 220. There cannot be an obligation to extradite 
if the suspect is not present on the territory of the forum State. However, if 
there is no obligation to provide for in absentia universal jurisdiction, there are 
no rules that prohibit it either 221.
Thirdly, State parties have made little use of this mechanism. Accord-
ing to the 2016 official Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, the 
first national case where a suspect was prosecuted for grave breaches on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction dates back to 1994, and only 17 cases have 
218 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2890-2891.
219 O’ Keefe, «The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction», op. cit., 2009, p. 828. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
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been reported whereby national courts have exercised universal jurisdic-
tion over alleged perpetrators of war crimes or grave breaches 222. Political 
considerations often come to the fore at that point. Indeed, some politi-
cians 223 consider that mandatory universal jurisdiction is a «dangerous and 
illegitimate» 224 tool, which has been used selectively and most notably by 
former empires towards State officials of their former colonies. Furthermore, 
the well-known debate between the need to fight against impunity and the 
necessity to restore social peace after an armed conflict has led several States 
to give preference to amnesties over justice. Another – practical – argument 
is the simple fact that it is extremely difficult for courts to gather evidence, 
interrogate witnesses, arrest suspects and conduct a proper investigation for 
acts committed in a foreign country.
All in all, despite the evident limitations of the grave breaches regime, its 
importance lies in the fact that it acted as a «blueprint for other treaties, rang-
ing from the Torture to the Enforced Disappearances Conventions» 225, thus 
establishing an important precedent in international law. As regards IHL, the 
grave breaches regime constitutes the embryo of the penal system of repression 
of IHL violations, which has considerably evolved since the adoption of the 
Geneva Conventions in 1949. As Knut Dörmann and Robin Geiβ put it:
Prosecuting grave breaches and other serious international crimes is no 
longer regarded as an historic anomaly specific to the post-war period, but 
as a primary concern of the international community 226.
In addition, the adoption of the Rome Statute has had a domino effect, 
as it compels national legislators to effectively criminalize the grave breaches 
together with the other serious violations of IHL which amount to war crimes. 
While in 1969 only 49 out of 122 State parties to the Geneva Conventions had 
criminalized the grave breaches of their national legal orders, this figure rises to 
125 out of 196 State parties in 2016 227.
222 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, para. 2889. 
223 See, e.g.: Henry Kissinger, «The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction», Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001. 
224 Fleck, «Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime», op. cit., 2009, p. 848.
225 James Stewart, «Introduction», Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, 2009a, p. 654. 
226 Dörmann and Geiβ, «The implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic Legal Orders», 
op. cit., 2009, p. 705. 
227 La Haye, «Article 49: Penal sanctions», op. cit., 2016, paras. 2857-2858. 
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Therefore, the development of international criminal justice in recent 
decades has arguably led to a renewed interest in the grave breaches regime, 
and more broadly, in national prosecution of serious violations of IHL.
2. COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS
Another means to enforce States’ obligation to ensure respect for IHL is coo-
peration with international criminal courts. A detailed account of the evolu-
tion of international criminal justice would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, it is important to briefly describe it, as States can enforce their 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL through cooperation with the interna-
tional criminal tribunals in charge of punishing perpetrators of IHL violations 
that amount to war crimes.
2.1. The development of international criminal justice
Firstly, the establishment and legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are 
analyzed, as they set a revolutionary precedent in the history of international 
criminal justice. Then, the creation, development, and duty of cooperation with 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
are studied.
2.1.1. Cornerstone: the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
The landmark of international jurisdictional developments providing for 
the repression of IHL violations can be situated around World War II, with the 
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In reaction to the atrocities 
committed during the Second World War, the Allies created the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals in charge of prosecuting war criminals.
Planning for the establishment of such tribunals was the result of a coor-
dinated effort by the Allies 228. In particular, the United Nations War Crime 
228 Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 61.
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Commission was established in 1943 in order to identify German individuals 
who should be prosecuted for war crimes, and President Roosevelt, Prime 
Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin signed a declaration at the Moscow 
Conference on atrocities, where they called for the trial of officers and sol-
diers who participated in «atrocities, massacres, and executions» and more 
importantly for the punishment of «German criminals whose offenses have 
no particular geographical localization» by «joint decision of the government 
of the Allies» 229. After much debate regarding the fate of the perpetrators, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics agreed on the organization of trials 230. It led to the adoption of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereafter, 
‘IMT Charter’) annexed to the London Agreement concluded among the 
four victorious States (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) 231.
Pursuant to article 1 IMT Charter, the objective of the Tribunal was 
«the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis». In particular, article 6 states that the Tribunal had jurisdic-
tion to:
try and punish persons who, acting in the interest of the European Axis 
countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, commit-
ted [crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity].
The principles of the IMT Charter were reproduced at the war crimes 
trial in Tokyo 232, where a similar tribunal was established by a special proclama-
tion issued by the Supreme Allied Commander of the Far East, General Doug-
las MacArthur. 24 people were indicted in Nuremberg, but only 21 of them 
could actually be prosecuted. The Nuremberg trials concluded with death 
penalty sentences for 12 accused, several prison sentences and three acquittals. 
229 9 US Department of State bulletin 310 (Nº 228, 6 November 1943). Quoted in Guilfoyle, Inter-
national Criminal Law, op. cit., 2016, p. 61.
230 Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law, op. cit., 2016, p. 62.
231 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945. Available at: 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/350?OpenDocument (Accessed: 02.08.2016). 
232 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, 3th ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2014, p. 6. 
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As for the Tokyo trials, they resulted in the death penalty for seven accused, 16 
life imprisonments, and two other prison sentences.
One of the most revolutionary aspects of the IMT Charter was the fact 
that individuals were prosecuted, instead of States 233. It was therefore the first 
time that the penal repression was organized on the basis of the nature of the 
acts committed, and not on the belligerent situation. It was likewise the first 
time that the individual criminal responsibility for international crimes was 
recognized regardless of the status of the suspects 234. Furthermore, the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo trials indisputably asserted the primacy of international law 
over domestic law, as their statutes stipulated that crimes against humanity 
were punishable «whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the coun-
try where perpetrated» 235. Thus, these statutes constituted an important prece-
dent regarding the tension between State sovereignty and respect for essential 
international norms. As Antonio Cassese observed:
[W]ith the establishment of international criminal tribunals, for the first 
time international bodies penetrated that powerful and historically imper-
vious fortress – State sovereignty – to reach out to all those who live within 
the fortress 236.
Those tribunals set an important precedent in the development of interna-
tional criminal law, but they were not exempt from criticism – both on political 
and legal grounds 237. In particular, the trials were not deemed impartial insofar as 
only the losing side of the war was prosecuted. The atrocities committed by the 
Allies, the winning side, have never been prosecuted. Another important criti-
cism put forward by the defense was that charges were brought without legal 
basis and therefore infringed upon the principle of non-retroactivity.
233 Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law, op. cit., 2016, p. 58. 
234 Article 7 of the IMT Charter reads as follows: «The official position of defendants, whether as 
Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as 
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment». 
235 Beth Van Schaack and Ron Slye, «A concise history of international criminal law: Chapter 1 of 
Understanding International Criminal Law», Santa Clara University Legal Studies Research Paper, 
nº 07/42, 2007, pp. 7-46. 
236 Antonio Cassese, «Reflections on International Criminal Justice», Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, vol. 9, 2011, p. 273. 
237 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p. 8. 
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However, as Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger underline, «it is undis-
putable that punishment of war crimes rested on a secure foundation in the law 
as it existed at the time they were committed» 238. In this regard, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal held that defenses based on the principle of non-retroactivity were 
invalid in light of the obvious wrongfulness of the defendants’ conduct. To do 
so, they relied on customary international law where treaty law would not 
criminalize such conduct 239. Furthermore, from a retrospective point of view, 
there is no doubt that the principles applied at Nuremberg have been «repeat-
edly conformed to be part of international law», and that they have crystal-
lized as customary international law 240. In particular, the UN General Assembly 
endorsed them in Resolution 95 of 11 December 1946 241, and charged the 
ILC with formulating such principles and «prepare a draft code of offenses 
against the peace and security of mankind» 242, which eventually led to the 
ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 243.
While these trials and the subsequent adoption of fundamental interna-
tional treaties and conventions – the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention 
in 1948, and the Geneva Conventions in 1949 – marked a turning point in 
the development of international criminal law, it seemed that this branch of 
international law was condemned to oblivion with the Cold War. Indeed, the 
development of international criminal law froze as a result of the lack of con-
sensus within the international community in order to establish new legal 
instruments on that matter. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War allowed 
new developments, especially from the UNSC. In reaction to the exactions 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the UNSC adopted two 
resolutions establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 244 in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 245 
in 1999 respectively.
238 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 9. 
239 Van Schaack and Slye, «A concise history of international criminal law», op. cit., 2007, p. 36. 
240 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 10.
241 UNGA Resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1946, UN Doc. A/RES/1/95: «Affirms the principles 
of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of 
the Tribunal». 
242 UNGA Resolution 177(II) of 21 November 1947, UN Doc. A/RES/2/177. 
243 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 13.
244 UNSC Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
245 UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994. UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
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2.1.2. Further developments: the «ad hoc» tribunals
The end of the Cold War signed a new era in the development of inter-
national criminal law, as the UNSC started to activate its peace enforcement 
mechanisms 246. In particular, the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via drew the attention of the UNSC, as tensions between ethnic groups esca-
lated and led to one of the most horrendous conflicts of the XXth century in 
Europe. In response to the commission of mass atrocities, the UNSC described 
the situation as a threat to international peace and security in Resolution 
808 (1993) and called on the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of 
Experts to document the violations of international law that were taking place. 
The Commission of experts recommended the creation of an international 
tribunal to prosecute the individuals responsible for the abuses reported. In 
response, the Security Council decided in Resolution 808 (1993):
[t]hat an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
The Secretary General then prepared a draft statute for the future tribu-
nal. Finally, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
approved the draft statute and established the ICTY in Resolution 827 (1993). 
In this same resolution, the UNSC considered that the prosecution of perpe-
trators before an international tribunal would «contribute to ensuring that such 
violations are halted and effectively redressed». Pursuant to its statute, the ICTY 
has jurisdiction over individuals accused of committing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law 247, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 248, 
violations of the laws or customs of war 249, genocide 250, and crimes against 
humanity 251 that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.
In the same manner, the UNSC used its powers under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter to create another ad hoc tribunal, responsible for prosecuting 
246 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 14.
247 Statute of the ICTY, article 1. 
248 Ibid., article 2. 
249 Ibid., article 3. 
250 Ibid., article 4. 
251 Ibid., articles 5.
324 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
the individuals allegedly accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994 in Rwanda. While 
the international community had mostly remained silent as mass killings and 
exactions were happening, a response was expected from the Security Coun-
cil. In Resolution 955 (1994), it established the ICTR as it considered that the 
widespread violations of international law amounted to a threat to international 
peace and security, even though they had taken place within the frame of an 
internal conflict for the most part 252. Although both ad hoc tribunals were orig-
inally thought to share the same Appeals Chambers and Chief Prosecutor, the 
Office of the Prosecutor was eventually split into two positions on 15 September 
2003 253.
These ad hoc tribunals have allowed noticeable progress in the field of 
international criminal law, and, in fine, IHL. In this respect, concerns over the 
rudimentary nature of some procedural and evidentiary rules of the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Tribunals are solved as the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
extensively address these issues 254. In addition, their statutes and case-law have 
provided further details regarding the precise meaning and scope of interna-
tional crimes. In particular, as mentioned above, the ICTY has elaborated on 
the elements of war crimes and importantly contributed to the development 
of the law governing NIACs. Most notably, it has extended individual criminal 
responsibility to conducts prohibited under IHL taking place in NIACs 255. It 
has therefore significantly filled in the gap of the grave breaches, which crim-
inalize IHL violations occurring in IACs only. In the same way, the ICTR has 
done pioneering work, most notably regarding the definition of genocide 256, 
and the recognition of sexual violence as a material element of genocide or 
crime against humanity.
The ICTY and ICTR’s functions have been taken upon by the Mecha-
nism for International Criminal Tribunals (‘MICT’), whose exact nature and 
mandate are provided by UNSC Resolution 1966 (2010) 257.
252 Van Schaack and Slye, «A concise history of international criminal law», op. cit., 2007, p. 44.
253 Ibid.
254 Werleand Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 16.
255 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a «Dule», Case IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995. 
256 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 17.
257 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1966 (2010), 22.12.2010. For a brief ovierview of the MICT, see: 
Giorgia Tortora, «The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals: A Unique Model and 
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2.1.3. Consolidation: The International Criminal Court
The development of the ad hoc tribunals served as an inspiration for the 
drafting of a permanent international criminal court, described as «the final 
milestone in the development of international criminal law» 258. As Antonio 
Cassese notes, while the creation of international criminal jurisdictions had 
thus far responded to the «failure of States and international organizations 
to take decisive political, military or diplomatic action» and to the «lack of a 
robust response at the domestic level», this was not the case of the ICC. Instead:
[t]he international criminal court was born out of a genuine desire to 
dispense justice at the international level regardless of any policy conside-
rations and without taking into account any geo-political context 259.
The idea of a permanent international criminal court was not novel; it is 
the product of a history marked by various attempts. Indeed, a Convention for 
the creation of an international criminal court (Convention pour la création d’une 
cour pénale internationale) was signed in 1937 under the auspices of the League 
of Nations; nonetheless, it never came into effect 260. Then, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials gave birth to a renewed interest in the establishment of an inter-
national criminal court. This is manifest in the Genocide Convention of 1948 
which provides for such a jurisdiction in addition to national prosecution.
Against this background, the UN General Assembly called on the ILC to 
study «the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial 
organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide» 261. This led to the sub-
mission of a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court to the General 
Assembly in 1954, but the international context defined by the cold war made 
it impossible to reach an agreement. Therefore, the General Assembly decided 
to postpone discussions on this matter in 1957. In 1989, it finally authorized 
the ILC to resume work on this issue, as Latin American and Caribbean States 
Some of Its Distinctive Challenges», ASIL Insights, vol. 21(5), 06.05.2017. Available at: https://
www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/5/mechanism-international-criminal-tribunals (Ac-
cessed: 25.05.2017). 
258 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 17.
259 Cassese, «Reflections on International Criminal Justice», op. cit., 2011, p. 274. 
260 Ibid. 
261 UNGA Resolution 260(III) of 9 December 1948, UN Doc. A/RES/3/260 (1948). 
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were willing to establish an international criminal court competent to prose-
cute drug traffickers 262. In response, the ILC presented a draft statute in 1994 
to the General Assembly, which further appointed an ad hoc Committee. The 
latter rejected the distinction between a Statute and a Code where the rules of 
procedure of the Court and substantial rules on the definition of crimes would 
be exposed respectively 263, thus resulting in one statute including both.
The negotiations took place at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome 
in 1998. During the course of these negotiations, mainly two camps opposed: 
some States were willing to establish a fully-fledged international criminal 
court acting also in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
while other States were more reticent and preferred a more symbolic court 
that the Security Council would trigger in crisis situations 264. The negotiations 
eventually led to the adoption of the Rome State of the International Crim-
inal Court (hereafter, ‘Rome Statute’), broadly accepted by the international 
community as only seven States voted against it, namely China, Iraq, Israel, 
Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen. The Rome Statute entered into 
effect only four years later, with the 60th ratification thereof. As of 4 August 
2016, 124 States are parties to the Rome Statute, including all the EU Member 
StatesEU.
Articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute stipulate the conditions for the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. One element that is particularly important is the automatic 
acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction by its State parties. Therefore, the exercise 
of jurisdiction is governed by the principles of territoriality and nationality 265. 
Further, the procedure may be triggered in three scenarios: referral by a State 
party, an investigation ordered by the Prosecutor propio motu, or referral by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 266. In the latter 
case, the investigation may take place even though the national and territorial 
States are not parties to the Rome Statute.
The establishment of the ICC thus represents a major improvement in 
international criminal justice. In particular, the Rome Statute constitutes the 
262 Van Schaack and Slye, «A concise history of international criminal law», op. cit., 2007, p. 39.
263 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 19.
264 Ibid.
265 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 12.2. 
266 Ibid., article 13. 
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greatest effort of codification of international criminal law, most notably with 
regard to the definition of the core crimes – genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and aggression. It therefore has become the most authoritative 
international treaty on this matter.
Nonetheless, for the ICC to become a «universally accepted and authori-
tative world court» 267, it would need to be ratified by major players such as the 
United States, Russia, China or Israel. It should be noted that while the United 
States used to adopt an aggressive approach towards the ICC 268, there has been 
a gradual shift under the Obama administration. Even though the United 
States have not ratified the Rome Statute, they have cooperated with the ICC 
and acted accordingly within the Security Council. By way of example, the 
United States voted in favor of Resolution 1970 (2011) 269 – which referred 
the situation in Libya to the ICC – and abstained on Resolution 1593 (2005) 
on the situation in Darfur, thus allowing the Security Council to refer the sit-
uation to the ICC 270. Further, the United States have facilitated the transfer of 
Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC in 2013 271. While this constructive attitude does 
not constitute an endorsement as strong as a ratification, it arguably provides 
greater credibility to the ICC.
Besides, the ICC has been accused of being partial and targeting Afri-
can countries only. These accusations have notably been spread by the African 
Union upon the issuance of an arrest warrant against Omar Al-Bashir in 2009. 
While this criticism must be taken into consideration, it is not entirely objec-
tive. It is true that much of the ICC’s work has targeted African countries, 
but it also has extended to other geographical areas. In particular, the ICC is 
currently conducting preliminary examinations in Colombia, Iraq as regards 
the conduct of UK nationals during the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and Ukraine; 
the 2008 armed conflict in Georgia 272 is likewise under formal investigation. 
It should also be noted that many of the situations under scrutiny at the ICC 
were referred to the Court by African States themselves or by the Security 
267 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 22.
268 See: William A. Schabas, «United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all 
about the Security Council», European Journal of International Law, vol. 15(4), 2004, pp. 701-720. 
269 UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011. UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011). 
270 See: http://www.amicc.org/usicc/approachtoicccases.php (Accessed: 05.08.2016).
271 See: http://www.amicc.org/usicc/approachtocooperation.php (Accessed: 05.08.2016). 
272 See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-27-01-2016-georgia (Accessed: 
04.08.2016).
328 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
Council, thus leaving not much margin of discretion to the ICC. For example, 
the situation in Sudan was referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Fur-
ther, as Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger underline, African countries have 
played an important role in the establishment of the ICC and the African civil 
society largely supports them 273. In the words of the current Prosecutor of the 
ICC, Fatou Bensouda:
If you look at protecting the perpetrators of these crimes, if that is the 
only thing you are looking at, obviously you will make the criticism that 
we are targeting only Africans. But if you look at the millions of victims of 
these crimes – millions, in all the situations across Africa that we are dealing 
with, there is millions of rape, of pillaging, of all sorts of atrocities – then 
you will know that someone, some institution, has to be there to protect 
them 274.
In addition, it should be noted that the establishment of the ICC does not 
constitute by itself a complete system; therefore, the claim according to which 
the ICC represents «the final milestone in the development of international 
criminal law» 275 must be nuanced.
In this respect, a movement has emerged with the creation of hybrid courts, 
in particular, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels in East Timor, 
the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or the Extraordinary Afri-
can Chambers in the Courts of Senegal 276. These jurisdictions are hybrid to the 
extent that they use elements of both domestic and international law. Conse-
quently, the establishment of the ICC did not constitute the final achievement 
of international criminal justice. More importantly, the ICC institutes a system 
of complementarity between international and national jurisdictions, which is 
essential for the effective success of the fight against impunity.
273 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 25. 
274 Theodor Meron and Fatou Bensouda, «Twenty Years of International Criminal Law: From the 
ICTY to the ICC and Beyond», Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, vol. 107, 2013, p. 410. 
275 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 17.
276 The Extraordinary African Chambers confirmed Hissène Habré’s penalty of life imprisonment 
in appeals on 27 April 2017. See: Extraordinary African Chambers, court of appeals, Le procu-
reur général c. Hissein Habré, judgment of 27 April 2017. Available at: http://www.chambresa-
fricaines.org/pdf/Arr%C3%AAt_int%C3%A9gral.pdf (Accessed: 25.05.2017). 
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2.2. A duty of cooperation
In accordance with their duty to ensure respect for IHL, third States to 
an armed conflict are called on cooperating with these international criminal 
jurisdictions. This duty of cooperation is further spelled out in the statutes of 
the different tribunals. In particular, article 28 ICTR Statute and 29 ICTY 
Statute stipulate this obligation of cooperation in similar terms:
1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investi-
gation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations 
of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assis-
tance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tri-
bunal.
As far as the ICC is concerned, the Rome Statute dedicates a whole part 
to the issue of international cooperation and judicial assistance 277. It should also 
be noted that the Security Council has reiterated this duty of cooperation in 
numerous resolutions on the international criminal tribunals 278, in particular 
with regard to the affected countries. Cooperation is crucial for the success of 
international criminal justice. Indeed, international jurisdictions do not have 
the same capacities as States and therefore rely heavily on them regarding 
arrest, surrender, detention, etc. The case of Omar al-Bashir is significant in 
this regard, as two arrest warrants were issued against him in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. However, this suspect has traveled throughout the world without 
being arrested, including in State parties to the Rome Statute 279.
277 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, articles 86-102. 
278 UNSC Resolution 1166 (1998) of 13 May 1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998); UNSC Res-
olution 1329 (2000) of 30 November 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000); UNSC Resolution 
1503 (2003) of 28 August 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003); UNSC Resolution 1534 (2004) 
of 26 March 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004). 
279 South African judges intended to prosecute him in 2015 on the occasion of an African Union 
summit in Johannesburg, however the South African government alleged he had immunity as a 
head of State and allowed him to leave the country. 
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Furthermore, it could be argued that prosecuting at national level sus-
pects who are involved in one of the cases being prosecuted before those 
international courts also constitute a fulfillment of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL. In this respect, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC provide two 
different models. While both admit concurrent jurisdiction, the ad hoc tribunals 
rely on the principle of precedence 280. That is, international criminal tribunals 
have primacy over national courts, so that they may «formally request national 
courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal» 281. However, 
they have rarely exercised this right 282.
Conversely, the ICC relies on a different model, that of complementa-
rity 283. Therefore, national prosecution takes precedence over international 
prosecution. In this regard, the preamble clearly refers to «the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes» and underlines that effective prosecution can only take place «by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation». As 
Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger note, this choice derives from «the real-
istic assessment that direct enforcement of international criminal law through 
international courts will continue to be the exception rather than the rule» 284. In 
practical terms, if domestic courts indeed enforced their obligation to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes, it would result in faster, cheaper 
and more effective proceedings 285. Therefore, for the ICC to act, the State must 
either be «unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation of pros-
ecution» 286. Consequently, this model seems to better adapt to concerns over 
State sovereignty 287 insofar as it avoids the intervention of the ICC whenever 
280 ICTY Statute, article 9(2); ICTR Statute, article 8(2). 
281 Ibid. 
282 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 93.
283 The preamble clearly expresses this idea: «Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions». This 
idea is further expressed in article 1: «An International Court [...] is hereby established. It shall 
be a permanent institutio and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for 
the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be com-
plementary to national criminal jurisdictions».
284 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 93. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 17. 
287 See: Óscar Solera, «Complementary jurisdiction and international criminal justice», International 
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 84(845), 2002, pp. 149-154.
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States already proceed to prosecution themselves. Furthermore, as noted above, 
this model of complementarity has prompted numerous States to actually legis-
late in order to be able to prosecute themselves. A virtuous circle has therefore 
taken place of mutual influence and cooperation, whereby the ICC has been 
bestowed competence to try alleged perpetrators of international crimes, except 
if they are already prosecuted at the national level. Therefore, national legislators 
have bestowed their national courts competence over these crimes as well, so 
as to make intervention by the ICC unnecessary. Yet, if a State were unwilling 
to prosecute, the ICC could still intervene. In the words of Gerhard Werle and 
Florian Jessberger, «[t]he Rome Statute thus regulates the relationship between 




One aspect of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL as provided by Com-
mon Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions deals with the consequences 
of a breach in terms of responsibility. In this respect, there are two mechanisms 
of international responsibility: State responsibility and individual responsibility. 
While the former does not entail criminal consequences as a result of the re-
jection of the notion of State crime in international law, the opposite is true 
with regard to individual responsibility. 
Pursuant to the system established by the ILC’ Articles on State Respon-
sibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, third States to an armed conflict may 
refer a case of serious violation to IHL to the ICJ, insofar as the norms at stake 
are owed to the international community. The regime of State responsibility 
follows the same logic as Common Article 1 since it creates a decentralized 
mechanism whereby all States are guardians of the respect for such obligations. 
This is arguably the case of many rules of IHL, some of which constitute jus 
cogens as already established in Chapter 1. Even though the application of State 
288 Werle and Jessberger, Principles of international criminal law, op. cit., 2014, p. 95.
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responsibility to Common Article 1 is theoretical at the moment, the regime 
of State responsibility retains some importance with respect to Common Arti-
cle 1. Indeed, the recurrent and systematic resort to the ICJ, together with 
the obligation to make reparation whenever the violations are established by 
the ICJ, should have some deterrent effect and help prevent future violations 
from occurring. Further, there is some overlap between the legal consequences 
arising from an internationally wrongful act pursuant to ARSIWA and the 
measures that third States may undertake in accordance with Common Arti-
cle 1. Consequently, it can be submitted that ARSIWA reinforces the system 
established by Common Article 1 and should be effectively implemented by 
the State parties to the Geneva Conventions in order to enforce their obliga-
tion to ensure respect for IHL.
As for the system of individual responsibility, it is probably the one that has 
been further developed in relation to IHL and for which the most important 
legal developments have taken place. To implement their obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL, third States to an armed conflict can prosecute or extradite 
alleged perpetrators of serious violations and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions on the one hand and cooperate with international criminal tri-
bunals on the other. The Geneva Conventions established, already in 1949, a 
decentralized model of penal repression of grave breaches whereby all State 
parties committed to providing penal sanctions for the grave breaches and to 
either prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators, including on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction if needed. This model contains many flaws and its prac-
tical application remains limited; however, its most important virtue actually 
lies in the fact that it established a precedent in the establishment of individ-
ual criminal responsibility for IHL violations in treaty law and enshrined the 
principle of universal jurisdiction over those cases. Further developments in 
international law have intended to fill in the gaps of the grave breaches regime 
and have tremendously extended the scope of individual criminal responsi-
bility at international level. The current system that is being designed rests 
on national/international cooperation which, despite the limitations of each 
system, is quite complete if effectively implemented. In particular, with regard 
to the ICC, national courts have precedence but if they do not prosecute, then 
the ICC can take the lead.
Therefore, it appears that States have the means to enforce their obliga-
tion to ensure respect for IHL in legal terms, but extra-legal considerations 
often impede their effective development. Concerning the use of universal 
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jurisdiction or the establishment of international criminal tribunals, practical 
issues arise as the courts responsible for the case are often too remote from 
the place where exactions took place for victims and civil society in general 
to play a role, and therefore require the effective cooperation of the affected 
countries in collecting evidence, etc. Another issue that arises is selectivity, as 
in many cases justice is rendered during or after the armed conflict took place 
with regard to the crimes committed by the losing party only 289. 
289 Cassese, «Reflections on International Criminal Justice», op. cit., 2011, p. 273.
Chapter 4 
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC 
LEVELS
The previous chapter dealt with the mechanisms of international responsibility 
over violations of IHL. While State responsibility may be invoked in accordan-
ce with the rules established under public international law, this system neither 
calls for a purely punitive response, nor requires transposition at national level. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to analyze whether the three actors – the EU, 
France, and Spain – have correctly transposed and enforced their obligations 
regarding the penal repression of violations of IHL committed by individuals.
In particular, this chapter seeks to assess whether they have appropriately 
transposed the grave breaches system into their legal order and if they have 
extended it to include serious violations of IHL occurring in NIACs. Besides 
this action designed to provide a response at national level, this chapter further 
aims to determine whether the EU, France and Spain have established the 
means for their cooperation with international criminal tribunals.
As a preliminary comment, it should be noted that despite lacking crim-
inal jurisdiction of its own, the potential of the EU on this matter should 
not be overlooked. Indeed, the IHL Guidelines specifically refer to the fight 
against impunity, so that the different operational means at the disposal at the 
EU to implement them are also available on this matter. Furthermore, the EU 
acknowledges that national prosecution is a priority, but also a consequence of 
the creation of the ICC, as EU Member States must cooperate with the ICC 
pursuant to the principle of complementarity.
The EU’s involvement in the fight against impunity is thus reflected both 
at internal and external levels. At internal level, the EU has adopted a series 
of legal instruments allowing an improved cooperation among EU Member 
States in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of core international crimes. 
At external level, it is reflected in the EU’s commitment to the establishment 
and consolidation of international criminal jurisdictions in charge of prosecut-
ing, inter alia, war crimes.
Section 1 
PROSECUTING ALLEGED PERPETRATORS
[N]ational courts are often the last opportunity for 
the State to comply with its international obliga-
tions before reaching an international tribunal. 1
In this section, the measures adopted at EU and domestic levels to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators are analyzed. It is sustained that the resort to national 
courts, together with the support of the EU, contributes to the process of en-
suring respect of IHL. As observed by Sharon Weill, this process is two-fold: it 
generates respect for IHL at the national level but also strengthens the «inter-
national rule of law on a global level» 2.
As explained in Chapter 3, the Geneva Conventions already established a 
mechanism of penal sanction with regard to the grave breaches. Nonetheless, 
since this system has proven to be limited, the elements scrutinized in this 
Chapter slightly differ from the strict wording of the Geneva Conventions. As 
such, the notion of grave breaches, typical of IHL, is replaced with that of war 
crimes, proper to international criminal law.
It should be noted in this regard that the adoption of the Rome Statute 
and its corresponding entry into force have arguably accelerated the process 
of prosecuting alleged perpetrators of violations of IHL. This is – unsurpris-
ingly – the case for the EU, but also for France. Indeed, the latter had not 
transposed into its legal order the obligation to extradite or prosecute in rela-
tion with violations of IHL, nor provided for a definition of war crimes before 
the entry into force of the Rome Statute. As for Spain, while it had transposed 
– for the most part – its obligations arising from the Geneva Conventions 
into its domestic legislation, the adoption of the Rome Statute constituted an 
opportunity to improve the existing system and to further enlarge it.
First, the process of criminalization of the violations of IHL is analyzed. 
It covers the process of providing for penal sanctions for a certain number 
of behaviors prohibited under IHL, the provisions relating to the status of 
the alleged perpetrator, as well as the operational developments, such as the 
1 Weill, The role of national courts in applying International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2014, p. 8. 
2 Ibid., p. 9.
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creation of specialized jurisdictions on this matter. Second, the establishment 
of universal jurisdiction mechanisms over war crimes allowing prosecution, 
regardless of nationality, is examined as this mechanism is mandatory with 
regard to the grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions.
1. CRIMINALIZING THE VIOLATIONS OF IHL
The action of the three different actors is analyzed with regard to the provision 
of penal sanctions in response to violations of IHL in their legal orders. In this 
framework, the EU has promoted the development of individual criminal res-
ponsibility for war crimes and the necessity to prosecute alleged perpetrators 
despite lacking criminal jurisdiction. As for France, it has enshrined the rele-
vant provisions in its criminal legislation quite lately, in response to the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute; nonetheless, this recent interest seems to be 
accompanied by political will, as operational means have been implemented 
subsequently to ensure the effectiveness of prosecutions. Finally, Spain has been 
a model insofar as it integrated the relevant provisions in its criminal legislation 
already in 1995 and has completed it with the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute.
1.1. The EU: Support national prosecutions 3
The EU has become an advocate of international criminal justice, includ-
ing with regard to the obligation to implement the aut dedere aut judicare prin-
ciple, which must be adapted to the EU’s specific nature. The potential of the 
EU on this matter should not be disregarded. Indeed, the IHL Guidelines 
specifically refer to the fight against impunity, so that the different operational 
means at the disposal at the EU to implement them are also available on this 
matter. Furthermore, the EU acknowledges that national prosecution is a pri-
ority, but also a consequence of the creation of the ICC, as EU Member States 
3 Some paragraphs in this section were published in: Bettina Steible, «EU support to domestic 
prosecution of violations of International Humanitarian Law», UNIO – EU Law Journal, vol. 
4(1), 2018, pp. 51-66.
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must cooperate with the ICC pursuant to the principle of complementarity. 
As a result, the EU has adopted a range of tools to foster judicial cooperation 
among EU Member States on this matter in order to ensure that the EU does 
not become a safe haven for perpetrators 4.
1.1.1. Supporting the fight against impunity regarding war crimes
The EU has been an important promoter of international criminal law, 
including the fight against impunity regarding war crimes. It proclaims that it 
is committed to ending impunity for the most serious crimes and therefore 
strongly supports the dissemination of international criminal law. Following 
the example of the UN, the EU projects the idea that peace may be achieved 
only if justice is made and alleged perpetrators of the most serious interna-
tional crimes are prosecuted 5. EU Member States formalized this commitment 
to the fight against impunity, including in several legally binding instruments.
1.1.1.1. An EU objective
In Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on 
the International Criminal Court, EU Member States expressed that inter-
national core crimes are «of concern for all Member States» so that they 
should «cooperate for the prevention of those crimes and for putting an end 
to the impunity of the perpetrators thereof» 6. The fight against impunity was 
then enshrined as an objective in the Stockholm Program 7, in which the 
4 Strategy of the EU Genocide Network to combat impunity for the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States, 2014, 
15581/1/14 Rev 1 (hereafter, ‘EU Genocide Network Strategy’), p. 3; The Stockholm Pro-
gramme, OJ C 115/1 of 4 May 2010, p. 8. 
5 ICC, 7th session of the Assembly of State parties, General debate, Declaration of Mr. Jean-Fran-
çois Blarel, Ambassador of France in the Netherlands, Head of Delegation, on behalf of the 
European Union, The Hague, 14 November 2008: «[...] une paix durable ne peut être réalisée si 
les exigences de la justice et la recherche des responsabilités individuelles pour les crimes inter-
nationaux les plus graves ne reçoivent pas une réponse appropriée». 
6 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court, OJ L 150, 18.06.2003, pp. 67-69, Recital, para. 4.
7 The Stockholm Programme was adopted on 4 May 2010. It established the priorities of the 
EU in the area of freedom and security for the period 2010-2014 and replaced the Hague Pro-
gramme. See: The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens, OJ C 115/1, 04.05.2010, pp. 1-38. 
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EU institutions are invited to «continue support and promote Union and 
Member States’ activity against impunity and to fight against crimes of gen-
ocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes» 8. Finally, Council Decision 
2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 endorsed these statements, as its recital 
also states that:
[t]he Union and its Member States are determined to put an end to the 
impunity of the perpetrators of those crimes by taking measures at national 
level and by enhancing international cooperation to ensure their effective 
prosecution 9.
It is also worth mentioning in this regard that the EU established an 
annual ‘EU Day against impunity’, which aims to raise awareness on interna-
tional core crimes, to promote prosecution, as well as to «appropriately recog-
nize the common efforts of the EU Member States and the European Union 
in enforcing international criminal law» 10.
In the same manner as IHL, the fight against impunity is understood as 
one component of the EU’s prior objectives, in particular regarding the EU’s 
founding values and its commitment towards the universal principles of lib-
erty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms 11. 
EU Member States made this commitment clear on several occasions, using 
the provisions on the EU’s founding values and on their externalization as the 
legal basis for the EU’s action on this matter. By way of example, the recital 
of Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP refers to «the consolidation 
of the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as the preservation of 
peace and the strengthening of international security» as the EU legal basis 
to act on this matter. It then explicitly integrates the principles of the Rome 
Statute into the EU’s objectives:
8 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ C 
115/1, 04.05.2010, p. 8.
9 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011, OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, p. 56, preamble, 
para. 6.
10 Presidency report of the EU Day against impunity of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, 23 May 2016, Eurojust, The Hague (10233/16). 
11 Jan Wouters and Sudeshna Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: The European Union 
and the International Criminal Court», in Cédric Ryngaert (ed.), The effectiveness of International 
Criminal Tribunals, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009, p. 5. 
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[...] the principles of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, as well as those regulating its functioning, are fully in line with the 
principles and objectives of the EU 12.
In Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011, the EU Mem-
ber States confirmed and further detailed those elements, as they based their 
Decision on article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union:
In its action on the international scene the Union seeks to advance the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law, as provided for in article 21 of the Treaty 13.
EU Member States explicitly reiterated this commitment in 2016 in their 
‘Conclusions on the fight against impunity for the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes within the European Union and its Mem-
ber States’. The recital states that the EU «is founded on the values of liberty, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights» 14. Consequently, the 
codification of the EU’s founding values as well as their externalization has not 
become a dead letter. On the contrary, they serve as the legal basis for the EU’s 
action in the fight against impunity on the international scene. The EU there-
fore explicitly legitimizes its action on this matter on the basis of article 2 TEU.
This commitment extends to violations of both IHL and IHRL, in par-
ticular with regard to the so-called ‘core international crimes’. It is manifest 
both externally and internally. In this respect, the EU has used its CFSP to pro-
mote the fight against impunity on the international stage, notably through the 
adoption of guidelines. The IHL Guidelines are of utmost importance in this 
regard, but it is also possible to refer to the ‘Guidelines to the EU policy toward 
third countries, on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
12 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court, OJ L 150, 18.06.2003, pp. 67-69, recital, para. 3. 
13 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 (OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, p. 56), recital, 
para. 1. 
14 Council Conclusions on fight against impunity for the crimes of genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States (15584/2/14), 15-16 
June 2015.
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or punishment’ 15, the ‘EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict’ 16, 
or the ‘EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all 
forms of discrimination against them’ 17.
1.1.1.2. Developing the legal framework on war crimes
In relation with the obligation to ensure respect for IHL specifically, the 
IHL Guidelines refer to the concept of war crimes and the necessity to prose-
cute them. In this regard, even though the wording of the Guidelines is quite 
vague, it refers to several key concepts. In particular, it recognizes that certain 
«serious violations of IHL are defined as war crimes», thereby acknowledging 
the link existing between IHL and international criminal law, two branches 
of international law which meet at the notion of war crimes 18. By giving its 
opinion on numerous declarations where it has called for the suppression of 
serious violations of IHL and the need to prosecute their perpetrators 19, the 
Union has, in the words of Tristan Ferraro, initiated a movement followed 
progressively by international organizations and States, which culminated with 
the creation of international ad hoc tribunals and the adoption of the Statute 
of Rome 20.
15 Council of the European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – An up-date of the Guide-
lines (6129/1/12), Brussels, 20.03.2012. Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/doc-
ument/ST-6129-2012-REV-1/en/pdf (Accessed: 15.05.2017). 
16 Council of the European Union, Update of the EU guidelines on children and armed conflict, 
16.06.2008. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/10019.en08.pdf 
(Accessed: 15.05.2017). 
17 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and com-
bating all forms of discrimination against them, 08.12.2008. Available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16173cor.en08.pdf (Accessed: 15.05.2017). 
18 But also genocides and crimes against humanity when they occur in times of war.
19 See, e.g.: Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European 
Union on Libya, Brussels, 23 February 2011, 6966/1/11 REV 1 PRESSE 36; Council conclu-
sions on Côte d’Ivoire, 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 31 January 2011; Dec-
laration by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton 
on behalf of the European Union on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, 6 October 2010, Brussels; Council 
Conclusions on Sri Lanka, 2942nd General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 May 2009; EU 
annual report on human rights 2008, p. 175.
20 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 448.
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The EU goes even further as it recognizes international criminal law as 
forming part of IHL. Indeed, the list of «principal legal instruments of IHL» 
contained in the annex of the IHL Guidelines refers to the statutes of the 
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC 21. In the same line, in the document on the ‘Use of 
Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations’, the EU 
confirms that the Statute of the ICC is an integral part of IHL:
References to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) are deemed to include, where applicable, inter 
alia, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the Protocols additional 
to these Conventions of 8 June 1977 and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998 22.
The latter example is significant in the sense that the Rome Statute is the 
only legal text referred to other than IHL, and no mention is made to the 1907 
Hague Regulations in the text of the IHL Guidelines 23, even though they are 
considered the most important IHL treaty norms alongside the Geneva Con-
ventions. It is further worth mentioning that the 2009 ‘Council Conclusions 
on promoting compliance with IHL’ highlight the importance of criminaliz-
ing the serious violations of IHL:
The Council affirms its strong opposition to impunity for serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. [...] The 
Council emphasizes the importance of dealing effectively with the legacy 
of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law 
by supporting appropriate accountability mechanisms 24.
As a result, the EU seems to consider international criminal law as an 
integral part of IHL as well as an essential component of its respect. By doing 
so, it participates in the general movement of criminalization of the most seri-
21 IHL Guidelines, Annex.
22 Use of Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations – 1st revision, 
Brussels, 28 February 2006, 6877/06, EXT 1 (31.03.2010).
23 IHL Guidelines, para. 8.
24 Council conclusions on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, 2985th For-
eign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009.
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ous violations of IHL on a conceptual level. In this context, the IHL Guide-
lines refer to the notion of war crimes as follows:
Certain serious violations of IHL are defined as war crimes. War crimes 
may occur in the same circumstances as genocide and crimes against hu-
manity but the latter, unlike war crimes, are not linked to the existence of 
an armed conflict 25.
With this wording, the EU emphasizes the close relationship between 
war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity. They all are considered 
the most serious violations of international law and are punishable, not only at 
national level, but also at the international level. However, the Guidelines do 
not provide for a definition of all these crimes. Instead of defining what war 
crimes, genocide and crime against humanity are, the Guidelines underline 
their differences in terms of ratione temporis only.
Furthermore, the EU’s practice seems to have focused on the notion of 
‘war crimes’ in the context of the fight against impunity, instead of those of 
‘grave breaches’ and ‘serious violations’, typical of IHL. The wording of the 
Guidelines does not seem to establish any kind of differentiated procedural 
regime, depending on the nature of the violation, as it is the case in IHL. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the obligation to prosecute or extradite was designed 
with regard to the grave breaches only. However, the Guidelines refer to war 
crimes and do not even mention the grave breaches in relation with the obli-
gation. Therefore, even though the wording is quite imprecise, it seems to 
endorse the alignment of the procedural regime of war crimes occurring in 
IAC and in NIAC. In practice, the EU has called to hold the criminal respon-
sibility of persons responsible for IHL violations regardless of the nature of 
the armed conflict 26. It should also be observed that the EU recognizes the 
authority of the Rome Statute of the ICC 27, so that it endorses the criminali-
zation of violations of IHL occurring both in IACs and NIACs, as enshrined 
in Article 8. Thus, through its practice and pursuant to the Guidelines, the EU 
participates in the movement of alignment of the regime of IACs and NIACs 
and focuses on the notion of ‘war crimes’.
25 IHL Guidelines, paras. 13/14.
26 Ferraro, «Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère», op. cit., 2002, p. 447.
27 See infra, Section 2. 
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In addition, the EU, together with some active Member States, has proven 
to advocate successfully for the extension of the list of behaviors that amount to 
‘war crimes’. On the occasion of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court held in Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May 
to 11 June 2010, the delegation of Belgium lobbied to include some new war 
crimes applicable to NIAC. Negotiations came out in favor of the delegation 
of Belgium so that three war crimes were added to the already long list of war 
crimes contained in the Rome Statute. These crimes are the following: employ-
ing poison or poisoned weapons 28; employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices 29; and employing bullets 
which expand or flatten easily in the human body such as bullets with a hard 
envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions 30. 
The argument raised was that these crimes constitute «serious violation of the 
laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, 
as reflected in customary international law» 31. The results of this Conference were 
acknowledged by the Council 32, which adopted a new Decision on the Inter-
national Criminal Court notably in order to integrate them in its policy action.
In the same line, the EU has focused on the criminalization of sexual vio-
lence occurring in armed conflict. By way of example, it reaffirms the commit-
ment to eliminate
all forms of discrimination and violence towards women and girls, notably 
by putting an end to impunity and ensuring the protection of civilians, 
especially women and girls, during and after armed conflicts, as IHL and 
IHRL impose the obligation to the States 33.
It is recalled that, pursuant to the Rome Statute, rape, sexual slavery, 
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and any other form 
of sexual violence are constitutive of war crimes when they are committed in 
28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 8(2)
(b)(xvii).
29 Ibid., article 8(2)(b)(xviii).
30 Ibid., article 8(2)(b)(xix).
31 Rome Statute amendment proposals, Report of the Working Group on other amendments, 
RC/11, annex IV. Available at: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-11-An-
nex.IV-ENG.pdf (Accessed: 22.05.2017).
32 Council Conclusions on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010, 25 May 2010.
33 6072/1/05 REV (Presse 19).
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situations of armed conflict and also, in some very specific circumstances, of 
crimes against humanity 34.
1.1.1.3. Recognizing international criminal responsibility
Lastly, the EU has touched upon the regulation of the status of the alleged 
perpetrator in the sense that it has consistently supported the recognition of 
international criminal responsibility. This commitment is formalized in the 
Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL:
Individuals bear personal responsibility for war crimes. States must, in 
accordance with their national law, ensure that alleged perpetrators are 
brought before their own domestic courts or handed over for trial by the 
courts of another State or by an international criminal tribunal, such as the 
International Criminal Court 35.
Even though the wording is quite vague, it recalls an essential element of 
international law that has been reiterated in numerous declarations.
As for immunity, some recommendations are addressed to EU Member 
States in the EU ‘Genocide Network Strategy to combat impunity for the 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes within the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States’. The underpinning is that immunity should 
not be understood as allowing safe havens on EU territory, thus encouraging 
EU Member States to develop «national guidelines in line with international 
standards and clarify this area of law applicable to relevant ministries and crimi-
nal justice authorities» 36. Within the frame of the EU’s external action, it is held 
in the 2013 ‘Toolkit for bridging the gap between international and national 
justice’ that the official capacity as a Head of State or government or a member 
of Government or Parliament shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility in national law «as there should be no exceptions in the fight 
against impunity», while recognizing that this may involve constitutional issues, 
which «may need to be resolved, either by interpretation or amendment» 37.
34 Auvret-Finck, «L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC», op. cit., 2010, p. 54.
35 IHL Guidelines, paras. 13/14. 
36 EU Genocide Network Strategy, Measure 4. 
37 European Commission, High Representative of the Europeann Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document on advancing the principle of complementarity, 
Toolkit for bridging the gap between international and national justice, SWD(2013) 26 final, 
Brussels, 31.01.2013, p. 19. 
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Thus, the EU has been a staunch supporter of the fight against impunity, 
considered one of its prior objectives. This political support has extended to, 
inter alia, war crimes, which are understood in accordance with the current 
state of international law, since they include not only ‘grave breaches’ but also 
‘serious violations’ of IHL and entail new behaviors, such as sexual violence. 
Nonetheless, all these elements are quite vague due to the lack of competence 
of the EU to enact penal legislation on this matter. In spite of these limitations, 
the EU has adopted legally binding instruments where it could: judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters.
1.1.2. Fostering judicial cooperation among EU Member States
The EU has adopted a range of instruments to foster judicial cooperation 
among EU Member States, in order to ensure that the EU does not become 
a safe haven for perpetrators 38. In this regard, article 8 of Council Deci-
sion 2011/168/CFSP clarifies that the EU’s commitment in the fight against 
impunity exists within the frame of its external action, but also extends to its 
internal policy:
The Union shall ensure consistency and coherence between its instru-
ments and policies in all areas of its external and internal action in relation 
to the most serious international crimes as referred to in the Rome Sta-
tute 39.
Developing tools at internal level is indeed necessary in order to avoid, to 
the largest extent possible, accusations of double standards. If the EU were to 
succeed in compelling EU Member States to develop legislation on this mat-
ter, its efforts in the fight against impunity would be more credible, legitimate, 
and comprehensive 40.
Even though the IHL Guidelines refer to the EU’s external action, they 
are indicative of the EU’s approach to the concepts that they implement. In 
38 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 3; The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115/1 of 4 May 2010, 
p. 8. 
39 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and 
repealing Common Position 2003/44/CFSP, OJ L 76 of 22 March 2011, p. 58. 
40 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 24.
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particular, they specifically refers to the obligation to extradite or prosecute in 
the following terms:
Individuals bear personal responsibility for war crimes. States must, in 
accordance with their national law, ensure that the alleged perpetrators are 
brought before their own domestic courts or handed over for trial by the 
courts of another State or by an international criminal tribunal, such as the 
International Criminal Court.
While the content of this clause is not exactly the same as the one con-
tained in the Geneva Conventions, there is no doubt that it recalls the obli-
gation to extradite or prosecute. First, it refers to the obligation to prosecute: 
«States must [...] ensure that the alleged perpetrators are brought before their 
own domestic courts», and presents extradition as an alternative, including 
before international jurisdictions.
In parallel to the IHL Guidelines, the EU has adopted a series of legally 
binding instruments in relation to domestic prosecution of war crimes within 
the frame of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In particular, it is worth 
mentioning Council Decision 2002/494/JHA, which established a ‘Euro-
pean network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (hereafter, ‘EU genocide network’), 
Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and 
prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the EU 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant. The adoption of such tools may be interpreted as a response to the 
commitment formalized by EU Members States in 2001 to work together to 
combat certain forms of crime 41.
The purpose of Council Decision 2003/335/JHA is:
to increase cooperation between national units in order to maximize 
the ability of law enforcement authorities in different Member States 
to cooperate effectively in the field of investigation and prosecution 
of persons who have committed or participated in the commission of 
41 Council Common Position of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal Court (2001/443/
CFSP), recital 4.
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genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as defined in Articles 
6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 
17 July 1998 42.
Therefore, an international commitment of the EU – cooperating with 
the ICC – is in turn used at internal level in order to encourage EU Member 
States to take action on this issue. The Decision does not provide for precise 
obligations but solely establishes an obligation of cooperation regarding the 
exchange of information 43, investigation, and prosecution 44 of people seeking 
residence in an EU Member State and allegedly accused of having committed 
an international core crime.
In the same line, the objective of Council Decision 2002/494/JHA is to 
make cooperation more efficient through the establishment of an EU Geno-
cide Network within Member States’ police and justice systems 45. Concretely, 
EU Member States must designate a contact point for the exchange of infor-
mation concerning the investigation of international core crimes, including 
war crimes, as defined by the Rome Statute 46. These contact points must then 
provide information upon request or on their initiative that may be relevant 
in this context. Therefore, this Decision aims to establish the means of cooper-
ation on this matter, as the actual investigation and prosecution fall under the 
remit of national authorities 47.
In this context, a Secretariat was established in July 2011 within the staff 
of Eurojust, although it works as a separate unit 48. Furthermore, it is worth 
noticing that the EU Genocide Network cooperates with institutions not from 
42 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, OJ L 118, 14.05.2003, pp. 12-14.
43 Ibid., article 2. 
44 Ibid., article 3. 
45 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and 
amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the 
fight against serious crimes, OJ L 138, 04.06.2009, p. 12.
46 Ibid., article 1. 
47 See: «EU a key player in ICC system» interview, Global Justice, 03.02.2015. Available at: 
https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/eu-a-key-player-in-icc-system/ (Accessed: 
09.02.2017). 
48 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and 
amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the 
fight against serious crimes, OJ L 138, 04.06.2009, p. 14, article 25a. 
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the EU. As such, it includes observers from Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and 
the USA and works with representatives from the ICC, ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, the ICRC, Interpol, and civil society organizations. The 
EU Genocide Network further liaises with representatives from the European 
Commission and Eurojust 49. In addition, a Task Force composed of five contact 
points was established within this framework with a view to propose improve-
ments in the fight against impunity’s efficiency 50.
The Task Force drafted a Strategy in this sense, published in 2014 51 and 
endorsed by the Council in its Conclusions of 15-16 June 2015 52. Some ele-
ments of the Strategy are worth mentioning here. It is stated that the EU 
Genocide Network holds «a pivotal role in ensuring the EU’s commitment to 
fighting impunity in the internal area» 53 and serves as a «best practice model 
for the development of similar networks in other regions» as it is already the 
case in the African Union framework 54. In addition, it provides a set of meas-
ures addressed to EU institutions and Member States «to support national 
investigations and prosecutions of core international crimes» 55.
Concretely, the Strategy proposes several recommendations relating to 
procedures and the operational functioning of the fight against impunity 
at national level, such as implementing measures to improve the identifica-
tion of cases and case-relevant information (measure 2), facilitating cooper-
ation among the «immigration, law enforcement, prosecution, mutual legal 
assistance, financial and intelligence authorities» as well as with civil society 
(measure 3).
For present purposes, the «desirability» of the creation of specialized 
units dealing exclusively with cases of core international crimes should be 
highlighted (measure 1). This recommendation should therefore be read in 
conjunction with Council Decision 2003/335/JHA on the investigation and 
prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which rec-
ommended – already in 2003:
49 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 24. 
50 Ibid., p. 4. 
51 Ibid.
52 Council conclusions on fight against impunity for the crime of genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States. 
53 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 24.
54 Ibid., p. 25. 
55 Ibid., pp. 32-45.
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to set up or designate specialist units within the competent law enfor-
cement authorities with particular responsibility for investigating and, as 
appropriate, prosecuting the crimes in question 56.
At least Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden, the UK and have created such units, which include officers 
specially trained to work in the identification, investigation or prosecution 
of, inter alia, war crimes, following a multidisciplinary approach 57. The cre-
ation of these units has proven to meaningfully improve the prosecution of 
alleged war criminals in the countries where they have been established. In 
this respect, the data presented in the Strategy on the number of completed 
and ongoing cases in EU Member States unsurprisingly reflect this reality, 
with the bulk of prosecutions taking place in the countries dotted with such 
specialized units 58.
In the same way, Measure 4 explicitly refers to the need to improve domes-
tic legislation relating to investigation, prosecution and mutual legal assistance 
so as to ensure that it appropriately reflects the current state of customary and 
treaty international law, in particular with regard to the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute. It likewise refers to the necessity to codify in domestic law the defini-
tion of «core international crimes in accordance with international standards», to 
provide for «an exercise of extraterritorial, including universal, jurisdiction over 
those crimes», to ensure that the legislation adequately transposes the notions of 
command or superior responsibility and «includes the relevant rules on the irrel-
evance of superior order defenses and statutes of limitation» 59. Special mention is 
also made to the necessity not to use immunity as an undue protection of alleged 
perpetrators. The Strategy also refers to the necessity to include the different 
types of individual criminal responsibility for these crimes, namely command or 
superior responsibility, as well as the «relevant rules on the irrelevance of superior 
order defenses and statutes of limitation» 60.
Furthermore, other recommendations are addressed to the EU insti-
tutions, some of which have already been implemented. Inter alia, the EU 
56 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, OJ L 118, 14.05.2003, pp. 12-14, article 4. 
57 EU Genocide Network Strategy, pp. 27-29 and 33.
58 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
59 Ibid., p. 40.
60 Ibid., Measure 4. 
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Genocide Network recommends evaluating the implementation of Council 
Decision 2002/494/JHA and Council Decision 2003/335/JHA, to elaborate 
an Action Plan on the Fight against Impunity within the EU, or to assess addi-
tional funding possibilities in that framework 61. In that same line, it is inter-
esting to note that the proposal to create a European day against impunity for 
core international crimes 62 has been implemented.
Another instrument designed to enhance cooperation among EU Mem-
ber States in relation with the fight against impunity is ‘Framework Deci-
sion 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States’ 63. Even though framework 
decisions do not have direct effect 64, they oblige EU Member States «to reach 
the requested result and set a standard level by which to interpret different 
national criminal legislation» 65. As such, they «generate a harmonizing effect 
on national criminal legislation within the Union» 66. The Framework Decision 
on the European Arrest Warrant replaces formal extradition procedures among 
EU Member States with a system of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, 
referred to as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation 67. In particular, the pur-
pose of the Framework Decision is to introduce «a new simplified system of 
61 Ibid., p. 43.
62 Ibid., p. 44.
63 Luisa Vierucci, «The European Arrest Warrant: An additional tool for prosecuting ICC crimes», 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 275-285.
64 Article 34(2) of the Treaty of the European Union as amended by the Treaty of Nice reads as 
follows: «The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the appropriate form 
and procedures as set out in this title, contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union. 
To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, 
the Council may: [...]
 (b) adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the 
result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
They shall not entail direct effect». Even though framework decisions no longer exist under the 
Lisbon Treaty architecture, their legal effects are preserved until they are repealed, annulled or 
amended. See: Protocol (nº 36) on Transitional Provisions, OJ 115, 09.05.2008, pp. 0322-0326, 
article 9. 
65 ECJ, Case 103/05, judgment of 16 June 2005, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, ECR 
I-5825. Quoted in Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European 
Union and the International Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 25.
66 Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and the Inter-
national Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 25.
67 EU Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, 
OJ L 190/1, 18.07.2002, Preamble.
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surrender of sentenced or suspected persons for the purposes of execution or 
prosecution of criminal sentences» allowing to «remove the complexity and 
potential for delay inherent in the present extradition procedures» 68. The new 
system shall therefore aim to facilitate the «free movement of judicial decisions 
in criminal matters, covering both pre-sentence and final decisions, within 
an area of freedom, security and justice» 69. To do so, the Framework Decision 
contains a list of offences, which:
if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence 
or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as 
they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State, shall, under the 
terms of this Framework Decision and without verification of the double 
criminality of the act, give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest 
warrant 70.
Said list includes «crimes within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court». Therefore, this Framework Decision does not subject national 
authorities to the double jeopardy rule, nationality, and specialty requirements 71 
to hand over a suspect to another Member State. As observed by Luisa Ver-
ucci, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant presents several 
advantages in the fight against impunity. It establishes a harmonized system 
of arrest and surrender throughout the EU, «which is unprecedented in any 
other region of the world» 72. More importantly, it allows national authorities to 
comply with their obligation to cooperate with the ICC without delay. Con-
sequently, the Framework Decision has the potential to considerably facilitate 
proceedings whenever national authorities are willing to prosecute an alleged 
war criminal that has moved to another EU Member State.
Thus, even though the EU retains limited competence on this matter, it 
has established a series of tools which allow EU Member States to cooperate 
68 Ibid., recital 5. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., article 2. 
71 The last two requirements do meet exceptions, detailed in article 4(6), 5(3), and 27. See: Vierucci, 
«The European Arrest Warrant: An additional tool for prosecuting ICC crimes», op. cit., 2004, 
p. 276. 
72 Vierucci, «The European Arrest Warrant: An additional tool for prosecuting ICC crimes», op. cit., 
2004, p. 277.
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efficiently in the apprehension and prosecution of persons suspected of hav-
ing committed war crimes. Through these legal instruments, the EU likewise 
implements part of its obligation to ensure respect for IHL insofar as it facili-
tates the work of national authorities to enforce Common Article 1.
1.2. France: a late criminalization
French law codifies the penal repression of international crimes in its crim-
inal code. War crimes have been punished in French law only since 2010, with 
the adoption of Act nº 2010-930 on the adaptation of criminal law to the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Court (Loi n° 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 
portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale). 
The reasons for such a late transposition are probably tied to the Algerian War 
of Independence, which took place from 1954 until 1962, and for which the 
French authorities had adopted a number of acts organizing the amnesty in 
order to avoid the prosecution of its nationals 73. Within this frame, French courts 
refused to apply the specificities of core international crimes to the atrocities 
committed during the Algerian War, so that amnesty was applicable 74.
Despite the ratification and integration of the Geneva Conventions in the 
French legal order (see supra, Chapter 2), French authorities had not incorpo-
73 Ordonnance nº 62-427 du 14 avril 1962 «rendant applicable sur l’ensemble du territoire de la 
République le décret nº 62-327 du 22 mars 1962 portant amnistie des infractions commises au 
titre de l’insurrection algérienne»; Ordonnance nº 62-428 du 14 avril 1962 «rendant applicable sur 
l’ensemble du territoire de la République le décret nº 62-328 du 22 mars 1962 portant amnistie 
de faits commis dans le cadre des opérations de maintien de l’ordre dirigées contre l’insurrection 
algérienne»; Ordonnance nº 62-429 du 14 avril 1962 «relative à la procédure concernant les crimes 
et délits en relation avec les événements d’Algérie»; Ordonnance nº 62-430 du 14 avril 1962 
«modifiant la décision du président de la République en date du 3 mai 1961 instituant un tribunal 
militaire»; Ordonnance nº 62-431 du 14 avril 1962 «relative à la délégation au tribunal militaire 
des magistrats de l’ordre judiciaire», Journal officiel, «Lois et décrets», pp. 3892-3894; Loi nº 64-
1269 du 23 décembre 1964 «portant amnistie et autorisant la dispense de certaines incapacités et 
déchéances», Journal officiel, «Lois et décrets», 24 décembre 1964, p. 11499; Loi nº 66-396 du 17 
juin 1966 «portant amnistie d’infractions contre la sûreté de l’État ou commises en relation avec 
les événements d’Algérie», Journal officiel, Lois et décrets, 18 juin 1966, p. 4915; Loi nº 68-697 
du 31 juillet 1968 «portant amnistie», Journal officiel, «Lois et décrets», 2 août 1968, p. 7521. On 
this aspect, see: Gilles Manceron, «Mémoire et guerre d’Algérie», La Revue des droits de l’homme [on 
line], nº 2, 2012. Available at: https://revdh.revues.org/252 (Accessed: 22.05.2017). 
74 Cour de cassation, criminal section, 20 May 2000. Quoted in Fouchard, Application et promotion 
du droit international humanitaire et du droit international, op. cit., 2009, p. 38. 
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rated the notion of grave breaches and corresponding procedures of prosecu-
tion in its criminal legislation. This codification is considered unnecessary in 
some countries to the extent that international treaties are automatically inte-
grated into national law, as it is the case in France. Furthermore, the Cour de 
cassation held in the Ould Dah Ely case of 23 October 2002 that the principle 
of legality authorized that an offence be defined in an international treaty 75.
Nonetheless, such integration does not automatically give rise to the 
invocability of the international provisions at stake. In the French case, this leg-
islative inertia proved to be problematic insofar as national jurisdictions refused 
to rely on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in order to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators on the grounds that the provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions were not precise enough, thus rejecting the internal applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions 76. Even though the Geneva Conventions effectively 
defined the grave breaches, they were not deemed a sufficiently precise legal 
basis allowing for criminal prosecution. Consequently, up until the adoption of 
Act nº 2010-930, French jurisdictions could only prosecute alleged perpetra-
tors of grave breaches and serious violations on the basis of ordinary criminal 
law, thus getting past the specificities of IHL, or on the basis of the code of mil-
itary justice, thus limiting importantly its scope of application ratione personae. 
The adaptation of French criminal law was therefore a necessary requirement 
for the effective jurisdiction of national courts over grave breaches 77.
The ratification of the Rome Statute by France constituted an impor-
tant step in that regard. The rule of complementarity obliged national 
authorities to modify the legislation for them to be able to effectively pros-
ecute alleged perpetrators of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute. 
Act nº 2010-930 on the adaptation of criminal law to the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court modified the French criminal code, so as 
to integrate the crimes included in the Rome Statute. The result of such 
process is that they are regulated by the new Chapter 1 of Book IV bis of 
the criminal code.
75 Cour de cassation, case nº 02-85379, 23 October 2002, Ould Dah Ely: «aux motifs, que le prín-
cipe de légalité ne s’oppose nullement à ce qu’une infraction soit définie dans un traité ou un 
accord international, celui-ci ayant une force supérieure à la loi».
76 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 95-81527, 26 March 1996, E. Javor et al. vs. X. 
77 CNCDH, Les Droits de l’Homme en France, Rapport 2009-2011, Paris, La Documentation fran-
çaise, 2011, p. 29.
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First, the transposition of the notion of war crimes in national legislation 
is provided. Then, the status of the alleged perpetrator has been defined by 
national legislation and case-law, on matters dealing with the rules on respon-
sibility, immunity, and statutory limits.
1.2.1. The notion of war crimes («crimes et délits de guerre»)
Following a general definition of war crimes, the criminal code then pro-
vides for a certain number of offenses that are common to NIACs and IACs 78, 
and for those that apply exclusively to IACs 79 and NIACs 80 respectively.
1.2.1.1. General definition
Pursuant to article 461-1, for a war crime to exist, three conditions shall 
be met: a) a violation shall be committed within the frame of an armed con-
flict; b) this behavior shall violate the laws and customs of war or treaty law; 
and c) they shall aim the persons or property referred to by articles 461-2 to 
461-31 of the criminal code. It should be noted that the ICRC proposed to 
add that these offences may constitute actions or omissions, so as to reflect 
article 86 of Additional Protocol I 81, but this proposal was rejected.
A few comments may be made regarding the definition of war crimes 
as provided by the French legal order. On the one hand, the criminal code 
established a distinction between more serious (crimes) and less serious crimes 
(délits). This distinction is surprising insofar as it does not reflect the current 
state of international criminal law. Furthermore, this distinction is question-
able. The notion of ‘délits’ seems to infer that these crimes are not so serious. 
Proof of that is that it is often translated into ‘misdemeanor’ in English. None-
theless, this section of the criminal code enshrines the prohibition of behaviors 
deemed so serious that their penal repression is organized at international level. 
78 French criminal code, articles 461-2 to 461-18.
79 French criminal code, articles 461-19 to 461-29.
80 French criminal code, articles 461-30 to 461-31. 
81 Nicole Ameline, Avis nº 1828 fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi, 
adopté par le Sénat, portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, Paris, 
Sénat, 8 July 2009, p. 30.
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In addition, the French category of ‘délits de guerre’ does not address the less 
serious violations of the Geneva Conventions that do not belong to the cate-
gories of grave breaches and serious violations. On the contrary, it transposes 
the content of well-established war crimes, which are either grave breaches or 
serious violations in IHL. Another issue is that it establishes a lower threshold 
regarding statutory limits than for war crimes.
On the other hand, the definition refers to the violations of the laws and 
customs of war («violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre») as well as to the 
violations of international conventions governing armed conflicts («violation 
des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés»). Those provi-
sions are welcomed, to the extent that they allow for a flexible interpretation 
of the notion of war crimes, in accordance with the evolution of international 
law, including further customary developments. Consequently, the choice of 
the legislature was to opt for a mixed approach, whereby the violations of the 
laws and customs of war and of international conventions governing armed 
conflicts are criminalized by a general provision, and certain serious crimes are 
explicitly and specifically codified in the criminal law.
It is also worth noticing that the criminal code contributes to the move-
ment of alignment of the regime of NIACs on that of IACs, even though 
this contribution is strictly framed. Indeed, one of the requirements for a war 
crime or delict to be constituted in the French legal order is the existence of 
an armed conflict, international or not 82. In this sense, the criminal code does 
not bind the notion of war crimes to that of IAC. Furthermore, it refers to the 
notion of «persons mentioned in the chapter» and may therefore apply to a 
broader category of persons than that of ‘protected persons’ in the sense of the 
Geneva Conventions. These elements demonstrate that the French legislature 
has endorsed the evolution of war crimes at international level. That being 
said, the provisions of the criminal code do not go beyond what is stated in the 
Rome Statute and operate a strict categorization among the offences which 
are made punishable both in IACs and NIACs, those which are made pun-
ishable exclusively in IACs, and those which constitute war crimes in NIACs. 
Consequently, the French legislation reflects a positive endorsement of the 
current state of international treaty law but does not seem to develop this area 
or to break new grounds.
82 French criminal code, article 461-1.
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Besides, the French legislature protected some of its specificities in the 
field of defense and security. Indeed, article 462-11 of the criminal code explic-
itly excludes from the scope of war crimes the use of nuclear weapons or any 
other weapon whose use is not prohibited pursuant to France’s international 
treaty obligations in the exercise of its right to self-defense. This provision is 
in line with France’s interpretative declarations made to the Rome Statute 83. 
However, it was criticized by the CNCDH, as it authorizes behaviors which 
are actually defined as war crimes by the Rome Statute. The CNCDH thus 
called for the abrogation of this provision 84. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that the ICJ was quite cautious on this issue, as it held in the Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that it could not:
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of 
nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in 
which its very survival would be at stake 85.
Following this general definition of war crimes, the criminal code 
then provides for a certain number of offenses that are common to NIACs 
and IACs 86, and for those that apply exclusively to IACs 87 and NIACs 88 
respectively.
1.2.1.2. A catalog of offences based on the Rome Statute
The first category of offences, which applies to both IACs and NIACs, 
is divided into three sub-categories: violations resulting from violence against 
persons, the conduct of hostilities, and from violence against property. Attempt-
83 «The provisions of article 8 of the Statute, in particular paragraph 2 (b) thereof, relate solely to 
conventional weapons and can neither regulate nor prohibit the possible use of nuclear weapons 
nor impair the other rules of international law applicable to other weapons necessary to the ex-
ercise by France of its inherent right of self-defence, unless nuclear weapons or the other weap-
ons referred to herein become subject in the future to a comprehensive ban and are specified in 
an annex to the Statute by means of an amendment adopted in accordance with the provisions 
of articles 121 and 123». 
84 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008, p. 2. 
85 IJC, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1. ICJ Reports 1996, 
p. 226, para. 97.
86 French criminal code, articles 461-2 to 461-18.
87 Ibid., articles 461-19 to 461-29.
88 Ibid., articles 461-30 to 461-31. 
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ing 89, and aiding or abetting 90 are also considered offences under the French 
criminal code.
In this regard, article 461-2 stipulates a general formula as it punishes 
willful killing («atteintes volontaires à la vie»), or willfully endangering the 
physical or mental integrity of protected persons in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war and IHL, as well as their kidnapping and unlawful con-
finement. It thus reflects to some extent articles 50/51/130/147 of the Geneva 
Conventions – which regulate the grave breaches, Common Article 3, and 
articles 8(2)(a)(i), (iii), (iv), and 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, although the 
reference to customary law seems to broaden its scope of application. Then, 
article 461-3 literally transposes the content of article 8 (2)(b)(x) of the Rome 
Statute and punishes the subjection of persons who are in the power of an 
adverse party to medical or scientific experiments or physical mutilation not 
justified on medical grounds nor made in the interest of these persons, and 
which cause death to or seriously endanger the health, physical or mental 
integrity of such person. Sexual violence is also repressed, namely enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sex-
ual violence of comparable gravity, which are punished by life imprisonment 
in accordance with article 461-4 91. Article 461-5 also refers to the prohibition 
of humiliating and degrading treatments on persons from the adverse party 
which seriously endanger their physic or mental integrity. The criminal code 
punishes the behaviors which endanger the individual freedom of protected 
persons, even in the absence of protection offered by international treaty law 
(articles 461-6). Finally, conscripting or enlisting children in the national armed 
forces or in armed groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities 
is also criminalized (articles 461-7), in accordance with the current state of 
international treaty and customary law 92, albeit the threshold is elevated from 
15 to 18 years.
89 Ibid., article 461-17.
90 Ibid., article 461-18.
91 Reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (vi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 4(2)(e) and (f) of Additional Protocol II, articles 
75(2)(b) and 76(1) of Additional Protocol I, as well as article 27(2) of GC IV.
92 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii), Additional Protocol II, article 4(3)(c), Additional Protocol I, article 
77(2), Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 38(2) and (3), ICRC Study on Customary 
IHL, rules 136 and 137. 
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Regarding the offences relating to the conduct of hostilities occurring 
both in IACs and NIACs, the criminal code punishes with life imprisonment 
to declare that there shall be no survivors or to threaten an adversary there-
with 93 and to willfully attack the civilian population or civilians not directly 
participating in hostilities 94. Furthermore, killing or wounding a combatant 
who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defense, has 
surrendered at discretion 95 is included, even though international treaty law 
does not seem to apply this rule to NIACs. Killing or wounding treacherously 
a combatant adversary is likewise penalized 96.
Finally, willfully attacking the staff and property making use of the dis-
tinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols or 
employed within the frame of a humanitarian mission or a peace-keeping 
mission in accordance with the UN Charter 97; willfully attacking buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or caritative purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided that they are not military objectives 98; willfully attacking civilian 
objects 99; pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault 100; as well as 
93 French criminal code, article 461-8. 
94 French criminal code, article 461-9, reflecting articles 85(3)(a) and 51(2) of Additional Protocol 
I, article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). 
95 French criminal code, article 461-10, reflecting article 85(3)(e) of Additional Protocol I and 
article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90). 
96 French criminal code, article 461-11, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xi) and 8(2)(e)(ix) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 37(1) of 
Additional Protocol I, and rule 65 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL.
97 French criminal code, article 461-12, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xxiv) and 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 19(1), 20, 
35(1), 24, 35(1) and 36(1) of GC I, articles 22(1), 23, 24(1), 27(1) and 36 of GC II, articles 18(1) 
and (3), 20(1) and (2), 21, and 22(1) and (2) of GC IV, articles 12(1) and (2), 15(1) and (5), 21, 
23(1), and 24 of Additional Protocol I, articles 9(1) and 11(1) of Additional Protocol II, Rules 
25, 28, 29, and 30 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL.
98 French criminal code, article 461-13, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 53(a) and 
c, 85(4)(d) of Additional Protocol I, article 16 of Additional Protocol II, articles 27(1) and 56 of 
HR IV, and rules 38 and 40 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
99 French criminal code, article 461-14, reflecting article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I.
100 French criminal code, article 461-15, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 28 of HR 
IV, article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II; and rule 52 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
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stealing, extorting, destructing, degrading or deteriorating the property of per-
sons protected by IHL, not justified by military necessity 101, constitute war 
crimes or délits.
The second category, which applies solely to international armed con-
flicts, is divided between the violations of IHL directed against persons and 
the conduct of hostilities. In this respect, utilizing the presence of a civilian 
or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces 
immune from military operations, compelling a protected person to serve in 
the forces of a hostile power 102, putting obstacles to the right for a protected 
person to be regularly and impartially judged 103, are punished by 20 years of 
imprisonment 104. Furthermore, declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible 
in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party is 
punished with 15 years of imprisonment 105.
In addition, employing poison or poisoned weapons, asphyxiating, poi-
sonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, employing 
bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, as well as employing 
weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare which are prohib-
ited and annexed to the Rome Statute are punished by life imprisonment 106. 
Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings which are defended and which are not military objectives 107, inten-
101 French criminal code, article 461-16, reflecting articles 50/51/147 of GC I, II, and IV, although 
the wording of the criminal code does not seem to require an ‘extensive’ destruction of appro-
priation of property. 
102 French criminal code, article 461-20, reflecting article 8(2)(a)(v) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 130 of GC III, and article 
147 of GC IV. 
103 French criminal code, article 461-21, reflecting article 8(2)(a)(v) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 130 of GC III, and article 
147 of GC IV.
104 French criminal code, article 461-19, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 23(1) of GC III, article 
28 of GC IV, articles 51(7) and 58(a) of Additional Protocol I, rule 97 of the ICRC Study on 
Customary IHL. 
105 French criminal code, article 461-22, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xiv) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), and article 23(2) of HR IV. 
106 French criminal code, article 461-23, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xvii), (xviii), (xix), and (xx) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90).
107 French criminal code, article 461-24, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(v) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 85(3)(d) of Additional 
Protocol I, article 25 of HR IV, and rules 35, 36, and 37 of the ICRC Study of Customary IHL. 
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tionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them 
of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief 
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols 108, the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts 
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation 
or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within 
or outside this territory 109, intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge 
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians, which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall mili-
tary advantage anticipated 110, are punished with life imprisonment. Moreover, 
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct overall military advantage anticipated is punished by 20 years 
of imprisonment 111. Finally, making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag 
or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, 
as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting 
in personal injury is punished by 20 years of imprisonment 112. If this causes 
mutilation or permanent injuries, the sentence increases to 30 years, while if it 
causes death, life imprisonment applies.
As for the third category, relating to crimes applicable to non-interna-
tional armed conflicts only, it is less extensive. They extend to the displacement 
of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security 
108 French criminal code, article 461-25, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 23(1) of GC IV, article 
55(1) of GC IV, article 59(1) of GC IV, articles 54(1) and (2) of Addtional Protocol I, rules 55 
and 56 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
109 French criminal code, article 461-26, reflecting article 8 (2) (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 85 (4) (a) of Additional 
protocol I, rules 129A and 130 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
110 French criminal code, article 461-27, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90).
111 French criminal code, article 461-28, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). 
112 French criminal code, article 461-29, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 85(3)(f) of Additional 
Protocol I; article 23f) of HR IV, and rules 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of the ICRC Study on 
Customary IHL. 
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of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand 113, as well 
as the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court as provided by 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 114. It should also be 
noted that if the person is executed, then the punishment shifts from 20 years 
of imprisonment to life imprisonment.
Thus, while the definitions enshrined in the criminal code extensively 
use the wording of the Rome Statute, they are nonetheless less detailed 115. 
Furthermore, some offences contained in the Rome Statute are not included 
in the criminal code. In this respect, sexual slavery is not expressly repressed 
although it is enshrined in article 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute 116. In the same 
way, taking hostages does not appear as a war crime in the criminal code, 
despite its codification in article 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute 117. Indiscrimi-
nate attacks and the unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war 
or civilians are not punished by the French criminal code either 118. These 
gaps, associated with the hierarchy between war crimes and délits, were criti-
cized by the CNDCH. The latter considers that the adaptation of the French 
legal order to the Rome Statute is incomplete and actually harms the coher-
ence, harmonization, and consolidation of international criminal law 119. It is 
possible to apply this statement to IHL as well.
1.2.2. The status of the alleged perpetrator
First, the French Criminal Code appropriately integrates the different 
types of criminal responsibility over war crimes. In this regard, it recognizes the 
responsibility of both natural and legal persons 120.
113 French criminal code, article 461-30, reflecting article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 17(1) of Additional Pro-
tocol II, and rule 129B of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
114 French criminal code, article 461-31.
115 Ameline, Avis nº 1828 fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, op. cit., 8 July 2009, p. 30.
116 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008, p. 2. 
117 Ibid. 
118 CNCDH, Avis sur la Cour pénale internationale, 23 October 2012, Recommendation 2. 
119 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008, p. 2.
120 French criminal code, articles 462-5 and 462-6. 
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Moreover, both military and civilian superior responsibility over war 
crimes are provided for. In this respect, article 462-7 stipulates the conditions 
that trigger command or superior responsibility. In accordance with these 
provisions, a military or civilian superior can be held responsible if (s)he 
knew – or should have known in the case of military superiors – that their 
subordinates committed or were about to commit a war crime and (s)he did 
not take all the necessary and reasonable measures to impede or repress such 
behavior, or to refer the situation to the competent authorities to investigate 
the facts or prosecute the alleged perpetrators. For the superior to be held 
responsible, the subordinates must be under their effective authority and con-
trol.
In the case of civilian superiors, the behavior at stake must be related to 
the activities that fall under their effective responsibility or control. Omis-
sions are also foreseen insofar as the civilian superior may be held responsible 
if (s)he deliberately decided not to take into consideration the information 
provided on the subordinates’ behaviors. Consequently, the wording used in 
the criminal code reflects to a large extent the wording used in the Rome 
Statute.
On the other hand, the criminal code explicitly refutes the possibility 
to exonerate one’s criminal responsibility on the grounds that the behavior 
at stake is prohibited or authorized by the law or ordered by a legitimate 
authority 121. Nonetheless, it may be used as a mitigating factor. In addition, 
if the suspect did not know that the act ordered by the legitimate authority 
was unlawful and if this order was not manifestly unlawful, then the criminal 
responsibility of the alleged perpetrator may not be incurred. A contrario, they 
may be held criminally responsible if the order is manifestly unlawful at all 
times. Ignorance is therefore not an acceptable excuse under French law.
Conversely, self-defense is recognized as an excuse under some condi-
tions. In particular, the person must have behaved reasonably to safeguard 
goods which are essential to their survival or someone else’s survival, or to the 
accomplishment of a military mission against an imminent and illicit use of 
force, except if the means of defense are disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the danger 122.
121 Ibid., article 462-8. 
122 Ibid., article 462-9.
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Second, the provisions on statutory limits do not appropriately reflect 
the current state of international law. The legislation transposing the Rome 
Statute establishes statutory limits over war crimes, a situation criticized by 
the CNCDH. Indeed, it considered that it goes against the coherence of the 
regime applicable to the crimes contained in the Rome Statute and that it 
undermines the penal repression of war crimes, thus posing a threat to the 
harmonization of their repression at international level 123. It also called on the 
French authorities to ratify the UN ‘Convention on the non-applicability of 
statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity’ 124 as well as 
the ‘European Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitation to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes’ 125.
It should be noted in this respect that there are no statutory limits 
with regard to the other international core crimes, namely genocides and 
crimes against humanity 126. The Constitutional Court acknowledged in 
1999 that the absence of statutory limits regarding the most serious crimes 
which affect the international community as a whole («crimes les plus graves 
qui touchent l’ensemble de la communauté internationale») was constitu-
tional 127. Therefore, this difference of treatment between war crimes and the 
other international core crimes seems to reflect the legislature’s willingness 
to establish a hierarchy among them and to emphasize the seriousness of 
genocides and crimes against humanity over any other type of offence in the 
French legal order 128.
123 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008, p. 2. 
124 See: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-6&chap-
ter=4&lang=en (Accessed: 30.01.2016). 
125 CNCDH, Avis sur la Cour pénale internationale, 23 October 2012, Recommendation 3. See 
also: CNCDH, Avis sur l’adhésion française au Protocole Additionnel aux Conventions de Ge-
nève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victims des conflits armés internationaux (Proto-
cole I), 6 July 2001; CNCDH, Avis sur l’adaptation du droit interne au Statut de la Cour pénale 
internationale, 23 November 2001. 
126 French criminal code, article 213-5. 
127 Conseil constitutionnel, case nº 98-408 DC of 22 January 1999, Loi autorisant la ratification de 
la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, JO of 24 January 1999, p. 1317, 
para. 20.
128 Patrice Gélard, Rapport n° 326 (2007-2008) fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, 
de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale sur le projet de loi portant 
adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, Paris, Sénat français, 14 May 
2008, p. 47. 
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Actually, several members of Parliament challenged this difference of 
treatment before the Constitutional Court in 2010 129. They considered that 
article 462-10 violated the Rome Treaty as well as the principle of equality. 
It is interesting to note that the appellants alleged that the codification of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction in article 53-2 of the Constitution entailed the inte-
gration of the Rome Statute in the bloc of constitutionality as a norm of 
reference of constitutionality review. Nonetheless, the Court rejected this 
argument and held that the conditions foreseen in the Rome Treaty did not 
transform it into such norm of reference. Consequently, it was not compe-
tent to ensure the control of conventionality of French laws, in accordance 
with its well-established case-law 130. As for the second argument, the Court 
concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity are of different 
nature, so that the difference of regime regarding statutory limits is consti-
tutional 131.
Thus, pursuant to article 462-10 of the criminal code, war crimes lapse 
upon 30 years, while ‘war délits’ lapse upon 20 years. The penalty imposed in 
case of conviction follows the same statutory limitations. Therefore, if the war 
crimes and delicts occurred more than 30 and 20 years respectively, French 
courts lose their competence to prosecute alleged perpetrators. In turn, this 
means that the ICC would automatically have a claim on situations involving 
French nationals or foreigners present on French territory in accordance with 
the principle of complementarity 132.
Finally, the existing case-law is not entirely clear on the extent of State 
immunity. Several cases are worth mentioning even though they do not nec-
essarily deal with war crimes.
Firstly, the personal immunity of incumbent State officials is under-
stood as general and absolute 133. In accordance with this approach, State 
129 Conseil constitutionnel, Case nº 2010-612 DC, Loi n° 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adap-
tation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, JO of 10 August 2010, 
p. 14682. 
130 Ibid., p. 14682, para. 5. 
131 Ibid., para. 7. 
132 Gélard, Rapport n° 326 (2007-2008) fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, op. cit., 14 
May 2008, p. 48. 
133 UN Committee against torture, «Liste de points concernant le septième rapport périodique de 
la France. Additif. Réponses de la France à la liste de points», CAT/C/FRA/Q/7/Add.1, 18 Fe-
bruary 2016, p. 12. 
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officials benefit from an absolute immunity during the time of their office 
on the French territory, provided that such immunity does not contradict 
other international provisions that apply to them 134. In this respect, a com-
plaint was filed in 2001 against Muammar Gaddafi for his involvement in 
the attack against an airliner in September 1989. However, the Cour de cas-
sation endorsed the application of the principle of immunity of incumbent 
heads of State and based its decision on international custom to do so 135. The 
Court nonetheless accepted that some exceptions may apply in accordance 
with international law, although it did not provide further details regarding 
such exceptions 136. Pursuant to a report of 2016 on France’s application of 
the Convention against Torture, these exceptions would include situations 
in which an arrest warrant has been issued by the ICC against a national 
of a State party to the Rome Statute or of a State whose situation has been 
referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council 137.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear who the beneficiaries of such personal 
immunity are besides heads of State, heads of government and ministers of 
foreign affairs 138. By way of example, the Cour de cassation rejected the appli-
cation of personal immunity to an incumbent vice president on 15 Decem-
ber 2015 139. Furthermore, the Cour de cassation considered that the obliga-
tion of a State official to inform within the frame of a preliminary inquiry 
does not infringe upon the principle of personal immunity 140. In this respect, 
the above-mentioned report on the application of the Convention against 
Torture specifies that the other acts of a preliminary inquiry such as an arrest 
134 Ibid. 
135 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 00-87215, 13 March 2001, Muammar Gaddafi 
case: «La coutume internationale s’oppose à ce que les chefs d’État en exercice puissent, en l’ab-
sence de dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernées, faire l’objet 
de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger [...]. Qu’en l’état du droit inter-
national, le crime dénoncé, quelle qu’en soit la gravité, ne relève pas des exceptions au principe 
de l’immunité de jurisdiction des chefs d’État étrangers en exercice». 
136 Ibid.
137 UN Committee against torture, «Liste de points concernant le septième rapport périodique de 
la France. Additif. Réponses de la France à la liste de points», CAT/C/FRA/Q/7/Add.1, 18 Fe-
bruary 2016, p. 12. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 15-83156, 15 December 2015. 
140 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 12-81676, 19 March 2013. Confirmed in: Cour 
de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 1380158, 17 June 2014. 
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warrant might violate such immunity 141. However, the interpretation pro-
vided by the Cour de cassation seems to nuance this approach insofar as it 
held that the acts of torture and cruelty committed by State officials do not 
belong to the exercise of State sovereignty and that since the prohibition 
of torture is a norm of jus cogens, it constitutes a legitimate restriction upon 
jurisdictional immunity 142.
As for functional immunity of the other State officials, it is limited to 
the acts conducted within the frame of their duties 143. However, the appli-
cation of immunity is not entirely clear. Indeed, on 25 October 2007, the 
International Federation of Human Rights filed a complaint against the for-
mer American Secretary for Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, on grounds of 
torture. On 16 November, the public prosecutor dismissed the proceedings, 
alleging that he enjoyed immunity. The arguments raised were that the acts 
for which he was challenged fell under the remit of his official functions, 
and that functional immunity continues even after leaving office 144. The pub-
lic prosecutor did not provide further details justifying how acts of torture 
could possibly enter within the scope of Donald H. Rumsfeld’s functions. 
This interpretation was nonetheless upheld by the Court of appeals 145. Yet, 
this interpretation is in contradiction with the one adopted in other cases. By 
way of example, the public prosecutor issued an extradition request against 
former President Augusto Pinochet and alleged that the crimes of which he 
was accused were not intrinsically connected («actes détachables») with the 
141 UN Committee against torture, «Liste de points concernant le septième rapport périodique de 
la France. Additif. Réponses de la France à la liste de points», CAT/C/FRA/Q/7/Add.1, 18 
February 2016, p. 12. 
142 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 12-81676, 19 March 2013: «3) alors que les actes 
de torture et de barbarie commis par les agents d’un Etat ne participent pas à l’exercice de la 
souveraineté de l’Etat; [...] 4) alors que l’interdiction de la torture a valeur de norme impérative 
ou jus cogens en droit international, laquelle prime les autres règles du droit international et 
constitue une restriction légitime à l’immunité de juridiction». 
143 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, 23 November 2004, Malta Maritime Authority case: 
«qu’en effet, la coutume internationale qui s’oppose à la poursuite des États devant les juri-
dictions pénales d’un État étranger s’étend aux organes et entités qui constituent l’émanation 
de l’État ainsi qu’à leurs agents en raison d’actes qui, [...] relèvent de la souveraineté de l’État 
concerné».
144 Court of appeals of Paris, Letter from the prosecutor Jean Claude Marin to Patrick Baudou-
in, Paris, 16.11.2007. Available at: https://competenceuniverselle.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/
lettre_du_procureur_dans_l.pdf (Accessed: 10.03.2017). 
145 Court of appeals of Paris, 27 February 2008, dismissal by the prosecutor. 
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exercise of his mandate. Consequently, even though the principle seems to be 
clearly stipulated, its application is more hazardous and seems to respond to 
extra-legal considerations.
1.2.3. Institutional developments
A specialized unit was created within the Paris Tribunal of first instance 
in order to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocides and war crimes (Pôle 
judiciaire spécialisé pour les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes et délits 
de guerre) in 2012 146. Created with a view to try the cases relating to the 
genocide in Rwanda already opened in France, it exercises its jurisdiction in 
accordance with the principles of complementarity and concurrent jurisdic-
tion with regard to international courts and local courts respectively. As such, 
local courts may decline their jurisdiction in favor of the specialized unit. 
This specialized unit is therefore composed of judges specialized in interna-
tional criminal law. It collaborates with foreign jurisdictions and police forces, 
notably when it applies universal jurisdiction or when cases are prosecuted in 
foreign countries. The creation of this specialized unit is understood as France’s 
active contribution to a European and international system dedicated to the 
fight against impunity 147.
As noted by Human Rights Watch, the establishment of the Pôle judi-
ciaire supposed a significant improvement in the prosecution of Rwandan 
genocide suspects living in France, insofar as the lack of experience, resources, 
and time of the prosecutors and investigative judges in charge had importantly 
delayed the proceedings 148. In this context, the first completed trial was that of 
Pascal Simbikanga in 2014.
The Pôle judiciaire is assisted by a specialized police unit in charge of 
searching alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity, genocides, and war 
146 Act nº 2011-1862 of 13 December 2011, article 22 (Loi nº 2011-1862 du 13 décembre 2011 
relative à la répartition des contentieux et l’allègement de certaines procédures juridictionnelles), 
JORF n°0289 of 14 December 2011, p. 21105. 
147 Damien Arnaud, «Crimes contre l’humanité: la France mobilisée», French Ministry of Justice, 5 
March 2013, Podcast.
148 Leslie Haskell, The Long Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War Crimes Units in France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands, Human Rights Watch, 2014, p. 72. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/IJ0914_ForUpload.pdf (Accessed: 05.05.2017). 
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crimes (Office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l’humanité, les gén-
ocides et les crimes de guerre) 149. It is particularly worth noticing that this 
specialized police unit is competent to search for the alleged perpetrators of, 
inter alia, war crimes, who are suspected to be in France. Consequently, the 
creation of the Office central responds to the obligation established by the 
Geneva Conventions to actively search for alleged war criminals under the 
grave breaches regime. It also means that investigators no longer need to rely 
«solely on victims and NGOs to bring [suspects] to their attention» as they 
have the «capacity to proactively look for them» 150.
It should be noted that both units collaborate with their European coun-
terparts and cooperate actively with Europol, Eurojust, in particular the EU 
Genocide Network 151. Furthermore, they maintain relationships with scholars, 
NGOs, members of the military, and public authorities in order to benefit 
from their expertise on the matter 152. As of April 2017, 57 cases were under 
investigation 153, thus making France one of the most active fora on the issue.
1.3. Spain: a progressive transposition
The Spanish legislature has progressively organized the penal repression 
of the grave breaches and serious violations of IHL at internal level. Indeed, 
the 1985 Spanish military criminal code 154 enshrined the penal repression of 
the violations of IHL. Nonetheless, this implementation was incomplete and 
unsatisfactory because it presented gaps in matters of competence ratione perso-
nae and ratione materiae 155. Indeed, the military criminal code applied to mem-
149 Decree nº 2013-987 of 5 November 2013 (Décret n° 2013-987 du 5 novembre 2013 portant 
création d’un office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l’humanité, les génocides et les 
crimes de guerre). 
150 Haskell, The Long Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War Crimes Units in France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands, op. cit., 2014, p. 72. 
151 Anaïs Colgnac, Report on ‘L’Office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l’humanite, pour que «la 





154 Organic Act 13/1985 of 9 December 1985 (Ley Orgánica 13/1985, de 9 de diciembre). 
155 Pignatelli y Meca, La sanción de los crímenes de guerra en el Derecho español, op. cit., 2003, p. 101.
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bers of the military, so that civilians could not be prosecuted on war crimes 
grounds and not all the existing grave breaches and serious violations of IHL 
at the time were included in the code 156.
It was in 1995, upon a proposal made by the CEDIH (Centro de Estudios 
del Derecho Internacional Humanitario de la Cruz Roja), that war crimes 
were included in the ordinary criminal legislation, with the introduction of 
Chapter III, on crimes against protected persons and property in case of armed 
conflicts («De los delitos contra las personas y bienes protegidos en caso de 
conflicto armado») in Title XXIV on ‘crimes against the international com-
munity’ («Delitos contra la comunidad internacional»). In contrast with the 
military criminal code, any person can be prosecuted on war crimes grounds, 
members of the military and civilians alike. Therefore, Spain complied with its 
obligation to provide for the penal repression of the grave breaches and estab-
lished the conditions allowing for the effective prosecution of alleged perpe-
trators – in accordance with the principle of legality – already in 1995 157. The 
early transposition of the grave breaches and other serious violations of IHL 
into the national criminal legislation has permitted the effective implemen-
tation and application of IHL and constituted a benchmark for other nations 
on this matter. As such, the Spanish transposition has been called a ‘model’ for 
legislative initiatives undertaken in foreign countries 158.
Nevertheless, the ratification of the Rome Statute on the ICC 159 made 
it necessary to amend the provisions on war crimes to the extent that some 
behaviors criminalized under the Rome Statute were not considered as such 
in the 1995 wording. In the same way, Spain had ratified several international 
conventions and treaties relating to armed conflicts after 1995 – the Con-
vention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel of 9 
December 1994 160, the Protocol on the participation of children in armed 
156 Ibid., pp. 101-103. 
157 Fernando Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio, 
de modificación del código penal», in José Luis Rodríguez-Villasante, José Luis Prieto and Joa-
quín López Sánchez (coords.), La protección de la dignidad de la persona y el principio de humanidad 
en el siglo XXI, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2012, p. 190.
158 Ibid., p. 195.
159 Instrumento de ratificación del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, hecho en 
Roma el 17 de julio de 1998, BOE nº 126, 27.05.2002, pp. 18824-18860. 
160 Instrumento de ratificación de la Convención sobre la Seguridad del Personal de las Naciones 
Unidas y el Personal Asociado, hecha en Nueva York el 9 de diciembre de 1994, BOE nº 124, 
25.05.1999, pp. 19556-19560. 
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conflicts to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 161, Protocol II to the 
Hague Convention of 1954 on the protection of cultural property in case of 
armed conflict of 1999 162, as well as other treaties relating to weapons 163 – so 
that Spain’s new international commitments had to be reflected in the leg-
islation as well 164.
Against this background, the Spanish legislature amended the criminal 
code in 2003 165, so as to include, inter alia, the protection of UN and associate 
personnel, additional provisions on specifically protected persons and objects, 
and the prohibition of some specific methods of warfare. Nonetheless, the 
proposal to include the prohibition of certain forms of sexual violence, in 
line with article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, was rejected 166. A new reform was 
therefore adopted in 2010 to fill in the remaining gaps in the legislation 167. 
Finally, a general reform was made to the criminal code in 2015 168, which 
provided for the prohibition of nuclear and radiological weapons as well as 
the prohibition of the denial of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.
In accordance with the current state of the legislation, articles 609 to 
615 include an extensive catalogue of violations of IHL that are punishable 
under Spanish law. Furthermore, the status of the alleged perpetrator has 
been defined by national legislation and case-law, on matters dealing with 
the rules on responsibility, immunity, and statutory limits.
161 Instrumento de ratificación del Protocolo facultativo de la Convención sobre los Derechos del 
Niño, sobre la participación de niños en conflictos armados, hecho en Nueva York el 25 de mayo 
de 2000, BOE nº 92, 17.04.2002, pp. 14494-14497.
162 Instrumento de ratificación del Segundo Protocolo de la Convención de La Haya de 1954 para 
la Protección de los Bienes Culturales en caso de Conflicto Armado, hecho en La Haya el 26 de 
marzo de 1999, BOE nº 77, 30.03.2004, pp. 13410-13417. 
163 See: Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, foot-
note 14. 
164 Ibid., p. 195. 
165 Organic Act 15/2003, of 25 November 2003 (Ley Orgánica 15/2003, de 25 de noviembre, por 
la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal), article 162, 
BOE nº 283, 26.11.2003, pp. 41842-41875. 
166 Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, pp. 200-201. 
167 Organic Act 5/2010, of 22 June 2010 (Ley Orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio, por la que se modi-
fica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal), BOE nº 152, 23.06.2010, 
pp. 54811-54883. 
168 Organic Act 1/2015, of 30 March 2015 (Ley Orgánica 1/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que 
se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal), BOE nº 77, 
31.03.2015, pp. 27061-27176.
372 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
1.3.1. The notion of war crime
Since – contrarily to France – Spain had incorporated into its national 
legislation the penal repression of the violations of IHL before it ratified the 
Rome Statute on the ICC, most of the provisions on this matter reflect the 
language used in IHL rather than in international criminal law. Nonetheless, 
the offences described in the Spanish criminal code do not necessarily follow 
the order presented in IHL.
1.3.1.1. General definition
Article 608 of the criminal code defines what a protected person is in 
accordance with the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and 
the second Hague Convention of 1899 169. It likewise expressly enlarges it 
to the UN and associated personnel, in accordance with the Convention on 
the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel of 9 December 
1994 170, as well as to any person who benefits from this condition pursuant 
to Additional Protocol II or any other international treaty to which Spain is a 
party 171. Consequently, it uses the terminology employed in the Geneva Con-
ventions, enlarges it to the other categories of protected persons in accordance 
with the current state of international law, and allows for its adaptation to 
future international legal developments. Consistent with these provisions, the 
Spanish criminal code covers both grave breaches and serious violations of 
IHL.
In this context, violations of IHL occurring both in IACs and NIACs are 
criminalized in Spanish law already under the 1995 criminal code 172. Actu-
ally, all the offences described in articles 609 to 615 are deemed to apply to 
IACs and NIACs without distinction. As a result, the Spanish criminal code 
undoubtedly participates in the movement of alignment of the regime of 
NIACs on that of IACs. Nonetheless, the territorial scope of application of 
these offences varies. Indeed, violations of IHL occurring in IACs may be 
repressed under the Spanish criminal code, regardless of the place where they 
were committed. Conversely, for a violation of IHL occurring in a NIAC to 
169 Spanish criminal code, article 608 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5). 
170 Ibid., article 608(6). 
171 Ibid., article 608(7). 
172 Pignatelli y Meca, La sanción de los crímenes de guerra en el Derecho español, op. cit., 2003, p. 129. 
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be prosecuted under Spanish law, it must either have occurred in Spain or be 
subject to universal jurisdiction 173.
It should be noted that, besides the catalog of offences detailed in Chap-
ter III, the 2003 reform introduced a new article 614 bis, which enshrined an 
aggravating factor when the behaviors defined in this chapter belong to a plan 
or a policy, or are committed on a large scale, thus reflecting the chapeau of 
article 8(1) of the Rome Statute 174. Moreover, article 615 punishes the prov-
ocation, conspiracy, and solicitation to commit these crimes with penalties of 
one or two degrees below the one which applies to the behaviors at stake.
1.3.1.2. An extended catalog of offences based primarily on the Geneva 
Conventions
For the sake of clarity, it is possible to divide the offences contained in 
articles 609 to 613 in the following categories: principle of distinction, spe-
cifically protected persons and objects, special methods of warfare, the use of 
certain weapons, and the treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat.
Firstly, the Spanish criminal code enshrines the cardinal principle of dis-
tinction by means of several articles. Article 611 punishes with penalties from 
10 to 15 years of imprisonment the following behaviors: launching or ordering 
an indiscriminate or excessive attack against the civilian population 175; attack-
ing or making the civilian population the object of reprisals 176; destroying or 
damaging, in violation of the Law of Armed Conflicts, the civilian ship or air-
craft of an adverse or neutral Party unnecessarily and without advance warn-
ing, or without adopting the measures necessary to ensure people’s safety and 
to safeguard the documentation onboard 177.
Secondly, the offences against specifically protected persons and objects 
are contained in the catalog of Spanish war crimes. In particular, article 612 
173 Ibid.; Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, 
pp. 193.
174 Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, p. 198. 
175 Spanish criminal code, article 611(1), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 85(3)(a), 52(1), and 51(2) 
of Additional Protocol I. 
176 Spanish criminal code, article 611(1), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 52(1) of Additional Pro-
tocol I. 
177 Spanish criminal code, article 611(2). 
374 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
punishes with penalties from three to seven years of imprisonment violations 
of the protection of non-military property and objects 178, and using violence 
against medical or religious personnel, or personnel belonging to the medical 
mission, or humanitarian relief personnel or against the personnel allowed to 
use the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions 179.
The same article punishes intentionally directing attacks against any 
member of the UN and associated personnel, personnel involved in a human-
itarian mission or peacekeeping mission, in accordance with the UN Char-
ter, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian 
objects under the international Law of Armed Conflicts, or threatening to 
direct such attacks to compel a legal or natural person to do or refrain from 
doing any act 180. As for article 613(1)(i), it punishes with penalties from four to 
six years of imprisonment attacking or conducting acts of hostilities against the 
installations, material, units, private homes or vehicles of the UN and associ-
ated personnel, personnel involved in a humanitarian mission or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the UN Charter, or threatening to commit any 
such attack with the objective of compelling a physical or legal person to do 
or to refrain from doing any act 181.
Furthermore, cultural and religious buildings are especially protected. In 
this regard, article 613(1) punishes with penalties from four to six years of 
imprisonment attacking, or making the object of reprisals or hostilities the 
cultural or religious buildings which constitute the cultural or spiritual herit-
age of peoples, when such objects and places are not located in the immediate 
178 Spanish criminal code, article 612(1): «willfully violating the protection due to hospitals, installa-
tions, material, medical units and vehicles, prisoner camps, medical and safety areas and localities, 
neutralized zones, non-defended localities and demilitarized zones» (freely translated by the 
author).
 Reflecting article 8(2)(b)(v) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 85(3)(d) of Additional Protocol I, article 25 of the Hague Reg-
ulation IV, rules 35, 36, and 37 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law. 
179 Spanish criminal code, article 612(2).
180 Spanish criminal code, article 612(10), reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and (xxiv) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 7(1) and 
9 of the 1994 UN Convention, article 71(2) of Additional Protocol I. 
181 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(i), reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(b)(xxiv) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 
7(1) and 9 of the 1994 UN Convention, article 71(2) of Additional Protocol I.
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proximity of military objectives and they are duly signaled 182; misappropriation 
of the cultural or religious buildings referred to in the previous paragraph in 
support of military action 183; and the extensive appropriation, theft, pillage or 
acts of vandalism directed against these cultural or religious buildings 184.
Moreover, directing attacks, reprisals, acts of hostilities or improper use 
against cultural or religious objects to which special protection has been given 
or to which protection has been given by special arrangement, cultural or 
religious property under enhanced protection, or their immediate surround-
ings constitute aggravating factors 185. The same holds true regarding the other 
actions which cause extensive and important destructions of the objects, works, 
and installations or which are extremely serious 186.
Civilian objects and population likewise benefit from special protection. 
In particular, attacking or making the object of reprisals or hostilities civilian 
objects of the adverse party, causing their destruction, as long as they do not 
offer a concrete military advantage or those objects do not contribute effi-
ciently to the military action of the adverse party 187; and attacking, destroying, 
removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civil-
ian population, except if the adverse party uses such objects in direct support 
182 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(a), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), articles 85(4)(d) and 53(a) and 
(C) of Additional Protocol I.
183 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(b), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 15(1)(e) of the Optional 
Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, 25.03.1999.
184 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(c), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 15(1)(c) and (e) of the 
Optional Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, 25.03.1999.
185 Spanish criminal code, article 613(2), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 4(1) of Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14.05.1954, article 15 of 
the Optional Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, 25.03.1999.
186 Spanish criminal code, article 613(2), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 4(1) of Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14.05.1954, article 15 of 
the Optional Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, 25.03.1999.
187 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(d).
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of military action or exclusively as a means of subsistence for the members 
of their armed forces 188 are punished with penalties from four to six years of 
imprisonment.
In addition, articles 612(4), (5), and (6) aim to enforce the protection of 
the symbols recognized in IHL. Concretely, using unduly the protecting or dis-
tinctive signs, symbols or signals established and recognized in the international 
treaties to which Spain is a party, especially the Red Cross, Red Croissant and 
Red Crystal 189; making improper or perfidious use of the distinctive flag, uni-
form, signs or symbols of neutral States, of the UN and other States not party 
to the armed conflict or adverse parties, during the attack or to cover, favor, 
protect or put obstacles to military operations, excepts in these cases expressly 
foreseen in the international treaties to which Spain is a party 190; and making 
improper or perfidious use of the white flag of truce for negotiations and sur-
render 191, breaching the inviolability of or improperly detaining parlementaires 
or any person who accompany them 192, the personnel of the Protecting Power 
or substitute, or a member of the International Fact Finding Commission 193 
are punished with penalties from three to seven years of imprisonment.
Finally, destroying, harming or seizing, without military necessity, the 
property of others, or obliging others to deliver them or to conduct any other 
act of pillage 194; seizing, unduly or unnecessarily, movable and immovable 
property in occupied territory; or destroying non-military ships and aircrafts 
of the adverse or a neutral party, in violation of the international norms appli-
cable to armed conflicts at sea 195 are also punished with penalties from four to 
six years of imprisonment.
Thirdly, the provisions of the Spanish criminal code likewise deal with 
specific methods of warfare. In particular, article 610 punishes with penalties 
188 Ibid., article 613(1)(e).
189 Ibid., article 612(4).
190 Ibid., article 612(5).
191 Ibid., article 612(6), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 85(3)(f) of Additional Protocol I, article 23(f) 
of Hague Regulation IV, rule 58 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law. 
192 Spanish criminal code, article 612(6), reflecting article 32 of the Hague Regulations, rule 67 of 
the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
193 Spanish criminal code, article 612(6).
194 Ibid., article 613(1)(g).
195 Ibid., article 613(1)(h).
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from 10 to 15 years of imprisonment the following behaviors: using or order-
ing to use means and methods of warfare which are conceived to or are likely 
to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment 196, putting at risk the health or survival of the population, or declaring 
that there shall be no survivors 197.
In the same way, article 612 punishes with penalties from three to seven 
years of imprisonment intentionally starving the civilian population as a 
method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, 
including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions 198; violating the moratorium on weapons, armistice, surrender, 
or any other agreement made with the adverse party 199; and conscripting or 
enlisting children in the national armed forces or in armed groups, or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities 200.
Fourthly, several provisions punish the use of certain weapons. In par-
ticular, using or ordering to use means and methods of warfare prohibited or 
destined to cause unnecessary suffering is punished with penalties from 10 to 
15 years of imprisonment 201. Furthermore, articles 566 and 567, as amended 
by Organic Act 1/2015, prohibit the illegal production, trade, stockpiling as 
well as the development, use, traffic, of certain weapons by adding nuclear and 
radiological weapons to the list which already included antipersonnel mines 
and cluster munitions as well as biological and chemical weapons 202.
Fifthly, the provisions on the treatment of civilians and persons hors de 
combat are extensively addressed as well. In this regard, article 609 provides for 
the penal repression of some of the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
196 Reflecting article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). 
197 Spanish criminal code, article 610, reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xii) of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 40 of Additional Protocol 
I, rule 46 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
198 Spanish criminal code, article 612(8), reflecting verbatim article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). Also reflecting articles 
23(1), 55(1), 59(1) of GC IV, articles 54(1) and (2) of API, as well as rules 55 and 56 of the ICRC 
Study on customary international humanitarian law. 
199 Spanish criminal code, article 612(9).
200 Ibid., article 612(3)
201 Ibid., article 610, reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xx) of the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I. 
202 Spanish criminal code, articles 566 and 567.
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As such, it punishes with penalties between four and eight years of imprison-
ment the following violations of physical integrity: mistreating or seriously 
endangering the life, health, or integrity of any protected person 203; torture or 
inhumane treatments, including biological experiments, causing great suffering 
or subjecting to any medical act not justified on health status nor the medical 
norms that the warring party would normally apply to their nationals 204. Fur-
thermore, article 611 punishes with penalties from 10 to 15 years of impris-
onment the following grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions: compelling 
a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power and 
depriving them of their rights to a fair and regular trial 205; deporting, forcibly 
transferring, detaining or unlawfully confining any protected person 206; taking 
of hostages 207; utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to 
render certain points, zones or military forces immune from enemy attacks 208; 
transferring and settling, directly or indirectly, part of the occupying pow-
er’s own population for them to permanently reside in occupied territory 209; 
practicing, commanding or maintaining racial segregation or inhuman and 
degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity with regard to 
any protected persons are both punished with penalties from 10 to 15 years of 
imprisonment 210; and declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court 
of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the adverse party 211.
Some of the behaviors punished in this article seem to overlap, in particu-
lar, article 611(3) on prisoners of war and civilians’ right to a fair and regular 
trial and article 611(8) on the abolition, suspension or inadmissibility of the 
203 Reflecting articles 50/51/130/147 of the Geneva Conventions. 
204 Reflecting article 8 (2)(b)(x) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). 
205 Reflecting articles 130 and 147 of GC III and GC IV respectively. 
206 Reflecting article 147 of GC IV.
207 Reflecting article 147 of GC IV.
208 Spanish criminal code, article 611(4), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 23(1) of GC III, article 
28 of GC IV, article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I, rule 97 of the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law. 
209 Spanish criminal code, article 611(5), reflecting article 85(4) of API, rules 129A and 130 of the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
210 Spanish criminal code, article 611. 
211 Ibid., article 611(8), reflecting article 8(2)(b)(xiv) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 23(1)(h) of the Hague Regulation IV. 
IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 379
rights and actions of the nationals of the adverse party. Nonetheless, the for-
mer has a more restricted scope of application. It applies to prisoners of war 
and civilians only and the judicial guarantees it refers to are the ones expressly 
provided for by articles 84 and 104 to 106 of GC III, articles 64, 65, 67, 71, 
and 74 to 117 of GC IV, article 7 of Additional Protocol I, as well as article 6 
of Additional Protocol II. Conversely, the latter is not restricted to these two 
categories of protected persons and includes, as a general rule, all the proce-
dural and substantive guarantees, of criminal nature or not, that normally apply 
to the nationals of the adverse party 212. Thus, article 611(8) constitutes the lex 
generalis, while article 611(3) is the lex specialis 213.
Besides, the reform of 2010 enshrined the prohibition of certain forms of 
sexual violence in article 611(9), namely the actions against the sexual freedom 
of protected persons by committing rape, sexual slavery, forced or induced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sex-
ual aggression 214. Consequently, the gap that existed in the 2003 reform was 
filled in.
Finally, article 612 punishes with penalties from three to seven years of 
imprisonment 215 seriously damaging or depriving essential foodstuffs and 
medical supplies necessary to any protected person or subject them to humil-
iating or degrading treatment; not to inform protected persons without justi-
fiable delay and in a comprehensible manner about their situation 216; imposing 
collective punishments in response to individual behaviors 217; and violating 
the provisions on women and families’ accommodation or on the special pro-
tection granted to women and children by the international treaties to which 
Spain is a party.
It should be noted that some of the behaviors which are made punisha-
ble in the Spanish legal order are contemplated as grave breaches in IHL, but 
not codified in the Rome Statute. By way of example, unjustifiably impeding 
or delaying the liberation or repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians is 
212 Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, p. 27. 
213 Ibid.
214 Spanish criminal code, article 611(9), reflecting articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90), article 27(2) of 
GC IV, articles 75(2)(b) and 76(1) of Additional Protocol I, article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II.
215 Spanish criminal code, article 612(3).
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
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punished with penalties from 10 to 15 years of imprisonment 218. In addition, 
despoiling the dead, the wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war and 
detained civilians is punished with penalties ranging from three to seven years 
of imprisonment 219. Finally, article 613(1)(f) punishes with penalties ranging 
from four to six years of imprisonment attacking or making the object of 
reprisals the works and installations containing dangerous forces, when such 
attacks may result in the release of dangerous forces and cause severe losses 
among the civilian population 220. Some exceptions to this rule are foreseen, in 
line with international State practice 221: if such works and installations are used 
in regular, important, and direct support of military action and such attacks are 
the only feasible means to put an end to this support 222.
Furthermore, although some of the behaviors criminalized in the Span-
ish legal order are codified in IHL, their repression is not organized at inter-
national level. In particular, article 611(1) punishes with penalties from 10 
to 15 years of imprisonment the acts or threats of violence whose primary 
purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population 223. These rules are 
well established in IHL insofar as they are enshrined in article 33 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I, as well 
as articles 4(2)(d) and 13(2) of Additional Protocol II; nevertheless, they do 
not amount to grave breaches and are not expressly recognized in the Rome 
Statute as war crimes.
Conversely, some of the violations of IHL whose repression is indeed 
organized at international level are missing. Among them, it is possible to men-
tion articles 8(2)(b)(vi) 224, (xi) 225, and 8(2)(e)(ix) of the Rome Statute, as well as 
218 Ibid., article 611. 
219 Ibid., article 612(7), reflecting article 15(1) of GC I, article 18(1) of GC II, article 16(2) of GC 
IV, Additional Protocol I, article 34(1).
220 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(f), reflecting article 56 of API; article 15 APII, rule 42 of the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
221 See: ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 42. 
222 Spanish criminal code, article 613(1)(f). 
223 Ibid., article 611(1): «actos o amenazas de violencia cuya finalidad principal sea aterrorizarla». 
224 «Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means 
of defence, has surrendered at discretion». Reflecting article 85(3)(e) of Additional Protocol I and 
article 23(c) of the Hague Regulation IV. 
225 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, article 
8(2)(b)(xi): «Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army».
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the prohibition of apartheid in accordance with article 85(4)(c) of Additional 
Protocol I. Furthermore, the provisions contained in the criminal code are 
often not as detailed as the definitions provided in IHL.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the Spanish criminal code pun-
ishes the violations of IHL which do not amount to grave breaches or seri-
ous violations and for which national authorities enjoy freedom regarding 
their penal repression. In this respect, article 614 punishes with penalties of six 
months to two years of imprisonment those who violate or order to violate 
the other behaviors prohibited by the international treaties to which Spain is a 
party and which govern the conduct of hostilities, the regulation of the means 
and methods of warfare, the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, 
the treatment of prisoners of war, the protection granted to civilians and cul-
tural property in case of armed conflict.
1.3.2. The status of the alleged perpetrator
First, the different types of criminal responsibility over war crimes are 
integrated into the national legislation. In this respect, article 55 of the Royal 
Ordinances on the Armed Forces refers to command responsibility and article 
56 to ‘serious criminal responsibilities in relation with IHL crimes’ («Responsa-
bilidades penales graves en relación con los delitos contra el Derecho Inter-
nacional Humanitario») 226. Commanders are subject to a duty to demand 
obedience from their subordinates and enjoy the right to see their authority 
respected. They shall be conscious of the important responsibility that falls on 
them; as such, they must avoid the commission of core international crimes by 
the forces under their command or effective control and may not order illegal 
acts that amount to crimes.
Furthermore, the criminal code provides for additional details on com-
mand responsibility. In particular, article 615 bis of the criminal code explicitly 
226 Royal Ordinances on the Armed Forces (Real Decreto 96/2009, de 6 de febrero, por el 
que se aprueban las Reales Ordenanzas para las Fuerzas Armadas), BOE nº 33, 07/02/2008, 
pp. 13008-13028, article 56: «Será consciente de la grave responsabilidad que le corresponde 
y asume para evitar la comisión, por las fuerzas sometidas a su mando o control efectivo, de 
los delitos de genocidio, lesa humanidad y contra las personas y bienes protegidos en caso de 
conflicto armado». 
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provides for both military and civilian superior responsibility. It should be 
noted that de facto leaders are also included in that category 227.
For certain conducts, article 615 foresees the same penalties as the ones 
falling on perpetrators. This is the case if a military or civilian superior does 
not adopt the measures under their remit to avoid the commission of a war 
crime 228 by the forces under their command or effective control. The same 
holds true regarding the leader who does not fall into the other categories 229.
Regarding some other conducts, the penalty foreseen is of one or two 
grades lower to the one normally foreseen for perpetrators. This is the case if 
the acts at stake are the result of a serious negligence 230, or if the superior has 
not adopted the measures necessary to prosecute the crimes at stake commit-
ted by their subordinates 231.
Furthermore, civil servants and other public authorities who do not pro-
mote the prosecution of the war crimes 232 described in the criminal code, in 
violation of the obligations arising from their duty, may be punished with 
a penalty of two to six years of special disqualification from public office 233. 
Generally speaking, penalties of 10 to 20 years of absolute disqualification from 
227 Spanish criminal code, article 615 bis (1). 
228 Ibid.: «La autoridad o jefe militar o quien actúe efectivamente como tal que no adoptara las me-
didas a su alcance para evitar la comisión, por las fuerzas sometidas a su mando o control efectivo, 
de alguno de los delitos comprendidos en los capítulos II, II bis y III de este título, será castigado 
con la misma pena que los autores».
229 Spanish criminal code, article 615 bis (4): «El superior no comprendido en los apartados ante-
riores que, en el ámbito de su competencia, no adoptara las medidas a su alcance para evitar la 
comisión por sus subordinados de alguno de los delitos comprendidos en los capítulos II, II bis 
y III de este título será castigado con la misma pena que los autores». 
230 Ibid., article 615 bis (2). 
231 Ibid., article 615 bis (3): «La autoridad o jefe militar o quien actúe efectivamente como tal que 
no adoptara las medidas a su alcance para que sean perseguidos los delitos comprendidos en los 
capítulos II, II bis y III de este título cometidos por las personas sometidas a su mando o control 
efectivo será castigada con la pena inferior en dos grados a la de los autores». And article 615 bis 
(5): «El superior que no adoptara las medidas a su alcance para que sean perseguidos los delitos 
comprendidos en los capítulos II, II bis y III de este título cometidos por sus subordinados será 
castigado con la pena inferior en dos grados a la de los autores». 
232 And other international crimes, as provided by the criminal code. 
233 Spanish criminal code, article 615 bis (5): «El funcionario o autoridad que, sin incurrir en las 
conductas previstas en los apartados anteriores, y faltando a la obligación de su cargo, dejará de 
promover la persecución de alguno de los delitos de los comprendidos en los capítulos II, II bis 
y III de este título de que tenga noticia será castigado con la pena de inhabilitación especial para 
empleo o cargo público por tiempo de dos a seis años».
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public office are foreseen for the offences detailed in articles 609 to 613, article 
615, and article 615 bis (1), (3), (4), and (5) in addition to the penalties already 
foreseen in these articles. In the case where perpetrators are ordinary citizens, 
Spanish tribunals can impose penalties of one to 10 years of special disqualifi-
cation from public office 234.
Nonetheless, there seems to be some gaps in the legislation on this 
matter. In particular, command and superior responsibility in case of failure 
to take action when they have information on the possible commission of 
a war crime by their subordinates is not foreseen. Moreover, the wording 
of articles 615 and 616 might be too vague, insofar as it does not expressly 
provide for command responsibility when the military superior should have 
known that their subordinates were about to commit a war crime and yet, 
did not take all the necessary and reasonable measures to avoid or repress 
such behavior.
Secondly, an important amendment to the criminal code made by the 
2003 reform was the codification of the absence of statutory limits to pros-
ecute war crimes 235 despite the fact that Spain has not ratified the UN and 
Council of Europe conventions on the matter. Indeed, article 131(4) was 
modified so as to state that the crimes against protected persons and objects 
in armed conflicts do not lapse. Article 133(2) holds the same with regard to 
the penalties imposed for such crimes. It should yet be noted that Organic 
Act 5/2010 modified article 131(4) so as to provide for an exception to the 
absence of statutory limits with regard to the crimes described in article 614. 
As noted by Fernando Pignatelli y Meca, this exception is justified on the 
grounds that article 614 provides for the punishment of less serious offences, 
which do not amount to war crimes or grave breaches and whose penal 
repression is not organized at international level. Therefore, the absence of 
statutory limits established in the Rome Statute is not intended to apply to 
such conducts 236.
234 Ibid., article 616: «En el caso de cometerse cualquiera de los delitos comprendidos en los Capítu-
los anteriores de este Título, excepto los previstos en el artículo 614 y en los apartados 2 y 6 del 
615 bis, y en el Título anterior por una autoridad o funcionario público, se le impondrá, además 
de las penas señaladas en ellos, la de inhabilitación absoluta por tiempo de diez a veinte años; si 
fuese un particular, los jueces y tribunales podrán imponerle la de inhabilitación especial para 
empleo o cargo público por tiempo de uno a diez años».
235 Pignatelli y Meca, «Los crímenes de guerra en la Ley orgánica 5/2010», op. cit., 2012, p. 12. 
236 Ibid., 2012, p. 21.
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Thirdly, the Spanish approach to immunity has been described as main-
taining the status quo 237. Following the current state of international law on the 
matter, Spain recognizes the immunity of incumbent foreign heads of State 238. 
In this respect, the Audiencia Nacional proposed an interpretation of the prin-
ciple of immunity very much in line with the Yerodia case, already in 1998:
Es indiscutible que los Jefes de Estado en funciones gozan de esta in-
munidad por la misma razón que el Estado extranjero goza de inmunidad 
soberana para actos de gobierno de naturaleza no privada 239.
As emphasized by Abraham Martínez Alcañiz, recognizing the immunity 
of incumbent heads of State or government is the result of a constant practice 
by Spanish courts 240. Nonetheless, the Audiencia Nacional also noted that for-
mer heads of State or government may not enjoy such immunity:
La situación es muy distinta, sin embargo, con respecto a ex jefes de Es-
tado. El derecho internacional no obliga a su protección, y por los mismos 
principios aplicables a la doctrina del acto del Estado, que no se extiende 
a los crímenes bajo el derecho internacional. En este sentido, todo el de-
recho penal internacional moderno rechaza, expresa o implícitamente, las 
defensas basadas en doctrinas de actos oficiales y en inmunidades de Jefes 
de Estado o similares 241.
The Spanish approach is therefore based on the current state of interna-
tional criminal law.
237 Ángel Sánchez Legido, «El fin del modelo español de jurisdicción universal», Revista electrónica 
de estudios internacionales, nº 27, 2014, p. 31. Available at: http://www.reei.org/index.php/revista/
num27/articulos/fin-modelo-espanol-jurisdiccion-universal (Accessed: 05.05.2017). 
238 Julio Jorge Urbina, «Las inmunidades de jurisdicción penal de los órganos del Estado en el con-
texto de la represión de las violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario», Revista Española 
de Derecho Militar, vol. 86, 2005, pp. 344-345. Quoted in Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia 
universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 346.
239 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 5, Judgment of 3 November 1998 re-
questing the extradition of Augusto Pinochet, Pinochet case, para. 4.
240 Confirmed, inter alia, in: Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, judgment of 4 March 1999, Fidel 
Castro Ruz case; Juzgado central de instrucción nº 4, auto de 4 de noviembre de 2005; Juzgado 
Central de Instrucción nº 4, auto de 13 de diciembre de 2007. Quoted in Martínez Alcañiz, El 
principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 346. 
241 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 5, Judgment of 3 November 1998 re-
questing the extradition of Augusto Pinochet, Pinochet case, para. 4.
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Thus, it can be sustained that all three actors have undertaken important 
efforts to allow national authorities to prosecute alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes. The EU has constantly recognized the importance of the fight against 
impunity, notably with regard to war crimes, and has established operational 
means at the service of judicial cooperation on this matter. As for France and 
Spain, both have extensively transposed the content of war crimes in their 
legal orders, although in differing ways. The Spanish approach better follows 
the course of international law, insofar as it first implemented the language of 
IHL in national law, and then adapted it to further evolutions. Conversely, the 
French approach is much more in line with international criminal law than 
with IHL. Furthermore, while France mostly limits itself to codify the current 
state of international law in relation with non-international armed conflicts, 
Spain makes no distinction based on the nature of the armed conflict. Finally, 
the provisions dealing with the status of the alleged perpetrator are not entirely 
satisfactory, especially with regard to the rules on immunity which would ben-
efit from further clarification. That being said, on the overall, these provisions 
allow national authorities to effectively prosecute alleged perpetrators. In addi-
tion, State parties are also under an obligation to provide for universal jurisdic-
tion mechanisms, at least with respect to grave breaches.
2. ESTABLISHING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION MECHANISMS
As explained in Chapter 3, the grave breaches regime provides for the obli-
gation to extradite or prosecute alleged perpetrators, regardless of their na-
tionality. The Geneva Conventions therefore establish an obligation to create 
universal jurisdiction mechanisms over such breaches. The approaches of the 
EU, France, and Spain on this matter are analyzed below.
2.1. The EU’s uneven support for universal jurisdiction 242
The position of the EU towards universal jurisdiction is ambiguous. 
Indeed, the EU institutions’ political support for the establishment of universal 
242 This part is based on: Bettina Steible, «EU support to domestic prosecution of violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law», op. cit., pp. 51-66.
386 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
jurisdiction mechanisms at domestic level is uneven. Furthermore, the EU 
recognizes the importance of universal jurisdiction, but only with regard to 
non-EU nationals seeking to enter and reside in the EU and in non-legally 
binding provisions. In spite of that, the EU has supported financially several 
non-governmental organizations promoting universal jurisdiction.
Firstly, the EU’s institutions political support to universal jurisdiction, 
inside and outside Europe, has been uneven. This is the case of the European 
Parliament, which has expressly done so on numerous occasions, by means 
of its resolutions. In this respect, it first stated such support unambiguously 
in a 2000 Resolution on the situation in East Timor 243. In this resolution, the 
European Parliament endorsed the principle of universal jurisdiction and 
called on the EU to support it, but further enjoined EU Member States 
to enshrine it into their domestic legislation. In subsequent resolutions, 
the European Parliament has called on third States – most importantly the 
USA 244 and the African Union Member States 245, the EU 246, and EU Member 
States 247 to codify and enforce universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has wel-
243 European Parliament Resolution on the situation in East Timor, OJ C 54, 25/02/2000, pp. 97-
98: «23. Considers that the Union should be committed to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
and no safe havens for the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and 
torture; 24. Calls on the Member States to enact the necessary legislation to permit domestic 
prosecution of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture, regardless of where 
these crimes were committed». 
244 European Parliament Resolution on Human Rights in the world in 2001 and European 
Union human rights policy (2001/2011(INI)), para. 44: «Calls on the Member States to appeal 
to all UN Member States, in particular the United States, to ratify or accede to the Rome Stat-
ute setting up the International Criminal Court and to enact effective universal jurisdiction 
legislation». 
245 European Parliament resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the case of Charles Tay-
lor (P6_TA(2005)0059), OJ C 304 E, 01/12/2005, p. 408; European Parliament Resolution on 
impunity in Africa and in particular the case of Hissène Habré (P6_TA(2006)0101). 
246 European Parliament resolution of 26 April 2007 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in 
the World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter (2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E, 20.03.2008, 
pp. 753-775, para. 137: «in pursuit of greater coherence of internal and external policies, en-
courages the Council, the Commission and the Member States to incorporate the fight against 
impunity for serious international crimes in the development of a common EU area of free-
dom, security and justice»; European Parliament resolution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Re-
port on Human Rights in the World 2007 and the European Union’s policy on the matter 
(2007/2274(INI)), OJ C 271E, 12.11.2009, pp. 7-31, para. 144.
247 European Parliament resolution of 26 April 2007 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in 
the World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter (2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E, 20.03.2008, 
pp. 753-775, para. 137: «Reiterates the importance of EU internal policy promoting adherence 
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comed on several occasions «the progress made in the application of universal 
jurisdiction in some Member States» 248 with regard to proceedings taking 
place in Spain and the UK. Yet, it should be noted, as Luc Reydams does, 
that the European Parliament remained silent regarding proceedings taking 
place in Belgium, Germany, or Spain against US, Chinese, Iranian, and Israeli 
officials 249.
Furthermore, the EU’s support to universal jurisdiction in its external 
action is mixed. As emphasized above, the EU conducts an important pol-
icy on the fight against impunity in its external relations; nonetheless, it has 
had to nuance its position with regard to universal jurisdiction in response to 
the African Union (hereafter, ‘AU’) criticism of EU Member States’ practice 
on the matter described as «abusive» 250. In particular, African States held that 
«the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states is politically selective 
against them», thus raising concerns over double standards 251. In this context, 
the EU and AU established an advisory Technical Ad Hoc Expert Group on 
to international human rights law and the need for Member States to legislate in a way con-
sistent with, inter alia, the obligations arising out of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention 
against Torture, the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the ICC»; European Parlia-
ment resolution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 and 
the European Union’s policy on the matter (2007/2274(INI)), OJ C 271E, 12.11.2009, pp. 7-31, 
para. 144; European Parliament resolution of 17 November 2011 on EU support for the ICC: 
facing challenges and overcoming difficulties (2011/2109(INI)), OJ 2013/C 153 E/13, paras. 
16 and 20: «Takes note of the Cooperation and Assistance Agreement between the EU and the 
ICC; calls on the EU Member States to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in tackling 
impunity and crimes against humanity, and highlights its importance for the effectiveness and 
success of the international criminal justice system». 
248 European Parliament Resolution on the arrest of General Pinochet in London, OJ C 341, 
09.11.1998, p. 0147; European Parliament Resolution on the proceedings against Ríos Montt, 
OJ 313 E, 20.12.2006, pp. 0465-0466; European Parliament resolution of 26 April 2007 on 
the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter 
(2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E, 20.03.2008, pp. 753-775, para. 137; European Parliament reso-
lution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 and the 
European Union’s policy on the matter (2007/2274(INI)), OJ C 271E, 12.11.2009, pp. 7-31, 
para. 144; European Parliament resolution of 17 November 2011 on EU support for the ICC: 
facing challenges and overcoming difficulties (2011/2109(INI)), OJ 2013/C 153 E/13, para. 16: 
«Welcomes the contribution of some EU Member States to the fight against impunity for the 
worst crimes known to humanity through the application of universal jurisdiction». 
249 Luc Reydams, Study on «The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity», Brus-
sels, European Parliament, 2016, p. 10.
250 Council of the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report on the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 8672/1/19, Brussels, 16 April 2009, p. 4. 
251 Ibid., p. 35.
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the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, which issued a report on the matter in 
2009 252. The following definition of universal jurisdiction was provided:
Universal criminal jurisdiction is the assertion by one state of its ju-
risdiction over crimes allegedly committed in the territory of another 
state by nationals of another state against nationals of another state where 
the crime alleged poses no direct threat to the vital interests of the state 
asserting jurisdiction. In other words, universal jurisdiction amounts to 
the claim by a state to prosecute crimes in circumstances where none of 
the traditional links of territoriality, nationality, passive personality or the 
protective principle exist at the time of the commission of the alleged 
offence 253.
Moreover, it recognizes that this is a principle which finds its legal basis 
both in international treaty – with special mention to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I – and customary law and that it applies, inter alia, to 
war crimes 254. On the overall, the report endorsed important but vague 255 prin-
ciples. Political and diplomatic consequences of the use of universal jurisdic-
tion are also addressed, as the experts recommend the States to «bear in mind 
the need to avoid impairing friendly international relations» 256.
This mixed endorsement is visible in other EU documents dealing with 
its external action. By way of example, in the 2009 annual report on the main 
aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, universal jurisdiction is explicitly men-
tioned as a «national instrument in the fight against impunity» 257. However, 
the report also emphasizes that this issue has «negative consequences for the 
relationships between EU and AU» 258. In the 2013 ‘Toolkit for Bridging the 
252 Ibid., p. 4. 
253 Council of the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report on the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction, op. cit., 2009, p. 6. 
254 Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
255 Sassòli and Carron, «EU Law and International Humanitarian Law», in Patterson and Södersten, 
A Companion to European Union Law and International Law, op. cit., 2016, p. 419. 
256 Council of the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report on the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction, op.cit., 2009, p. 42.
257 Council of the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of 
the CFSP, 10659/10, Brussels, 8 June 2010, p. 49. 
258 Ibid. 
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gap between international and national justice’, universal jurisdiction is seen 
as a means to «reduce the risk of impunity», in accordance with the national 
authorities’ duty to prosecute alleged perpetrators of international core crimes 
by virtue of the principle of complementarity 259. Nonetheless, no further 
details are provided on that matter.
In 2012, the European Commission expressed its view on universal juris-
diction on behalf of the EU in an amicus brief presented before the US Supreme 
Court, in relation with the case ‘Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co’ 260. 
Even though this case concerned a civil suit for damages under the Alien Tort 
Statute, the Commission elaborated on universal criminal jurisdiction. In this 
brief, it provides for a quite general definition of universal jurisdiction:
Universal criminal jurisdiction permits a State to prosecute universally 
condemned international crimes even when committed by aliens against 
aliens in the territory of another sovereign 261.
A pure form of universal jurisdiction is therefore acknowledged. In addi-
tion, the Commission refers to the concept of erga omnes obligation to the extent 
that it grounds universal jurisdiction on the rationale according to which:
[t]he universally condemned crimes to which it extends are so repugnant 
that all States have a legitimate interest and therefore have the authority to 
suppress and punish them 262.
259 European Commission; High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy, Joint Staff Working Document on advancing the principle of complementarity. 
Toolkit for Bridging the gap between international and national justice, Brussels, 31.01.2013, 
SWD(2013) 26 final, p. 19: «It is equally important to introduce in national law all the pro-
visions which are necessary for the national criminal courts to establish and exercise their 
jurisdiction. The adoption of legal provisions establishing extensive extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion, or even universal jurisdiction, will reduce the risk of impunity. No State Party to the 
Rome Statute should accept to host on its territory someone who is suspected of having 
committed a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC, wherever this crime has been 
committed». 
260 Reydams, Study on «The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity», op. cit., 2016, 
p. 10. 
261 Supplemental Brief of the European Commission on behalf of the European Union at Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Supreme Court of the United States, Esther Kiobel et al. 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 13 June 2012, p. 14.
262 Ibid., p. 16.
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It is likewise important to note that it considers that «universal criminal 
jurisdiction is well established under international law» 263. To illustrate such 
general acceptance, the Commission relies on treaty law, and for present pur-
poses, on the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. In particular, it 
acknowledges that such «treaties require States to extend universal jurisdiction 
over defined crimes where the alleged perpetrator is present within their terri-
tory» 264. Consequently, it endorses the view, seemingly based on State practice, 
that the alleged perpetrator’s presence on a State’s territory is a requirement for 
the activation of universal jurisdiction mechanisms.
As regards State practice, the Commission recognizes that it is «not widely 
exercised» 265 but that the fact that it does not «upset comity between nations» 
is another argument in favor general acceptance 266. Nonetheless, it – surpris-
ingly – uses the scarce number of prosecutions as an additional argument in 
this sense 267.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the EU Genocide Network Strategy, 
which, as noted above, has been endorsed by the Council. It expressly recog-
nizes that the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols constitute the 
legal basis for:
national authorities to seek out, investigate and prosecute or extradite those 
responsible for the commission of core international crimes, regardless of 
where they are committed, and irrespective of the nationality of the per-
petrator or the victim 268.
Secondly, in strict legal terms, the EU’s competence is quite limited, to 
the extent that the exercise of universal jurisdiction remains a national com-
petence. Nonetheless, there are references to universal jurisdiction at EU level 
in ‘Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and 
263 Ibid., p. 14. 
264 Ibid., p. 15. 
265 Supplemental Brief of the European Commission on behalf of the European Union at Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Supreme Court of the United States, Esther Kiobel et al. 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 13 June 2012, p. 14. 
266 Ibid., p. 16.
267 Ibid. Also observed in: Reydams, Study on «The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against 
impunity», op. cit., 2016, p. 10.
268 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 12. 
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prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes’, adopted 
within the frame of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In particular, 
recitals (6) and (7) express such support as they refer to the obligation of EU 
Member States to extradite or prosecute alleged perpetrators from non-EU 
Member States accused of, inter alia, war crimes 269. Therefore, there is recog-
nition at EU level of the obligation to establish universal jurisdiction mecha-
nisms at domestic level with regard to non-EU citizens seeking to enter and 
reside in the EU.
Luc Reydams goes even further and considers that under current EU 
law, «Member States are obliged to establish jurisdiction over international 
crimes by non-EU citizens who are seeking to enter and reside in the EU» 270. 
Nonetheless, it seems more appropriate to consider that there is no legal obli-
gation to do so under current EU law, insofar as recitals are not legally binding 
and Council Decision 2003/335/JHA establishes a more limited obligation 
of cooperation among EU Member States on these matters. Consequently, it 
seems reasonable to assert that the support expressed in recitals (6) and (7) is of 
political – not legal – nature. In any event, these provisions would most likely 
apply to low-profile perpetrators, namely refugees and migrants who cannot 
and often do not want to be extradited, rather than former heads of State or 
government and other high-level officials 271.
Finally, this uneven support in legal terms should not overshadow the 
important financial effort made by the EU on this matter, as observed by Luc 
Reydams 272. Indeed, the European Commission has financed several NGOs 
whose objective is the fight against impunity, including on the basis of univer-
sal jurisdiction: e.g., the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, No 
Peace without Justice, Parliamentarians for Global Action, Redress, Avocats 
269 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes: «(6) Member States are being confronted on a 
regular basis with persons who were involved in such crimes and who are trying to enter and 
reside in the European Union.
 (7) The competent authorities of the Member States are to ensure that, where they receive infor-
mation that a person who has applied for a residence permit is suspected of having committed or 
participated in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, the relevant 
acts may be investigated, and, where justified, prosecuted in accordance with national law».
270 Reydams, Study on «The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity», op. cit, 2016, 
p. 10.
271 Ibid., p. 20. 
272 Ibid.
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Sans Frontières and the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
l’Homme 273. In conclusion, according to Luc Reydams, «grassroots support 
for universal jurisdiction (and the ICC) within and outside Europe has been 
partially underwritten by the EU» 274.
2.2. France: a progressive recognition of universal jurisdiction over war crimes
Universal jurisdiction is regulated by the current code of criminal pro-
cedure and the criminal code. It should be noted that article 113-6 and 113-7 
recognize the competence of French courts over crimes committed outside of 
the French territory on the grounds of active and passive personality respec-
tively. These possibilities are justified either because France does not accept 
extraditing its own nationals, or to protect its interests abroad. Besides these 
traditional mechanisms of extra-territorial application of the law, the French 
legal order now enshrines, under some conditions, a mechanism of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes.
2.2.1. The original exclusion of war crimes from the scope of application 
of universal jurisdiction
Before the adoption of Act nº 2010-930 of 9 August 2010, the French 
legislature had not implemented the obligation to establish universal juris-
diction over the grave breaches in application of the Geneva Conventions. 
Nonetheless, pursuant to articles 689 and 689-1 of the code of criminal pro-
cedure, French courts could prosecute any person guilty of having committed 
certain international and transnational crimes. Article 689-1 of the code of 
criminal procedure grants universal jurisdictions over the offences contained 
in the international treaties and conventions exhaustively detailed in the same 
code 275. According to this article, the requirement regarding the alleged perpe-
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
275 French code of criminal procedure, article 689-1: «En application des conventions interna-
tionales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions fran-
çaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire 
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trator is the presence on the French territory. However, the Geneva Conven-
tions and their Additional Protocols are excluded from this list so that universal 
jurisdiction does not apply on these grounds.
As for article 689, it allows French courts to prosecute the alleged per-
petrators of offences committed outside of the French territory when an 
international treaty gives them competence to do so. One could therefore 
wonder whether the Geneva Conventions could have been invoked as an 
«international treaty that gives French courts the competence to prosecute 
the offence». Nonetheless, when confronted to this question, French courts 
rejected the direct effect of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In 
particular, the Cour de cassation considered in the Javor case that the obliga-
tions to adopt criminal legislation providing for the repression of the grave 
breaches, to look for perpetrators, and prosecute or extradite them regardless 
of their nationality exist towards States and are not directly applicable in the 
French legal order. It argued that the relevant provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions were not detailed enough to constitute the legal basis for extra-ter-
ritorial jurisdiction in criminal matters 276. The Cour de cassation therefore 
rejected its competence over the grave breaches when they are committed 
abroad, by foreigners, or against foreign victims, on the basis of article 689-
11 of the code of criminal procedure. Consequently, a legislative reform was 
needed in order to align the French legislation with the Geneva Conven-
tions on that matter.
de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles. Les dispositions du 
présent article sont applicables à la tentative de ces infractions, chaque fois que celle-ci est 
punissable».
276 See: Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 95-81527, 26 March 1996, E. Javor et al. 
vs. X: «Aux motifs qu’aux termes des quatre Conventions de Genève entrées en vigueur pour 
la France le 28 décembre 1951, les Etats parties s’engagent à prendre les mesures législatives 
nécessaires pour réprimer, par des sanctions adéquates, les infractions graves; que ces conven-
tions imposent également aux parties contractantes de rechercher les auteurs de ces infractions 
graves, de les déférer à leurs propres tribunaux quelle que soit leur nationalité ou de les remettre 
à une autre partie contractante intéressée à la poursuite; que la rédaction de ces textes permet 
de déduire que les obligations précitées ne pèsent que sur les Etats parties et qu’elles ne sont pas 
directement applicables en droit interne; que ces dispositions revêtent un caractère trop général 
pour créer directement des règles de compétence extraterritoriales en matière pénale, lesquelles 
doivent nécessairement être rédigées de manière détaillée et précise; qu’en l’absence d’effet di-
rect les dispositions des quatre Conventions de Genève relatives à la recherche et à la poursuite 
des auteurs d’infractions graves, l’article 689 du Code de procédure pénale ne saurait recevoir 
application». 
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In this context, the French legislature started with the recognition of 
universal jurisdiction over the graves breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
the violations of the laws and customs of war that fall under the competence 
of the ICTY 277 and ICTR 278. The application of universal jurisdiction to such 
cases is subject to the presence of the alleged perpetrator on the French ter-
ritory. Even though it constituted a first recognition of universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes, it remained a mechanism with a limited scope of application 
in terms of territory, crimes, and time 279. Consequently, it was the adaptation of 
the French legal order to the Rome Statute which permitted the recognition 
of the principle of universal jurisdiction over war crimes as a general rule.
2.2.2. The change initiated with the transposition of the Rome Statute
Indeed, Act nº 2010-930 of 9 August 2010 inserted a new article 689-11 
which grants universal jurisdiction to French courts over the crimes falling 
under the competence of the ICC in accordance with the Rome Statute. How-
ever, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is importantly restricted, as several 
conditions must be met. In particular, while foreigners may be prosecuted by 
French courts, they must regularly reside in France. In this regard, the Cour 
de cassation held in 2005 that the regular residence («résidence habituelle») 
is defined as the place where the concerned party established the permanent 
or common centre of their interests, with a view to confer a stable character 
to it 280. Therefore, two conditions – material and intentional – are required 281.
277 Act nº 95-1 of 2 January 1995 (Loi nº 95-1 du 2 janvier 1995 portant adaptation de la législation 
française aux dispositions de la résolution 827 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies instituant 
un tribunal international en vue de juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations 
graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie depuis 
1991), JORF n°2 of 03.01.1995, p. 71. 
278 Act nº 96-432 of 22 May 1996 (Loi nº 96-432 du 22 mai 1996 portant adaptation de la légis-
lation française aux dispositions de la résolution 955 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies 
instituant un tribunal international en vue de juger les personnes présumées responsables d’actes 
de génocide ou d’autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire commis en 1994 
sur le territoire du Rwanda et, s’agissant des citoyens rwandais, sur le territoire d’Etats voisins), 
JORF n°119 of 23.05.1996, p. 7695. 
279 Ameline, Avis nº 1828 fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, op. cit., 8 July 2009, p. 52.
280 Cour de cassation, first civil chamber, 14 December 2005, case nº 1880. 
281 Ameline, Avis nº 1828 fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, op. cit., 8 July 2009, p. 58. 
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This requirement has been criticized both by politicians 282 and scholars 283 
on the grounds that it is unnecessarily strict and reduces considerably the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by French courts. Another criticism is that 
it establishes an – unjustified – difference of treatment between the crimes 
defined in the Rome Statute on the one hand, and those regulated by article 
689-1 of the Code of criminal procedure or those falling under the compe-
tence of the ICTR and the ICTY on the other, as those require the mere 
presence of the alleged perpetrator on the French territory 284. In this respect, 
the Cour de cassation held, in a case relating to the competence of French 
courts over torture, that the requirement of the presence on the territory was 
met whenever sufficient elements are found on the presence of at least one of 
the alleged perpetrators when the proceedings are initiated 285. As emphasized 
by the CNCDH, the legislation makes it more difficult to punish the worst 
crimes affecting the international community as a whole than crimes of a 
lesser magnitude on the scale of international offences 286.
The second element required by article 689-11 is the double jeopardy 
rule. Pursuant to this criterion, for an alleged perpetrator to be prosecuted in 
France on the grounds of universal jurisdiction, the relevant crime must be 
punishable in the State where it was committed. If not, the territorial State or 
the State of nationality of the alleged perpetrator must be a party to the Rome 
Statute.
This requirement is problematic in several respects 287. First, it subjects the 
possibility of proceedings in France to the existence of provisions providing 
282 Ibid.; Alain Anziani, Rapport nº 353 fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, 
du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale sur la proposition de loi de M. Jean-Pierre 
Sueur et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à modifier l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale relatif 
à la compétence territoriale du juge français concernant les infractions visées par le statut de la Cour pénale 
internationale, Paris, Sénat français, 13 February 2013. 
283 Xavier Philippe and Anne Desmaret, «Remarques critiques relatives au projet de loi portant 
adaptation du droit pénal français à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale: la réalité 
française de la lutte contre l’impunité», Revue française de droit constitutionnel, vol. 1(81), 2010, 
pp. 41-65. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, case nº 7513 of 10 January 2007, «Disappeared of the 
Beach». 
286 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008. 
287 Ameline, Avis nº 1828 fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, op. cit., 8 July 2009, p. 58.
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for the repression of war crimes in the other State. Thus, French courts will 
not be competent with regard to the crimes perpetrated in countries where 
the legislation is more lenient and where the authorities are reluctant to ini-
tiate proceedings, even though this is precisely the scenario where universal 
jurisdiction is especially relevant and necessary. In this regard, Mireille Del-
mas-Marty notes that France’s recognition of the criminal responsibility of 
legal persons is not shared with many other domestic legal systems, so that 
the withdrawal of the double jeopardy rule could allow the prosecution of 
foreign multinational groups operating in war zones 288. A contrario, the action 
of French Courts will not be as relevant if the territorial State or the State of 
nationality of the alleged perpetrator is a party to the Rome Statute, as the 
ICC is competent to prosecute such crime. Besides, this requirement con-
tradicts the provisions on the European Arrest Warrant, insofar as war crimes 
belong to the category of crimes that can be executed without complying 
with the double jeopardy rule. Finally, this requirement does not exist with 
regard to the other mechanisms of extra-territorial jurisdiction of French 
courts 289 and actually seems to contradict the idea of universality at the basis 
of international criminal justice 290.
Third, proceedings may be initiated by the sole public prosecutor 291. As 
observed by the CNCDH, this condition deprives victims of their right to an 
effective remedy, although France actively committed to the recognition of 
their rights during the negotiations that led to the establishment of the ICC 292.
Finally, the public prosecutor must ensure that the ICC expressly declines 
jurisdiction and that no other competent international or national court has 
formulated an extradition request to initiate the proceedings 293. Therefore, it 
seems that the wording of article 689-11 reverses the order of the obliga-
tion to extradite or prosecute, which should be understood as a primo prosequi, 
288 Anziani, Rapport nº 353 fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, op. cit., 
13 February 2013, p. 27.
289 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008.
290 Anziani, Rapport nº 353 fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, op. cit., 13 
February 2013, p. 27.
291 French code of criminal procedure, article 689-11. 
292 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008.
293 French code of criminal procedure, article 689-11. 
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secundo dedere mechanism, as the obligation to extradite seems to prevail over 
the obligation to prosecute. In the same way, requiring that the ICC declines 
jurisdiction goes against the letter and spirit of the principle of complementa-
rity, insofar as it seems to shift States’ primary responsibility in the fight against 
impunity towards the ICC. This approach has been called an erroneous inter-
pretation of the principle of complementarity, which substitutes it with the 
principle of primacy of the ICC 294.
Thus, article 689-11 contains four conditions which importantly restrict 
the scope of application of universal jurisdiction over war crimes in the French 
legal order. These conditions have been criticized on several occasions, notably 
because they establish a differentiated and restrictive procedural regime for 
core international crimes, something hardly justifiable both in terms of anal-
ogy and hierarchy. In this regard, the same crimes are subject to a less restric-
tive regime if they fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR. In the 
same manner, less serious crimes can be prosecuted in France in accordance 
with a less restrictive procedural regime. Therefore, alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes could freely move on French territory as long as they do not ordinarily 
reside in France, while suspects of crimes of torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment could not. This difference in the procedural regime 
of universal jurisdiction would result in treating more leniently the person 
responsible for the wave of acts of torture and murders which constitute war 
crimes, than their subordinates 295. In its last opinion on the matter – in 2012, 
the CNCDH thus reaffirmed its concerns already expressed in 2008 296 and 
2010 297 and called for the withdrawal of these conditions so as to align article 
689-11 with the Rome Statute 298.
The Senate adopted an amendment on 26 February 2013 in this sense. 
The so-called Sueur proposal aims to modify article 689-11 of the code of 
criminal procedure, so as to align its procedural regime with the one estab-
lished in article 689-1, requiring the mere presence of the suspect on the 
294 Anziani, Rapport nº 353 fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, op. cit., 
13 February 2013, p. 28. 
295 Ibid., p. 26. 
296 CNCDH, Avis sur la loi portant adaptation du droit pénale à l’institution de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale, 6 November 2008.
297 CNCDH, Avis sur l’adaptation de la legislation pénale française au Statut de Rome relatif à la 
Cour pénale internationale, 4 February 2010. 
298 CNCDH, Avis sur la Cour pénale internationale, 23 October 2012, Recommendation 1. 
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French territory, with regard to crimes against humanity, genocide, and war 
crimes as defined in the French criminal code 299. Even though this amend-
ment was transferred to the National Assembly on the same day, it has not been 
placed on its agenda to this date 300.
2.3. Spain: a progressive restriction of universal jurisdiction over war crimes
The Spanish legal framework in relation to the prosecution of perpe-
trators of international crimes, including war crimes, has profoundly evolved. 
Originally considered a pioneer in universal jurisdiction, several amendments 
have been made in order to minimize its scope of application. Even though 
the Spanish legislation extends the principle of universal jurisdiction to several 
crimes, including crimes which are excluded from the scope of the inter-
national public order 301, the following developments will focus on universal 
jurisdiction over grave breaches and serious violations of IHL.
2.3.1. Universal jurisdiction over war crimes as provided by Organic Act 
6/1985
In its original version, article 23 of Organic Act 6/1985 on the Judicial 
Power provided for the possibility to prosecute «Spaniards or foreigners out-
side of the national territory» accused of having committed a certain number 
of international and transnational crimes as defined in Spanish law. A ‘pure 
form’ of universal jurisdiction was therefore enshrined in national legislation, 
insofar as no special connection was required between the perpetrator and 
Spain. Thus, the accent was put on the seriousness of the crime at stake and on 
the necessity to deny safe havens for their perpetrators.
The first cases resorting to universal jurisdiction were based on genocide, 
terrorism, and torture against the Argentinian military junta as well as against 
299 Proposition de loi tendant à modifier l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale relatif à la 
compétence territoriale du juge français concernant les infractions visées par le statut de la Cour 
pénale internationale. 
300 See: http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl11-753.html (Accessed: 14.03.2017). 
301 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 492. 
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Augusto Pinochet and the military leadership, in 1996 302 and therefore fall 
outside of the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, they gave international vis-
ibility to universal jurisdiction, notably thanks to the absolute interpretation 
made thereof by Spanish judges 303. Even though Augusto Pinochet was not 
extradited but returned to his home country on health grounds in 2000 304, 
these cases remain important insofar as they triggered the application of uni-
versal jurisdiction mechanisms in Spain, and other cases were presented before 
Spanish judges on this basis thereafter. As observed by Antoni Pigrau Solé, the 
Guatemala case constitutes the cornerstone of Spanish judicial practice on 
universal jurisdiction 305. It is therefore important to mention it, albeit it does 
not deal with war crimes.
This case was presented by Peace Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú 
on the situation that occurred in Guatemala between 1978 and 1986. Con-
cretely, a complaint was filed against eight former politicians and military 
leaders from Guatemala before Spanish courts on 2 December 1999 306. In a 
judgment of 13 December 2000, the Audiencia Nacional rejected the com-
petence of Spanish courts over the alleged crimes as a result of the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity 307. As noted by Abraham Martínez Alcañiz, the 
Court interpreted the latter principle quite liberally, insofar as the absence of 
legal obstacles in the legislation of the territorial State was deemed a sufficient 
requirement for the application of subsidiarity 308.
302 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 5, Auto de 10 de diciembre de 1998.
303 José Elías Esteve Moltó, «La persecución universal de los crímenes de guerra en España: más 
retrocesos, que avances», in Consuelo Ramón Chornet (dir.), Conflictos armados: de la vulneración 
de los Derechos Humanos a las sanciones del Derecho Internacional, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2014, 
p. 130.
 It should also be noted that, contrarily to what is sustained by part of the scholarship on the 
matter, the extradition request made by Spanish judges was not based on passive personnality 
but on universal jurisdiction. See, in this sense: Antoni Pigrau Solé, La Jurisdicción universal y su 
aplicación en España: la persecución del genocidio, los crímenes de guerra y los crímenes contra la humanidad 
por los tribunales nacionales, Colección Recerca por Drets Humans 03, Barcelona, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2009, footnote 271. 
304 Pigrau Solé, La Jurisdicción universal y su aplicación en España, op. cit., 2009, p. 94.
305 Ibid., pp. 98-100.
306 Ibid.
307 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Judgment of 13 December 2000, diligencias previas 331/99, 
Guatemala genocide case, para.2.
308 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 494. 
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Such decision was challenged before the Supreme Court (Tribunal 
Supremo). In its judgment of 25 February 2003, the Court upheld the deci-
sion of the Audiencia Nacional pursuant to which the Spanish courts lacked 
jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes of genocide and terrorism on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction. Conversely, it accepted Spanish courts’ jurisdiction 
over the crime of torture on the basis of passive personality 309. It should also 
be noted that it rejected the interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity put 
forward by the Audiencia Nacional 310.
Indeed, the Supreme Court established a system respectful of some prin-
ciples of international law – such as the principle of non-intervention – in 
the cases where universal jurisdiction finds its legal basis in on domestic law 
only 311. In particular, the extra-territorial application of criminal law is allowed 
when the interests of the prosecuting State are at stake, such as the principles of 
active and passive personality. Conversely, if the extra-territorial application of 
the law is based on the nature of the offence, the compatibility of the universal 
jurisdiction with other principles of international law arises. Where universal 
jurisdiction is expressly based on norms established by treaty law, no objections 
can be made; on the contrary, if there are no explicit international provisions 
law and universal jurisdiction is provided at domestic level only, then it must 
be accommodated with the limits existing under international law 312. Thus, 
309 Tribunal Supremo, Judgment nº 327/2003 of 25 February 2003, Guatemala case. 
310 Ibid., point 6: «En cualquier caso, el criterio de la subsidiariedad, además de no estar consagrado 
expresa o implícitamente en el Convenio para la prevención y la sanción del delito de geno-
cidio, no resulta satisfactorio en la forma en que ha sido aplicado por el Tribunal de instancia. 
Determinar cuando procede intervenir de modo subsidiario para el enjuiciamiento de unos 
concretos hechos basándose en la inactividad, real o aparente, de la jurisdicción del lugar, 
implica un juicio de los órganos jurisdiccionales de un Estado acerca de la capacidad de ad-
ministrar justicia que tienen los correspondientes órganos del mismo carácter de otro Estado 
soberano».
311 Tribunal Supremo, Judgment nº 327/2003 of 25 February 2003, Guatemala case, point 8: «Como 
principio, y con carácter general, la previsión de la ley española ha de hacerse compatible con las 
exigencias derivadas del orden internacional, tal como es entendido por los Estados». 
312 Ibid.: «La extensión territorial de la ley penal, en consecuencia, se justifica por la existencia de 
intereses particulares de cada Estado, lo que explica que actualmente resulte indiscutible el reco-
nocimiento internacional de la facultad de perseguir a los autores de delitos cometidos fuera del 
territorio nacional, sobre la base del principio real o de defensa o de protección de intereses y 
del de personalidad activa o pasiva. En estos casos el establecimiento unilateral de la jurisdicción 
tiene su sentido y apoyo fundamental, aunque no exclusivo, en la necesidad de proveer a la pro-
tección de esos intereses por el Estado nacional.
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in accordance with this doctrine, confirmed in subsequent cases 313, universal 
jurisdiction may be exercised only if some type of nexus with Spain is found.
Nonetheless, the case went to the Constitutional Court, which put for-
ward a different approach 314. In the Case 237/2005 of 26 September 2005, 
the Court annulled the judgments passed before the Audiencia Nacional and 
Supreme Court and provided a broad interpretation of the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction:
En otras palabras, desde una interpretación apegada al sentido literal 
del precepto, así como también desde la voluntas legislatoris, es obligado 
concluir que la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial instaura un principio de 
jurisdicción universal absoluto, es decir, sin sometimiento a criterios res-
trictivos de corrección o procedibilidad, y sin ordenación jerárquica alguna 
con respecto al resto de las reglas de atribución competencial, puesto que, a 
diferencia del resto de criterios, el de justicia universal se configura a partir 
de la particular naturaleza de los delitos objeto de persecución 315.
The Constitutional Court therefore endorsed the principle of pure uni-
versal jurisdiction and further considered that the presence of the alleged per-
petrator was not a necessary requirement to initiate proceedings, even though 
the presence of the accused will be necessary at a later stage given the pro-
hibition of trials in absentia in the legislation. In this respect, the existence of 
mechanisms such as extradition or arrest warrants excludes the requirement 
of the presence of the accused to trigger the proceedings 316. In addition, the 
 Cuando la extensión extraterritorial de la ley penal tenga su base en la naturaleza del delito, en 
tant que afecte a bienes jurídicos de los que es titular la Comunidad Internacional, se plantea la 
cuestión de la compatibilidad entre el principio de justicia universal y otros principios de dere-
cho internacional público».
313 Tribunal Supremo, Judgment nº 712/2003 of 20 May 2003, Peru case; Tribunal Supremo, Judg-
ment nº 319/2004 of 8 March 2004, Chile case. Quoted in Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de 
justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 497.
314 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 501. 
315 Tribunal Constitucional, Case nº 237/2007 of 26 September 2007, BOE nº 258, 28.10.2005, 
pp. 45-57, para. 3.
316 Ibid., para. 7: «Sin lugar a dudas la presencia del presunto autor en el territorio español es un 
requisito insoslayable para el enjuiciamiento y eventual condena, dada la inexistencia de los 
juicios in absentia en nuestra legislación (exceptuando supuestos no relevantes en el caso). 
Debido a ello institutos jurídicos como la extradición constituyen piezas fundamentales para 
una efectiva consecución de la finalidad de la jurisdicción universal: la persecución y sanción 
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Court held that the necessity to establish some kind of nexus with Spain was 
contra legem 317 and insisted that universal jurisdiction is a mechanism based on 
the nature of the offence.
Besides, it should be noted that the original wording of article 23(4) 
referred to genocide, but not crimes against humanity or war crimes. As 
observed by Gimeno Sandra, the original version of article 23(4) established 
two groups of crimes: the first category included crimes which, by their very 
nature, fell directly and immediately under extraterritorial jurisdiction. As for 
the second category, it included the crimes that could be prosecuted uni-
versally on the basis of the international treaties and conventions ratified by 
Spain 318. Indeed, a clause allowed the prosecution of any crime that shall be 
prosecuted in Spain in accordance with international treaty law («según los 
tratados o convenios internacionales») 319. This clause was interpreted liberally 
and paved the way for several prosecutions against alleged war criminals. The 
Couso case is worth mentioning in this regard.
In this case, members of the American military were prosecuted regard-
ing the death of a Spanish journalist in Baghdad 320. In 2006, the Supreme 
Court accepted the jurisdiction of Spanish courts most notably on the basis 
of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of universal jurisdiction 321. It was 
therefore the first time that the Court expressly considered that the provisions 
de crímenes que, por sus características, afectan a toda la comunidad internacional. Pero tal 
conclusión no puede llevar a erigir esa circunstancia en requisito sine qua non para el ejercicio 
de la competencia judicial y la apertura del proceso, máxime cuando de así proceder se some-
tería el acceso a la jurisdicción universal a una restricción de hondo calado no contemplada 
en la ley; restricción que, por lo demás, resultaría contradictoria con el fundamento y los fines 
inherentes a la institución».
317 Ibid., para. 8: «supone una reducción contra legem a partir de criterios correctores que ni siquiera 
implícitamente pueden considerarse presentes en la ley y que, además, se muestran palmariamen-
te contrarios a la finalidad que inspira la institución, que resulta alterada hasta hacer irreconocible 
el principio de jurisdicción universal según es concebido en el Derecho internacional, y que 
tiene el efecto de reducir el ámbito de aplicación del precepto hasta casi suponer una derogación 
de facto del art. 23.4 LOPJ». 
318 José Vicente Gimeno Sandra, Derecho penal procesal, Madrid, Colex, 2004, pp. 118-119. Quoted in 
Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 492.
319 Organic Act on the Judicial Power, article 23.4.g.
320 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 1, Judgment nº 27/2007 of 27.04.2007. 
321 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, Sección 1, Judgment nº 1240/2006 of 11.12.2006. It should 
also be noted that the existence of a legitimate nexus with Spain was likewise recognized, as the 
victim was a Spaniard. 
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relating to the grave breaches contained in the Geneva Conventions were 
applicable to article 23(4) 322.
322 Ibid., para. 7: «Establece el art. 23.4 de la LOPJ que “igualmente será competente la jurisdicción 
española para conocer de los hechos cometidos por españoles o extranjeros fuera del territorio na-
cional susceptibles de tipificarse, según la ley penal española, como alguno de los siguientes delitos: 
[...]. h) Y cualquier otro que, según los tratados o convenios internacionales, deba ser perseguido en 
España”. Esta última referencia genérica completa la relación de delitos sobre los que la comuni-
dad internacional ha suscrito determinados Tratados o Convenios (genocidio, terrorismo, piratería, 
falsificación de moneda, prostitución y corrupción de menores y tráfico de drogas).
 En la materia que aquí nos ocupa, existen los cuatro Convenios de Ginebra sobre el Derecho de 
la Guerra, de 12 de agosto de 1949, con sus correspondientes Protocolos Adicionales, relativo uno 
de dichos Convenios (el IV) a la protección de personas civiles en tiempo de guerra, cuyo art. 146 
establece que “las Altas Partes contratantes se comprometen a tomar todas las medidas legislativas 
necesarias para fijar las sanciones penales adecuadas que hayan de aplicarse a las personas que co-
metieren o diesen orden de cometer cualquiera de las infracciones graves al presente Convenio 
que quedan definidas en el artículo siguiente. Cada una de las Partes contratantes tendrá la obliga-
ción de buscar a las personas acusadas de haber cometido u ordenado cometer, una cualquiera de 
dichas infracciones graves, debiendo hacerlas comparecer ante los propios tribunales de ella, fuere 
cual fuere su nacionalidad. Podrá también, si lo prefiriese, y según las condiciones previstas en su 
propia legislación, entregarlas para enjuiciamiento a otra Parte contratante interesada en el proceso, 
en la medida que esta otra Parte contratante haya formulado contra ella suficientes cargos. [...]”. 
Por su parte, el art. 147 del citado Convenio dispone que “las infracciones graves a que alude el ar-
tículo anterior son las que implican cualquiera de los actos siguientes, si se cometieren contra per-
sonas o bienes protegidos por el Convenio: homicidio adrede, tortura o tratos inhumanos, incluso 
experiencias biológicas, causar intencionadamente grandes sufrimientos, o atentar gravemente a la 
integridad física o a la salud, las deportaciones y traslados ilegales, la detención ilegítima, coaccio-
nar a una persona protegida a servir en las fuerzas armadas de la Potencia enemiga, o privarla de su 
derecho a ser juzgada normal e imparcialmente según las estipulaciones del presente Convenio, la 
toma de rehenes, la destrucción y apropiación de bienes no justificadas por necesidades militares y 
ejecutadas en gran escala de modo ilícito y arbitrario”. En este mismo ámbito, el art. 79 del Proto-
colo I Adicional de 8 de junio de 1977, relativo a “medidas de protección de periodistas”, dice que 
“1. Los periodistas que realicen misiones profesionales peligrosas en las zonas de conflicto armado 
serán considerados personas civiles en el sentido del párrafo 1 del artículo 50.2. Serán protegidos 
como tales de conformidad con los Convenios y el presente Protocolo, a condición de que se 
abstengan de todo acto que afecte a su estatuto de persona civil y sin perjuicio del derecho que 
asiste a los corresponsales de guerra acreditados ante las fuerzas armadas a gozar del estatuto que 
les reconoce el artículo 4, A 4) del III Convenio [...]”.
 Consecuencia de los anteriores Convenios ha sido la inclusión en el Código Penal de 1995, 
como novedad absoluta en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, del Capítulo III del Título XXIV 
(“Delitos contra la Comunidad Internacional”), en cuyo art. 611.1º se castiga al que, “con oca-
sión de un conflicto armado: 1º. Realice u ordene realizar ataques indiscriminados o excesivos o 
haga objeto a la población civil de ataques, represalias o actos o amenazas de violencia cuya fina-
lidad principal sea aterrorizarla”; precisándose en el art. 608 del Código Penal que “a los efectos 
de este capítulo, se entenderá por personas protegidas: [...] 3º. La población civil y las personas 
civiles protegidas por el IV Convenio de Ginebra de 12 de agosto de 1949 o por el Protocolo I 
Adicional de 8 de junio de 1977”».
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Against this background, several cases were brought before Spanish 
jurisdictions to prosecute alleged perpetrators of war crimes, such as the Gaza 
case 323, the Rwanda case 324, the Guantanamo case 325, or the ‘Asesores de Bush’ 
case 326. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the Spanish legal order 
authorized actio popularis, thus allowing several associations to initiate pro-
ceedings before Spanish courts 327. On the other hand, on different occasions, 
other cases were not adjudicated on war crimes grounds even though they 
could have been considered as such. For example, in the Guatemala case, the 
plaintiff was successful albeit the facts were not described as war crimes, but 
as genocide 328.
2.3.2. Organic Act 1/2009: clarification of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes
Article 23(4) was further amended in 2009 by means of Organic Act 
1/2009 329. The objectives of the reform, in accordance with the preamble, 
were two-fold. On the one hand, it added new crimes for which universal 
jurisdiction could be exercised, in particular war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. For present purposes, it is worth noticing that article 23(4)(h) refers 
to any crime which shall be prosecuted in Spain in accordance with treaty law, 
in particular with regard to IHL and IHRL conventions. While the former 
terminology allowed for the prosecution of war crimes, this clarification was 
desirable as it provided a clearer legal basis for prosecution, an element particu-
larly important with regard to the principle of legality.
323 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 4, Judgment nº 157/2008 of 29.01.2009.
324 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 4, Judgment nº 03/2008 of 06.02.2008.
325 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 5, Judgment nº 150/2009 of 27.04.2009.
326 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Judgment nº 134/2009 of 23.03.2012.
327 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, p. 494. 
328 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 1, Interlocutory decisión nº 331/99.10 
of Justice Ruiz Polanco of 27.03.2000. Quoted in Esteve Moltó, «La persecución universal de 
los crímenes de guerra en España: más retrocesos, que avances», op. cit., 2014, p. 131. 
329 Organic Act 1/2009 of 3 November 2009 (Ley Orgánica 1/2009, de 3 de noviembre, com-
plementaria de la Ley de reforma de la legislación procesal para la implantación de la nueva 
Oficina judicial, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judi-
cial).
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On the other hand, the reform aimed to require some connection 
between the crime and Spain. Thus, article 23(4) as amended by Organic Act 
1/2009 requires the presence of the suspect in Spain, the existence of Spanish 
victims, or the existence of some relevant nexus with Spain («algún vínculo de 
conexión relevante con España»). Universal jurisdiction in its pure form was 
therefore abolished. Furthermore, the reform codified the principle of subsidi-
arity as interpreted by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 330. 
On this basis, Spanish tribunals are deemed incompetent where another com-
petent State or international tribunal has initiated proceedings that entail an 
effective investigation and prosecution. Thus, Spanish courts are required to 
dismiss provisionally the criminal proceedings as soon as they are aware of 
another trial on the same situation which has started in another country or 
international tribunal.
Even though the objective of this reform was, inter alia, to restrict the 
application of universal jurisdiction, several cases were brought before Span-
ish judges on this basis. Because some of them brought political and dip-
lomatic difficulties, the legislation on universal jurisdiction was once again 
modified.
2.3.3. Organic Act 1/2014: further restrictions to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes
Organic Act 1/2014 331 was adopted on 13 March 2014 in order to restrict 
use universal jurisdiction, but also to clarify it. It should be noted that these 
restrictions applied to the pending cases at the moment of the adoption of the 
Organic Act.
Organic Act 1/2014 enlarges the list of crimes that may be prosecuted 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction. For the purpose of this thesis, it is 
worth mentioning that article 23(4)(a) now specifically refers to the crimes 
330 Esteve Moltó, «La persecución universal de los crímenes de guerra en España: más retrocesos, 
que avances», op. cit., 2014, p. 131. 
331 Organic Act 1/2014 of 13 March 2014 on universal jurisdiction (Ley Orgánica 1/2014, de 13 
de marzo, de modificación de la Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial, relativa 
a la justicia universal). 
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committed against protected persons and property within the frame of an 
armed conflict:
4. Igualmente, será competente la jurisdicción española para conocer de 
los hechos cometidos por españoles o extranjeros fuera del territorio na-
cional susceptibles de tipificarse, según la ley española, como alguno de los 
siguientes delitos cuando se cumplan las condiciones expresadas:
a) Genocidio, lesa humanidad o contra las personas y bienes protegidos en 
caso de conflicto armado, siempre que el procedimiento se dirija contra un 
español o contra un ciudadano extranjero que resida habitualmente en 
España, o contra un extranjero que se encontrara en España y cuya extradi-
ción hubiera sido denegada por las autoridades españolas [emphasis added].
This clarification is more than welcomed in a matter, criminal law, 
where provisions must be as clear and detailed as possible in accordance 
with the principle of legality. As a result of this codification, all the behav-
iors which constitute war crimes in accordance with the Spanish criminal 
code may be prosecuted on the basis of universal jurisdiction. As mentioned 
above, articles 609 to 614 establish no distinction between IACs and NIACs; 
consequently, universal jurisdiction is applicable to all types of war crimes, 
i.e., violations of IHL occurring both in IACs and NIACs. This amendment 
thus tremendously enlarged the material scope of application of universal 
jurisdiction with regard to IHL, insofar as the previous wording could apply 
to grave breaches only 332.
Nevertheless, this extension of the material scope of application of uni-
versal jurisdiction is counter-balanced by the addition of restrictive conditions 
of exercise. It is quite surprising in this regard that the preamble states that 
these additional restrictions are based on Spain’s international legal commit-
ments, so that the extension of Spanish jurisdiction to other territories must be 
legitimized and justified on the basis of an international treaty. In this respect, 
Organic Act 1/2014 specifies that proceedings on the basis of universal juris-
diction may be triggered only by the prosecutor or the victim 333. As a result, 
actio popularis is now prohibited.
332 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, pp. 515-516. 
333 «6. Los delitos a los que se refieren los apartados 3 y 4 solamente serán perseguibles en España 
previa interposición de querella por el agraviado o por el Ministerio Fiscal». 
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In addition, the reform clarified the principle of subsidiarity, which is 
defined in more details. In accordance with this clarification, the Spanish 
courts’ jurisdiction is excluded whenever other proceedings are taking place 
before an international tribunal, in the territorial State, or in the alleged per-
petrator’s country. The latter two cases, subsidiarity applies if the suspect is not 
in Spain, or a request for extradition has been issued against them by an inter-
national court or the national court of a foreign country.
That being said, Spanish courts still have the possibility to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction if the prosecuting State is unable or unwilling to effectively 
conduct the investigation. The assessment of these conditions is undertaken 
by the Supreme Court (Sala 2.ª del Tribunal Supremo) in accordance with 
the criteria set forth in article 17 of the Statute on the International Criminal 
Court. Thus, Spanish courts may decide to proceed if a) the proceedings were 
or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility; b) there has been 
an unjustified delay in the proceedings which, in the circumstances, is incon-
sistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; c) the proceed-
ings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and 
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice 334. Fur-
thermore, Spanish courts must assess whether, due to a total or substantial col-
lapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the forum State is unable 
to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings 335. 
334 «A fin de determinar si hay o no disposición a actuar en un asunto determinado, se examinará, 
teniendo en cuenta los principios de un proceso con las debidas garantías reconocidos por el 
Derecho Internacional, si se da una o varias de las siguientes circunstancias, según el caso:
 a) Que el juicio ya haya estado o esté en marcha o que la decisión nacional haya sido adoptada 
con el propósito de sustraer a la persona de que se trate de su responsabilidad penal.
 b) Que haya habido una demora injustificada en el juicio que, dadas las circunstancias, sea in-
compatible con la intención de hacer comparecer a la persona de que se trate ante la justicia.
 c) Que el proceso no haya sido o no esté siendo sustanciado de manera independiente o impar-
cial y haya sido o esté siendo sustanciado de forma en que, dadas las circunstancias, sea incompa-
tible con la intención de hacer comparecer a la persona de que se trate ante la justicia». 
335 «A fin de determinar la incapacidad para investigar o enjuiciar en un asunto determinado, se exa-
minará si el Estado, debido al colapso total o sustancial de su administración nacional de justicia o 
al hecho de que carece de ella, no puede hacer comparecer al acusado, no dispone de las pruebas 
y los testimonios necesarios o no está por otras razones en condiciones de llevar a cabo el juicio».
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Judicial practice on this matter is mixed. Some authors have criticized 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity in cases involving American 
or Israeli officials, as they consider that the criteria were used in favor of the 
accused 336. On the other hand, in the judgment of 17 March 2014 held within 
the frame of the Couso case, the hearing judge interpreted the principle of 
subsidiarity quite restrictively. He declined the jurisdiction of US courts on the 
grounds that the United States are not a State party to the GC IV 337 – even 
though this is false 338 – and that no proceedings had taken place in the US on 
these grounds. On this basis, the Court thus wrongly concluded to the lack of 
application of the principle of subsidiarity to these facts.
Secondly, some aspects are controversial regarding the prosecution of war 
crimes specifically. In particular, the wording of article 23(4)(a) seems to contra-
dict to some extent the obligation to extradite or prosecute as provided by the 
Geneva Conventions with respect to foreigners suspected of having committed 
a crime against a protected person or property who are present on Spanish ter-
ritory. Indeed, it subjects the possibility to exercise universal jurisdiction to the 
refusal of a request for extradition. Consequently, it seems to reverse the order of 
the obligation to extradite or prosecute, which should be understood as a primo 
prosequi, secundo dedere mechanism, as explained in Chapter 3. Pursuant to the 
Geneva Conventions, Spanish authorities should not be subject to an obligation 
to wait for an extradition request to initiate proceedings if an alleged perpetrator 
is on their territory. Therefore, it seems that this new formulation contradicts – if 
not the letter – the spirit of the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, this condi-
tion has a narrow scope of application to the extent that it applies only to for-
eigners present on Spanish territory and who do not permanently reside there.
While the legislature aimed to restrict the scope of application of univer-
sal jurisdiction with the last reform, it remains unclear whether such limita-
tions will actually be enforced. Abraham Martínez Alcañiz notes in this sense 
336 See, e.g.: Esteve Moltó, «La persecución universal de los crímenes de guerra en España: más 
retrocesos, que avances», op. cit., 2014. 
337 Audiencia Nacional, judgment nº 27/2007 of 15/04/2014, Couso case, para. 4: «La razón es sim-
ple: EE.UU. no ha suscrito esa IV Convención, con lo que lo no es “Parte Contratante”. No cabe 




StatesParties&xp_treatySelected=380 (Accessed: 05.05.2017). 
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that judges may be tempted to apply article 23(4)(p) instead of article 23(4)
(a) 339, insofar as the former does not require a special relationship with Spain 
for the case to proceed:
Igualmente, será competente la jurisdicción española para conocer de 
los hechos cometidos por españoles o extranjeros fuera del territorio na-
cional susceptibles de tipificarse, según la ley española, como alguno de los 
siguientes delitos cuando se cumplan las condiciones expresadas [...]. Cual-
quier otro delito cuya persecución se imponga con carácter obligatorio 
por un Tratado vigente para España o por otros actos normativos de una 
Organización Internacional de la que España sea miembro, en los supuestos 
y condiciones que se determine en los mismos 340.
This interpretation has already been used, and overturned. In this regard, 
the Audiencia Nacional had to assess on 17 March 2014 341 whether investiga-
tions and prosecutions within the frame of the above-mentioned Couso case 
could be pursued, although the accused were US military personnel who did 
not reside in Spain, did not happen to be in Spain, or whom the Spanish author-
ities had not refused to extradite. The Court held that the current wording of 
article 23(4)(a) contradicts article 146 of GC IV and articles 26 and 27 VCLT 342. 
339 Martínez Alcañiz, El principio de justicia universal y los crímenes de guerra, op. cit., 2015, pp. 525-526. 
340 Organic Act on the Judiciary, article 23(4)(p). 




342 Ibid., para. 2: «Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta que el citado artículo 146 de la IV Convención 
de Ginebra se contradice abiertamente con el nuevo apartado 4 a) del artículo 23, no procede 
el archivo de la causa: De otro modo estaríamos admitiendo la posibilidad de que una norma 
interna modifique o derogue una disposición de un tratado o convenio internacional vigente 
para España, lo cual está proscrito por dos razones:
 En primer lugar, porque con ello se vulneraría la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los 
Tratados, también suscrita por España, que preceptúa: Artículo 26: «Pacta sunt servanda». Todo 
tratado en vigor obliga a las partes y debe ser cumplido por ellas de buena fe. Artículo 27. El de-
recho interno y la observancia de los tratados. Una parte no podrá invocar las disposiciones de su 
derecho interno como justificación del incumplimiento de un tratado. De hecho, el propio legis-
lador en la Exposición de Motivos de la reforma, viene a reconocerlo implícitamente: Con esta 
finalidad, se precisan los límites positivos y negativos de la posible extensión de la jurisdicción 
española: es necesario que el legislador determine, de un modo ajustado al tenor de los tratados 
internacionales, qué delitos cometidos en el extranjero pueden ser perseguidos por la justicia 
española y en qué casos y condiciones. En segundo lugar, porque para modificar o derogar una 
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Consequently, since international law, most notably IHL 343, prevails over legis-
lative provisions in the Spanish legal order, the Court held that article 23(4)(a) 
was inapplicable to this case. The Court further considered that the transitory 
provisions of Organic Act 1/2014, which shall apply to all cases pending at the 
time of its entry into force, were inapplicable as well 344. As a result, the Court 
held that the proceedings should continue on the basis of article 23(4)(p). While 
this decision aims to pursue efforts in the fight against impunity, there are no 
specific indications found in the judgment as to why article 23(4) contradicts 
146 of GC IV, thus raising concerns over legal certainty. However, a few months 
later, the same hearing judge closed the proceedings. To do so, he based his rea-
soning on the Tibet case 345, adjudicated in May 2015 by the Supreme Court, 
the latter being a higher court. On this basis, the hearing judge considered that 
article 23(4)(a) was applicable, so that the accused should have been present on 
the Spanish territory in order to be prosecuted 346.
Indeed, in the Tibet case, the Supreme Court held that article 23(4)(p) 
could not apply to the cases already foreseen in the previous paragraphs:
En consecuencia, debe establecerse con claridad y firmeza, para éste y 
para otros supuestos similares, que el apartado p) del art. 23.4º de la LOPJ, 
disposición de un tratado, la propia Constitución Española prevé un específico trámite (art. 96.1 
CE): las disposiciones de un tratado sólo podrán ser derogadas, modificadas o suspendidas en la 
forma prevista en los propios tratados o de acuerdo con las normas generales del Derecho inter-
nacional; lo que obviamente no acontece en el caso. Así, solo es posible modificar o derogar el 
artículo 146 siguiendo ese trámite».
343 Ibid.: «De otro lado, no cabe duda de la primacía del Derecho Internacional sobre el Derecho in-
terno, máxime en materia de Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Así el Tribunal Constitucio-
nal ha indicado –STC 78/82– que los tratados sobre estas materias (Derechos Humanos) deben 
ser considerados canon de interpretación de las normas relativas a los derechos fundamentales y 
libertades públicas, en los términos del artículo 10.2 CE. Y precisamente, los cuatro Convenios 
de Ginebra se consideran el núcleo de Derecho Internacional Humanitario».








346 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 1, Sumario 27/2007, Auto of 9 June 
2015. Confirmed by the Tribunal Supremo on 27 October 2016. Available at: http://estaticos.
elmundo.es/documentos/2015/06/09/conclusion_caso_couso.pdf (Accessed: 08.05.2017). 
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no es aplicable a los supuestos que ya aparecen específicamente regulados 
en los apartados anteriores del precepto, y concretamente a los delitos con-
tra las personas y bienes protegidos en caso de conflicto armado 347.
In that same case, the Supreme Court clarified that article 23(4)(a) does 
not violate article 146 GC IV. It affirmed that while the latter indeed imposes an 
obligation to establish universal jurisdiction mechanisms over grave breaches, it 
does not entail an obligation to become global enforcers of any grave breach 
occurring in any armed conflict in the world; conversely, it imposes an obli-
gation to look for, detain, and prosecute before their own courts the suspects 
who have sought asylum or have hidden in their countries 348. Consequently, 
the Court argued that universal jurisdiction over war crimes could not be 
conducted in absentia 349.
347 Tribunal Supremo, judgment nº 296/2015 of 06.05.2015, para. 25. Available at: http://www.
poderjudicial.es/search/contenidos.action?action=contentpdf&databasematch=TS&refer-
ence=7389459&links=%22corte%20penal%20internacional%22&optimize=20150526&pub-
licinterface=true (Accessed: 08.05.2017). 
348 Ibid., para. 27: «El artículo 146 del IV Convenio de Ginebra de 12 de agosto de 1949 relativo a 
la protección debida a las personas civiles en tiempo de guerra, establece el principio de Justicia 
Universal obligatoria para los Estados firmantes en el sentido de imponer la obligación de juzgar 
o extraditar a los responsables de las Infracciones Graves del Convenio, cualquiera que sea el 
lugar del mundo donde se cometió la infracción y cualquiera que sea la nacionalidad del respon-
sable. Pero esta obligación está referida a los supuestos en que estos responsables se encuentren 
en el territorio del Estado firmante, pues su contenido y finalidad es evitar que ninguno de estos 
responsables pueda encontrar refugio en un país firmante de la Convención.
 Así se entiende por la doctrina mayoritaria, que si bien concuerda con la posición mantenida 
por los recurrentes en el sentido de que la Jurisdicción Universal para los crímenes de guerra es 
imperativa, y no facultativa, mantiene sin embargo que esta obligación no se extiende al hecho 
de que todos y cada uno de los países firmantes deban investigar todas y cada una de las Infrac-
ciones Graves de la Convención de Ginebra, en todos y cada uno de los conflictos armados que 
se produzcan en cualquier lugar del mundo, y deban competir para reclamar y extraditar a los 
responsables, sino que esta obligación se concreta para cada país firmante en buscar, detener y 
enjuiciar ante sus propios Tribunales a los responsables que se hayan refugiado u ocultado en sus 
respectivos países».
349 Ibid., para. 30: «En consecuencia, y para que quede claro en éste y en otros procedimientos con 
similar fundamento, conforme a la vigente Ley Orgánica 1/2014, los Tribunales españoles care-
cen de jurisdicción para investigar y enjuiciar delitos contra las personas y bienes protegidos en 
caso de conflicto armado cometidos en el extranjero, salvo en los supuestos en que el procedi-
miento se dirija contra un español o contra un ciudadano extranjero que resida habitualmente 
en España, o contra un extranjero que se encontrara en España y cuya extradición hubiera sido 
denegada por las autoridades españolas. Sin que pueda extenderse dicha jurisdicción in absentia 
en función de la nacionalidad de la víctima o de cualquier otra circunstancia».
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Thus, the presence of the alleged perpetrator has been recognized as a 
requirement for the activation of universal jurisdiction whenever the other 
conditions are not fulfilled (active personality or residence in Spain).
In light of these developments, the position of the three actors on uni-
versal jurisdiction seems to converge on some aspects. The EU, France, and 
Spain all agree on the principle of universal jurisdiction over some core inter-
national crimes. In this respect, it is acknowledged that in the case of IHL, the 
creation of universal jurisdiction mechanisms is not optional but mandatory at 
least with regard to the grave breaches. However, its practical implementation 
has been restricted, probably in response to the political complications that 
its exercise might entail. Actually, the current legal framework in Spain and in 
France present similarities even in the elements which are questionable, such 
as the reversal of the order of the principle of complementarity. All in all, it 
seems that universal jurisdiction as it is regulated at EU, French, and Spanish 
levels aims to deny safe havens to people willing to establish themselves in 
those territories rather than to become global enforcers proactively prosecut-
ing high-level officials.
Section 2 
COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTIONS
Besides the enactment of criminal provisions allowing for the prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators at domestic level, another means to enforce the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL in its repressive dimension lies in external action, 
through the cooperation with international criminal jurisdictions. In this con-
text, the purpose of this section is to analyze the efforts made at EU, French, 
and Spanish levels to cooperate with international criminal jurisdictions, with 
a special focus on the ICC.
1. COOPERATION WITH THE «AD HOC» TRIBUNALS
All the three actors have established the means necessary for the cooperation 
with the ad hoc tribunals. In this case, the multilevel approach is particularly 
visible. Indeed, the EU has made use of its sanctions and conditionality poli-
cies to induce third States to cooperate with the ICTY. France, as a permanent 
member of the UNSC has not only implemented its obligation to cooperate 
with the ad hoc tribunals, but it also participated in its establishment. As for 
Spain, it has duly transposed its obligations derived from the Statutes. It should 
likewise be observed that the three actors have concentrated their efforts on 
different situations. This is particularly clear with regard to the EU, which has 
conducted an aggressive policy of cooperation with the ICTY, and with res-
pect to France in relation with the ICTR. This situation is most likely due to 
historical and cultural ties concerning France. As for the EU, the Balkan region 
is of utmost importance with regard to geopolitical interests, security, and with 
a view to the EU’s enlargement.
1.1. The EU
The EU has cooperated to a larger extent with the ICTY than with 
the ICTR. Regarding the latter, despite the EU’s support to the ICTR since 
its establishment in 1994, no formal bilateral agreement has been contracted 
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between both institutions. Even so, the EU has stated in various political state-
ments the importance of the ICTR for the international criminal justice. In 
particular, in the Statement on the ICT Report on Genocide in Rwanda, the 
Presidency affirms its «strong support for the ICTR» and considers that the 
work of the ICTR and ICTY «has paved the way for the ICC» and «serves as 
an example of the determination of the international community to combat 
impunity» 350. More importantly, the 2002 Common Position on Rwanda 351, 
which follows Common Positions 2000/558/CFSP 352 and 2001/799/
CFSP 353, defines its objectives and priorities with regard to the situation in 
Rwanda. As stated in article 1:
The objectives and priorities of the European Union in its relations 
with Rwanda are to encourage, stimulate and support the process of:
(a) recovery from genocide and the promotion of national reconcilia-
tion,
(b) reconstruction, poverty reduction and development,
(c) protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental free-
doms,
(d) transition to democracy.
For present purposes, article 4(i-ii) is dedicated to supporting the work 
of the ICTR and to «renew its efforts to ensure that all States surrender to 
the ICTR all those indicted by it for genocide and other serious violations 
of IHL». Furthermore, the EU has called on the Government of Rwanda 
to comply fully with its obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal, notably 
through the provision of information asked by the ICTR 354. Generally speak-
ing, the EU’s support to the ICTR is mainly financial 355.
350 EU Presidency Statement, ICT Report on Genocide in Rwanda, 28 October 2002. Available 
at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-presidency-statement-ict-report-on-genocide-in-rwanda/ (Ac-
cessed: 05.05.2017). Quoted in British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Imple-
mentation of International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., 2009, p. 152.
351 Council Common Position of 21 October 2002 on Rwanda and repealing Common Position 
2001/799/CFSP, OJ L 285, 23.10.2002, pp. 3-6. 
352 Common Position 2000/558/CFSP, OJ L 20.09.2000, p. 1. 
353 Common Position 2001/799/CFSP, OJ L 303, 20.11.2001, p. 1.
354 Wouters and Sudeshna Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and 
the International Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 7. 
355 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Implementation of International Humanitar-
ian Law, op. cit., 2009, p. 153.
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In contrast, the EU’s position towards the ICTY has been more impor-
tant. The EU’s support dates back to 1993, although cooperation was rather 
minimal and consisted mainly in series of statements supporting States and 
individuals dedicated to further the mandate of the ICTY. However, the EU’s 
involvement has been more important starting from 2003, after Slobodan 
Milošević was voted out of office and replaced by Vojislav Koštunica as Pres-
ident of Yugoslavia in 2000 356. In this context, the EU has resorted to condi-
tionality clauses and the adoption of restrictive measures to fulfill its obligation 
of cooperation with the ICTY.
1.1.1. The use of conditionality clauses
The EU adopted a conditionality approach towards the successor States 
of the former Yugoslavia. As observed by Jan Wouters and Sudeshna Basu, 
by making EU membership dependent on cooperation with the ICTY, the 
EU has managed to contribute actively to the effective functioning of the 
ICTY 357. Florence Hartmann further argues that:
EU conditionality and international pressure have proved to be the only 
effective means of overcoming [Western Balkans politicians] reluctance 
and eliciting the cooperation without which the tribunal would not have 
been able to fulfill its mandate 358.
In this context, the EU is called a ‘surrogate enforcer’ 359 of the Tribunal. 
This role is reflected both in the approach requiring States to handover sus-
 By way of example, the EU has allocated 290 million Euros for the period 2008-2013 within the 
frame of its 10th European Development Fund. See: Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global 
justice system: the European Union and the International Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 7. 
356 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Implementation of International Humanitar-
ian Law, op. cit., 2009, p. 153.
357 Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and the Inter-
national Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 8.
358 Florence Hartmann, «The ICTY and EU conditionality», in Judy Batt and Jelena Obra-
dovic-Wochnik (eds.), War crimes, conditionality and UE integration in the Western Balkans, Chaillot 
Paper nº 116, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 67. 
359 Beke, D’hollander, Hachez and Pérez de las Heras, Report on the integration of human rights in EU 
development and trade policies, op. cit., 2014, p. 25. 
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pects to the ICTY and in the clauses 360 enshrined in Stabilization and Associ-
ation Agreements.
As Dejan Jovic has shown, this policy was successful with regard to Croa-
tia thanks to a partnership between the EU and the ICTY. Indeed, EU mem-
bership was conditioned upon full cooperation with the ICTY and the EU 
approved to move forwards in the talks only when the ICTY recognized that 
Croatia had undertaken «real efforts to identify, arrest and extradite alleged 
war criminals» 361. As the inclusion of Croatia in the next wave of enlargement 
together with Bulgaria and Romania was discussed, the EU decided in 2003 to 
halt the process notably because of the failure to hand over ICTY accused 362. 
In 2004, the EU made accession negotiations conditioned to the arrest and 
handover of the last Croatian ICTY suspect, General Gotovina 363, who was 
eventually arrested in December 2005 and transferred to the ICTY with the 
cooperation of Croatian authorities. This ‘strict conditionality’ was effective 
not only with regard to the functioning of the ICTY, but also to strengthen 
pro-European forces internally 364.
Despite inconsistencies, the same holds true with regard to Serbia. By 
way of example, the EU suspended the negotiations of a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement in May 2006, following a negative assessment of State 
cooperation and failure to locate, arrest, and transfer of former Chief of Staff 
of the Bosnian Serb Army Ratko Mladić. It should nonetheless be noted that 
in the Serbian case, full cooperation with the ICTY was understood under 
lower thresholds than in the Croatian case, as the EU also intended to provide 
incentives to pro-Western forces in the country 365.
The EU efforts in the Western Balkans were endorsed by the ICTY, as 
former Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte claimed that «EU conditionality is 
360 «Cooperation with the ICTY, with a view to bringing war criminals to justice, is a basic con-
dition for any progress in the development of bilateral relations in the areas of commercial ex-
changes, financial assistance and economic cooperation as well as contractual relations between 
the EU and the countries of the region».
361 Dejan Jovic, «Croatia after Tudjman: the ICTY and issues of transitional justice», in Batt and Ob-
radovic-Wochnik (eds.), War crimes, conditionality and UE integration in the Western Balkans, op. cit., 
2009, p. 23. 
362 Hartmann, «The ICTY and EU conditionality», op. cit., 2009, p. 69. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid., p. 68. 
365 Ibid., pp. 67-82. 
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a crucial tool for encouraging cooperation with the ICTY. 90 % of those in 
custody now are there as a direct result of EU conditionality» 366.
1.1.2. The use of restrictive measures
EU Member States adopted a certain number of measures against ICTY 
suspects under the CFSP, which were further implemented within the frame 
of EU integrated policies. Without providing full account of the EU’s policy 
on the matter, it is worth mentioning that the Council approved ‘Common 
Position 2003/280/CFSP in support of the effective implementation of the 
mandate of the ICTY’ 367 on 16 April 2003, in which the EU committed to 
cooperate with the ICTY 368. As such, EU Member States are required to:
take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their 
territories of the persons listed in the Annex, who are engaged in activities 
which help persons at large continue to evade justice for crimes for which 
the ICTY has indicted them or are otherwise acting in a manner which 
could obstruct the ICTY’s effective implementation of its mandate 369.
The objective was therefore to deny safe havens on EU soil to persons 
indicted by the ICTY and evading justice by restricting their admission in EU 
Member States. These measures are likewise applicable to those individuals 
obstructing the ICTY’s effective functioning 370. This Common Position was 
implemented by Council Decision 2003/280/CFSP which included a list of 
the relevant persons 371. These measures have been renewed on several occa-
366 European Parliament, «Serbia must deliver war criminals before signing stabilisation agreement 
with the EU» says Carla Del Ponte, Press release, 26.06.2007. 
367 Council Common Position 2003/280/CFSP of 16 April 2003 in support of the effective imple-
mentation of the mandate of the ICTY, OJ L 101, 23.04.2003, pp. 0022-0023.
368 Ibid., recital 6: «The European Union should do all it can to prevent obstructions being placed 
in the way of the ICTY’s effective implementation of its mandate». 
369 Council Common Position 2003/280/CFSP of 16 April 2003 in support of the effective imple-
mentation of the mandate of the ICTY, OJ L 101, 23.04.2003, pp. 0022-0023, article 1. 
370 Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and the Inter-
national Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 8.
371 Council Decision 2003/484/CFSP of 27 June 2003 implementing Common Position 
2003/280/CFSP in support of the effective implementation of the mandate of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 162, 01.07.2003, pp. 77-79. 
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sions 372 and the list of persons concerned updated as suspects were transferred 
into the custody of the ICTY 373.
In addition, the Council agreed on the imposition of restrictive meas-
ures in 2004. On this basis, the EU adopted a certain number of legislative 
acts to implement this common position. In this context, ‘Council Regulation 
nº 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of effective 
implementation of the mandate of the ICTY’ imposed the freezing of funds 
and economic resources own by «persons indicted by the ICTY who are still 
at large and to ban any support they might receive from within the Commu-
nity» 374. It was extended and amended on several occasions in order to update 
the list of persons covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources 375.
372 Council Common Position 2004/694/CFSP of 11 October 2004 on further measures in sup-
port of the effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 315, 14.10.2004, p. 52; Common Position 2009/164/
CFSP of 26 February 2009 renewing measures in support of the effective implementation of 
the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 
55, 27.02.2009, p. 44; Decision 2010/145/CFSP renewing measures in support of the effective 
implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), OJ L 58, 09.03.2010, p. 8; Council Decision 2011/146/CFSP of 7 March 2011 amend-
ing Decision 2010/145/CFSP renewing measures in support of the effective implementation of 
the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 61, 
08.03.2011, p. 21. 
373 See, e.g.: Council Implementing Decision 2011/422/CFSP of 18 July 2011 implementing De-
cision 2010/603/CFSP on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the 
mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 188, 
19.07.2011, p. 19. 
374 Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 of 11 October 2004 imposing certain restrictive mea-
sures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 315, 14.10.2004, pp. 14-23. 
375 See, e.g.: Commission Regulation (EC) Nº 607/2005 of 18 April 2005 amending, for the fourth 
time, Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support 
of effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY); Commission Regulation (EC) Nº 830/2005 of 30 May 2005 amending, 
for the fifth time, Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive mea-
sures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1053/2006 of 11 July 
2006 amending, for the 10th time, Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 imposing certain 
restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 189, 12.07.2006, pp. 5-6; Commis-
sion Implementing Regulation (EU) Nº 715/2011 of 19 July 2011 amending, for the 15th time, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of 
effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 191, 22.07.2011, pp. 19-20; Council Decision 2010/603/CFSP of 7 
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As Goran Hadzic – the last ICTY indictee evading justice – was trans-
ferred into the custody of the ICTY in 2011, the Council finally adopted 
Decision 2011/705/CFSP 376, which repealed the last Decision in force relat-
ing to restrictions on admission. The same holds true regarding the imposition 
of restrictive measures, as the Council approved Regulation nº 1048/2011 377 
which eventually repealed Decision 2010/145/CFSP.
1.2. France’s cooperation with the «ad hoc» tribunals
France has traditionally been an active supporter of international crimi-
nal justice. As observed in Chapter 1, it was one of the States participating in 
the London Agreement, which gave birth to the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 378.
Thereafter, as a permanent member of the UNSC, it has had to adopt 
eminently important decisions with regard to the fight against impunity at 
international level. In particular, France defended the adoption of UNSC res-
olutions 827 of 25 May 1993 and 955 of 8 November 1994 at UNSC, which 
established the ICTY and ICTR respectively 379. Since its creation, French 
authorities have supported both tribunals in multilateral fora 380.
October 2010 on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the mandate 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 265, 08.10.2010, 
p. 15.
376 Council Decision 2011/705/CFSP of 27 October 2011 repealing Decision 2010/145/CFSP 
renewing measures in support of the effective implementation of the mandate of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ L 281, 28.10.2011, pp. 27-27.
377 Council Regulation (EU) nº 1048/2011 of 20 October 2011, OJ L 276, 21.10.2011, p. 1. 
378 Decree nº 45-2267 of 06 October 1945 (Décret nº 45-2267 du 06.10.1945 portant promul-
gation de l’accord entre le gouvernement provisoire de la république française et les gouver-
nements des USA, du RU, et de l’URSS concernant la poursuite et le châtiment des grands 
criminels de guerre des puissances européennes de l’axe, signé à Londres le 08.08.1945, ensemble 
le statut du tribunal militaire international). 
379 Ministry of foreign affairs, «Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY)», avai-
lable at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/la-france-a-l-
onu/domaines-d-action-de-l-onu/la-justice-internationale/article/tribunal-penal-internatio-
nal-pour-108944 (Accessed: 05.06.2017); Ministry of foreign affairs, «Tribunal pénal international 
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In accordance with the resolutions of the UNSC adopted on the basis 
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, French authorities have approved laws of 
cooperation with both ad hoc tribunals 381. These laws have been amended so as 
to reflect the evolution of international law on the matter and the establishment 
of the MICT 382. Pursuant to these laws, French courts benefit from a residual 
jurisdiction with regard to the crimes referred to in the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals. In this context, they may prosecute alleged perpetrators on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction, provided that they are found in France 383. Nonetheless, if 
the ad hoc tribunals or MICT address a request in this sense, French courts may 
decline its jurisdiction in their favor 384. Furthermore, the legislation regulates 
legal assistance 385, arrest and surrender 386, and the execution of prison sentences 387.
On this basis, French courts have cooperated in the prosecution of a 
certain number of suspects within the frame of these conflicts, especially in 
Rwanda. The Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta cases are also worth mentioning, 
as France is the only country, together with Rwanda, to which the ICTR has 
referred cases. After some tergiversation 388, the ICTR referred the cases to 
381 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995 (Loi n° 95-1 du 2 janvier 1995 portant adaptation de la législation 
française aux dispositions de la résolution 827 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies instituant 
un tribunal international en vue de juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations 
graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie depuis 
1991), JORF n° 2 of 03.01.1995, p. 71; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996 (Loi n° 96-432 du 22 
mai 1996 portant adaptation de la législation française aux dispositions de la résolution 955 du 
Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies instituant un tribunal international en vue de juger les 
personnes présumées responsables d’actes de génocide ou d’autres violations graves du droit 
international humanitaire commis en 1994 sur le territoire du Rwanda et, s’agissant de citoyens 
rwandais, sur le territoire d’Etats voisins), JORF n° 119 of 23.05.1996, p. 7695.
382 Act n° 2013-711 of 5 August 2013 (Loi n° 2013-711 du 5 août 2013 portant diverses dispositions 
d’adaptation dans le domaine de la justice en application du droit de l’Union européenne et des 
engagements internationaux de la France), JORF nº 9181 of 06.08.2013, p. 13338, Chapter IX.
383 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995, article 2; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996, article 2.
384 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995, articles 3 to 6; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996, article 2.
385 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995, articles 7 and 8; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996, article 2.
386 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995, articles 9 to 16; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996, article 2.
387 Act n° 95-1 of 2 January 1995, articles 16-1 and 17; Act n° 96-432 of 22 May 1996, article 2.
388 In 1995, French courts declined their competence, alleging the non-self executing nature of 
the Geneva Conventions, in accordance with the above-mentioned Javor case. Nonetheless, the 
Cour de cassation decided to reopen the proceedings in 1998, on the basis of the newly enacted 
law of cooperation with the ICTR (Cour de cassation, criminal section, judgment nº 96-82491 
of 6 January 1998). The ECtHR condemned France in June 2004 because of the tardiness of the 
investigation, which had violated the right of the plaintiff to be heard promptly and the right to 
compensation (ECtHR, Mutimura v. France, Judgment nº 46621/99 of 8 June 2004). Then, the 
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French courts in 2007 389. The proceedings were closed in 2015, as the cases 
were dismissed because of a lack of evidence. Lastly, France has welcomed 
several persons acquitted by the ICTR and ICTY 390 and imprisoned one per-
petrator convicted by the ICTY 391.
On the other hand, there are some examples of non-cooperation or at 
least, lack of transparency with the ad hoc tribunals. For instance, French author-
ities were criticized within the frame of the Gotovina case, as they granted a 
passport to the General only a few days before his arrest warrant was issued 392, 
despite the fact that the EU made Croatia’s membership talks conditioned to 
his arrest and surrender to the ICTY.
1.3. Spain’s cooperation with the «ad hoc» tribunals
On the basis of the UNSC resolutions establishing the ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunals, Spain adopted laws organizing its cooperation with 
the ICTY 393 and ICTR 394 in 1994 and 1998 respectively.
ICTR issued an arrest warrant against Wenceslas Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta in 2007 
but it decided a few months later to refer the cases to French authorities. 
389 ICTR, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Bucyubaruta, Decision on Prosecutor’s re-
quest for referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s indictment to France, Case nº ICTR-2005-85-I, 20 
November 2007; ICTR, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s request for referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s indictment to France, Case nº 
ICTR-2005-87-I, 20 November 2007.




391 Ministry of foreign affairs, «Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY)». Avail-
able at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/la-france-a-l-onu/
domaines-d-action-de-l-onu/la-justice-internationale/article/tribunal-penal-internation-
al-pour-108944 (Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
392 Elise Bernard, «La coopération avec le TPIY, une justice internationale négociable?», Nouvelle 
Europe [on line], 25 June 2013. Available at: http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/1713 (Ac-
cessed: 07.06.2017).
393 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994 (Ley Orgánica 15/1994, de 1 de junio, para la cooperación 
con el Tribunal Internacional para el enjuiciamiento de los presuntos responsables de violaciones 
graves del Derecho internacional humanitario cometidas en el territorio de la ex-Yugoslavia), 
BOE nº 131, 02.06.1994, p. 17399. 
394 Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998 (Ley Orgánica 4/1998, de 1 de julio, para la Cooperación 
con el Tribunal internacional para Ruanda), BOE nº 157, 02.07.1998, p. 21880.
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Both organic acts establish the obligation of cooperation of the Kingdom 
of Spain with the respective ad hoc tribunals with regard to the prosecution of 
the alleged perpetrators of serious violations of IHL committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and of genocide and other serious violations of IHL committed 
in Rwanda and in the territory of neighboring States under the conditions 
provided by the relevant UNSC resolutions 395. It is worth mentioning that the 
preamble refers to the self-executing nature of the most part of the Statutes, 
so that the organic laws were adopted solely to allow the implementation of 
the matters falling under the remit of organic laws pursuant to the Spanish 
Constitution.
They stipulate that the Ministry of Justice shall be the central authority 
competent to transfer and receive cooperation requests and that the Audi-
encia Nacional shall be the court in charge of cooperating with the ad hoc 
tribunals 396. Furthermore, they address questions linked to concurrent jurisdic-
tion 397, the non bis in idem principle 398, the detention and transfer of suspects 399, 
appearance before the ad hoc tribunals 400 and the enforcement of sentences 401. 
In this respect, it is expressly stated that extradition proceedings are excluded 
in favor of direct transfer to the tribunals.
The Gotovina case is worth mentioning in this regard. Indeed, he was 
arrested and detained by the Spanish authorities while he was in the Canary 
Islands 402. Nonetheless, contrarily to France, the ad hoc tribunals have not 
referred situations to Spanish authorities.
In addition, Spain has called for the cooperation of the relevant States 
with the ad hoc tribunals. This is the case for example of Serbia in 2009, as 
Spain called on the authorities to pursue cooperation to arrest Ratko Mladic 
395 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 1; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 1. 
396 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 3; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 3. 
397 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 4; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 4. 
398 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 5; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 5. 
399 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 6; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 6. 
400 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 7; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 7. 
401 Organic Act 15/1994 of 1 June 1994, article 8; Organic Act 4/1998 of 1 July 1998, article 8. 
402 «El ex general Ante Gotovina, el criminal de guerra croata más buscado, detenido en Tene-
ri fe», La Van guar dia, 08.12.2005. Available at: http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacio-
nal/20051208/51262818153/el-ex-general-ante-gotovina-el-criminal-de-guerra-croa-
ta-mas-buscado-detenido-en-tenerife.html (Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
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and Goran Hadzic 403. In addition, while Spain was a non-permanent member 
of the UNSC in 2015-2016, it issued a declaration in which it expressed the 
country’s official position with regard to the ad hoc tribunals and the MICT. In 
this context, it acknowledged the important efforts conducted to fight against 
impunity and welcomed the advances made in that regard. More specifically, it 
called the creation of the ad hoc tribunals a milestone for international crimi-
nal law, but also recalled that national courts must complete this task. Lastly, it 
welcomed the overall satisfactory cooperation of the successor countries of the 
former-Yugoslavia with the ICTY 404.
2. COOPERATION WITH THE ICC
State parties to the Rome Statute are subject to a duty to cooperate with the 
Court. This obligation of cooperation has been duly implemented by both 
French and Spanish authorities, even though the understanding of the prin-
ciple of complementarity is not in line with the Rome Statute. Furthermore, 
this is probably the area where the action of the EU has been most visible, 
as the EU has undertaken a «pivotal and crucial» 405 policy of support for the 
ICC.
2.1. The EU’s unconditional support for the ICC
The ICC’s creation, «regarded as the greatest development in interna-
tional law over the past decade» 406 was made possible notably thanks to the 
403 «España pide a Serbia que siga cooperando con el TPIY para la captura de Mladic», Lainfor-
macion.com, 09.03.2009. Available at: http://www.lainformacion.com/policia-y-justicia/dere-
cho-internacional/espana-pide-a-serbia-que-siga-cooperando-con-el-tpiy-para-la-captura-de-
mladic_5fZ7RSUMyd9XhUYDPqgG21/ (Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
404 UNSC 7574th meeting, S/PV.7574, Intervención del representante de España en debate TPIY / 
TPIR, 9 December 2015. Available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteri-
orCooperacion/CSNU2015-2016/Actualidad/Documents/2015-12-09_INTERVENCION.
PDF (Accessed: 05.06.2017).
405 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Implementation of International Humanitar-
ian Law, op. cit., 2009, p. 141.
406 Anttonis Antoniadis and Olympia Bekou, «The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in in-
teresting times», International Criminal Law Review, vol. 7(4), 2008, pp. 621-655.
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EU. All EU Member States are parties to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court 407. Therefore, the EU is a regional area where the 
authority of the ICC is unanimously recognized. Furthermore, EU Member 
States have pushed forward the acceptance of international criminal law by 
way of the EU. Indeed, it probably was the international organization that 
pushed the most forwards the establishment of the Rome Statute, together 
with the UN. As emphasized by Jan Wouters and Sudeshna Basu, the very fact 
that EU Member States adopted legally binding acts on the ICC is «signifi-
cant at both the EU and international levels» 408. On the one hand, it creates a 
legally binding framework for both the EU and its Member States with regard 
to the ICC, insofar as EU Member States must ensure that national legisla-
tion comply with the Common Position. On the other hand, it constitutes 
the expression of all EU Member States on the international stage on matters 
relating to the fight against impunity 409. As observed by Martjin Groenleer 
and David Rijks:
Itself a hybrid of an emerging polity and an international organization, 
the development of the ICC as an issue of foreign policy has enhanced its 
role as an international actor in its own right 410.
EU Member States adopted Common Position 2001/443/CFSP 411 to 
establish the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the ICC in anticipation 
of the Rome Statute’s entry into force 412. Such Common Position was further 
407 International Criminal Court’s website, The State Parties to the Rome Statute. Available at: 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20
to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (Accessed: 08.05.2017).
408 Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and the Inter-
national Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 5. 
409 Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European Union and the Inter-
national Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, p. 5. 
410 Rijks Groenleer Martjin, «The European Union and the International Criminal Court: the 
politics of international criminal justice», in Knud Erik Jørgensen, The European and Interna-
tional Organizations, London, Taylor and Francis, 2009, p. 168. Quoted in European Parliament, 
Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, Directorate General for external policies 
of the Union, Policy Department, March 2014, p. 16. Available at: http://www.europarl.euro-
pa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433844/EXPO-DROI_ET(2014)433844_EN.pdf 
(Accessed: 11.07.2017). 
411 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court, OJ L 150, 18.06.2003, pp. 67-69.
412 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, p. 16. 
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amended in 2002 and 2003 413. On this basis, promoting the universality and 
integrity of the Rome Statute constituted the principal basis for the EU’s 
engagement with the ICC until 2011 414. However, as the Court became oper-
ational, a new priority emerged, that of making the Court effective 415. This 
new concern was echoed at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC held in Kampala in 2010. On this occasion, the EU and its Member 
States issued a pledge to:
– Promoting the universality and preserving the integrity of the Rome 
Statute;
– The fight against impunity as a core value to share with our partners 
when entering into agreements with third states;
– Financial support to the ICC, civil society and third country partners;
– And the update and review of the EU instruments in support of the 
ICC after the meeting in Kampala, where appropriate 416.
Those pledges were reflected in Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP 417, 
which repealed the former Common Position. To supplement these legal 
instruments, the EU has adopted action plans in 2002 and 2004 418, the one 
in force being Action Plan to follow-up on the Decision on the International 
Criminal Court of 2011 419. According to those and regarding the EU’s external 
413 Council Common Position 2002/474/CFSP on the International Criminal Court, OJ L164, 
22.06.2002, pp. 1-2; Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP on the International Criminal 
Court, OJ L150, 18.06.2003, pp. 67-69.
414 European Parliament, «Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies», op. cit., 2014, 
p. 17. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Declaración realizada en nombre de la Unión Europea por la Excma. Sra. Dña. María Jesús Figa 
López-Palop Subsecretaria de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación del Reino de España en el 
debate general de la Conferencia de Revisión del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Interna-
cional, 31.05.2010, Kampala (Uganda), para. 14.
417 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court 
repealing Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, p. 56.
418 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Common Position on the 
International Criminal Court (9019/02), available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/
en/02/st09/09019en2.pdf (Accessed: 10.05.2013); Council of the European Union, Action 
Plan to follow-up on the Common Position on the International Criminal Court (5742/04), 
available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st05/st05742.en04.pdf (Accessed: 
10.05.2013).
419 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Decision on the International 
Criminal Court (12080/11), 12.07.2011. 
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action, the EU is required to review its support for the ICC periodically and 
is called to support third states in the ratification and implementation of the 
Rome Statute.
It should be noted that third countries – candidate countries, potential can-
didate countries, Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process, ETFA 
countries, and others – are associated with the EU’s legislation on the matter. This 
movement arguably contributes to the authority of the Rome Statute. Indeed, 
pursuant to the preamble of Council Common Position of 16 June 2003:
the application of this Common Position by the acceding countries and the 
alignment with it by the associated countries Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey 
and by the EFTA countries important in order to maximize its impact 420.
This commitment is still on going as the objectives of the 2011 Council 
Decision on the ICC are shared with
the Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Iceland, the Countries of the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Eco-
nomic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia 421.
Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP identifies five objectives, some of 
which were already contained in former common positions:
The objective of this Decision is to advance universal support for the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the ‘Rome 
Statute’) by promoting the widest possible participation in it, to preserve the 
integrity of the Rome Statute, to support the independence of the ICC and 
its effective and efficient functioning, to support cooperation with the ICC, 
and to support the implementation of the principle of complementarity 422.
420 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal 
Court, L 150/67 18.06.2003, Preamble, pt. 14
421 Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment 
of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on 
the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, Brussels, 6 
April 2011, 8756/11, PRESSE 98.
422 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court 
repealing Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, p. 56, article 1(2).
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In this context, the EU has developed a policy encouraging ratification, 
acceptance and approval of the Rome Statute. It has unconditionally sup-
ported the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute and has undertaken 
important efforts to ensure the effective functioning of the ICC once it was 
established.
2.1.1. Regarding to the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute
The EU’s action and support to the ICC is particularly remarkable when 
one knows the position the United States had at the time of the establishment 
of the ICC. Indeed, although President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute, 
he did not ratify it. However, when George W. Bush became president, he 
launched a rather hostile policy towards the ICC 423. The reason invoked was 
that the ICC could be misused for political ends. Although the United States 
put an end to this aggressive policy, it left the Court with difficulties at the 
moment of its establishment. In this regard, one could infer that it is in reaction 
to this policy that the EU has stepped over and undertaken important efforts 
to support the Rome Statute.
First, the United States adopted the American Service Members Pro-
tection Act on 2 August 2002, which limited the United States’ cooperation 
with the ICC, restricted the United States’ participation in UN peacekeep-
ing operations, prohibited military assistance to most countries that ratify the 
Rome Statute, and authorized the President to use «all means necessary and 
appropriate» to free any American or allied personnel held by or on behalf of 
the ICC 424. Second, the United States intended to neutralize the impact of the 
ICC within the Security Council on the occasion of the adoption of Reso-
lution 1422 (2002) 425 in which it requested the ICC to refrain from initiating 
investigations or proceedings related to peacekeepers or State who are not 
parties to the Rome Statute. Moreover, it was assorted with the possibility to 
renew this request each year. Third, the United States adopted bilateral agree-
ments of immunity according to which the other State parties committed 
423 For a more detailed approach, see: Schabas, «United States Hostility to the International Crimi-
nal Court», op. cit., 2004, pp. 701-720.
424 American Service Members Protection Act of 2 August 2002.
425 Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) of 12 July 2002, UN. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002).
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themselves not to deliver American citizens to the ICC and to hand them over 
to the American jurisdictions when necessary 426.
This set of legal instruments was undoubtedly in breach of the Rome 
Statute, the principle pacta sunt servanta, and was undermining the authority 
of the Rome Statute. Although reactions in the EU were mixed at the begin-
ning 427, the EU eventually adopted a critical approach. The 2002 Council 
Conclusions on the ICC noticeably reply to the United States’ concerns by 
contesting their arguments:
The International Criminal Court will be an effective tool of the in-
ternational community to buttress the rule of law and combat impunity 
for the gravest crimes. The Rome Statute provides all necessary safeguards 
against the use of the Court for politically motivated purposes. It should 
be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions and is limited to the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole 428.
The EU’s ambition to preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute has 
become clearer in the 2003 Common Position: «[i]t is eminently important 
that the integrity of the Rome Statute be preserved» 429. In the same line, the 
EU congratulated Croatia for not having signed a bilateral agreement with the 
United States on the ICC 430. In its annual report on human rights of 2008, the 
EU reminds it «continued to carry out démarches in third countries [...] to 
discourage states where possible from signing bilateral non-surrender agree-
ments» 431.
Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the Preamble of the 2011 Decision 
does not mention anymore the «eminently» importance of the preservation of 
426 Moulier, «L’Union européenne et les juridictions pénales internationales», in Millet-Devalle, 
L’Union Européenne et le Droit International Humanitaire, op. cit., 2010a, p. 278.
427 Ibid.
428 Council Conclusions on the International Criminal Court, 2450th Council session, Brussels, 30 
September 2002. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/en/gena/72321.pdf (Accessed: 11.07.2017).
429 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP on the International Criminal Court, OJ L150/67, 
18.06.2003, Preamble, pt. 10.
430 Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Croatia, Brussels, 
06.03.2007.
431 Council of the EU, EU annual report on human rights 2008, Brussels, 27 November 2008, p. 76.
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the Rome Statute’s integrity as the 2003 Common Position did. The preamble 
rather states «[i]t is most important that the integrity of the Rome Statute and 
the independence of the ICC be preserved» 432. This change of formulation is 
likely due to the change of tone of the American administration, which does 
not press on its aggressive policy towards the ICC anymore. However, the 
recent developments regarding the withdrawal and eventual return of some 
African countries – to this date, South Africa, Gambia, and Burundi – together 
with the new administration in the United States seem to augur challenging 
times ahead on this aspect.
In parallel, the EU has encouraged ratification, acceptance and approval 
of the Rome Statute ever since its adoption. This position was included in the 
2001 Common Position, where the EU and its Member States were urged:
to raise the issue of the ratification, acceptance and approval in negotiations 
or political dialogues with third countries, to adopt initiatives to promote 
the dissemination of the values, principles and provisions of the Statute 
and to support the early creation of an appropriate planning mechanism in 
order to prepare the effective establishment of the Court 433.
This statement was later on confirmed in the 2003 Common Position, 
which raised the objective to the «widest possible ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession» 434. With the adoption of the 2011 Decision, the EU has 
enlarged the means at its disposal to reach the objective of the widest possible 
ratification. The list provided is indeed non-exhaustive as the use of the word 
«including» shows it:
the Union and its Member States shall make every effort to further this 
process by raising the issue of the widest possible ratification, [...] in nego-
tiations, including negotiations of agreements, or political dialogues... 435.
432 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court 
repealing Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, 22.03.2011, Preamble, pt. 10.
433 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court.
434 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal 
Court, OJ L150, 18.06.2003, article 2, para. 1.
435 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court 
repealing Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, article 2.
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In addition, the 2011 Decision no longer refers to signature but rather to 
«accession or ratification», thus sending out a strong message to the interna-
tional community: signature is not enough.
Against this background, the EU has developed partnerships with third 
countries sharing the same objective of promotion of universality of the Rome 
Statute. As emphasized in the EU annual reports on human rights, the EU has 
undertaken important efforts to include the ICC agenda in human rights dia-
logues and encouraged further countries to ratify the Rome Statute 436. Further-
more, EU presidencies have carried out over 275 démarches between 2002 and 
2008 to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities 437. In the same way, the EU concluded agreements 
with South Africa, Australia, Brazil, Japan and Canada to promote the universal-
ity of the Rome Statute. To better fulfill their mission, these countries agreed on 
a common language to be used when promoting the universality of the Rome 
Statute. In this context, they exchange information and adopt joint démarches 438. 
Additionally, the EU adopted a ‘Toolkit for bridging the gap between interna-
tional and national justice’ 439 in 2013 in order to assist third countries in imple-
menting the principle of complementarity as provided by the Rome Statute.
In this context, the EU has sought to include a clause supporting the ICC 
in mandates and agreements concluded with third countries. The EU main-
436 Council of the European Union, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 
in 2012 (Thematic reports) (9431/13), Brussels, 2013b, p. 110, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/
sites/eeas/files/2012_human-rights-annual_report_thematic_en_0.pdf (Accessed: 11.05.2017); 
Council of the European Union, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 
in 2013 (11107/14), Brussels, 2014b, p. 34, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/
files/2013_human-rights-annual_report_en.pdf (Accessed: 11.05.2017); Council of the Euro-
pean Union, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2014, 2015, p. 19, 
available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2014-human-rights-annual_report_en.pdf 
(Accessed: 11.05.2017); Council of the European Union, EU annual report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2015, Luxembourg, 2016, pp. 17-18, available at: https://eeas.europa.
eu/sites/eeas/files/qc0216616enn_002_0.pdf (Accessed: 11.05.2017). 
437 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, 2008b, 
p. 10. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf 
(Accessed: 11.07.2017).
438 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 
2008b, p. 15.
439 European Commission, High Representative of the Europeann Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document on advancing the principle of complementarity, 
Toolkit for bridging the gap between international and national justice, SWD(2013) 26 final, 
Brussels, 31.01.2013, p. 19.
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streams the ICC in its relations with third countries by bringing up the aim of 
the universality of the Rome Statute as a human rights issue in the negotia-
tions of agreements 440, negotiated by the European Commission in accordance 
with Article 218 of the TFEU 441. On this basis, all recent negotiating mandates 
include an ICC clause 442.
In this regard, the above-mentioned Cotonou Agreement 443 constitutes a 
landmark, as it is the first legally binding instrument containing an ICC-related 
clause 444. In particular, article 11(7) reads as follow:
In promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice, the 
Parties reaffirm their determination to:
– share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to 
allow for the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court; and
– fight against international crime in accordance with international law, 
giving due regard to the Rome Statute.
The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implementing 
the Rome statute and related instruments 445.
The inclusion of the ICC clause in the Cotonou Agreement has pro-
duced some effects. As emphasized in the European Parliament’s Study on 
‘Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies’ 446, 11 State parties 
440 Antoniadis and Bekou, «The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times», 
op. cit., 2008, p. 23.
441 Formerly: Treaty establishing a European Community, article 300.
442 Antoniadisand Bekou, «The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times», op. cit., 
2008, p. 22.
443 The Cotonou Agreement ensues from the Lomé Conventions. It is the most comprehensive 
partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since 2000, it has been the 
framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm 
(Accessed: 13.05.2013)
444 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 
2008b, p. 13.
445 Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members 
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, 
as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, OJ L 287, 04.11.2010, pp. 1-49, article 
11(7).
446 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, pp. 17,34.
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to the agreement have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute 447 and ten have 
yet to sign or ratify it 448. It should also be noted that Sudan did not sign the 
revised version of the Cotonou agreement in 2005 due to the referral of the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC 449.
This clause has become a model of ICC-related clause to be followed 
when the EU negotiates agreements with third States 450. It was included – with 
their corresponding adaptations – in Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, 
Trade Cooperation and Development Agreements and Association Agreements, 
such as the ones concluded with Canada 451, Indonesia 452, Iraq 453, New Zea-
447 Angola, the Bahamas, Cameroon, Eritra, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Mozambique, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Solomon Islands and Zimbabwe.
448 Ethiopia, Kiribati, Micronesia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo and 
Tonga.
449 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, pp. 17, 
34.
450 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 
2008b, p. 13.
451 Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the 
one part, and Canada, of the other part, OJ L 329, 03.12.2016, pp. 45-65, article 5. 
452 Framework Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one 
part, and the Republic of Indonesia, on the other part, OJ L 125, 26.04.2014, p. 17, article 4: «1. 
The Parties shall cooperate on issues pertaining to the development of their legal systems, laws 
and legal institutions, including on their effectiveness, in particular by exchanging views and 
expertise as well as by capacity building. Within their powers and competences, the Parties shall 
endeavour to develop mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition.
 2. The Parties reaffirm that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished and that those who are accused of them should be brought 
to justice and if found guilty should be duly punished.
 3. The Parties agree to cooperate on the implementation of the Presidential Decree on the Na-
tional Plan of Action of Human Rights 2004-2009, including preparations for the ratification 
and implementation of international human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Rome Statute on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.
 4. The Parties agree that a dialogue between them on this matter would be beneficial».
453 Partnership and cooperation agreement establishing a partnership between the European Union 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Iraq, of the other part, OJ L 204, 
31.07.2012, p. 18. Article 7 reads as follows: «1. The Parties reaffirm that the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole should not go unpunished and that their 
prosecution should be ensured by measures at either the domestic or international level.
 2. The Parties recognise that Iraq is not yet a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, but that Iraq is considering the possibility of acceding to it in the future. In so 
doing, Iraq will take steps to accede to, ratify and implement the Rome Statute and related instru-
ments. 3. The Parties reaffirm their determination to cooperate on this issue, including by sharing 
experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required by the relevant international law».
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land 454, South Africa 455 or South Korea 456. This list is by no means exhaustive 
and the examples provided are simply meant to reflect the diversity of the States 
with which the EU concludes such agreements. The EU Strategy for Central 
Asia adopted in June 2007 also illustrates the mainstreaming of the ICC in the 
EU’s external action 457 since it foresees the exchange of practices «in the adop-
tion of the necessary legal adjustments required to accede to the Rome Statute 
454 Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, OJ L 321, 29.11.2016, 
pp. 3-30, article 10.
455 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – To-
wards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM/2006/0347 final, endorsed by the 
Council, para. 3.4: «South Africa occupies a unique position on the international scene. On 
many occasions, it speaks on behalf of the emerging and the developing world. Its authority 
in international fora is remarkable and surpasses its economic weight. Although South Africa 
and the EU do not always take the same positions on international issues, they agree on many. 
Like Europe, South Africa is committed to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, to the 
abolition of the death penalty and to combating terrorism. Both share a strong belief in the 
multilateral system of collective security of the United Nations and in the prime responsibility 
of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Both 
also share a strong commitment to tackling the causes and impacts of climate change and 
have confirmed their interest in deepening their dialogue on these and other environmental 
concerns.
 These issues are on the agenda of political talks between the EU and South Africa, but must 
also lead to concrete action. The EU must seek joint positions and effective cooperation with 
South Africa in all of these areas and defend mutual interests at international level.
 Similarly, the EU must seek to launch mutually beneficial cooperation on the environment, 
energy security and sustainable use of energy resources, migration, the fight against the inter-
national drugs trade, money laundering, tax fraud and avoidance, corruption, maritime and 
aviation security, trafficking in human beings, in particular children, small arms and organised 
crime.
 Finally, both partners favour a stronger representation of developing and emerging coun-
tries in international organisations. To that end, they need to promote stronger political 
coordination, cooperation in the IFIs and international fora, including UN bodies, and 
joint action».
456 Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, 
and the Republic of Korea, on the other part, OJ L 20, 23.01.2013, p. 2. Article 6 reads as 
follows: «1. The Parties reaffirm that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation, 
as appropriate, including the International Criminal Court. The Parties agree to fully support 
the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
related instruments.
 2. The Parties agree that a dialogue between them on these matters would be beneficial».
457 Ibid.
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of the International Criminal Court, and in combating international crime in 
accordance with international law» 458.
In the same way, the European Commission has negotiated ICC-related 
clauses in its Action Plans created within the frame of the European Neigh-
borhood Policy 459. It has been noted in this regard, that in the framework 
of Europe’s southern and Eastern neighborhoods, such clauses have been 
enshrined in all agreements but the ones of Israel, Palestine, and Tunisia 460. 
For present purposes, this is particularly problematic with regard to countries 
where there is a situation of occupation and allegations of widespread vio-
lations of IHL. Regarding Israel, the Action Plan limits itself to promoting 
«cooperation on issues such as fight against impunity of authors of genocide, 
war crimes and any other crime against humanity» 461.
Besides, the EU has adopted a policy of conditionality towards candidate 
States, requiring the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute as 
a condition for accession 462. In this regard, four – Albania, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia – out of the five candidate 
countries are parties to the Rome Statute, the exception being Turkey 463. It 
should nonetheless be mentioned that the Czech Republic became an EU 
Member State even though it had not ratified the Rome Statute, as this ele-
ment was overlooked in the final monitoring report on the preparedness of 
EU membership. The absence of mechanism to enforce compliance made it 
more difficult to require the ratification of the Rome Statute. However, the 
Czech Republic eventually ratified the Rome Statute in 2009, most likely as it 
had to assume the rotating presidency of the Council. In spite of that, it seems 
458 Council of the EU, The European Union and Central Asia: the new partnership in action, June 
2009, pp. 16/17. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/the_european_union_and_
central_asia_the_new_partnership_in_action.pdf (Accessed: 08.07.2017).
459 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 
2008b, p. 15.
460 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, pp. 17 
y  33.
461 EU-Israel Action Plan, 01.05.2004, p. 8. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/isra-
el_enp_ap_final_en.pdf (Accessed: 11.05.2017). 
462 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, pp. 17 
y 32. 
463 International Criminal Court’s website, The State Parties to the Rome Statute. Available at: 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20
to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (Accessed: 08.05.2017). 
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that this failure did not have a negative impact on EU démarches to third coun-
tries to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute 464.
Finally, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol-
icy – formerly the Presidency – makes statements on behalf of the EU in 
order to encourage, but also to welcome ratifications 465. On the occasion of 
these statements, the High Representative always recalls the EU’s support to 
the Court and calls on third states that have not yet ratified the Rome Statute 
to do so. As observed in the Statement on Moldova’s ratification of the Rome 
Statute, the High Representative trusts this ratification encourages «also other 
partners in the EU’s neighborhood to take similar steps» 466.
An element which negatively affects the EU’s policy on encouraging 
ratifications of the Rome Statute is the «absence of key partners including 
the USA and Russia [...] from the lists of States with whom the issue of ICC 
ratification has been recently raised» 467. Even though it is an issue which has 
been in present in most dialogues, it inevitably raises the question of double 
standards 468. Furthermore, as noticed by the European Parliament, the EU has 
missed the opportunity to include an ICC clause within the frame of the 
System of Generalized Preferences Plus (GSP+) 469, which allows developing 
countries to pay lower duties on their exports to the EU. To qualify to GSP+ 
status, third States are subject to an obligation to ratify and implement certain 
international treaties and conventions, including human rights treaties, but not 
the Rome Statute 470.
464 See, on this matter: Wouters and Basu, «The creation of a global justice system: the European 
Union and the International Criminal Court», op. cit., 2009, pp. 21-22.
465 See for example: Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Chile’s ratification 
of the Rome Statute, 30 June 2009, Brussels; Statement by High Representative Catherine Ash-
ton on the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by Seychelles, 
Brussels, 12 August 2010, A 159/10; Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by the Republic of 
Moldova, Brussels, 14 October 2010, A 207/10.
466 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the ratification of the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court by the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 14 October 
2010, A 207/10.
467 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, p. 35. 
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid., p. 36. 
470 Regulation (EU) Nº 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25.10.2012 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) Nº 
732/2008, OJ L 303, 31.10.2012. 
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2.1.2. Regarding to the independence and effective functioning of and 
cooperation with the ICC
Article 87(6) of the Rome Statute refers to the cooperation between the 
ICC and international organizations by enabling the former to request assis-
tance from the latter. The recognition of the role of international organizations 
is in line with the current treatment of post-conflict situations or situations 
where serious disorders have occurred where international organizations may 
be called to intervene. As a result, cooperation of intergovernmental organiza-
tions such as the EU is essential for the ICC to properly function 471.
To this end, the EU signed a cooperation and assistance agreement with 
the ICC on 10 April 2006 472. It was the first regional organization to do so. Its 
origin can be found in a request from the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
regarding EU strategic information 473. It must be noted that EU/ICC coop-
eration does not replace the individual relationship EU Member States have 
with the ICC since it remains under their remit. Pursuant to the agreement, 
the EU and the ICC are under the obligation of cooperation and assistance:
[t]he EU and the Court shall, to the fullest extent possible and practica-
ble, ensure the regular exchange of information and documents of mutual 
interest in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence 474.
The agreement likewise entails the obligation for the EU to provide sup-
port in the training and assistance «for judges, prosecutors, officials and counsel 
in work related to the Court» 475. Thus, the agreement is limited by itself as 
it only comprises the «hardcore elements of cooperation and assistance on 
the provision of information or documents» 476. Moreover, the EU commits to 
471 Antoniadis and Bekou, «The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times», 
op. cit., 2008, p. 80.
472 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation 
and assistance, OJ L 105/50, 28.04.2006. 
473 Antoniadis and Bekou, «The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times», 
op. cit., 2008, p. 11.
474 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation 
and assistance, OJ L 105/50, 28.04.2006, article 7.
475 Ibid., article 15.
476 Ibid.
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cooperate with the Prosecutor 477. On the basis of the 2006 agreement, the ICC 
and the EU set up a roundtable in 2014 whose objective was to consult and 
ensure «regular exchanges on matters of mutual interest, including coopera-
tion, complementarity, diplomatic support and mainstreaming, as well as public 
information and outreach» 478.
In addition, both entities agreed on security arrangements for the pro-
tection of classified information that entered into force on 31 March 2008 479. 
It is under those agreements that the EUFOR Chad/RCA 480 was allowed to 
provide support to the Court in Chad on logistical and security issues upon 
request 481. In this respect, the commitment of the EU did not go unheeded 
since it has assisted the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor on several occasions 
including in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Darfur 482.
A last element defining the contours of the EU-ICC cooperation is fund-
ing as the EU is a major contributor of the ICC 483.
Besides the strict cooperation between the ICC and the EU, the latter has 
implemented a certain number of measures to ensure the ICC’s independence 
and effective functioning, as they have become a priority for the EU. On this 
matter, the former common positions were rather vague and aimed at support-
ing «the effective functioning of the Court and to advance universal support 
for it by promoting the widest possible participation in the Rome Statute» 484. 
Conversely, the 2011 Decision details the objectives as follow:
477 Ibid., article 11.
478 Council of the EU, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2014, op. cit., 
2015, p. 19.
479 Ibid., p. 21.
480 The EUFOR Chad/CAR mission was launched on 28 January 2008 in accordance with the 
mandate set out in the UN Security Council Resolution 1778. The operation’s objectives were 
to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel 
by helping to improve security in the area of operations and to contribute to protecting UN 
personnel, facilities installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of 
movement of its own staff, UN staff and associated personnel. See: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-tchad-rca/mission-description/index_en.htm 
(Accessed: 11.07.2017). 
481 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 
2008b, p. 21.
482 Ibid., p. 22.
483 See: European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014. 
484 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP on the International Criminal Court, OJ L150/67, 
18.06.2003, article 1(2).
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advance universal support for the Rome Statute of the International Cri-
minal Court [...] by promoting the widest possible participation in it, to 
preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute, to support the independence of the 
ICC and its effective and efficient functioning, to support cooperation with the 
ICC, and to support the implementation of the principle of complemen-
tarity 485 [emphasis added].
This inclusion is encouraging to the extent that it underlines the advances 
made by the ICC, which is now operational and has already ruled important 
cases. It highlights the general acceptance of the Rome Statute and the need 
to concentrate on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Court.
The EU’s willingness to ensure the independence and efficiency of the 
Court is essential to the extent that the ICC does not possess an international 
police force on its own. As a result, it needs States’ cooperation to perform its 
functions and the State parties to the Rome Statute are actually subject to the 
obligation to execute a cooperation request made by the Court 486. Against 
this background, the 2011 Action Plan underlines the issue of cooperation and 
provides the following:
[T]he EU and its Member States will undertake consistent action to 
encourage full cooperation of States with the ICC, including the prompt 
execution of arrest warrants. The EU and its Member States should avoid 
non-essential contacts with individuals subject to an arrest warrant issued 
by the ICC. They will monitor and address developments that may hamper 
the ICC’s work 487.
In this line of reasoning, the Council approved ‘The EU’s response to 
non-cooperation with the International Criminal Court by third states’ in 
2013 488. The Council described non-cooperation as «one of the most seri-
485 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court 
repealing Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76, 22.03.2011, p. 56, article 1.2.
486 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Chapter IX.
487 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Decision on the International 
Criminal Court (12080/11), 12.07.2011, p. 14.
488 Council of the European Union, The EU’s response to non-cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court by third states (16993/13), Brussels, 27 November 2013. Available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16993-2013-INIT/en/pdf (Accessed: 
11.05.2017). 
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ous challenges to the effective functioning of the ICC» and recalled that it 
also constitutes a «breach of a legal obligation» concerning State parties to 
the Rome Statute. It reminds that this also holds true whenever the UN 
Security Council has approved a resolution based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter which refers a situation to the Court. In light of these elements, it 
is stated that «[w]henever non-cooperation occurs or is impending, the EU 
and its Member States will call for cooperation with the ICC and respond 
to non-cooperation» 489. To do so, the document provides a list of actions 
that may be undertaken to «respond to instances of non-cooperation, to 
persisting or repeated cases of non-cooperation, and when to avoid non-es-
sential contacts with individuals subject to arrest warrants issued by the 
ICC» 490.
Some examples may be found on this matter. As observed by the Euro-
pean Parliament, the EU has, contrarily to the UN Security Council, provided 
constant support to the Court in relation to all its proceedings, including in 
relation with the situations referred to by the Security Council 491. Hence, the 
High Representative or spokesperson has issued numerous statements con-
demning failures to cooperate with the ICC but also welcoming executions 
of arrest warrants. The following statement made in reaction to the visit of 
President Al-Bashir to South Africa in 2015 constitutes an example of such 
practice:
Committed to preventing crimes against humanity, war crimes and ge-
nocide, and to avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes, the 
EU confirms its continuing support for the ICC and its work.
Full cooperation with the ICC is a prerequisite for the Court’s effective 
functioning. 
In accordance with established approach of the EU and its Member 
States, the EU expects South Africa, a founding State Party of the Court, to act in 
accordance with UN Security Council 1593, in executing the arrest warrant against 
any ICC indictee present in the country 492 [emphasis added].
489 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
490 Ibid., p. 4. 
491 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, p. 64. 
492 Statement by spokesperson on South Africa and the ICC, 150614_02_en, Brussels, 14 June 2015. 
Quoted in Council of the European Union, EU annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in 
the World in 2015, op. cit., 2016, p. 18. 
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As for non-essential contacts, the ‘EU’s response to non-cooperation with 
the International Criminal Court by third states’ defines them as follows:
[T]hose which are strictly required for carrying out core diplomatic, 
consular and other activities and/or those activities which are UN-manda-
ted or which arise from a legal obligation (e.g., under headquarters agre-
ements) [...]
[T]he specific circumstances of a particular case would be relevant when 
determining what is an essential contact for these purposes 493.
However, it has been observed that such definition lacks guidance and 
that the EU guidelines on the implementation of its policy of non-essential 
contacts should be more transparent, in the interest of both the EU and the 
ICC State parties 494.
Lastly, when the EU adjudicates on the ICC’s situations, it contributes to its 
effective functioning. It does so by way of European Council conclusions, Coun-
cil Conclusions and High Representative (formerly Presidency) Declarations 
on behalf of the EU. The EU’s positions on Sudan 495, Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo or Kenya are representative of this practice 496. In recent years, 
the EU has repeatedly called to the UN Security Council to refer the situation 
in Syria to the ICC 497. These positions contribute to the authority of the ICC, a 
recent court that needs to find its place in the international legal order.
493 Council of the European Union, The EU’s response to non-cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court by third states (16993/13), Brussels, 27 November 2013, p. 4. Available 
at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16993-2013-INIT/en/pdf (Accessed: 
11.05.2017).
494 European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in the EU’s Policies, op. cit., 2014, p. 65. 
495 The Council of the EU has adopted several sets of conclusions, in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 calling for the need to establish a Commission of Inquiry about the crimes committed 
in Darfur, the need to prosecute these serious crimes, to refer them before the ICC and calling 
Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. See: Council of the European Union, The European Union and 
the International Criminal Court, op. cit., 2008b, p. 22.
496 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
497 See, e.g.: European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat, 
JOIN(2015) 2 final, Brussels, 06.02.2015, p. 15; Council Conclusions on EU priorities at UN 
Human Rights Fora in 2016, 15.02.2016; Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. 
Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Na-
tions, at the Security Council Open Debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the 
Palestinian question, New York, 12.07.2016.
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Thus, the EU has undertaken important measures to implement its obli-
gation to ensure respect for IHL in relation with the criminalization of IHL’s 
violations. Its strong commitment to the ICC and other criminal jurisdictions, 
as well as its declaratory policy fostering the respect for international criminal 
law illustrate the EU’s activism in the criminalization of serious violation and 
grave breaches of IHL. This participation is of utmost importance. Firstly, it 
permits to define IHL as «real law» for those authors who believe that sanc-
tion is inherent in the law. Secondly, it defines a behavior that is considered 
as infringing the international order and has a deterrent effect on those who 
would be tempted to commit it.
2.2. France’s cooperation with the ICC
France has been an active supporter of the ICC as well 498. It signed the 
Rome Statute in July 1998 and ratified it on 9 June 2000, thus being the 12th 
State of the international community and the second EU Member State to do 
so 499.
2.2.1. Ratification
In accordance with article 54 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister 
requested the Constitutional Court to assess whether the ratification of the 
Rome Statute should require an amendment to the Constitution. The Con-
stitutional Court indeed held on 22 January 1999 that some provisions of 
the Treaty were unconstitutional, thus necessitating a reform prior to ratifica-
498 See: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II: 
summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meeintgs of the Committee of the Whole. 
Available at: http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf 
(Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
499 Xavier Philippe and Anne Desmarest, «Remarques critiques relatives au projet de loi portant 
adaptation du droit pénal français à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale: la réalité 
française de la lutte contre l’impunité», Revue française de droit constitutionnel, vol. 1(81), 2010, 
p. 41. 
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tion 500. Against this background, a reform was conducted and led to the con-
stitutionalization of the Rome Statute in the French legal order by means of 
article 53(2) 501. This means that the obligation to prosecute or extradite alleged 
war criminals within the frame of the system established by the ICC is based 
on international law, but also on a constitutional mandate. Furthermore, as 
observed by Xavier Philippe and Anne Desmarest, article 53(2) entails the tak-
ing into consideration of the Rome Statute in its entirety 502. Therefore, French 
authorities accept to draw all the legal consequences resulting from France’s 
participation in the system established by the ICC. France then ratified the 
Statute in June 2000 503. Besides, France ratified the Agreement on the privi-
leges and immunities of the ICC in 2004 504. However, France had not ratified 
the Amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
War Crimes at the time of writing.
As observed already in Chapter 2, France opposed a declaration on 
the basis of article 124 of the Rome Statute in order to exclude the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over the war crimes committed by French nationals for a period 
of seven years upon the entry into force of the Statute. This declaration was 
made in order to preserve the immunity of French nationals with regard to 
the Algerian War of Independence. However, this declaration was withdrawn 
on 13 August 2008 505, thus abolishing an anomaly in a State based on the 
rule of law.
500 Conseil constitutionnel, Case nº 98-408 DC of 22 January 1999, JO of 24 January 1999, 
p. 1317. 
501 Loi constitutionnelle n°99-568 du 8 juillet 1999 insérant, au titre VI de la Constitution, un 
article 53-2 et relative à la Cour pénale internationale: «La République peut reconnaître la ju-
ridiction de la Cour pénale internationale dans les conditions prévues par le traité signé le 18 
juillet 1998».
502 Philippe and Desmarest, «Remarques critiques relatives au projet de loi portant adaptation du 
droit pénal français à l’institution de la Cour pénale international», op. cit., 2010, p. 45. 
503 Loi n° 2000-282 du 31 mars 2000 autorisant la ratification de la convention portant statut de 
la Cour pénale internationale et décret n° 2002-925 du 6 juin 2002 portant publication de 
la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, adoptée à Rome le 17 juillet 
1998.
504 Act n° 2003-1367 of 31 December 2003 (Loi n° 2003-1367 du 31 décembre 2003 autorisant 
l’approbation de l’accord sur les privilèges et immunités de la Cour pénale internationale), JO nº 
1 of 1 January 2004.
505 Notification dépositaire C.N.592.2008.TREATIES-5 (France: Retrait de déclaration), 20 Au-
gust 2008. 
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2.2.2. Implementation
On this basis, France has adapted its legislation to the Rome Statute 
by means of Act nº 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on the cooperation with 
the ICC 506 and the above-mentioned Act nº 2010-930 on the adaptation of 
the criminal law to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. 
It therefore took about 10 years for France to adapt its legislation to the 
Rome Statute. The aspects relating to the transposition of the Statute into 
the legal order and the implementation of the principle of complementarity 
have already been touched upon in the first section of this chapter. While this 
transposition is on the overall satisfactory, it should nevertheless be recalled 
that the principle of complementarity was not correctly transposed in the 
French legal order, since it reverses the order of complementarity by estab-
lishing the residual jurisdiction of French courts (article 8). In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court refused to examine the compatibility of article 8 with 
the Rome Statute, in accordance with its constant doctrine on international 
agreements 507.
As regards cooperation, Act nº 2002-268 included some provisions relat-
ing to judicial cooperation with the ICC to the Code of criminal procedure. 
In particular, it defines the modalities of judicial assistance 508, the conditions 
for the execution of requests for arrest and surrender 509, the modalities of exe-
cution of the penalties and measures of reparation 510, and the service of prison 
sentences 511. Additionally, the criminal code punishes some offences against the 
administration of justice in the ICC context. As such, it punishes the threats 
or acts of intimidation against an ICC official, the solicitation or acceptance of 
benefits or bribes to influence a decision, as well as false testimonies 512.
506 Act nº 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on the cooperation with the ICC (Loi n°2002-268 du 
26 février 2002 relative à la coopération avec la Cour pénale internationale), JORF 27 February 
2002, p. 3684. 
507 Conseil constitutionnel, Case nº 2010-612 DC, Loi n° 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adap-
tation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale internationale, JO of 10 August 2010, 
p. 14682. Available at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/
bank/download/2010612DC2010612dc.pdf (Accessed: 30.05.2017). 
508 Code of criminal procedure, articles 627-1 to 627-3. 
509 Ibid., articles 627-4 to 627-15. 
510 Ibid., articles 627-16 and 627-17. 
511 Ibid., articles 627-18 to 627-20. 
512 Criminal Code, articles 434-23-1, 435-7, 435-8, 435-9, 435-10.
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On this basis, France has cooperated with the ICC regarding different 
situations. By way of example, Callixte Mbarushimana, a political refugee, 
was detained in France in October 2010 on the basis of an arrest warrant 
issued by the ICC on 28 September 2010 513. He was accused of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in North and South Kivu, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2009. The Cour de cassation recognized 
in this context that the detention of Callixte Mbarushimana was legal on 
the grounds that the ICC holds its rulings in the respect for international 
human rights, in accordance with article 21 of its Statute 514. On this basis, 
the French authorities surrendered Callixte Mbarushimana on 25 January 
2011 and the ICC was therefore able to prosecute him. In its decision of 
16 December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I declined to confirm the charges 
in the absence of sufficient evidence and decided to release him 515. On 30 
May 2012, the Appeals Chamber rejected the appeal against the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I 516.
Finally, France has promoted the universality of the Rome Statute and 
cooperation with the ICC in bilateral and multilateral fora. In this context, 
France has called on the UN Security Council to refer certain situations. For 
example, it is at the initiative of France that the Security Council referred the 
situations in Darfur and in Libya to the ICC 517. In the same way, France has 
513 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision of the Prosecutor’s Application for 
a Warrant of Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana nº ICC-01/04-01/10, 28 September 
2010. 
514 Cour de cassation, criminal section, Case nº 10-87759 of 4 January 2011: «Attendu qu’en l’état 
de ces énonciations, la cour d’appel a justifié sa décision, dès lors que la Cour pénale interna-
tionale statue, en application de l’article 21 de son Statut, dans le respect des droits de l’homme 
internationalement reconnus [...]».
515 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges nº ICC-
01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011. 
516 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled «Decision on the confirmation 
of charges» nº ICC-01/04-01/10 OA 4, 30 May 2012. 




IMPLEMENTATION AT EU AND DOMESTIC LEVELS │ 445
called on referring the situation in Syria to the ICC on repeated occasions, 
without success 518. It should also be mentioned that France is the third con-
tributor to the ICC’s budget 519.
2.3. Spain’s cooperation with the ICC
Spain has been a constant supporter of the ICC 520. This is reflected in 
the state of ratification of the Rome Statute and other associated documents. 
Furthermore, Spain has transposed the Rome Statute into its legal order, so as 
to establish the means of its cooperation with the ICC.
518 «France threatens Damascus & Moscow with ICC war crimes probe over Aleppo», RT, 10 
October 2016, available at: https://www.rt.com/news/362229-france-threatens-icc-alep-
po/#.V_uJbAQzFoY.twitter (Accessed: 05.06.2017); UN press release, ‘Referral of Syria 
to the International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes prevent Security Council from 
adopting Draft Resolution’, 22 May 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/
sc11407.doc.htm (Accessed: 05.06.2017); Human Rights Watch, Syria and the Internation-
al Criminal Court, Questions and answers, September 2013, available at: https://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/related_material/Q%26A_Syria_ICC_Sept2013_en_0.pdf (Accessed: 
11.05.2017). 




520 See, e.g.: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II: 
summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meeintgs of the Committee of the Whole, 
available at: http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf 
(Accessed: 05.06.2017); Spain in UN, «España celebra la primera sentencia de la Corte Penal In-
ternacional», 14.03.2012, available at: http://www.spainun.org/2012/03/espana-celebra-la-pri-
mera-sentencia-de-la-corte-penal-internacional/ (Accessed: 05.06.2017): «España reitera su 
firme y constante apoyo a la Corte Penal Internacional, a cuya creación y desarrollo ha con-
tribuido desde los orígenes de la institución. España reafirma su profundo compromiso con los 
principios recogidos en el Estatuto de Roma, y con la lucha contra la impunidad de los crímenes 
más graves para la comunidad internacional»; Spanish Ministry of foreign affairs, «Corte Penal 
Internacional», available at: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCoopera-
cion/NacionesUnidas/Paginas/CortePenalInternacional.aspx (Accessed: 05.06.2017): «España 
tiene un alto grado de compromiso con la CPI y con las funciones que ésta ejerce, como insti-
tución universal que lucha contra la impunidad de los crímenes más graves. España ha ratificado 
los instrumentos internacionales reguladores de los crímenes de los que conoce la CPI y ha 
apoyado firmemente la labor de la Corte desde la entrada en vigor de su Estatuto»; ICC, Press 
release: «Reaffirming Spain’s support, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation visits the 
ICC», 30 January 2017.
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2.3.1. Ratification
Spain actively participated in the establishment of the ICC 521. It signed 
the Rome Statute in July 1998 and ratified it on 24 October 2000 522. Prior 
to the ratification, the Council of State issued an advisory opinion according 
to which there was no need to amend the Constitution to proceed to rati-
fication. In particular, it held that the powers of the ICC prosecutor, which 
normally fall under the remit of national jurisdictions, may be transferred to 
an international organization of institution in accordance with article 93 of the 
Constitution 523. However, the Council of State considered that the ratification 
required the adoption of an organic act in this sense. This was done by means 
of Organic Act 6/2000 of 4 October 2000 524.
Spain issued two declarations to the Rome Statute 525. The first one deals 
with article 87. It clarifies which institutions are competent to «transmit 
requests for cooperation made by the Court or addressed to the Court», i.e. the 
521 See: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II: 
summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meeintgs of the Committee of the Whole. 
Available at: http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf 
(Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
522 Organic Act 6/2000 authorizing Spain’s ratification of the Statute on the International Criminal 
Court (Ley Orgánica 6/2000, de 4 de octubre, por la que se autoriza la ratificación por España 
del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional), BOE nº 239, 05.10.2000, pp. 34138-34140; Instru-
mento de Ratificación del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, hecho en Roma 
el 17 de julio de 1998, BOE nº 126, 27.05.2002, pp. 18824-18860. 
523 «D) El artículo 99.4 del Estatuto de Roma permite determinadas actuaciones del Fiscal en el 
territorio de los Estados Partes, para el caso de que una, solicitud pueda ejecutarse sin necesi-
dad de medidas coercitivas, aun cuando sea sin la presencia de las autoridades del Estado Parte 
requerido. Las funciones en materia de cooperación y asistencia a que se refiere, enunciadas en 
los artículos 54.2, 93 y 96 del Estatuto, son competencia en su mayor parte del Poder Judicial 
conforme a la Constitución, en la medida en que podrían coincidir con funciones judiciales de 
instrucción. De acuerdo con el parecer del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, se estima que las 
eventuales excepciones que ellas supongan a la exclusividad del ejercicio de la función judicial 
prevista por el artículo 117.3 de la Constitución, o bien a la misión constitucional (ex artículo 
124) del Ministerio Fiscal de promover la acción de la justicia en defensa de la legalidad, pueden 
reconducirse por el procedimiento del artículo 93 de la Constitución».
524 Organic Act 6/2000 authorizing Spain’s ratification of the Statute on the International Criminal 
Court (Ley Orgánica 6/2000, de 4 de octubre, por la que se autoriza la ratificación por España 
del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional), BOE nº 239, 05.10.2000, pp. 34138-34140. 
525 See: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&doc-
umentId=47087E3DC4714E0B412566BB003B64EE (Accessed: 11.05.2017). 
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Ministry of Justice. In addition, such requests and accompanying documents 
must be in Spanish or provided with a translation into Spanish. As for the sec-
ond declaration, it refers to article 103 of the Statute, on the role of States in 
the enforcement of sentences of imprisonment. It clarifies that Spain is willing 
to enforce prison sentences issued by the ICC «provided that the duration of 
the sentence does not exceed the maximum stipulated for any crime under 
Spanish law» 526.
For present purposes, Spain has actively contributed to the codification 
of war crimes in the Rome Statute. This is reflected in the official records of 
the Rome Conference 527, but also in the fact that Spain ratified the Amend-
ment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 528, 
which enlarges the catalog of war crimes.
Finally, Spain ratified the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the ICC in 2009 529.
2.3.2. Implementation
The relationship between Spain and the ICC is regulated mostly by 
Organic Act 18/2003 of 10 December 2003 530. The elements regarding the 
transposition of the Rome Statute in national law were already analyzed in the 
526 See: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&doc-
umentId=47087E3DC4714E0B412566BB003B64EE (Accessed: 11.05.2017). 
527 See: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II: 
summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 
p. 61. Available at: http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.
pdf (Accessed: 05.06.2017).
528 Organic Act 5/2014 (Ley Orgánica 5/2014, de 17 de septiembre, por la que se autoriza la ra-
tificación de las Enmiendas al Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, relativas a los 
crímenes de guerra y al crimen de agresión, hechas en Kampala el 10 y 11 de junio de 2010), 
BOE nº 227, 18.09.2014, pp. 72966-72970; Instrumento de ratificación de la Enmienda al artí-
culo 8 y las Enmiendas relativas al crimen de agresión del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal 
Internacional, adoptadas en Kampala el 10 y 11 de junio de 2010, BOE nº 310, 24.12.2014, 
pp. 105054-105058.
529 See: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-13&chap-
ter=18&lang=en (Accessed: 05.06.2017). 
530 Organic Act 18/2003 of 10 December 2003 (Ley Orgánica 18/2003, de 10 de diciembre, de 
Cooperación con la Corte Penal Internacional), BOE nº 296, 11.12.2003. 
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first section of this chapter. Therefore, it is simply reminded that Spain already 
provided for a catalog of war crimes before the ratification of the Rome Stat-
ute, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. However, with the establish-
ment of the ICC, Spanish authorities further enlarged this catalog, and even 
went beyond what is required by article 8 of the Rome Statute, insofar as the 
nature of the armed conflict is irrelevant for its recognition as war crime.
Regarding cooperation strictly speaking, article 2 of Organic Act 18/2003 
establishes the obligation to cooperate with the ICC in accordance with article 
86 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, Organic Act 18/2003 regulates aspects 
relating to detention (article 11), conditional release (article 12), the different 
modalities of surrender to the Court (articles 13, 15, and 18), summons before 
the ICC (article 14), the issue of competing requests (article 16), as well as the 
different courses of action upon surrender (article 19). It is also worth men-
tioning that article 20 establishes an obligation of cooperation with regard to 
the requests made by the ICC under article 93 of the Statute, and which are 
not prohibited under Spanish law 531. Organic Act 18/2003 further specifies 
which are the legal bodies competent to implement requests for coopera-
tion, namely the Audiencia Nacional in relation with the surrender to other 
countries and all courts with respect to the other forms of cooperation. Con-
sistent with Spain’s declaration to the Rome Statute, the Ministry of Justice is 
the entity competent regarding the communication and consultation with the 
ICC on cooperation matters.
Moreover, the Organic Act authorizes the Government to refer a situa-
tion to the ICC’s prosecutor (article 7.1). This reflects Spain’s choice to base 
the initiative of activities with the ICC on the executive branch, with a view 
to balance the obligations arising from the Rome Statute with «and the diverse 
variables of foreign policy that need to be assessed by the body that is consti-
tutionally responsible for foreign policy» 532.
It is interesting to note that articles 8, 9, and 10 of Organic Act 18/2003 
connect universal jurisdiction at domestic level with the ICC in order to 
531 Cuestionario para los Estados partes sobre la legislación de aplicación, Respuestas del Reino 
de España, 19.05.2010. Available at: https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/PoA/ICC-
RC-POA2010-SPA-SPA.pdf (Accessed: 05.06.2017).
532 Fourth consultation on the implications for Council of Europe Member States of the ratification 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Progress Report: Spain. 4th Consult/
ICC (2006) 08. Strasbourg, 14.09.2006. 
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implement the principle of complementarity and to mitigate jurisdictional 
conflicts. Nonetheless, just like in the French case, the complementarity prin-
ciple has been reversed with regard to the crimes committed outside of Spain 
by foreigners 533. Yet, article 7(3) states that if the ICC does not initiate an 
investigation on the situation reported, the complaint may be resubmitted to 
the Spanish courts, who thus recover their jurisdiction.
Lastly, Organic Act 15/2003 of 25 November 2003 added a new chapter 
IX to Title XX of the criminal code, on the offences against the administra-
tion of justice in the ICC context. It punishes false testimonies, the inten-
tional provision of false evidence, the international destruction of evidence, 
corruptly influencing, obstructing the attendance of or retaliating against a 
witness, impeding, corrupting, intimidating, or retaliating against a Court offi-
cial, or soliciting or accepting bribes as a Court official 534. With this provision, 
533 Ibid., article 7(2): «Cuando se presentare una denuncia o querella ante un órgano judicial o 
del Ministerio Fiscal o una solicitud en un departamento ministerial, en relación con hechos 
sucedidos en otros Estados, cuyos presuntos autores no sean nacionales españoles y para cuyo 
enjuiciamiento pudiera ser competente la Corte, dichos órganos se abstendrán de todo proce-
dimiento, limitándose a informar al denunciante, querellante o solicitante de la posibilidad de 
acudir directamente al Fiscal de la Corte, que podrá, en su caso, iniciar una investigación, sin per-
juicio de adoptar, si fuera necesario, las primeras diligencias urgentes para las que pudieran tener 
competencia. En iguales circunstancias, los órganos judiciales y el Ministerio Fiscal se abstendrán 
de proceder de oficio».
534 Spanish Criminal Code, article 471 bis: «1. El testigo que, intencionadamente, faltare a la verdad 
en su testimonio ante la Corte Penal Internacional, estando obligado a decir verdad conforme 
a las normas estatutarias y reglas de procedimiento y prueba de dicha Corte, será castigado con 
prisión de seis meses a dos años. Si el falso testimonio se diera en contra del acusado, la pena será 
de prisión de dos a cuatro años. Si a consecuencia del testimonio se dictara un fallo condenatorio, 
se impondrá pena de prisión de cuatro a cinco años.
 2. El que presentare pruebas ante la Corte Penal Internacional a sabiendas de que son falsas o han 
sido falsificadas será castigado con las penas señaladas en el apartado anterior de este artículo.
 3. El que intencionadamente destruya o altere pruebas, o interfiera en las diligencias de prueba 
ante la Corte Penal Internacional será castigado con la pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años 
y multa de siete a 12 meses.
 4. El que corrompiera a un testigo, obstruyera su comparecencia o testimonio ante la Corte 
Penal Internacional o interfiriera en ellos será castigado con la pena de prisión de uno a cuatro 
años y multa de seis a 24 meses.
 5. Será castigado con prisión de uno a cuatro años y multa de seis a 24 meses quien pusiera trabas 
a un funcionario de la Corte, lo corrompiera o intimidara, para obligarlo o inducirlo a que no 
cumpla sus funciones o a que lo haga de manera indebida.
 6. El que tomara represalias contra un funcionario de la Corte Penal Internacional en razón de 
funciones que haya desempeñado él u otro funcionario será castigado con la pena de prisión de 
uno a cuatro años y multa de seis a 24 meses.
450 │ ENSURING RESPECT: PUNISHING VIOLATIONS OF IHL
Spain fulfills its obligation arising from article 70(4)(a) of the Rome Statute. 
Lastly, Spain highlights its commitment to the ICC and emphasizes its support 
for the Trust Fund for Victims 535.
In light of these developments, it can be concluded that Spanish author-
ities are committed to meet their obligations arising from the Rome Statute. 
They have appropriately transposed at national level their duty to cooperate 
with the ICC. For present purposes, the activism of Spanish authorities with 
regard to the criminalization of serious violations of IHL is especially note-
worthy. Conversely, the interpretation of the principle of complementarity 




It can be sustained that all three actors have undertaken important efforts to 
allow national authorities to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of war crimes 
and to cooperate with international criminal tribunals, especially the ICC. 
Therefore, they have implemented – with some nuances – their obligation to 
punish the alleged perpetrators of war crimes, in accordance with the system 
established by Common Article 1.
In the first place, the EU, France, and Spain have established the means 
allowing for prosecution at national level. The EU has constantly recognized 
the importance of the fight against impunity, notably with regard to war 
crimes, and has established operational means at the service of judicial cooper-
ation on this matter. As for France and Spain, both have extensively transposed 
 En la misma pena incurrirá quien tome represalias contra un testigo por su declaración ante la 
Corte.
 7. El que solicitara o aceptara un soborno en calidad de funcionario de la Corte y en relación 
con sus funciones oficiales incurrirá en la pena de prisión de dos a cinco años y multa del tanto 
al triplo del valor de la dádiva solicitada o aceptada».
535 Spanish Ministry of foreign affairs: «Corte Penal Internacional». Available at: http://www.exte-
riores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/NacionesUnidas/Paginas/CortePenalIn-
ternacional.aspx (Accessed: 05.06.2017).
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the content of war crimes in their legal orders, although in differing ways. The 
Spanish approach better follows the course of international law, insofar as it 
first implemented the language of IHL in national law, and then adapted it to 
further evolutions. Conversely, the French approach relies clearly on interna-
tional criminal law, rather than on IHL.
Furthermore, while France mostly limits itself to codify the current state 
of international law in relation with non-international armed conflicts, Spain 
makes no distinction based on the nature of the armed conflict. Besides, the 
provisions dealing with the status of the alleged perpetrator are not entirely 
satisfactory, especially with regard to the rules on immunity which would ben-
efit from further clarification. Lastly, the creation of specialized units dedicated 
to the investigation and prosecution of alleged perpetrators of core interna-
tional crimes in France represents undoubted progress in the effectiveness of 
the fight against impunity at national level. On the overall, these provisions 
allow national authorities to effectively prosecute alleged perpetrators.
In addition, State parties are also under an obligation to provide for uni-
versal jurisdiction mechanisms, at least with respect to the grave breaches. The 
position of the three actors on this point seems to converge on some aspects. 
The EU, France, and Spain all agree on the principle of universal jurisdiction 
over some core international crimes. In this respect, it is acknowledged that 
in the case of IHL, the creation of universal jurisdiction mechanisms is not 
optional but mandatory, at least with regard to the grave breaches. Further-
more, there seems to be consensus among the French and Spanish authorities 
that the presence of the accused is required to initiate proceedings when the 
crime occurred outside of their territories and was committed by foreigners 
not residing in their countries. This condition is not required by the Geneva 
Conventions themselves, although it is not prohibited under IHL either.
While the concept of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is accepted, its 
practical implementation has been restricted, probably in response to the political 
complications that its exercise might entail. While the Spanish legal order used to 
be a pioneer in the use of universal jurisdiction – even if in some cases, concerns 
over legal certainty could be raised – the Spanish legislature has progressively 
clarified and, at the same time, narrowed its scope of application. Conversely, 
France authorized quite late the use of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, but 
even its codification was accompanied with important limitations. Actually, the 
current legal frameworks in Spain and in France present similarities also in some 
questionable elements, such as the reversal of the principle of complementarity. 
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Furthermore, as evidenced by Langer, the executive branch has intervened in 
several cases involving high-profile cases; as a result, universal jurisdiction seems 
to be more successful in cases involving low cost defendants 536. This is probably 
a reality in the legal orders scrutinized in this chapter 537.
The result of this process is that, nowadays, France is the European coun-
try with the greatest number of procedures for international crimes cases under 
investigation. By April 2017, 57 cases were under investigation 538, although the 
number of cases brought on war crimes grounds is not known. Therefore, even 
though France implemented its obligations under IHL and the Rome Statute 
quite late, this delay seems to be compensated by the political will that now 
exists to actually prosecute alleged perpetrators of core international crimes 
in France. Conversely, Spain has established quite soon a well-established legal 
framework allowing for the prosecution of people suspected of having com-
mitted grave breaches and other serious violations. The Spanish legislation is 
at the avant-garde on some aspects, such as the criminalization of serious vio-
lations of IHL occurring in NIACs, and it has been a pioneer in the use of 
universal jurisdiction on this matter. Nonetheless, in contrast with France, the 
political will to translate these principles into action appears less clearly, as the 
low number of open cases before Spanish courts 539 has shown.
These developments therefore impose to conceive universal jurisdiction 
as a more ‘reasonable’ instrument in the fight against impunity than what was 
originally expected. It seems that universal jurisdiction as it is regulated at 
EU, French, and Spanish levels aims to deny safe havens to people willing to 
establish themselves in those territories rather than to become global enforc-
ers proactively prosecuting high-level officials worldwide, as observed by Luc 
Reydams 540. That being said, it should also be mentioned that both French and 
536 Máximo Langer, «The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the 
Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes», American Journal of International Law, vol. 
105(1), 2011, pp. 1-49, 3. 
537 On the situation in Spain, see inter alia: Esteve Moltó, «La persecución universal de los crímenes 
de guerra en España: más retrocesos, que avances», op. cit., 2014; Sánchez Legido, «El fin del mo-
delo español de jurisdicción universal», op. cit., 2014.
538 Colgnac, Report on ‘L’Office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l’humanite, pour que «la justice reste», 
op. cit. Available at: http://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/dossier/l-office-central-de-lutte-contre-
crimes-contre-l-humanite-pour-que-justice-reste#.WO3txBLyhQM (Accessed: 10.04.2017).
539 EU Genocide Network Strategy, p. 31. 
540 Reydams, Study on «The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity», op. cit., 2016.
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Spanish authorities have opened investigations regarding the Syrian case 541, 
although these are at a too early stage to draw conclusions.
Lastly, this commitment of the three actors to the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL is manifested in their support to and cooperation with the 
international criminal tribunals. This is particularly clear with regard to the 
EU. The latter has implemented an extensive policy of support to the ICTY, 
and more importantly to the ICC, which became one of the priorities of 
the EU’s external action. This aspect is particularly interesting insofar as the 
developments in the field of international criminal justice impose obligations 
on State parties. Therefore, through their active support to the ICC, Spain and 
France participated in the elaboration of new – or renovated – international 
obligations. Likewise, it triggered the modification of domestic law in relation 
with the prosecution of alleged perpetrators, thus generating a virtuous circle 
in the fight against impunity.
541 Reuters, «Spanish court to investigate complaint against Syrian security forces», 27.03.2017. 
Elise Vincent, «Une plainte contre Damas déposée à Paris pour «crimes contre l’humanité», Le 
Monde, 24.10.2016.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to assess whether and to what extent the EU, 
France, and Spain are bound by the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, as 
provided by Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. This 
question has been analyzed from two angles of research.
The first part was dedicated to the obligation to ensure respect in its first 
two dimensions, that is, to adopt measures to prevent violations of IHL from 
occurring or to stop them. Concretely, the objective of the first part was to 
define the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, in accordance with the current 
international legal framework, and its corresponding implementation at Euro-
pean and domestic levels.
In this context, it was found that although Common Article 1 could have 
been condemned to oblivion, as a symbolic provision without much legal 
projection, the absence of a centralized monitoring mechanism established by 
the Geneva Conventions decided otherwise. Indeed, IHL does not provide for 
such a mechanism and the High Contracting Parties have recently refused to 
establish one. Nevertheless, the effective implementation of IHL is of utmost 
importance, and it has become necessary to refer to other instruments in order 
to enforce IHL. This is where Common Article 1 appears, a provision whose 
wording is both vague and summary. Common Article 1 has, to some extent, 
filled in this gap most probably thanks to the vagueness of its wording, as it has 
allowed an evolving and extensive interpretation thereof. The vagueness of the 
formula has therefore played in the benefit of IHL.
Different institutions have played an important role in defining the scope 
and limits of this obligation, namely, the ICRC and the ICJ. Thus, according to 
its modern acceptation, Common Article 1 not only requires State parties to 
respect the legal provisions they ratified, but also places a duty upon them to 
ensure respect for IHL by others. In addition to the (traditional) internal dimen-
sion of the obligation, State parties are bound to its external dimension and must 
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take all the necessary measures to ensure that the warring parties to an armed 
conflict indeed comply with IHL. This external dimension of the obligation is 
grounded on the erga omnes nature of Common Article 1, a provision destined to 
protect some of the most fundamental norms of the international legal system. 
Consequently, Common Article 1 has established a decentralized monitoring 
system, whereby all States are guardians of IHL. The effectiveness of the system 
established by the Geneva Conventions relies on the good will of its State par-
ties, and as such, it is important to make use of all the instruments made available 
under international law. If only the international community consistently and 
systematically implemented the measures at its disposal to ensure respect for 
IHL in accordance with international law, then much would be gained.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that Common Article 1 is an obligation 
of due diligence. As a result, third States to an armed conflict must take all the 
necessary – and reasonable – measures to prevent IHL violations from occur-
ring, intend to stop IHL violations if they occur, and repress them once they 
have occurred if they are tantamount to grave breaches or serious violations. In 
this regard, it is possible to consider that not all State parties are bound in the 
same manner to this obligation, depending on political and cultural bonds with 
the State party to the armed conflict. In the same way, it seems reasonable to 
consider that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are proba-
bly subject to a higher duty because of their particular mission in maintaining 
international peace and security pursuant to the UN Charter.
In this respect, all three actors have indeed implemented the obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL both in terms of opinio juris and practice, with mixed 
results. In this regard, the position of the EU has been bold, as it adopted 
the Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL, a document in which it 
expressly formalized its commitment to the obligation to ensure respect for 
IHL. This unique document thus expresses the commitment of – thus far – 28 
Member States to Common Article 1, as an obligation that creates a system of 
collective responsibility. In addition, it serves as the ‘legal basis’ on which the 
EU institutions may operate to fulfill the obligation.
Furthermore, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has opened up 
new possibilities with the recognition of the EU’s international legal personal-
ity and the consolidation of the CFSP. As demonstrated above, there are exter-
nal and internal factors that compel the EU to comply with Common Article 
1. The EU is a fully-fledged international actor which must act in accordance 
with international law, and a fortiori, with IHL, a legal corpus with customary 
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character at the very heart of the international legal order. At internal level, the 
EU is a union of values – the rule of law, democracy and the respect for human 
rights – which include IHL. These values have become axiological to the EU, 
and the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the necessity to externalize them in order 
to ensure coherence. Thus, the implementation of the obligation to ensure 
respect for IHL at EU level is framed within the externalization of EU values 
on the international scene and thereby acquire a constitutional dimension.
Ensuring respect for IHL is arguably in the interest of the EU, an inter-
national actor willing to assert its credibility and power through multilateral-
ism. As a result of this integration of IHL in European law, the EU defines its 
identity but also contributes to the development of this area of international 
law. These two elements, the customary nature of Common Article 1 and the 
‘constitutionalization’ of the EU’s founding values, are reflected in the Guide-
lines on promoting compliance with IHL, which explicitly reflect the EU’s 
commitment on this matter.
As any other State party to the Geneva Conventions, France and Spain 
are subject to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, both internally and 
externally. In this regard, the overwhelming ratification of IHL treaties denotes 
an overall commitment of both States with respect to IHL in general, and the 
Geneva Conventions in particular. They have ratified the four Geneva Con-
ventions and their three additional protocols, and have complied with their 
internal obligations in order to give full effect to these ratifications. They are 
therefore unequivocally bound by Common Article 1, a situation not explicit 
in domestic law but acknowledged by the authorities in different policy doc-
uments and public statements.
Furthermore, France has long projected itself as the nation of human 
rights and has been willing to embrace this mandate. Mirroring the EU, France 
bases the functioning of democracy and its involvement in international organ-
izations on the respect for human rights, which are considered its founding 
values. The same can be said with regard to Spain’s foreign policy. Pursuant 
to this mandate, they must take all measures to ensure respect for IHL on the 
international scene. In addition, it clearly appears that their action on the mat-
ter is multilateral and placed within the framework of the EU and the UN. In 
the French case, this is likewise reinforced by its higher responsibility, resulting 
from its permanent membership in the UN Security Council.
In addition, opinio juris is indeed reflected in the protean practice of the 
three actors, although this practice is not always consistent. They all have under-
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taken action to prevent IHL, most notably in terms of training and promotion 
of IHL. In this context, they all have promoted the ratification of IHL treaties 
as well as the respect for IHL principles on the international stage, through 
multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, they have adapted their responses to vio-
lations of IHL depending on their capacities, basing their action on diplomatic, 
economic, and military instruments.
In terms of capacities, France is an especially important actor on the inter-
national scene and must act accordingly. In particular, France probably has a 
higher duty to ensure respect for IHL in its quality of permanent member of 
the UNSC. The above-mentioned France’s initiative together with Mexico 
on UNSC permanent members refraining from using their right to veto in 
case of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing is 
encouraging insofar as it highlights the shift from a State-centered approach to 
a human-centered approach of international relations. The French government 
expressed its readiness to give up on one of its most important privileges in case 
of serious international crimes. France’s commitment to the R2P is clear, which 
in turn has an impact on the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Spain supports 
these developments and has proven to reflect its commitment to Common Arti-
cle 1 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2015-2016.
The second part of the thesis was dedicated to the third dimension of 
IHL, the one that has arguably most developed in the last decades: the crimi-
nalization of the behaviors prohibited under IHL that amount to war crimes. 
The objective of this second part was to analyze the legal instruments to pun-
ish the violations of IHL at the disposal of the State parties. Consequently, 
the objective was to identify the mechanisms of responsibility existing under 
international law and to analyze whether the EU, France, and Spain have ade-
quately used them.
In this context, the first instrument at their disposal is the invocation of 
State responsibility for an international wrongful act on behalf of the inter-
national community as a whole, pursuant to the regime existing under public 
international law. However, this system is not ‘punitive’ strictly speaking, and it 
has never been activated by third States for violations of IHL. The alternative, 
on the other hand, is more interesting for present purposes: individual inter-
national responsibility. Actually, the Geneva Conventions themselves establish 
the grave breaches regime, whereby the State parties commit to prosecute or 
extradite, including on the basis of universal jurisdiction, the alleged perpe-
trators of the so-called ‘grave breaches’, a list of behaviors prohibited under 
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IHL. This system has produced mixed results; nonetheless, it established the 
blueprint of the international system of penal repression of violations of IHL. 
Indeed, international criminal law has developed upon the categories estab-
lished in the Geneva Conventions with regard to the repression of war crimes. 
The result today is that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL obliges the 
members of the international community to implement the grave breaches 
system in their legal orders and to cooperate with international criminal tri-
bunals regarding war crime cases.
Against this backdrop, the EU, France, and Spain have undertaken steps 
to implement these obligations. Since the EU does not hold competence on 
the matter, it has intended to facilitate cooperation among EU Member States 
in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of core international crimes. As for 
France, it delayed the transposition of the grave breaches in its legal order and 
finally did so with the adoption of the Rome Statute. French authorities even-
tually transposed the definitions of war crimes contained in the Rome Stat-
ute, authorized universal jurisdiction – under strict conditions – and created 
specialized units to investigate and prosecute war crimes. Therefore, despite 
its delay in implementing its penal obligations under IHL, France is now at 
the forefront of prosecutions of alleged war criminals. As for Spain, it has pro-
ceeded in different steps. It transposed the grave breaches system on the basis 
of the Geneva Conventions and further adapted it to subsequent changes in 
international law. Concerning prosecutions, Spain has been considered a pio-
neer in the fight against impunity thanks to an extensive interpretation of uni-
versal jurisdiction by Spanish courts. Nonetheless, the legislature has redefined 
the scope of universal jurisdiction in order to provide greater legal certainty, 
but also to restrict its use due to political pressure.
Regarding the obligation to cooperate with international criminal courts, 
all three actors have adopted the relevant measures to do so with regard to the 
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that France 
has importantly worked on Rwandan cases due to historical and cultural ties. 
More importantly, this is an area where EU Member States, including France 
and Spain, have levelled their activism at EU level, through the application of 
conditionality clauses and restrictive measures in support for the ICTY and the 
unconditional support for the ICC. The EU has probably earned its reputation 
as human rights leader in this context, as it is commonly acknowledged that its 
activism on the matter has importantly contributed to the establishment and 
effective functioning of the ICC.
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In light of these findings, it is worth stressing the following general conclusions.
First, an introductory and concise article, Common Article 1 establishes a 
complete yet complex system of monitoring taking place at all times – before, 
during, and after an armed conflict. The measures to prevent and react to IHL 
violations include a wide set of measures ranging from dissemination of IHL, 
to public denunciations, to military intervention in accordance with the UN 
Charter. However, these measures are not always sufficient, so that it is nec-
essary to criminalize IHL violations. The measures relating to responsibility 
involve the criminalization and prosecution of alleged perpetrators of serious 
violations and grave breaches of IHL, as well as litigation before interna-
tional courts, especially the ICJ in order to invoke the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing State. In this manner, the obligation to ensure respect borrows 
from many different branches of international law, including the norms reg-
ulating general international law, international human rights law, the law of 
international peace and security, or international criminal law. Thanks to the 
vagueness of its wording, Common Article 1 has become a catch-all provision 
which connects all these branches to fulfill one purpose: ensuring respect 
for IHL. Common Article 1 is indeed the element that allows connecting all 
these elements and giving coherence to the system as a whole with regard 
to IHL.
However, the force of Common Article 1 is also its weakness, insofar as it 
relies on the developments in other branches of international law and is prone 
to fragmentation. Furthermore, the spectacular development of international 
criminal justice in the last decades also highlights that the sophisticated sys-
tem originally elaborated by the Geneva Conventions in order to tackle IHL 
violations during the conflict is not efficient. In fact, it seems that the efforts of 
the international community have focused on strengthening repressive mech-
anisms in the last decades. More recently, prevention seems to have appeared 
on top of the agenda. It therefore looks like the mechanisms foreseen in the 
Geneva Conventions to stop violations of IHL are insufficient or ineffective. As 
a consequence, ex ante and ex post measures seem to be favored for an increased 
efficiency.
Second, the EU, France and Spain contribute to the crystallization of 
Common Article 1 as a norm of customary IHL, as they provide evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law. The analysis of the transposition of Common 
Article 1 highlights the existence of an opinio juris, with Common Article 1 
being interpreted according to its contemporary meaning, that is, as an obli-
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gation with external effects. Similarly, the analysis of State and EU practice is 
consistent with this opinio juris.
Third, Common Article 1 should be read in conjunction with an emerg-
ing norm of international law, the Responsibility to Protect, which reflects 
a shift in the understanding of State sovereignty. In this respect, an impor-
tant issue which applies to the whole system, and in particular with regard to 
individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility, is the willingness of 
States to preserve their sovereignty and the unwillingness to intervene by pros-
ecuting alleged perpetrators or resorting to international tribunals as a result. 
However, in line with the logic of the Responsibility to Protect, if a State does 
not ensure the respect for the most fundamental norms of international law 
– including the prohibition of war crimes – then, the international community 
must take over. That same idea is reflected in the principle of complementarity 
as established in the Rome Statute: States are primarily responsible for prose-
cuting alleged perpetrators, but if they do not fulfill this obligation, then the 
ICC can take the lead and open an investigation.
This evolution of the concept of State sovereignty is essential in order to 
maintain a balance in international law between two (sometimes) competing 
interests: States’ interests and individuals’ interests. This shift is therefore desir-
able as it allows conciliating these elements. Indeed, it guarantees the respect 
for the traditional principles of international law, such as the equality between 
States or non-interference, but also the protection of humanity, a principle 
enshrined in numerous IHRL and IHL treaties and conventions adopted since 
World War II. Pursuant to this understanding (non-military) intervention by 
third States to an armed conflict does not constitute a breach of the principle 
of sovereignty, but rather its application. State sovereignty cannot be under-
stood as unlimited power anymore, but rather as a responsibility.
Fourth, the European Union is becoming a global actor with regard to 
the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. While its economic weight is undis-
putable, the same does not hold true regarding its political power on the inter-
national scene. In spite of that, the EU has integrated IHL into its CFSP and 
has progressively allowed it to enter its sphere of competency well before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU has been a promoter of IHL since 
the 1990’s, thus acting as if it were bound by Common Article 1 even before 
the adoption of the IHL Guidelines. It has used its status and resources to rein-
force the implementation and respect for IHL by mainstreaming the Geneva 
Conventions in its external action. The result today is that it is a protean actor 
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of IHL, acting in the same way as State parties to the Geneva Conventions and 
resorting to an arsenal of tools to ensure respect for IHL: declaratory policy, 
sanctions policy, or even management-crisis operations. The diversity of means 
reflects the EU’s complexity and illustrates how the EU juggles with the dif-
ferent aspects of its power to ensure respect for IHL.
In this context, the EU is becoming a credible actor of IHL on the interna-
tional scene. The international community has acknowledged the EU’s action in 
the maintenance of international peace and security through the Statement by 
the President of the Security Council of 14 February 2014 (S/PRST/2014/4). 
In this statement, the partnership of the EU with the UN in resolving global 
challenges is applauded, notably with regard to the promotion of human rights 
and the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. It therefore constitutes a pow-
erful signal regarding the perception and credibility of the EU on the interna-
tional scene as well as the expectations that arise with respect to Common Arti-
cle 1. Consequently, it is possible to expect Brussels to become one of the centers 
of development of IHL, together with Geneva, The Hague, and New York.
Fifth, despite the unequivocal legal authority of Common Article 1 in the 
international legal order, the EU’s action in the IHL field is limited. The CFSP 
remains an intergovernmental policy, where EU Member States wish to retain 
their sovereignty, a fortiori in the field of IHL, as it may entail the use of lethal 
force. Furthermore, there are no express references to IHL in the EU treaties. 
Hence, Member States chose to alter the language used in Common Article 
1 and to talk about an obligation to ‘promote compliance with IHL’ in the 
Guidelines. This choice of vocabulary seems to underline that implementing 
Common Article 1 remains primarily in the hands of EU Member States. Yet, 
this difference in the terminology does not correspond to the existing legal 
framework. Indeed, as Common Article 1 is a customary obligation, it directly 
binds the EU. Furthermore, adopting this language seems to elude that Com-
mon Article 1 stipulates an obligation of due diligence; therefore, nothing that 
the EU cannot do can be expected from it. It is required to act within the 
frame of its capacities, nothing more but nothing less. If one takes into account 
this element of the obligation to ensure respect, then it clearly appears that the 
EU is required to ensure respect for IHL at all times, but it will necessarily do 
so together with its Member States and in accordance with the corresponding 
division of competences and capacities.
This statement leads to the sixth point: The obligation to ensure respect 
applied to the EU highlights the necessity to understand the EU legal order 
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from a multilevel perspective. The EU is an autonomous subject of interna-
tional law, but it also expresses the common will of its Member States. There-
fore, for the sake of effectively ensuring respect for IHL, both the EU and 
national levels must work together and take upon the most appropriate tasks 
at their respective levels. This process reflects how multilevel constitutionalism 
constitutes an appropriate framework of analysis, as Common Article 1 has 
become an obligation of quasi-constitutional nature in the international legal 
framework, whose implementation is made possible at EU and domestic levels 
thanks to the provisions contained in primary law and in the Constitution 
respectively. It therefore highlights the existence of a common core at interna-
tional, EU, and national levels.
In this respect, the common expression of the – so far – 28 Member 
States feeds into a virtuous circle whereby Common Article 1 is reinforced 
as an international treaty obligation, and the international consensus on the 
matter is reaffirmed. The implementation of Common Article 1 leads to the 
improved respect for IHL at all times, before, during, and after the armed con-
flict. In turn, the EU projects itself as global leader through the externalization 
of its values, including IHL and thus reinforces its credibility as a territory 
where the rule of law and human rights ought to be protected. In this sense, 
the promotion of IHL on the international stage reflects the EU’s values and 
contributes to its constitutional ambition to be a global actor in human rights. 
At the same time, EU Member States fulfill their obligation to ensure respect 
for IHL as State parties to the Geneva Conventions. In light of these devel-
opments and in the presence of a general practice accepted as law, Common 
Article 1 is reinforced as an international customary obligation.
Seventh, the action of the three actors to ensure respect for IHL has reper-
cussions on the development of IHL. In this respect, it appears from State and 
EU practice that some aspects of IHL are particularly emphasized, such as the 
protection of civilians, the protection of women and children in armed con-
flict, or the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, thereby underlining 
the special importance of these elements in IHL. The areas where the three 
actors are most active thus gain visibility and their legal authority is reinforced.
Furthermore, the EU, France, and Spain contribute to the convergence 
of IHL and IHRL. This is reflected in the resort to human rights instruments 
at UN level to promote compliance with IHL or in the quasi-systematic asso-
ciation of these bodies of law in the declaratory policy of the three actors, 
especially the EU. At EU level, this approach is all the more relevant, since it is 
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through the vector of human rights that IHL has first been developed. In addi-
tion, both the EU and its Member States must take into account the ECtHR’s 
case-law, which has developed its own doctrine on the application of human 
rights to situations of armed conflicts. This approach certainly has advantages 
as well as drawbacks. On the one hand, it avoids having to determine the 
nature of the armed conflict and may fill in the gaps of IHL. It likewise helps 
ensuring that victims will not be left without a right to reparation for their 
damages. On the other hand, its practical application is difficult.
In addition, the EU, France, and Spain participate in the alignment of 
the legal regime of non-international armed conflicts on that of international 
armed conflicts. Indeed, the EU calls for the respect for IHL, most notably 
through its declaratory policy, regardless of the nature of the armed conflict and 
therefore participates in the creation of an opinio juris in this sense. International 
and domestic criminal law further contribute to this movement. France’s penal 
legislation enshrines the classification of war crimes established by the Rome 
Statute, thereby acknowledging that certain serious violations of IHL, occurring 
in non-international armed conflicts, may be tantamount to war crimes. The 
Spanish legislation goes even further as it provides for penal sanctions regardless 
of the nature of the armed conflict, thus aligning completely the legal regimes 
of international and non-international armed conflicts with regard to penal 
repression. Consequently, it can be sustained that the efforts of the three actors 
to develop international and domestic criminal law have indirectly impacted 
the development of IHL itself and contributed to its strengthened authority.
Lastly, IHL seems to be increasingly applied to the fight against terrorism. 
This is particularly clear within the frame of the Common Commercial Policy, 
as numerous international trade agreements refer to the respect for IHL in the 
clauses related to the fight against terrorism. This is an interesting develop-
ment insofar as political leaders have over-exploited the loopholes regarding 
the legal framework applicable to counterterrorism, resulting in denying the 
application of both IHL and IHRL. This will likely call for interesting devel-
opments within the EU as well, as European countries have suffered several 
terrorist attacks.
Eighth, despite these important developments and advances, there are 
serious limitations. Some of them are inherent in the legal system while some 
others depend on extra-legal considerations. In particular, it is difficult to assess 
the impact and effectiveness of the measures undertaken to ensure respect for 
IHL, especially those adopted to put an end to violations of IHL during an 
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armed conflict. In the same way, it seems difficult to induce non-State armed 
groups to respect IHL during the armed conflict.
Additionally, the question of double standards arises. The analysis of State 
and EU practice has shown that measures to ensure respect for IHL have been 
more systematic and constraining regarding some third States than others. This 
position may be justifiable in the cases where it seems that measures conducted 
in this sense will produce no effect. Nonetheless, it is also probably due to 
political rather than legal motives. This is deplorable from a legal– and moral – 
standpoint; but it is unfortunately inevitable. This statement is also applicable 
to the fight against impunity, insofar as the exercise of universal jurisdiction has 
been selective and in tension with geopolitical interests.
In the same line of argument, there are inconsistencies regarding what 
is promoted at external level and remaining issues at internal level, which 
in turn have an effect on the credibility of the three actors. The adoption of 
amnesty laws and the early reservations made to the Rome Statute by France 
with regard to the Algerian War of Independence highlight this duality. Similar 
inconsistencies are found outside of the scope of IHL, but they also have an 
impact on the credibility of the different actors in ensuring respect for IHL. 
This is the case, for example, of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, whose manage-
ment has negatively impacted the image of the EU and its Member States and 
challenged them as leaders in human rights. Therefore, coherence and consist-
ency are key to establish credibility.
On this basis, it is possible to address the following recommendations.
First, Member States and the EU should adapt the wording of the IHL 
Guidelines, so as to align it to the current state of international law. In particu-
lar, the Guidelines should appropriately reflect that the EU is bound by the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL on the basis of customary international 
law, so that it is subject to an obligation to ‘ensure respect’ for IHL.
Second, the EU could adopt a truly legally binding act, such as a Council 
Decision in which it commits to ensure respect for IHL. This document would 
replace the Guidelines and send out a strong message to the international 
community.
Third, it could extend the conditionality clause to all its partners and 
include explicitly the respect for IHL into it. In particular, no distinction 
should be made among third States in doing so.
Fourth, the EU should conduct ex ante and ex post assessments regarding 
the different measures implemented in response to violations of IHL, in order 
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to analyze their effectiveness. In the same line of reasoning, France and Spain 
should ensure that they effectively enforce the arsenal of tools at their disposal 
to ensure that they do not export arms to third countries involved in violations 
of IHL.
Fifth, France and Spain should consider invoking the responsibility of the 
States involved in armed conflicts and violating IHL before the ICJ on behalf 
of the international community as a whole, in accordance with the regime of 
State responsibility as established in ARSIWA.
Sixth, France and Spain should amend their legislation on universal juris-
diction over war crimes so as to align it with the provisions contained in the 
Geneva Conventions and in the Rome Statute. In this regard, it is particularly 
important to reconsider the reversal of the principle of complementarity and 
to enshrine the prior responsibility of State parties to prosecute all alleged 
perpetrators. Requiring that a request for extradition be made or that the ICC 
expressly declines its competence to activate the proceedings at national level 
contradicts the letter of the Geneva Conventions, which establish a primo prose-
qui, secundo dedere obligation.
Lastly, France should abolish the distinction between war crimes and 
délits, as it does not appropriately reflect the current state of international law.
On a final note, it should be stressed that despite the important above-men-
tioned inconsistencies, loopholes, and limitations, it is important to give vis-
ibility to the action of the three actors – and in general, of any international 
actor – in ensuring respect for IHL. This is an essential element for the proper 
enforcement of IHL, insofar as the lack of visibility in this field entails a certain 
attitude of resignation and apathy because there is a perception that noth-
ing is done and, more importantly, nothing can be done. This perception is 
quite dangerous, as it fuels the feeling of impunity, and therefore feeds into 
a vicious circle of non-compliance. Consequently, the efforts of the different 
actors of the international community should be encouraged and advertised, as 
reporting on compliance and efforts to ensure compliance is probably equally 
important as reporting on the violations of IHL.
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